JUDGMENT - KANIA M.H., Actg.C.J.: - This is an appeal by the unsuccessful petitioners against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 2170 of 1984 filed by the appellants. 2. The facts necessary for the determination of the points arising in the appeal lie within a very narrow compass., The petitioners are the joint owners of a building known as Kavarana Building situated at Parel in Bombay. Respondents 1 and 2 are the State of Maharashtra and the Controller of Accommodation respectively. Respondent No. 3 is the allottee of the premises in question. It appears that Room No. 71 in the said building became vacant as a result of the judgment and order passed in Suit No. 873 of 1957 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. On the said room falling vacant, the appellants gave an intimation to the then Controller of Accommodation as required under the provisions of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (referred to hereinafter as the Land Requisition Act'). The predecessor of the 2nd respondent by an order dated 6th June, 1957 requisitioned the said premises comprising the said room No. 71 under section 6(4)(a) of the Land Requisition Act for a public purpose, viz., housing a homeless person. Thereafter by an order dated 19/20th June, 1957 the said premises were allotted to respondent No. 3 for the personal use of herself and her dependents normally residing with her. The appellants by their letter dated 2nd May, 1972 requested respondents 1 and 2 to derequisition the said premises but that request was turned down in August, 1972. A similar request was also rejected in March, 1981. Finally he appellants by their letter dated 15th March, 1983 once again wrote to respondent No. 2 seeking derequisitioning of the premises pointing out in the letter that the husband of the 3rd respondent was a Railway Officer and had been offered a Government flat and hence the premises in question should be derequisitioned. However, the said request was also turned down by respondent No. 2 on the ground that the Government had stopped derequisitioning of the premises as a matter of policy. The appellants, thereafter, filed the aforesaid Writ Petition challenging the validity of the said order of requisition or, alternatively the validity of the continuance thereof on several grounds. However, the said request was also turned down by respondent No. 2 on the ground that the Government had stopped derequisitioning of the premises as a matter of policy. The appellants, thereafter, filed the aforesaid Writ Petition challenging the validity of the said order of requisition or, alternatively the validity of the continuance thereof on several grounds. It is not necessary to refer to all these grounds because, from the impugned judgment, it appears that the only contention urged before the learned trial Judge by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants was that the order of requisition can never continue for an indefinite period of time and that an order os requisition, though valid at the inception, becomes invalid after a reasonable lapse of time. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the said premises were in the possession of respondent No. 3 right from 1957 under the said order of requisition passed by respondents 1 and 2 and that a sufficiently long period of time had gone to draw an inference that, though the requisition order might be valid at its inception, it had now become invalid in view of the lapse of such a long period of time. After briefly referring to several judgments, the learned trial Judge relying generally upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector)1, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1707, held that mere length of requisition by itself cannot be a ground for sitting aside the requisition order if the purpose of the requisition continues. The learned trial Judge dismissed the aforesaid writ petition. 3. Mr. Menezes, the learned Counsel for the appellants, has urged before us the same ground which he urged before the learned trial Judge, viz. that the requisition order in this case was for a public purpose of a temporary duration, namely, housing a homeless person, and that such an order could not last indefinitely but would automatically come to an end after a reasonable period of time. The order of requisition was made on 6th June, 1957 and the petition was filed about 27 years, after the said order of requisition had come into force. The order of requisition was made on 6th June, 1957 and the petition was filed about 27 years, after the said order of requisition had come into force. It may be mentioned here that in the affidavit in reply filed by respondents 1 and 2 it has been admitted that the previous requests for derequisitioning the said premises were turned down by respondents 1 and 2. The only material submission made in the affidavit is that there is a dearth of accommodation in Bombay and majority of Government servants do not have residential quarters of their own and, therefore, the life of the Land Requisition Act was extended from time to time. At the material time, the Land Requisition Act envisaged the allotment of premises, inter alia, to homeless persons and, therefore, the premises in question were allotted to respondent No. 3. 4. In our view, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1984(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)239 fairly covers the point raised in the petition before us. In that case the order of requisition was passed under the said Requisition Act viz. under section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 and it did not set out the public purpose for which the flat was requisitioned. The order was challenged, inter alia, on that ground and the challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court which held that it was not necessary that the order of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made. The requirement of law is that the requisition must be made for a public purpose and so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, it would be valid, irrespective of whatever such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not. From the perusal of the statements contained in paragraph 5 of the judgment it is clear that in the case before the Supreme Court the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made