G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitioners involve common questions of law and facts and were heard together at the request of the learned advocates for both the sides. They are disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) SOME of these petitioners are filed by Lariwalas Gallawalas and Patharanawalas themselves; while remaining petitions have been filed by the Associations representing their members who are either Lariwalas or Gallawalas or Patharanawalas. They are either from the city of Ahmedabad or Baroda or Surat. Gallawalas are persons who have put up Gallas i. e. cabins or stalls for selling their goods or articles. Lariwalas sell their goods or articles by keeping them in their laries i. e. hand-carts with four wheels. Patharnawalas sit on the ground and spread their goods or articles in their front for selling them. All these Lariwalas Gallawalas and Patharnawalas (who will be hereafter collectively referred to as the hawkers for brevitys sake) except the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2194 of 1982 who has put up his Galla in a plot belonging to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation occupy parts of public streets or roads including foot-paths. The municipal and/or police authorities often remove their Laries and Gallas or Patharanas together with the goods or articles contained therein on the ground that they cause encroachments over public streets and obstructions to the pedestrians and vehicular traffic. The petitioners have therefore filed these petitions for a declaration that the respondents have no power or authority to remove and take away their Laries or Gallas or the goods and that Sections 230 and 231 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 (hereafter referred to as the B. P. M. C. Act) authorising the municipal officers to take such an action are violative of their fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. They have also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from acting in that manner. ( 3 ) THE case of the petitioners as it appears from the petitions is that they are poor persons and earn their livelihood by selling petty articles useful to the general public. As they are poor they cannot afford to have shops; and out of economic compulsion and/or necessity they are required to occupy parts of public streets or roads and mostly foot-paths only. As they are poor they cannot afford to have shops; and out of economic compulsion and/or necessity they are required to occupy parts of public streets or roads and mostly foot-paths only. They have to be in those localities and places where people are likely to collect or go for purchasing their requirements. For various reasons they cannot go on moving from place to place and they have to keep themselves stationary at fixed places. Under these circumstances removal of their Laries Gallas or goods results into deprivation of their means of livelihood; and thus their fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution are violated. It is also their case that it is an obligatory duty of the respondent Corporations to make reasonable and adequate positions for construction and maintenance of public markets. It is also the duty of the State to secure to its citizens right to an adequate means of livelihood. As the State and the respondent Corporations have failed to provide adequate market places they have no right or authority to remove their Gallas or Laries or goods and therefore they should be restrained from doing so till a reasonable and adequate provision is 619 made in that behalf. It is also their case that the respondent Corporations give them hawkers licences and therefore they are entitled to keep their Laries and Gallas stationary so long as they do not cause real and substantial encroachments or obstructions to the pedestrians and vehicular traffic. It is also their case that the municipal and police authorities remove their Laries or Gallas together with their goods in an arbitrary manner; and so long as suitable rules regulating their powers and prescribing reasonable procedure are framed their actions should be regarded as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It may be stated that some of the points taken by the hawkers of Ahmedabad have not been taken by the hawkers of Baroda and Surat. ( 4 ) ON the other hand the case of the respondent Corporations is that admittedly these hawkers sit at fixed places and they occupy parts of public streets or roads including foot-paths. They thereby not only commit encoroachments over public properties but also obstruct members of general public who have a right to pass and re-pass over those streets or roads freely. They thereby not only commit encoroachments over public properties but also obstruct members of general public who have a right to pass and re-pass over those streets or roads freely. While conceding that everybody has a right to live and earn his livelihood it is the case of the respondent Corporations that the hawkers have no fundamental right to carry on any trade or business by encroaching upon properties of others or upon public streets. Individual rights of the petitioners or a class of persons like the petitioners cannot be permitted to defeat or destroy the rights of the public as a whole. They have pointed out that the number of hawkers is so large and the obstruction which they cause to the pedestrians and vehicular traffic has not only assumed serious proportions but it often results into danger or threats to the lives or personal safety of the members of the general public using the said streets or roads. The respondent Corporations have denied that they are not making reasonable and adequate provisions for public markets. They have pointed out that consistent with their means suitable provisions have been made and are being made by them in that behalf. They have also denied that actions are taken by their officers in an arbitrary manner. It is also pointed out by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation that pursuant to the suggestion made by this Court it has framed a scheme whereunder areas which can be conveniently allocated to hawkers within the city of Ahmedabad have been earmarked and that many hawkers