JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J.- This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent etc. The trial Court had decreed the suit both for ejectment of the defendant from the land in suit as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits. On appeal by the defendant-respondent, however, the suit for ejectment was dismissed and that for recovery of Rs. 140/- as arrears of rent was decreed. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the plaintiffs have filed this second appeal. Shortly stated, the plaint case was that the defendant-respondent had taken the land in dispute on a lease dated November 16, 1959 on a monthly rental of Rs. 6/- for a period of five years from the plaintiffs' father who died in March, 1963 leaving the plaintiffs who are the sons and widow of the original lessor, namely, Lakshmi. The tenancy of the defendant automatically came to an end after the expiry of the period of five years fixed in the lease and thereafter the defendant continued in possession over the land with their consent. A sum of 173.23 had become due against the defendant since March, 1963 till July 27, 1965 which he failed to pay despite a notice of demand and ejectment dated July 27, which was served on him on July 30, 1965. 3. The defence of the respondent was that Madan and Lakshmi were members of a Joint Hindu Family since long. They started living separately after partition of their houses and sahen. As the defendant was serving outside he could not know about the said partition and when he returned home after service he wanted to install a flour mill for his livelihood for which he needed some land. He approached Lakshmi who did not disclose that Madan also had half share in the property and executed a lease sole in his name in favour of the defendant. Later on Raj Mangal son of Madan sold half share in the property to the defendant on August 24, 1964 on the basis of which the defendant was in occupation of the disputed property in his own right as an owner thereof. 4. The trial Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the plaintiffs and the defendant. 4. The trial Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant was valid and that the defendant was also liable to pay the arrears of rent. etc. claimed by the plaintiffs and on these findings the suit was decreed. 5. The appellate Court held that the disputed property was a joint property of Lakshmi and Raj Mangal son of Madan and that the latter had sold his half share in the same to the defendant. In this way, the defendant had become co-owner of the property to the extent of half share. However, in view of the lease executed by Lakshmi in favour of the defendant, the latter was clearly a tenant and the plaintiffs his landlords. However, as Lakshmi had also left a daughter Smt. Kamla who had not joined in the notice purporting to terminate the tenancy of the defendant, the relief for ejectment could not be granted as Smt Kamla would be deemed to be a co-lessor. In regard to the claim for arrears of rent the appellate Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the payment of Rs. 140/- as arrears of rent. 6. When this appeal was first taken up, this Court by an order dated December 18, 1978 after hearing learned counsel for the parties remitted the following issue to the lower appellate Court. "Whether there was any holding over by the defendant-respondent upon the expiry of the period of five years fixed in the original lease as contemplated by Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act ?." 7. The lower appellate Court has returned a finding and held that in view of the admission made by the plaintiffs in paragraph 4 of the plaint to the effect that the defendant continued to remain in possession of the premises with the consent of the plaintiffs after the expiry of the period of five years the defendant-respondent must be deemed to have been holding over as contemplated by Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. The said finding of the lower appellate Court was not challenged before me when the appeal was against taken up for hearing. 9. 8. The said finding of the lower appellate Court was not challenged before me when the appeal was against taken up for hearing. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants was that even if the defendant is assumed to be holding over as found by the lower appellate Court he would be deemed to be doing so only on behalf of the plaintiffs and not Smt. Kamla. It was urged that after the expiry of the period of five years a new tenancy came into existence with the plaintiffs alone as the lessors and the defendant as the lessee on a result of the latter continuing in possession over the premises with the consent of the plaintiffs in view of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act given on behalf of the plaintiffs without joining Smt. Kamla was perfectly valid in law and the lower appellate Court has committed a serious error in holding to the contrary. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I find considerable force in the above submissions. The right and interest of the defendant-respondent under the original lease executed by Lakshmi in his favour came to an end on the expiry of the term of the lease, namely, five years. Thereafter as a result of the defendant remaining in possession after expiry of the term of the lease and the plaintiffs, assenting to his continuing in possession a new lease came into existence by implication in terms of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the creation of this new lease Smt. Kamla did not figure at all as it is nobody's case that she was also in some way a party to the defendant respondent's holding over after the determination of the lease with her consent. 11. That as a result of holding over a new plea comes into existence seems settled beyond doubt. In Bhagwanji Lakhamshi and others v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and other, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 819, Mathew, J. speaking for the Court observed : "A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The former is a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of possession after the determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy' (emphasis added). 12. Again, in Kai Khushrao Bezenjee Capadia v. Bai Jarbai Hirjibhoy Warden and another, AIR 1949 Federal Court 124. I find the same view reiterated. The Federal Court had occasion to consider the precise nature of the tenancy created under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and Mukherjea, J. speaking for the majority said that the tenancy which is created by holding over a lease is a new tenancy in law even though many of the terms of the old lease might be continued in by it by implication. 13. That being the legal position it is clear that the tenancy created in favour of the defendant-respondent in consequence of his holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was a new tenancy of which the plaintiffs alone were the exclusive lessors. That being so, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act given by the plaintiffs alone determining the tenancy of the defendant-respondent was valid in law and the lower appellate Court has erred in law in holding the same to be invalid on the ground that Smt. Kamla had not joined in it. For the same reasons the frame of the suit is also proper and the absence of Smt. Kamla would not make any difference in law. The plaintiffs have claimed the ejectment of the defendant respondent simply on the ground that the latter was their tenant and is liable to be ejected as he has failed to vacates the premises despite a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 14. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent, however, sought to support the decree passed by the lower appellate Court on the ground that in view of the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant-respondent by Raj Mangal in respect of his half share the defendant had become a co-owner of the property to the extent of half share and consequently he could not be ejected from the premises. 15. 15. I am unable to agree. Under clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act a lease of immovable property determines in the case of merger of the interest of the lessee and the lessor only if the interests in whole property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. In the present case as has been found by the Courts below the subject-matter of the tenancy consists of the premises in suit whereas under the sale deed the defendant purchased only half share in the ownership rights over the property. The benefit of clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act could, therefore, be available to the defendant only if the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the entire property had merged in the same person and in the same rights. The mere fact, therefore, that the defendant become owner of share in the property by virtue of the sale deed executed by Raj Mangal could not automatically result in the determination of the lease as the entire subject-matter of the lease had not come to be vested in him. 16. The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that the lower appellate Court was not right in not granting the decree for ejectment also to the plaintiff-appellants. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court dismissing the plaintiff-appellants' suit for ejectment are set aside and those passed by the trial Courts are restored. The appellants shall be entitled to cost of this appeal.