was in fact for housing a homeless person. From the perusal of the statements contained in paragraph 5 of the judgment it is clear that in the case before the Supreme Court the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made was in fact for housing a homeless person. The order was also challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in character and it cannot endure for an indefinite period of time and the order in question before the Supreme Court had ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. In the case before the Supreme Court a period of 30 years had elapsed after the order of requisition was made. It was pointed out by Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), who delivered the judgment of the Court, that the two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition, are totally distinct and independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The concept of acquisition has an air of permanence and finality in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership and must by its very nature be of a temporary duration. If requisitioning of property could legitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, the distinction between requisition and acquisition would tend to become blurred. It was further held that if the Government wants to take over a property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception, no order can be passed requisitioning the premises. The Supreme Court took the view that more than a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the order of requisition was made and hence, even if the order was valid when made, it ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. The Supreme Court took the view that more than a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the order of requisition was made and hence, even if the order was valid when made, it ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. Bhagwati, J. observed that it was not necessary for the Court to decide what period of time could be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an order of requisition in a given case, because that must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but observed that “whatever be the public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, the period of time for which the order of requisition may be continued cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years.” On the basis of this conclusion the Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court in the decision against which the appeal was filed. It was held that the requisition order could not survive any longer and the State Government was bound to revoke the order of requisition, derequisition the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from flat and to hand over vacant possession to the landlady. 5. In Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, (supra), the order challenged before the Supreme Court was passed under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provision) Act, 1947. In that case the order of requisition related to an area of 2521 sq.ft. on ground floor and 1677 sq.ft. on the mezzanine floor of a building situated at No. 7/1A-D, Lindsey Street, Calcutta, an important commercial locality of Calcutta, for the purpose of establishing main sales showroom of the West Bengal Handicraft and Development Corporation Limited. The contention of the petitioner, who challenged the order of requisition, was that from the beginning the State Government had the intention of keeping the said requisitioned premises permanently and the State Government had ample power to acquire the said property under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, at the time when the order of requisition was issued. In spite of having that power to acquire, the State Government resorted to requisition the premises with the intention of permanently acquiring the property in an indirect manner, and it was alleged that the power was not exercised bona fide. In spite of having that power to acquire, the State Government resorted to requisition the premises with the intention of permanently acquiring the property in an indirect manner, and it was alleged that the power was not exercised bona fide. On behalf of the respondents attention was drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in (Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra)3, 1969(1) S.C.R. 401, where it was held that there was no antithesis between the power to requisition and the power of compulsory acquisition under Land Acquisition Act. Neither of the two Acts contained any provision under which it could be said that if one was acted upon, the other could not be. In that case the Supreme Court had pointed out that the words “for any public purpose” in section 5(1) of the Bombay Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were wide enough to include any purpose of whatever nature and did not contain any restriction regarding the nature of that purpose. There was no limitation on the competent authority as to what kind of public purpose it should be for the valid exercise of its power of requisition nor did it confine the exercise of that power to a purpose which was of temporary nature. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki's case held that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was reconcilable with the aforementioned decision in H.D. Vora's case (supra). He pointed out that the only question which was argued in the case of Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra, (supra) was whether the order of requisition could be exercised for a permanent purpose. The order of requisition in that case was challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the order of requisition was made, namely, the rehabilitation of flood victims, was a permanent purpose and the order of requisition was, therefore, bad from its inception. It was that contention which was rejected by the Supreme Court. No question was raised before the Supreme Court in Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra as to whether an order of requisition can be continued for an indefinite duration. That argument was raised before the Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case (supra). It was that contention which was rejected by the Supreme Court. No