Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 35 (MAD)

Adhikesavan v. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu (Home) (Accommodation), Madras

1985-01-23

RAMANUJAM, SATHAR SAYEED

body1985
Judgment :- RAMANUJAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order of Mohan, J., in W.P. 983 of 1978 dismissing the same. 2. The appellant herein is the owner of premises No. 48, Sami Pandaram St, Chintadripet, Madras. The portions of the said premises are occupied by the tenants. There was a tenant by name Mohan Naidu occupying the ground floor, right side, front portion of the said building. The appellant claims to have approached the said tenant and somehow persuaded him to vacate the said portion of the premises so as to enable him to occupy the same. The said tenant is said to have obliged the appellant by vacating the said portion After the tenant vacated that portion the appellant gave a notice of vacancy to the Accommodation Controller and at the same time applied for therelease of the said portion of the premises for his own use and occupation The Accommodtion Controller after enquiry rejected the request of the appellant for the release of the said portion on the ground that the appellant was residing comfortably along with his brother at No. 23, Rajagopal Naicken Street, Chintadripet, Madras, and that he is not under threat of eviction. One other ground on the basis of which the request, for release of the portion of the building was rejected was that there are ten other private tenants in the same premises and if the appellant was actually in need of accommodation he could evict any one of the other private tenants and occupy the same. The said rejection of the appellants request for release of the said portion of the building by the Accommodation Controller was challenged in an appeal filed before the Government. However, the Government relying on the same reasoning as has been mentioned by the Accommodation Controller in his order dismissed the appeal. According to the Government, the appellate authority, the appellant has been living with his brother for the last 40 years, that the Accommodation available for him in his brothers house is quite sufficient, that he is comfortably living there and that it is unlikely that the appellant will surrender more spacious accommodation available in his brothers house and reside in the portion in question which has got lesser accommodation. As against the order of the Government, the appellant filed W.P. 3922 of 1976. As against the order of the Government, the appellant filed W.P. 3922 of 1976. The said writ petition was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Government for considering the matter afresh in the light of the decision rendered by this Court in D. Ramanujam v. Accommodation Controller 1 and in Mullaikodl Anmal v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu 2. Then the matter went before the Government and the Government has again rejected the appellants request for release by dismissing his appeal in G.O. Rt. No. 906 dated 7th March, 1978. The said order of the Government was again challenged by the appellant in W.P. 983 of 1978. This time, however, the learned single Judge dismissed the ( sic ) Writ Petition holding that the Government has held that the appellants request for release is not bona fide and that so long as that finding stands, the order of the Government cannot be set aside. As against the said order of the learned single Judge the present appeal has been filed. 3. From the facts stated above it is clear that the question to be considered is whether the appellant has made out a case for release of the portion of the premises in question. As already stated the Government relied on two circumstances for rejecting the request of the appellant for release of the portion. In the original order the Government have said that the appellant has been residing along with his brother comfortably for 40 years at No. 23, Rajagopala Naicken St, Chintadripet, Madras, that it is not likely the appellant will occupy the portion in question after vacating the larger accommodation available to him in his brothers house and that if the appellant really wants to occupy a portion in his own house he could evict the other private tenants in the same building. After the remit order the Government has referred to the three circumstances for denying the relief to the appellant: (1) that the appellant ‘sniece used to occupy the premises; (2) that the appellants terms with his brother are cordial and therefore there is no necessity for him to move out of the premises at No. 23, Rajagopala Naicken St., Madras, and (3) that there is no addition to his family necessitating the additional accommodation It is significant to note that though the order passed in W.P. 3922 of 1976 directed the Government to dispose of the appeal in the light of the observations made in the judgment rendered by this court in Dr. Ramanujam v. Accommodation Controller 1 and in Mullaikodi Ammal v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu 2 the Government has not chosen to refer to any one of the said judgments and the principles laid down therein. Even otherwise, the reasons given by the Government in the impugned order cannot justify their refusal to release the said portion of the building in favour of the appellant. Admittedly the appellant ii not residing in his own house but is living along with his brother in a house owned by his brother. The fact that the appellant has been residing in his brothers house along with his brother for the last 40 years does not mean that he must continue to live there against his will till the end of his life. Though the relationship between the brothers are alleged to be cordial there is nothing wrong for the appellant deciding to reside in his own house. The fact that the accommodation available to the appellant in his brothers house is larger than the accommodation available in the portion now in dispute will not make the request of the appellant for the release of the portion of the building a mala fide one. The fact that the appellant since was occupying the premises for some time when the appellants application for release was pending consideration will not also in any way indicate that the appellants request of release of the portion of the building is not bona fide . According to the appellant his niece was put in the premises as a care-taker since the portion was vacant after the previous tenant vacated. According to the appellant his niece was put in the premises as a care-taker since the portion was vacant after the previous tenant vacated. Therefore, while the application for release was pending disposal the appellants niece was occupying the premises for some time will not make the appellants request as not a bona fide one. The fact that the appellants terms with his brother are cordial will not also stand in the way of the appellant seeking the release of the portion of his own building for his accommodation. As a matter of fact the appellants case h that actually the terms between him and his brother are not cordial and therefore he is constrained to seek release of the portion of his own building for occupation. Another ground set down by the Government in its order is that there had been no addition to the family necessitating additional accommodation. This ground is not sustainable as it is not a request for additional accommodation. In this case, the appellant is not residing in his own house but is residing with his brother in his brothers house and when a portion of his own building fell vacant he naturally wanted to occupy the said portion. 4. We do not see how the request for release can be taken to be otherwise than bona fide. One of the reasons given both by the Rent Controller as well as by the Government in its original order is that if the appellant is really in need of accommodation he should have applied for eviction of the other private tenants in the premises. We are at a loss to find any substance in this ground. When actually there is a portion vacant the appellant naturally seeks to get release of that portion of the building for his own accommodation, especially when the portion vacated is the front portion in the ground floor. When a portion has already been vacated by a tenant and the appellant seeks for the release of that portion for his occupation, he cannot be asked to give up that portion and take eviction proceedings against other tenants. The appellants con duct in seeking the release of the portion which has fallen vacant has to be taken as quite bona fide. The appellants con duct in seeking the release of the portion which has fallen vacant has to be taken as quite bona fide. When actually a portion in the premises has fallen vacant the statute enables him to seek release of that portion for his own bona fide occupation In those circumstances, appellant need not give up the vacant portion and take a chance of getting an eviction order against other private tenants. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant has got any oblique motive in seeking the release of the portion. Bona fide is a subjective element and the word ‘bona fide’ implies that it is more under the force of his personal circumstances than under the impulse of a desire that the landlord needs the premises. In Dr Ramanujam v. Accommodation Controller 1 which was rendered by one of us it has been observed that it is for the landlord to decide as to what accommodation of that house he would have for purpose of his residence or for the residence of the members of his family and that he or the members of his family cannot be forced to live in a portion of the premises against their will. In this case, the view taken by the Government is that the appellant could have asked for eviction of the other private tenants in the same building for his own occupation, ignoring the fact that if the appellant files an eviction petition against one of the tenants, that tenant will by the same reasoning be entitled to say that the landlord can file eviction petition against other tenants but not against him. It is for the landlord to decide as to which portion he wants to occupy in the premises in question. Thus the view taken by the Government in the impugned order cannot be sustained. The appeal is therefore allowed and the impugned order of Government is set aside and the Government is directed to release the building in question. There will be no order as to costs.