have been allotted fixed places. It is also pointed out by the respondent Corporations that hawkers licences are freely given and the respondents are not taking any action against those persons who keep their Laries moving and do not keep them stationary at fixed places. No action is taken against them even if they keep their Laries stationary for reasonable time. ( 5 ) DURING the course of hearing of these petitions none of the learned advocates for the petitioners except Mr. No action is taken against them even if they keep their Laries stationary for reasonable time. ( 5 ) DURING the course of hearing of these petitions none of the learned advocates for the petitioners except Mr. Memon contended that the hawkers have a fundamental or a legal right to carry on their business on public roads or streets and that Sections 230 and 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act are ultra vires Articles 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution though in some of the petitions such a contention has been vaguely raised. Even Mr. Memon did not press this contention at the time of hearing of these petitions in view of the decision of this Court in Palaji Amraji and others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and others 22 G. L. R. 783 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pyare Lal v. Delhi Municipality A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 133 In Palajss case some hawkers of Ahmedabad without specifically 620 saying that it was their fundamental right had raised a contention before this Court that they had a right to keep their Laries and Gallas parked at fixed places in order to enable them to carry on their business. That contention was rejected by the Court and it was held that Lariwalas and Gallawalas have no right to keep their Laries or Gallas parked at a particular place. Against this decision the petitioners in those petitions had preferred Special Leave Petitions Nos. 39 to 49 100 to 105 and 356 to 361 of 1981. Those Special Leave Petitions were rejected by the Supreme Court by its order dated 21-1-1981. While rejecting those petitions the Supreme Court observed: In view of the fact that the stalls cannot be constructed in contravention of the provision of the aforesaid Act the S. L. P. s and the writ petitions must fail and are dismissed. In Pyare Lals case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that it cannot be said that the persons in India have a lawful right to pursue street trading and such trading may be regulated but not altogether prevented. ( 6 ) ON this point we have now two more decisions of the Supreme Court viz. In Pyare Lals case (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that it cannot be said that the persons in India have a lawful right to pursue street trading and such trading may be regulated but not altogether prevented. ( 6 ) ON this point we have now two more decisions of the Supreme Court viz. Bombay Hawkers Union and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others (1985) 3 S. C. C. 528 and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 S. C. C. 545. In Bombay Hawkers Unions case the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar contention has observed as under:"we would however like to add that there is no substance in the challenge because the right conferred by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution to carry on any trade or business is subject to the provisions of clause (b) of that Article which provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of Article 19 (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. The affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents show in unmistakable terms that the impugned provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act are in the nature of reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public on the exercise of the light of hawkers to carry on their trade or business. No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public streets by their very nomenclature and definition are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying of the private trade or business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the centre of busy thorough fares thereby paralysing all civic life. Indeed that is what some of them have done in some parts of the city. They have made it impossible for the pedestrians to walk on foot-paths or even on the streets properly so called". Indeed that is what some of them have done in some parts of the city. They have made it impossible for the pedestrians to walk on foot-paths or even on the streets properly so called". Though the challenge in the said petitions was to the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 and the challenge in these petitions is to the relevant provisions of the B. P. M. C. Act the aforesaid observations would apply with equal force. ( 7 ) IN Olga Telliss Case (supra) the Supreme Court had to consider the challenge to Sections 312 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 (hereafter referred to as the B. M. C. Act) on the ground that they are invalid as violating Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution by the pavement dwellers of Bombay. After considering the impact of Articles 39 (a) and 41 of the Constitution 621 on the meaning and content of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 the Supreme Court held that the right to life includes right to livelihood it being an integral component of the right to life. It also held that if any person is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law he can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21. Even after giving such a wide a interpretation the Supreme Court observed that footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to Serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security That facility which has matured into a right of the pedestrians cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements The Supreme Court then held that no one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose and that if a person puts any public property to use for which it is not intended and is not authorised so to use it he becomes a trespasser. Thus the Supreme Court