Judgment :- 1. The question raised in these revisions is, though short, an important one. The question is this:-Whether the debts barred by the law of limitation can be included within the purview of the "debts due" as mentioned in S.2(4) of Act 17 of 1977 (for short'the Act'). The court below has answered this question in the affirmative and hence the judgment debtor has filed these revisions. 2. Three decree holders have proceeded against this petitioner in execution for realisation of the decree debts due to them. In all the three execution petitions, the present petitioner had put forward a defence that he is a debtor coming within the purview of the Act and therefore claimed the benefit of the provisions of the Act. By a common order, the lower court has held that he is not a debtor because the total debt due from him exceeds Rs. 3,000/- which is the statutory limit In so holding the court below took the view that the time barred debts are not excludable from the total debts of the petitioner. 3. S.2(4) of the Act reads thus:-"Debtor" means any person whose annual income does not exceed three thousand rupees, from whom any debt is due, but does not include (1) Any person from whom debt or debts exceeding three thousand rupees (excluding interest) is or are due". (Sub clause (ii) is not material and hence omitted). The word "debts" in the said sub-section need not consist of the debts as defined in S.2 (3) of the Act. This proposition is not disputed in view of the decisions reported in Baby v. Sidharthan (1979 K.L.T. 869), Kunhiraman v. Kunhambu (1980 K.L.T. 297). But the crucial word is not "debt" alone, but the words "debts due". What is meant by that? The word "due" has a legal connotation. When that word is used in conjunction with any fees, toll, goods, or any other sum, its ordinary meaning is "payable" or "legally demandable", etc. It is true that a time barred debt is still a debt. The creditor is entitled in certain circumstances to appropriate the money received from his debtor even towards a debt barred by limitation. Similarly the time barred debt can be good consideration for a contract. It is true that a time barred debt is still a debt. The creditor is entitled in certain circumstances to appropriate the money received from his debtor even towards a debt barred by limitation. Similarly the time barred debt can be good consideration for a contract. In another instance, when a tenant is proceeded against for eviction in Rent Control proceedings, the tenant is liable to deposit the arrears of rent including that portion of rent which is barred as per the law of limitation (Muhamedkutty v. Ahamedkutty (1979 K.L.T. 539)). 4. The position would not have acquired this importance if the word "due" has not followed the word debt. When you say that a debt is due, it connotes that the debt is legally due to you and its repayment can be enforced through legal process. If the legal remedy is barred by any law, then, it cannot be said that it is a debt due. Such a pragmatic interpretation is warranted in this context where a beneficial legislation like Act 17 of 1977 is interpreted, for, a construction otherwise is likely to lead to preposterous consequences. Thus, when a person's debts are to be ascertained, no reasonable man is expected to make an exploration into distant past and to ferret out some record of an ancient debt the right to recover which had been barred decades ago. Sometimes a person might have had a pious obligation to discharge the debt contracted by his father or grandfather, or even great grandfather and such a debt would have been forgotten long ago even by the creditors. It would be touching on the fringe of absurdity to suggest that all such debts also will be allowed to be traced out in calculating the debts due from him. 5. In an early decision reported in 2 K.B. 307 (dated 22-5-1905), Darling, J has observed as follows: "When is the principal sum remaining due? It could only be due from the bankrupt, and ex hypothesis he has been discharged from all liability to pay the principal money. 5. In an early decision reported in 2 K.B. 307 (dated 22-5-1905), Darling, J has observed as follows: "When is the principal sum remaining due? It could only be due from the bankrupt, and ex hypothesis he has been discharged from all liability to pay the principal money. In my opinion, money can only be said to be due in a legal sense when it can be recovered in an action, and it is impossible to say that there can be anything due under this security when no money can be recovered by any legal process" The above observations are apposite in this context where the construction of the expression "debts due" is to be made in a context as this. Similar observation has been made by the Privy Council in the decision reported in Hansraj v. Dehra Dun M.E.T. Co. (A.I.R.1933 P.C. 63), while dealing with S.186 of the Companies Act, 1913. The relevant observations are quoted: "The words "any money due from him or from the estate of the person whom he represents to the company" in S.186 must be confined to money due and recoverable in a suit by the company and they do not include any moneys which at the date of the application could not have been so recovered". 6. While discussing the scope of S.4(h) of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (4 of 1938), Subba Rao, J (as he then was) has stated as follows in Janakiramayya v. Ranganayakamma (A.I.R.1953 Madras 174). "The first question depends upon the meaning of the word "due". Ordinarily, it means 'payable'. As a noun, it connotes an existing obligation. As an adjective, it means capable of being justly demanded, claimed as of right, payable". 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to the decision in New Delhi Municipality v. Kalu Ram (A.I R.1976 S.C.1637) where the word "payable" has been interpreted. Their Lordships have held that "the word 'payable' in S.7 of the said Act, in the context in which it occurs, means 'legally recoverable'; if the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable". (emphasis supplied) 8. Their Lordships have held that "the word 'payable' in S.7 of the said Act, in the context in which it occurs, means 'legally recoverable'; if the recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable". (emphasis supplied) 8. Even if the word "due" is capable of a different interpretation in a different context, what must be taken care of by the court is to give that interpretation which is consistent with the object sought to be achieved by the statute. I am aware that a similar word employed in S.60 of the Contract Act can give a different interpretation because the section itself provides so. In that Section "a creditor is permitted to apply the payment made by a debtor to any debt'actually due and payable to him from the debtor', whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits". It can be found that the word "due" is embodied in the said Section in a very wide perspective, embracing not only those debts the recovery of which are barred by any period of limitation but even other debts as well because the latter part of S.60 of the Contract Act contains the necessary intendments for such an interpretation. The object in making the scope of S.60 so wide is discernible from the context indicated in that section. But it may be unsound to import that meaning to the same word used in a different context by a statute for a different purpose altogether. As is observed by the Supreme Court in the New Delhi Municipality Cases (A.I.R.1976 S C.1637) (cited supra), the interpretation to be made is in respect of the context and for that the object for which the legislation is made has to be borne in mind. 9. Here when a debtor is sought to be protected by the legislature, the definition of that word used in Act 17 of 1977 should receive an interpretation which advances the protective limbs to those small debtors who are groaning under the burden of debt liabilities. The attempt must be to alleviate the agonies of those persons who are under the real threat of being proceeded against by their creditors by resort to legal proceedings. The attempt must be to alleviate the agonies of those persons who are under the real threat of being proceeded against by their creditors by resort to legal proceedings. Such persons need not worry about those debts whose recovery has become an impossibility due to the operation of the law of limitation. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, I am inclined to hold that the expression "debts due" in S.2 (4) of the Act does not take in those debts, the enforcement of the right to recover which has been barred by the law of limitation. 11. In the cases before me, the lower court has to take a decision whether the debts mentioned are really barred by the law of limitation as on the date of commencement of the Act 17 of 1977. For that matter, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his debts have become time barred. If the court finds, on such consideration, that the petitioner is a person from whom debts exceeding Rs. 3,000/- is or are due. then it has to be held that the petitioner is not a debtor, otherwise he is. Subject to the above observations, the impugned common order is set aside and the cases are remitted to the lower court for disposal afresh in accordance with the directions contained herein. No costs. Issue carbon copy of the order on usual terms. Allowed.