JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya is owner of House No. D-39/26, Kodi Chauki in Varanasi Kanti Lal partner of Swastik Cycle Store, is a tenant in a garage of this house on a monthly rent of Rs. 25. He fell in arrears and, according to Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya, failed to pay the amount of arrears within a month of the service of a notice of demand. This notice was combined with a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy of Kanti Lal and requiring him to hand over vacant possession of the garage on expiry of thirty days. Kanti Lal did not vacate the garage so Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya had to institute Suit No. 1172 of 1969 against him both for recovery of the amount of arrears and ejectment of Kanti Lal. Apart from the ground that Kanti Lal was in arrears of rent, Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya also asked for his ejectment on the ground that he had created nuisance. 2. Kanti Lal resisted the suit and inter alia, pleaded that Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya was not the owner and thus landlord of the premises. And, also that no notice of demand or the one terminating the tenancy was served upon him as alleged. He denied that there was any nuisance committed by him entitling Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya to get a decree for his ejectment. The trial Munsif as well as the Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi, to whom the matter was taken in appeal (Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1972) took the view, on consideration of the evidence on record, that no notice making a demand of arrears of or terminating the tenancy of Kanti Lal was served upon Kanti Lal. The learned Additional Civil Judge upheld the claim of Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya that she was the owner-landlady of the premises reversing the decision of the trial Munsif to the contrary. Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya approached this Court in S.A. No. 3188 of 1972 seeking relief against Kanti Lal. On February 17, 1971, the appeal was allowed and the matter was sent back to the lower appellate Court for decision afresh on the question whether the notice aforesaid was served upon Kanti Lal in accordance with law or not. This Court was of opinion that the Addl. On February 17, 1971, the appeal was allowed and the matter was sent back to the lower appellate Court for decision afresh on the question whether the notice aforesaid was served upon Kanti Lal in accordance with law or not. This Court was of opinion that the Addl. Civil Judge had committed an error in taking the view that it was for plaintiff Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya to choose whether she would relay upon the statutory presumption on arising in her favour in the matter of service of notice upon Kanti Lal by the fact that the registered cover addressed to Kanti Lal had been received back with an endorsement from the postal authorities that Kanti Lal had refused to accept it. The Court explained the correct legal position in this respect by observing, in substance, that the matter should be examined by the lower appellate Court on the basis that there was a statutory presumption of law under Section 27 of the U.P. General Clauses Act to the effect that the refusal aforesaid amounted to service of notice upon Kanti Lal and that thereafter the burden of establishing that the said presumption stood rebutted, by the evidence on record lay upon Kanti Lal. The law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Dwarika Singh v. Rattan Singh Ahuja, 1969 ALJ 849; , and by a Full Bench in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 Allahabad 446; , was noticed by this Court in its judgment. 3. When the matter went back, the 3rd Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi, now heard the appeal, returned a conclusion that the notice was duly served upon Kanti Lal. Since that was the only question which was urged before him, the learned Judge decreed the suit for ejectment of Kanti Lal from the garage reversing the trial Court decree. This time Kanti Lal has sought redress from this Court in the present appeal. 4. The notice was sent by Smt. Kalyani Bhattacharya on August 16, 1969 through registered post. It was correctly addressed. Faqre Alam, postman, who took the notice for service entered the witness box as the plaintiff's first witness. He stated that when he showed the notice to the defendant, he was asked by the defendant to endorse thereon that he was out of town but he did not accede to this request. It was correctly addressed. Faqre Alam, postman, who took the notice for service entered the witness box as the plaintiff's first witness. He stated that when he showed the notice to the defendant, he was asked by the defendant to endorse thereon that he was out of town but he did not accede to this request. Instead, upon his refusal to accept the notice the fact it had been refused was endorsed by him in the presence of the defendant and that thereafter the cover was returned to the post-office. In cross-examination, the witness said that he could recognise the person who had refused to accept the notice and being asked to do so he pointed to Jaswant Lal a brother of Kanti Lal, defendant, as the person who had refused to accept the notice. The Civil Judge has taken the view that the failure of the postman to identify the defendant may have been occasioned due to the fact that he came across a large number of people in the course of his duty as a postman and was asked to identify the person who is said to have refused to accept the notice after a lapse of a year from the date on which refusal is alleged. 5. Kanti Lal entered the witness-box as D.W. 1 and said that he was not at Varanasi when the notice is said to have been tendered. He was lying ill in Madhya Pradesh and was under the treatment of a doctor in district Satna. He produced a medical certificate but did not produce the doctor. The Civil Judge found that the medical certificate did not bear the signatures of the patient and was not proved in accordance with law. The doctor who issued it also did not enter the witness-box. The learned Judge disbelieved the plea that Kanti Lal was not in Varanasi on the date when the notice was said to have been tendered to him. The doctor who issued it also did not enter the witness-box. The learned Judge disbelieved the plea that Kanti Lal was not in Varanasi on the date when the notice was said to have been tendered to him. Appearing on behalf of Kanti Lal, Sri R.N. Singh, his learned counsel, urged that the fact that the postman pointed to Jaswant Lal as the person to whom he had tendered the notice and who had refused to accept it was a conclusive circumstance to establish that the notice was never tendered to the defendant nor refused by him and as such the learned Civil Judge was in error in taking the view that Kanti Lal had failed to rebut the presumption of service of notice upon him. He further urged that the fact the notice was tendered to Kanti Lal's brother and was refused by him could not be treated in law to be a refusal of the notice by defendant Kanti Lal. This submission is founded upon an observation made by a Division Bench of this Court in Babu Ram and others v. State and another, 1971 ALJ 4, where it was observed in paragraph 10 of