JUDGMENT - DEO B.G., J.: - This judgment shall dispose of cri. Appeal No. 166/81 and Cr. Appeal No. 198/81 as in both these appeals common questions are involved. 2. In Cri. Appeal No. 166/81, the Corporation of City of Nagpur through its Food Inspector has challenged the order of acquittal passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class (Corporation), Nagpur dated 30-8-1980 in Cri. Case No. 4151/78 acquitting the respondent No. Smt. Prakash Kaur wife of Ratansingh Notey owner of Prakash Ice Bar Factory of the offence punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(i), (v) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 3. On 25-4-1978 at about 9.00 a.m. Food Inspector Shri Makde P.W. 1 visited the Ice Bar Factory of the respondent, found 50 kgs. yellow colour ice candy in stock for sale, gave warranty form under section 14-A, purchased 900 grams yellow ice candy from the ready stock, took the ice candy in a dry pot, gave intimation notice in form No. VI and paid 0.90 ps. to the accused as cost of the ice candy purchased. He divided the purchased ice candy into three parts, collected those parts in the bottles and after labelling and sealing the bottles and followed the other procedure, one sealed bottle alongwith original Form No. VII was sent to the Public Analyst in a sealed packet. The report Ex. 32 of the Public Analyst was received on 1-7-1978. The report is as follows: “I further certify that i have analysed the aforementioned sample and declare the result of my analysis as follows: Test for Saccharine - Positive Court - permitted colour present.” 4. The Food Inspector obtained the consent Ex. 33 from the Joint Commissioner, Food and Drugs for prosecution against the accused. The relevant portion of the consent Ex. 33 is as under: “.....having persued relevant papers hereby give consent for the prosecution of Shrimati Prakash Kaur Ratansingh Notey, Panchpaoli Road, Nagpur for offence alleged to have been committed by himself by manufacturing for sale, stocking for sale and selling yellow coloured Ice Bar in contravention of section 7 punishable under section 16 of the said Act.” 5. 33 is as under: “.....having persued relevant papers hereby give consent for the prosecution of Shrimati Prakash Kaur Ratansingh Notey, Panchpaoli Road, Nagpur for offence alleged to have been committed by himself by manufacturing for sale, stocking for sale and selling yellow coloured Ice Bar in contravention of section 7 punishable under section 16 of the said Act.” 5. Eventually, the respondent was prosecuted and the impugned order of acquittal was passed by the learned Magistrate, who relying on a Judgment of the Orissa High Court in (Bansbihari Pradhan v. Food Inspector, Puri Municipality)1, 1979 Cri.L.J. 23, came to the conclusion that as the Public Analyst has not determined the sugar in the sample of Ice Candy, and had determined the permitted colour and saccharin, it was frozen ice with a colour which is not a food and, therefore, the addition of saccharin in frozen ice was not an offence as held by His Lordship of Orissa High Court. 6. In this appeal, two questions are involved. The first relates to whether frozen ice permitted colour is food as defined under section 2(v) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the second is whether the consent given only for prosecution under section 7 of the Prevention of Foods Adulteration Act without specifying the particular offence out of a number of parts was an omnibus consent and was fatal to the prosecution. 7. So far as the first point is concerned, the learned Counsel for the respondent Shri Kanhe referred me to 1979 Cri.L.J. Note 23 (Orissa), 1978(II) F.A.C. page 105 (Babu v. Food Inspector)2, and 1980(II) F.A.C. Page 13 (Municipality, Jammu v. M/s. Glacier Cold Storage Ice Mill)3, while Mr. Shelat learned Counsel for the appellant relied on 1973 Cri.L.J. 1730 (State of Kerala v. Lakshmanan)4. 8. Their Lordships of the Orissa High Court in the aforesaid case had observed that there the accused was charged with storing adulterated ice-candy and the report of the Public Analyst showed that the ice-candy contained frozen ice and saccharin and no sugar, the articles alleged to be ice-candy cannot be said to be ice candy as defined in Item A.07.04 firstly because it did not contain sugar and secondly because there was no evidence to show that it was a produce out of frozen ice. In the instant case, there was not merely frozen ice but was a produce of frozen ice as it also contained colour although permitted. It is true that no sugar has been reported to have been analysed by the Public Analyst in the sample in question. Suffice it, however, to say that it was not merely froze ice but contained not only saccharin which is an artificial sweetener and which is totally prohibited for ice candy, but contained also colour to the permitted extent. 9. A Division Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Municipality, Jammu v. M/s.Glacier Cold Storage reported in 1980(II) F.A.C. page 13, while dismissing the appeal against the acquittal in a case of sample of ice observed in para 14 as under: “It is well known in chemistry that water has three forms - solid (i.e. ice), liquid (i.e. water itself) and vapours (i.e. water beyond the boiling temperature). The exemption granted to 'water' in section 2(v) of the Act would in our opinion extend to all the three forms of water.” 10. In the third case cited by the learned Counsel of the respondent in Babu v. Food Inspector, 1981(II) F.A.C. 106, a similar view has been taken by the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court observing inter alia that the sample of ice candy contained only water and no other ingredient and that, therefore, the conviction was set aside. 11. I have already observed that in the instant case, the sample of ice candy did not only contain saccharin but it also contained permitted colour. It was not a case of mere water plus saccharin. It is case of water plus saccharin plus colour. The question is whether this combination renders ice candy food within the meaning of section 2(v) of the Act. The entire question has been thrashed out by the Division Bench Ruling of Kerala High Court (which was not considered by the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court) reported in State of Kerala v. Laxmanan, 1973 Cri.L.J. 1730. 