has in terms held that no proson has a right to encroach by erecting a structure or otherwise on foot-paths pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for public purpose and that the provision contained in Section 314 of the B. P. M. Act. Act is not unreasonable or ultra vires Article 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution though Sections 229 230 and 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act are not Verbatim the same as corresponding sections of the B. P. C. Act the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision would equally apply to the present case also. ( 8 ) IN view of these decisions we hold that the hawkers have no fundamental or legal right to occupy parts of public streets for doing their business and that Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act is not ultra vires Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) THE petitioners had also made an attempt to spell out the right claimed by them by relying upon Article 39 of the Constitution 3nd Sections 63 and 66 of the B. M. P. C. Act. Article 39 casts a duty on the States to direct-their policies towards securing to all citizens an adequate means to livelihood and to see at the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Section 63 of the B. P. M. C. Act provides for the obligatory dudes M the Corporation governed by the Act. Sub-section (12) inter alia provides for making a reasonable and adequate provision for the construction or acquisition and maintenance of public markets Section 66 specifies the matters which may be provided for by the Corporation at its discretion. Sub-section (12) thereof authorises the Corporation to provide for any measure likely to promote public safety health convenience or instruction. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that it is the duty of the respondent Corporadons to make adequate and reasonable provision for public markets so that even poor persons like hawkers can go there sell their goods and earn their livelihood. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that it is the duty of the respondent Corporadons to make adequate and reasonable provision for public markets so that even poor persons like hawkers can go there sell their goods and earn their livelihood. So long as such facilities are not provided these obligatory duties create a corresponding right in favour of the hawkers to occupy places where they can sell their goods and earn their livelihood. The purpose of enacting Section 63 and 66 of the B. P. M. C. Act is to specify the function 622 which the Corporation are required to perform or may perform. By enacting such provisions the intention of the Legislature could not have been to confer such a right as claimed by the hawkers. It really becomes difficult to appreciate how these obligations can create a right in favour of the hawkers to do their business in such a manner as to perma trespass won public property and to cause obstruction to predestrians and vehicular their and defeat their rights. If the Corporations have failed to discharge their obligatory duties a citizen at the highest can appropriate Court for compelling the Corporation to discharge those duties. But that can never confer on a citizen a right as claimed by the petitioners. The decitions of the Supreme Court referred to above also support this view. ( 10 ) IT was next urged that the hawkers have a right to five which includes right to livelihood and it that purpose out of economic necessity and compulsion and in absence of any other alternative they are entitled to occupy parts of public streets for carrying on their business. So long as the Corporations do not provide adequate market places it would be neither proper nor just on their part to remove the Laries and Gallas of the hawkers. This is nothing but an attempt to enter by the backdoor under the pretext of poverty economic compulsion and humanitarian considerations. It is no doubt true that the respondent Corporations are under an obligation to provide adequate markets but they are required to discharge their obligations according to their means and along with other equally or more important obligations. This obligation of providing adequate markets cannot be viewed in isolation. Except some hawkers of Ahmedabad represented by Mr. It is no doubt true that the respondent Corporations are under an obligation to provide adequate markets but they are required to discharge their obligations according to their means and along with other equally or more important obligations. This obligation of providing adequate markets cannot be viewed in isolation. Except some hawkers of Ahmedabad represented by Mr. Memon no officer petitioner has thought it fit to point out what are the financial resources and other budgetory provisions of the respondent Corporations. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has tried to meet this submission by filing an affidavit dated 11-3-1985 of As Director of Estate and Tow Planning wherein it is pointed out what provisions the Municipal Corporation has made so far in order to discharge its obligation. In Annexure to the said affidavit it has given the list of Municipal markets shops and big stalls provided by the Corporation in the city of Ahmedabad. It has also pointed out what further provisions are being made and which are in contemplation It is also pointed out that pursuant to the suggestion made by the Cost a scheme has been framed by the Corporation and number of sites in different parts of the city are set apart where the hawkers an keep their Laries and Gallas and carry on their business. It is also pointed out their according to the standards prescribed by the Town and Country Planning Organisation of the Government of India New Delhi the normal requirement is 12 to 14 shops per population of 1000 people. It has also been pointed out that in the city of Ahmedabad as many as 1 15 0 shops have been registered; and on the basis of present population approximately 25 lakhs in the city the average works out to more than 40 per 1000 prsons as against the norms prescribed by the Tow and Country Planning Organisation of the Government of India. In view of what has been pointed out by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and