question was raised before the Supreme Court in Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra as to whether an order of requisition can be continued for an indefinite duration. That argument was raised before the Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case (supra). After analysing the facts and the contentions in the case of H.D. Vora it was pointed out by Sabyasachi Mukharjee, J., that the principal decision in that case was that an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in character and cannot be allowed to continue for an indefinite length of time, because then it would tantamount to an order of requisition and would amount to a fraud on the exercise of the power of requisition, especially where there is no impediment in making the acquisition. It was held that the correct enunciation of the law in H.D. Vora's case was not in any way in conflict with what was laid down in the case of Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra which merely took the view that an order of requisition can be made for a permanent purpose. In view of this it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that there was no contradiction between the decision in Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra, and the later decision in H.D. Vora's case (supra). After analysing decisions in both the cases, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., observed: “.. In view of this it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that there was no contradiction between the decision in Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra, and the later decision in H.D. Vora's case (supra). After analysing decisions in both the cases, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., observed: “.. the correct position in law would be that it will not be correct to say that in no case can an order of requisition for permanent purpose be made but in a situation where the purpose of requisitioning the property is of a permanent character and where the Government has also the power and the opportunity to acquire the property or a part thereof especially upon the fulfilment of the conditions of section 49(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended by the West Bengal Act) to the extent applicable, if the Government chooses not to exercise that power nor attempts to exercise that power to achieve its purpose, then that will be bad not because the Government would be acting without power of requisition but the Government might be acting in bad faith....” Thus the decision of the Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumar's case in no manner runs contrary to the decision in H.D. Vora's case in so far as that decision took the view that where an order of requisition is made for a temporary purpose, like housing a homeless person, such an order could not last or continue beyond a reasonable period of time. In the present case, we find that the order of requisition was made over 27 years prior to the filing of this petition and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case, it is not possible to say that a reasonable time has not elapsed since the making the order of requisition. Respondent No. 1 and 2 have not in their affidavit brought on record any special circumstances which would lead to a conclusion, even if such a conclusion were possible in law in spite of the said decision of the Supreme Court, that in this case the period of 27 years can be regarded as a reasonable period for the order of requisition to continue. As far as respondent No. 3, the allottee, is concerned, she has not filed by affidavit at all. Mr. As far as respondent No. 3, the allottee, is concerned, she has not filed by affidavit at all. Mr. Nilkantha, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, has fairly stated that he had nothing to say except that mercy should be shown to respondent No. 3. In our view, therefore, the learned Judge was, with respect, in error in relying on the observations in the case of Jiwani Kumar's case for coming to the conclusion that, merely because the purpose for which the premises were requisitioned continued, the order of requisition continued to remain valid. In fact, we may point out that, in our prima facie view, the learned Judge was in error even in coming to the conclusion that the purpose for which the premises were requisitioned still continues merely on the basis that respondent No. 3, the allottee still lives in the said premises with the members of her family. It might be that respondent No. 3 was a homeless person at the time when the order of requisition was made but, in view of the allegations made by the petitioner which have not been controverted in any affidavit, there is no material on which one could come to the conclusion that respondent No. 3 was unable to acquire premises of her own in spite of reasonable efforts. On that ground also the order of the learned trial Judge appears to be clearly erroneous. 6. It may be mentioned that our attention was drawn to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court comprising K. Madhava Reddy, C.J. and S.M. Daud, J., in Writ Petitions Nos. 102 and 922 of 1985 delivered on July 31, 1985, we do not consider it necessary to discuss that judgment in detail because the view taken in that judgment in no way conflicts with the view which we have taken and, in fact, lends some support to our conclusions. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order impugned are set aside and there will be an order directing respondents 1 and 2 to cancel or withdraw the order of requisition date 6th June, 1957 and to derequisition the premises and hand over vacant possession of the same to the appellants. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order impugned are set aside and there will be an order directing respondents 1 and 2 to cancel or withdraw the order of requisition date 6th June, 1957 and to derequisition the premises and hand over vacant possession of the same to the appellants. In view of the fact and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the possible difficulties of respondent No. 3, although she has not even cared to appear, we direct that this order shall not be executed for a period of one year from today. The respondents 1 and 2 to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. Appeal allowed. -----