12. The question is whether this combination renders ice candy food within the meaning of section 2(v) of the Act. The entire question has been thrashed out by the Division Bench Ruling of Kerala High Court (which was not considered by the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court) reported in State of Kerala v. Laxmanan, 1973 Cri.L.J. 1730. 12. Food has been defined in section 2(v) of the Act as, “any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes - (a) any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of, human food, and (b) any flavouring matter or continent,” It follows, therefore, that any article generally used as food or drink other than drugs and water would come within the definition. In Appendix B of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (Rules for short) certain articles of food are mentioned which include ice candy at Item No.A.07.04. Rule 44(g) prohibits sale of any article of food which contains any artificial sweetener, except where such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standard laid down in Appendix B. Their Lordships were of the view that Appendix B did not contain an exhaustive list and the definition of food in section 2(v) would come into play irrespective of whether the said article of food is included or not in Appendix B. Their Lordships thus came to the conclusion that ice candy being an item expressly included in Appendix B was food within the ambit of this section and, therefore, was food. 13. Item No. A.07.04 as it was in force at the time when the sample of ice candy was collected in the instant case was as under:- “Ice candy, ice lollies or edible ices means the frozen ice produce, which may contain the permitted flavours, sugar, syrup, fruit, juices, cocoa, citric acid, stabilizers or emulsifiers not exceeding 0.5 percent by weight. It shall not contain any artificial sweetener.” 14. Rule 44(g) prohibits sale of articles of food which contain any artificial sweetener except where such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standard laid down in Appendix B Ice candy finds place in Appendix B. In the instant case, it was found to contain saccharin, which is prohibited. It shall not contain any artificial sweetener.” 14. Rule 44(g) prohibits sale of articles of food which contain any artificial sweetener except where such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standard laid down in Appendix B Ice candy finds place in Appendix B. In the instant case, it was found to contain saccharin, which is prohibited. It must be held, therefore, that the frozen ice which was found to contain colour and saccharin was an article of food which was in fact meant for human consumption and came within the mischief of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 15. What has been excepted from the definition of food under section 2(v) is water, which essentially means water in liquid form. The Legislature has advisedly not used the two other different forms of water in the exception in the definition contained in section 2(v) as the Legislature intended that frozen ice used as ice candy was not to be excluded from the definition. That is why ice candy or frozen ice which is coloured and flavoured and sweetened was considered as an article of food by the Legislature. 16. It is common knowledge that flavoured, coloured and sweetened ice candy is mostly consumed by the children of tender ages as articles of food and if ice candy is excluded from the mischief of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act that would defeat the very purpose of the Legislation and may bring the health of children mostly from weaker section of the society in jeopardy. Having, therefore, considered the various sections, including the definition of Item and the definition of Item No. A.07.04, I have come to the conclusion that frozen ice i.e. ice candy when it is coloured and flavoured becomes an item of food and becomes adulterated food if found to contain saccharin which is totally prohibited. 17. The next question to be considered is about the consent Exh. 33 obtained by the Food Inspector for prosecution of the respondent under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 17. The next question to be considered is about the consent Exh. 33 obtained by the Food Inspector for prosecution of the respondent under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Section 20(1) runs thus: “No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under section 14 or section 14-A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government.” (emphasis supplied). 18. What is required under section 20(1) is that a written consent has to be given for each offence under this Act and not for offences cumulatively. The consent in the instant case which has been already reproduced above has been given for selling yellow coloured ice bar in contravention of section 7 punishable under section 16 of the said Act without specifying the particular offence falling within one or other parts of section 7. A Division Bench of this High Court in (State of Mah. v. Jamnadas)5, 1981(II) F.A.C. 92, while maintaining the acquittal of the respondent in a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has observed in para 14 as under:- “If the sanction shows that all necessary papers and the report of the Public Analyst were placed before the concerned authority and were perused by him, that the particulars of the alleged offence are also found stated in the sanction, that the provisions of law the breach of which is complained of is also stated, then only because a reference to some unnecessary provisions of law is mentioned through mistake that should not ordinarily render the same invalid, nor can it be said that such a sanction was given only mechanically without any application of mind.” (emphasis supplied). 19. Their Lordships of the Division Bench were clearly of the view as can be gathered from the emphasized portion that a sanction in order to be held valid must contain particulars of the alleged offence. In other words, it should not be an omnibus consent. 20. In the instant case, it is the consent for prosecution under section 7 without reference to any particular, offence which falls under section 7. This High Court has taken a view that such omnibus consent is fatal to the prosecution. In other words, it should not be an omnibus consent. 20. In the instant case, it is the consent for prosecution under section 7 without reference to any particular, offence which falls under section 7. This High Court has taken a view that such omnibus consent is fatal to the prosecution. I may refer to a Single Bench ruling of this Court in (Nizamuddin v. State of Mah.)6, 1985(II) P.F.A. 88, wherein it has been held that it is expected of the sanctioning authority to mention while consenting for prosecution the one or two of the various types of adulteration as are described in section 2(ia)(a) and (m). 21. In the case of (State of Mah. v. Shantilal)7, reported in 1975 U.C.R. 409 this High Court has held that such an omnibus consent for prosecution under section 7 is totally defective and vitiate the trial. 22. This view also finds support in the observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1975(II) F.A.C. 331, (State of Bombay v. Purshottam)8. While considering the case of consent under section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Their Lordships in para 13 of the judgment have observed as under:- “In the second place, the sub-section itself contains an indication that the written consent is for the launching of a specified prosecution and not one “in favour of” of a complainant authorising him to file the complaint.” (Emphasis Supplied) 23. On the other hand, Mr. Shelat learned Counsel for the appellant contended that there is a difference between sanction and consent, that sanction stands on a higher pedestal and that a consent when accorded is for prosecution for the offences generally and need not, therefore, be specified. He also argued that consent implies an agreement with the consenting party and the person seeking consent and nothing more. He also referred to certain observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Dhansingh v. Saharanpur Municipality)9, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 318, regarding non-application of mind; A.I.R. 1961 S.C. Page 1, State of Bombay v. Parshottam on the question of authorities competent to grant consent and that non-specification of the complaint was not fatal. Both these authorities are directly not in point as to whether a specified offence is a necessary ingredient of consent as given in section 20(1). Both these authorities are directly not in point as to whether a specified offence is a necessary ingredient of consent as given in section 20(1). The section itself is clear as it refers to the offence while section 7 refers to different offices which can be committed in breach of the Act. In particular Shri Shelat invited my attention to a Single Bench Judgment of this Court in (State of Mah. v. J.B. Narwankar)10, 1978 Cri.L.J. 811. His Lordship in para 52 observed as under:- “It is pointed out that the sanction merely refers to section 7 without mentioned the definite clause of that section which was, in the opinion of the sanctioning authority, contravened. In this connection, a reference was also made to the definition of the expression 'adulterated' occurrings in section 2(i). It is pointed out that this clause contains several sub-clauses and, therefore, it was necessary for the Commissioner to specify as to under what particular clause these sample were said to have been adulterated. In my view this argument is not tenable...... There is obvious difference between 'consent' and 'sanction'. “Consent' implies mere concurrence or agreement whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person. Therefore, the conditions applicable in the case of 'sanction' would in my opinion not be applicable to a case where mere consent is required.” 24. The Division Bench ruling cited supra has already considered this fact and has come to a conclusion that specified offence must be mentioned in the consent under section 20(1) of the Act to render it a valid sanction. 25. Although the words 'sanction' and 'consent' are not synonymous, the difference in the two is only that of a degree. In both the cases consenting or sanctioning authority has to go through the papers submitted before it and to come to a conclusion whether prosecution is called for. In both the cases, the Authority has to consider as to which offence appears to have been made out prima facie on perusal of the papers produced before it. Reference, therefore, to a specified offence is absolutely necessary in both the cases and cannot be disposed with because the word, 'consent' is used in section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in place of 'sanction'. 26. In the instant case, the consent at Exh. Reference, therefore, to a specified offence is absolutely necessary in both the cases and cannot be disposed with because the word, 'consent' is used in section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in place of 'sanction'. 26. In the instant case, the consent at Exh. 33 is undoubtedly an omnibus consent inasmuch as only section 7 has been referred to without in particular mentioning the sub-section of section 7. In the result, the consent order does not in so many words specify the particular offence which was alleged to have been committed by the respondent. In such a situation, consent order must be held to be invalid vitiating the prosecution. 27. The consent order Ex. 33 in the instant case being invalid, the appeal fails. It was pointed out to me by Shri Kanhe, the learned Counsel for the respondent that there were a number of other breaches of mandatory rules committed by the Food Inspector while following the procedure. In particular he referred to the Public Analyst's report being in old form; for want of precaution to be taken by the Food Inspector while sending the sample to the Public Analyst and lastly there being no evidence to show that Public Analyst's report alongwith an intimation under section 13(2) was delivered to the respondent by the Local Public Health Authority. It is not necessary to go into all these lacunas now as the appeal fails on the ground of validity of the consent under section 20(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In the result, Cri. Appeal No. 166/81 is hereby dismissed. 28. It is necessary to reproduce the entire facts of Cr. Appeal No. 198/81 as in that case also sanction at Ex. 32 is defective. This was also a case of prosecution for the offence of manufacturing and stocking for sale and selling coloured ice candy. The consent was given at Ex. 32 for contravention of section 7 punishable under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It was also an omnibus sanction and prosecution, therefore, was vitiated in that case also. For the reasons sated above in Cr. Appeal No. 166/81, this appeal also fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed. -----