in absence of any other material before us it is not possible to hold that the respondent Corporations have unreasonably failed to discharge their obligations and therefore it would not be proper and judgment 623 on their part to prevent the hawkers from occupying parts of public streets for doing their business. It should also be remembered that public streets are meant for the use of public as a whole and they are public properties. Sub-section (19) of Section 63 makes it an obligatory duty of the Corporation to remove obstruction and projections in or upon any public street or any public place. Section 67 of the Bombay Police Act also casts an obligation on the police authorities to prevent obstruction on public streets and also to prevent the infraction of any rule or order made under the said Act or any other law in force for observance by the public in or near the streets. It is really in order to discharge this obligation that power has been conferred by Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act on the Corporation and its officers to remove encroachment and obstruction. Even the Corporations have no right or authority to use public streets in any other manner. It should therefore follow that whenever it becomes known to the respondent Corporations and the police authorities that any encroachment or obstruction prohibited by the B. P. M. C. Act or the Bombay Police Act has been committed it becomes their duty to exercise their powers of removing the same for the common good. Such powers can never be made conditional upon fulfilment of other obligations to the satisfaction of the members of public. ( 11 ) HEAVY reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in M. A. Pal Mohd. v. R. K. Sadarangani A. I. R. 1985 Madras 23 to point out that the hawkers trade so long as it is regulated in a proper manner by concerned public authorities could never be a public nuisance; and that general public by and large are not only attracted by this type of trade but look forward to it for more than one reason. In that case it has been observed that if regulatory measures are introduced bearing in mind the requirements of the public of free access public hygiene public safety and the like they case also prosper and the general public will thereby be benefited. In that case it has been observed that if regulatory measures are introduced bearing in mind the requirements of the public of free access public hygiene public safety and the like they case also prosper and the general public will thereby be benefited. If specific plots are allotted and they are confined to those portions there could be no conceivable objection for such a lawful trade to be carried out particularly when it would provide an honest livelihood for those who have meagre capital but have a keen desire to carry on trade. On regulatory measures introduced it could never be a public nuisance. The Madras High Court was concerned with the Act which gave the Corporation of Madras City a right to lease out road sides and street margins. No such provisions is to be found in the Act with which we are concerned. That apart the question which has been raised before us is quite different from the one which was raised before the Madras High Court. In view of the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court on the point it also becomes doubtful if the view taken by the Madras High Court can be said to be correct. For all these reasons the second contention raised by the petitioners must also fail. ( 12 ) IT was then urged that in order to accommodate the hawkers a scheme should be framed by the respondent Corporations whereby certain portions of public streets can be set apart for the use of the hawkers; and till that is done the respondent Corporations their officers and servants should be prevented from exercising their powers under Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act. For the reasons already stated the power of the Corporations and their officers cannot be 624 restricted and made conditional in this manner. If the respondent Corporations have a desire to frame schemes whereby certain portions can be me earmarked for the hawkers without causing substantial obstruction to the pedestrians and vehicular traffic it is open to them to do so. But that can ever be a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act. This contention also therefore must be rejected. But that can ever be a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act. This contention also therefore must be rejected. ( 13 ) NEXT contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that neither the officers nor servants of the respondent Corporations nor the police authorities can remove the lorries or Gallas of the petitioners together with the articles and goods contained therein without giving them a prior notice. ( 14 ) IN support of this contention reliance was sought to be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis case (supra) where the Supreme Court speaking through Chandrahud C. J. (as he then was) ruled that eviction of pavement dwellers would lead to deprivation of the livelihood and consequently the deprivation of life. The Court however cautioned that the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty and the impugned legislation would be beyond the pale of challenge under Art. 21 if it permits deprivation according to the procedure established by law which must be reasonable just and fair. In the context of the challenge to the action of the Bombay Municipal Corporation in Olga Tellis case (supra)) on the ground that the procedure prescribed under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is reasonable and not violative of Art. 21 on the ground of procedural unreasonableness and no person by erecting structures or hutments on pavements and in places near High Way in encroachment can claim it as a matter of right on the ground of right to life conferred under Art. 21 of the Constitution howsoever compelling the necessity may be. Rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the pavement dwellers that Section 314 in so far as it empowers the Corporation to remove encroachment from pavements without notice is arbitrary and unreasonable the Supreme Court held as under:"40. . Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has therefore to be tested by the application of two standards: The action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly it must be reasonable. . Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has therefore to be tested by the application of two standards: The action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly it must be reasonable. If any action within the scope of the authority conferred by law is found to be unreasonable it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. . . "43 In the first place footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility which has matured into a right of the pedestrians cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. . . . Public streets of which pavements form a part are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and even the pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does 625 not transgress the limited purpose for which pavements are made his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. But if a person puts any public property to a use for which it is not intended and is not authorised so to use it he becomes a trespasser. . . 44 The challenge of the Petitioners to the validity of the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is directed principally at the procedure prescribed by Section 314 of that Act which provides by clause (a) that the Commissioner may without notice take steps for the removal of encroachments in or upon any street channel drains etc. By reason of Section 3 (w) street includes a causeway footway or passage. In order to decide whether the procedure prescribed by Section 314 is fair and reasonable we must first determine the true meaning of that Section because the meaning of the law determines its legality. By reason of Section 3 (w) street includes a causeway footway or passage. In order to decide whether the procedure prescribed by Section 314 is fair and reasonable we must first determine the true meaning of that Section because the meaning of the law determines its legality. If a law is found to direct the doing of an act which is forbidden by the Constitution or to compel in the performance of an act the adoption of a procedure which is impermissible under the Constitution it would have to be struck down. Considered in its proper perspective Section 314 is in the nature of an enabling provision and not of a compulsive character. It enables the Commissioner in appropriate cases to dispense with previous notice to persons who are likely to be afflicted by the proposed action. It does not require and cannot be read to mean that in total disregard of the relevant circumstances pertaining to a given situation the Commissioner must cause the removal of an encroachment without issuing previous notice. The primary rule of construction is that the language of the law must receive its plain and natural meaning. What Section 314 provides is that the Commissioner may without notice cause an encroachment to be removed. It does not command that the Commissioner shall without notice cause an encroachment to be removed. Putting it differently Section 314 confers on the Commissioner the discretion to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without notice. That discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner so as to comply with the constitutional mandate that the procedure accompanying the performance of a public act must be fair and reasonable. We must lean in favour of this interpretation because it helps sustain the validity of the law. . . 45 It must further be presumed that while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice the Legislature intended that the power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases no departure from the audi alteram partem rule (Here the other side) could be presumed to have been intended. Section 314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule. . . . In all other cases no departure from the audi alteram partem rule (Here the other side) could be presumed to have been intended. Section 314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule. . . . The Court also ruled out the contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that the compliance with the principles of natural justice would have made no difference since the non-observance by itself is prejudicial to an aggrieved person. The Court said that normally it would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford an opportunity to the Petitioners to show cause why the encroachment committed by them should not be removed but the Court did not think fit to issue a writ since the opportunity was aiforded by the Court in ample measure 626 of hearing both the sides elaborately and particularly because the Court was inclined no grant some time to the pavement dwellers by directing the Corporation to remove them after the specified date. Having regard to the settled legal position we are of the opinion that the Corporations in different cases with which we are concerned in this group of petitions except in respect of the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2194/82 were justified in taking the action. None of the petitioners has put any other defence except that no action should have been taken against them on humanitarian consideration. We have heard all the learned Advocates of the respective petitioners and also the learned Advocates for the Corpotions. It is quite apparent from the material on record that besides committing encroachment the petitioners were causing obstruction to the pedestrian and vehicular traffic in most of the cases in the heart of the cities. It is difficult for us to agree with the learned Advocates for the petitioners that there was no justification for the Commissioner to act immediately in the matter without giving opportunity to these street-traders. It is difficult for us to agree with the learned Advocates for the petitioners that there was no justification for the Commissioner to act immediately in the matter without giving opportunity to these street-traders. We have heard the learned Advocates for the petitioners at length in context of the merits of each case and we are of the opinion that any inaction or delay in such cases on the part of the Commissioner would create not only a serious traffic problem by causing obstructions to the vehicular and pedestrian traffic but also could have resulted in serious safety problems to the citizens on the footpath and the road and also persons travelling in Municipal bus transport or private vehicles. In the circumstances therefore we reject the contention about the violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 15 ) IT was then urged by Mr. Memon that so long as proper rules or guidelines are framed by the respondent Corporations with respect to taking away and return of lorries galas and the articles contained therein the municipal authorities should be prevented from taking any action against the hawkers and from removing them from the respective places of their business or trade. He pointed out that while dismissing Special Leave Petition No. 39 of 1981 and others and Writ Petition No. 33 of 1981 and others on 21-2-1981 the Supreme Court had directed the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to frame appropriate rules for the disposal and return of goods and articles dealt with under Section 231 (C) of the B. P. M. C. Act. But Mr. Panchal for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation submitted that pursuant to the said directions the respondent Corporation has framed the rules and they are published in the Gujarat Government Gazette on 3-6-1982. We find that the said rules do provide for giving of receipts in respect of lorries gallas and articles contained therein which are removed by the municipal authorities. All these articles are returned to the respective owners on payment of prescribed charges. It therefore cannot be said that the respondent Corporation has not provided reasonable procedure for removal storage and return of the goods and articles dealt with under Section 231 (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act. All these articles are returned to the respective owners on payment of prescribed charges. It therefore cannot be said that the respondent Corporation has not provided reasonable procedure for removal storage and return of the goods and articles dealt with under Section 231 (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act. When the attention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners was drawn to these Rules only grievance which they could make was that the storage facilities are not adequate; and sometimes lorries goods and articles are staked above each other with the result that they get damaged. Merely because of such occasional events it cannot be said that no rea 627 sonable procedure has been prescribed by the Municipal Corporation. As and when such events take place in breach of the aforesaid rules the person concerned can obviously take appropriate action against the respondent Corporation or its employees. But that cannot be canvassed as a ground for holding that the rules framed by the respondent Corpora-tion are either inadequate or unreasonable. ( 16 ) LASTLY a grievance was made by the hawkers of Ahmedabad that the scheme framed the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation is not adequate and no proper steps are taken for implementing the same. The petitioners have made only general and vague allegations in this behalf and in view of what has been stated in the reply affidavit Sled by the respondent Corporation it is not possible for us to say that it has not taken any steps for implementing the said scheme. Surat Municipal Corporation has also framed a scheme pursuant to the directions given by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1885 of 1582 on December 22 1983 But neither the Corporation nor the hawkers are sated with it Baroda Municipal Corporation has also taken some Steps but it cannot be said that it has framed a where such can be regarded as proper and adequate. However we are of the opinion that if the following directions are given in the matter to the respondent Corporations before us it will not only serve the ends of justice but on also save public time and costs. However we are of the opinion that if the following directions are given in the matter to the respondent Corporations before us it will not only serve the ends of justice but on also save public time and costs. ( 17 ) THE respondent Corporations are directed to evolve scheme with such modifications as may be necessary having regard to the over-all local conditions in the area under the jurisdiction of the respective respondent municipal corporation on the municipal of the scheme as modified and approved by the Supreme Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 S. C. C. 528. The respondent Corporations are directed to frame of the scheme within three months from the dated of the receipt of the writ from this Court and gradually implement the same within the time-limit that may be specified by the Corporations. The petitioners shall be at liberty to move the respective Corporation for some interim protection till the scheme is framed and implemented by the Corporation and the Corporation shall decide the applications on the merits of each case. ( 18 ) RULE is made absolute in each of these petitions to the aforesaid extent only except in Special Civil Application No. 2194 of 1982 with no order as to costs. ( 19 ) SO far Special Civil Application No. 2194 of 1982 is concerned we hold that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation cannot proceed against the petitioner in the said petition under Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act as he has not committed any encroachment over a public street. It will be open to it to take any other action permissible under the law. Rule issued in the said petition is made absolute accordingly with no order as to cost. The learned Advocates for the petitioner make an oral application that the operation of this order be stayed for a period of one week so as to enable the petitioners to go to the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate interim relies in the matter. We there-fore direct that the operation of this order be stayed for one week so as to enable the petitioners to move the Supreme Court for appropriate orders. Rule made absolute .