the report that : ".........There is no presumption, in our opinion, that a father and son even in a Joint Hindu Family, share the knowledge or the personality of each other or agents of each other for all purposes......" In that case the Court was examining the matter in a Criminal Revision against conviction of the applicants under Section 143 and 453 I.P.C. The case was that even after possession of the shop had been given to the complainant in execution of a decree, the accused persons retook possession. Babu Ram, the father was sought to be saddled with the consequence of the action of his son Mangal Sen in re-taking the possession. Another decision to which my attention was invited by Sri R.N. Singh was in the case of Chhedi Lal v. Mannu Sardar, 1982 Alld. RC 788; 1982 ALR 1*9 (Summary) in which N.D. Ojha, J. was called upon to decide whether service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by affixation could, in the circumstances of the case, be treated to be a valid service. RC 788; 1982 ALR 1*9 (Summary) in which N.D. Ojha, J. was called upon to decide whether service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by affixation could, in the circumstances of the case, be treated to be a valid service. The learned Judge found that there was no finding that any notice sent by post was served upon the applicant or that any notice had been tendered or delivered personally to the tenant or to one of his residence. In these circumstances, it was held that affixation as a mode of service could not be validly resorted to in view of the language of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which, inter alia, provides : "Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (fix such tender as delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." In Rangi Lal v. Laxmi Narain Gupta, 1984 Alld. RC 129, , I had to consider the question whether service of summons upon the son of the defendant at this shop could be held to be service upon the defendant. Dealing with the intendment of Order 5, Rule 12, C.P.C., I said that : "The clear intendment of this rule is that an effort should first be made to find out the defendant and serve him personally." and that "the mere fact that when the service official went to effect service, he found the son of the defendant sitting at the shop would not entitle him in the absence of any effort to seek and serve the defendant personally, to effect service upon the son." In the present case, the question is about service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and it is undisputed that service was sought to be effected by one of the modes contemplated by this provision, namely, by post. It is also undisputed that notice was sent by registered post and was correctly addressed to Kanti Lal. The notice was not accepted and the cover was returned with the endorsement of refusal made by the postman. It is also undisputed that notice was sent by registered post and was correctly addressed to Kanti Lal. The notice was not accepted and the cover was returned with the endorsement of refusal made by the postman. Can, in this situation, the service be treated to be sufficient ? Before the legal position is examined, it is worthwhile noticing that in paragraph 20 of the written statement it is acknowledged by Kanti Lal that Jaswant Lal was a partner of the firm. Also that in his cross-examination Kanti Lal said that Jaswant Lal was his brother and that when he had gone to Madhya Pradesh, Jaswant Lal was sitting at the shop and further that when the notice was tendered, Jaswant Lal was present at the shop. It may also be noticed that the case of Kanti Lal is that he was the partner of Swastik Cycle Stores along with Ummed Lal and Jaswant Lal and had taken the premises in question on rent "for the purpose of storing cycles, cycle parts and mobil oil etc." In this situation, the observations of a Division Bench in Manzoor Ali Usmani v. Mt. Lal Devi and another, AIR 1951 Allahabad 396, which are apposite, may be extracted. There it was said that :- "Coming to the third ground it appears that the notice to quit was sent by the plaintiff under a registered cover addressed to the defendant at the leased premises. It was taken by one of his servants who put the seal of the defendant upon the acknowledgement receipt and affixed his signature thereon. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this is no service upon the defendant. We are unable to agree with this. The defendant's servant was his agent and a service upon him is as effective as a service upon the defendant himself." Similarly, what has been said by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Balgovind Rastogi v. M/s Bhargava School Book Depot, AIR 1950 Allahabad 369, also merits a mention. We are unable to agree with this. The defendant's servant was his agent and a service upon him is as effective as a service upon the defendant himself." Similarly, what has been said by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Balgovind Rastogi v. M/s Bhargava School Book Depot, AIR 1950 Allahabad 369, also merits a mention. It was said that after the amendment of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, by amending Act 20 of 1929, the words "requiring the delivery or tender of notice to the lessee" personally or to one of his family or servants" did not apply to a notice sent by post, and that "the purpose of the amendment, evidently, was to make service by post an alternative provision for giving the notice under Section 106." In Matadin Sharma v. Upendra Sharma, AIR 1972 Patna 282, Sawar Ali, J., referring to the decision of the Privy Council in Harihar Banarji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 P.C. 102 and noticing the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mulchand Khurana, AIR 1956 Calcutta 537 observed that : "........where notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is properly addressed and sent by registered post, it would be presumed that the service of the notice has been legally effected. The mere fact that this physical delivery of notice was made to a person other than the addressee would not be of any consequence and would not affect the presumption of proper service." In Sami Ullah v. Mohammad Zahoor, 1979(5) ALR 435, Mahavir Singh, J., chose to reply upon the presumption arising under Section 114 of the Evidence Act when he said that 'where a composite notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was received by the son of the tenant the presumption would be that it was received on behalf of the tenant. 6. 6. In view of the circumstance that the notice, when tendered, was refused by Jaswant Lal, the brother of Kanti Lal, who was a partner of the firm Swastik Cycle Stores and that Kanti Lal had taken the garage on rent for the purpose of storing cycle, cycle parts and mobil oil etc., it cannot but be held that Jaswant Lal was an agent of Kanti Lal, etc., particularly, in view of the statement of Kanti Lal himself that when he was in Madhya Pradesh, Jaswant Lal sat in shop. Refusal of notice sent by registered post, duly addressed to Kanti Lal by Jaswant Lal would amount, in law, to refusal by Kanti Lal himself. The Court below was not in error in its conclusion, though for a different reason, that the notice was duly served upon the defendants. Its decree does not merit interference. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs.