Judgment :- These revisions are directed against the common order passed in I.A.No. 133 of 1981 and I.A.No. 180 of 1980 in O.P.No.24 of 1980 by the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of these two Revisions are as follows:- The first respondent herein is the wife of the petitioner herein and she filed the petition O.P.No.24 of 1980 for judicial separation against the petitioner herein alleging that they were married on 7th July, 1971 as per Christian rites at Nagercoil C.S.I. Church; but immediately soon after the marriage, the relations between them were far from cordial and that she had been ill-treated and subjected to cruelty by the petitioner herein and there were exchanges of notice in June, 1972. It is further alleged that the first respondent herein joined the petitioner in May, 1974 on the assurance given by relations and well-wishers of the parties that the petitioner herein would treat the first respondent properly. Thereafter, they lived together at Madras and the first respondent herein was employed in Madras in the office of the Superintending Engineer (M. & R.W.) Designs Circle, Adyar. Thereafter, the first respondent gave birth to a boy, viz., the second respondent herein on 25th April, 1974 and even after the delivery, she joined the petitioner herein at Madras and was living with him along with the child, the second respondent herein till 24th February, 1980, when her father came and took her to Nagercoil, which is their native place. The said application was resisted by the petitioner herein and he filed a counter wherein he denied the allegations in the main Original Petition and contended that the Court at Nagercoil, has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that it is only the Court at Madras, where they last resided together, alone is having jurisdiction to try the petition and the cause of action arose immediately only at the place where they last resided together, i.e., at Madras. The petitioner herein also filed a petition in I.A.No.180 of 1980 requesting the Court below to hear the question regarding the jurisdiction as preliminary issue, before the Court deciding the petition on merits. That application was resisted by the respondent herein on the ground that the respondent and the petitioner herein had been living only temporarily at Madras and their permanent houses are at Nagercoil. That application was resisted by the respondent herein on the ground that the respondent and the petitioner herein had been living only temporarily at Madras and their permanent houses are at Nagercoil. Later, the respondents herein filed I. A. 133 of 1981 for leave to amend the main petition for inclusion of certain allegations in respect of the residence. The said application was also resisted by the petitioner herein reiterating the same allegations as contained in the counter to the main petition. 3. The learned District Judge for the reasons assigned in his order, allowed the petition for amendment in I.A.133/81 while he dismissed the application in I.A.No. 180 of 1980 holding that the said Court is having jurisdiction to try the petition. Aggrieved by the same, these two Revisions are filed. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein in both the Revision Petitions, Mr. K.T.Palpandian, took me through the pleadings and also the order of the learned District Judge. According to the learned counsel the Court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for amendment of the main petition in order to bring it within its jurisdiction and further, even if the amendment is allowed there is nothing to hold that the parties last resided within the jurisdiction of the lower court, which is the necessary ingredient for instituting a proceeding under the Indian Divorce Act before the lower Court. 5. It is not in ‘dispute that the necessary ingredients for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Sec.3 of the Indian Divorce Act is the place in whose jurisdiction the husband and wife reside or last resided together. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration in this matter is the interpretation of the words’ last resided’. 6. The Court below relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in S m t . J e e w a n t i Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey, (1981)4 S.C.C 517 : (1982)1 S.C.R. 1003 : (1982)1 S.C.J. 166: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 3 mainly,’ for arriving at the finding in favour of the respondents herein. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein submitted that the said decision is not at all helpful for deciding this issue in this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein submitted that the said decision is not at all helpful for deciding this issue in this case. In the above quoted Supreme Court decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while interpreting the provision of Sec.15 of the Hindu Marriage Act had dealt with only C1.(ii) of Sec.19 of the Hindu Marriage Act which deals with only the question regarding the residence of the respondent at the time of the presentation of the petition and the other conditions, viz., Nos.1 and 3, were held to be not present in the said case to invest the Court of the District Judge to entertain the petition for annulment of the marriage under Sec.12 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is only sub-C1.(iii) of Sec.19, which relates to the place where the parties to the marriage last resided. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for . the petitioner herein, the Supreme Court decision is not at ail helpful in deciding the question involved in this case, viz., the place where they last resided together. Even in the above quoted decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the word ‘resides’ must mean the actual place of residence and not a legal or constructive residence and it does not connote the place of origin. It was further observed that: ‘The word’ resides ‘ is a flexible one and has many shades of meaning, but it must take its colour and content from the context in which it appears and cannot be read in isolation. It follows that it was the actual residence of the appellant, at the commencement of the proceedings, that had to be considered for determining whether the District Judge, Almora, had jurisdiction or not’. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the instant . case, even according to the allegations made in the Original petition, though the marriage took place on 7th July, 1971 at Nagercoil, soon after the marriage, the relation between the parties was far from cordial and there was exchange of notice even in 1972 and only in 1974 May, the petitioner herein and the first respondent joined at Madras and they lived together from 1974 till 24th February, 1981, when she left the house lastly along with her father. Even in the cause of action, only three dates have been given, viz., 7th July, 1971, the date of marriage and 6.3.1980 and 18th March, 1980, the dates of notice and reply notice and only the place where-the marriage took place was shown as Nagercoil as situated within the jurisdiction of the District Court Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. Even in the particulars of amendment which are sought to be included, it has not been alleged that the petitioner herein and the first respondent herein lived together lastly at Nagercoil, except stating that they were natives of Kanya-. kumari District and their permanent residence is at Kanyakumari District. It is also not alleged anywhere either in the notice or in the petition, that after the marriage and before they joined at Madras in 1974, they lived together at Nagercoil, and in the circumstances, their living together at Madras, cannot be said to be temporary and that alone should be taken into consideration as the place where they last resided together for invoking the jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act and the Court at Nagercoil has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 7. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the decisions of this Court and that of the Supreme Court, where the meaning of the word ‘resides’ and also the words ‘last resided’ had been dealt with. In Balakrishnan Naidu v. Sakuntala Bai, (1942)2 M.L.J. 134 : 1942 M.W.N. 369: A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 666: 55 L.W.306, Horwill, J., while dealing with the revision arising out of a petition filed under Sec.488, Cr.P.C, interpreted the word ‘reside’ in Sec.488(8), Cr.P.C. and held that: ‘A person who follows a profession must necessarily have some place of residence in which he can keep his wife and family and store his furniture and goods and to which he can return when he is not on tour and that place of residence would be his permanent residence.’ As contemplated under Sec.458, Cl.8, Crl.P.C, it is observed in the said decision that he can as well be said to reside in a rented house as in a house of which he is the owner’. 8. My attention was also drawn to the decision in Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh. 8. My attention was also drawn to the decision in Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh. 1964 M.L.J.(Crl.) 254: (1964)2 S.C.R. 73 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521: (1964)1 S.C.J. 386, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that: ‘The expression’ resides ‘ implied something more than a brief visit but not such continuity as to amount to domicile’... ‘The sole test on the question of residence was whether a party had animus menendi or an intention to stay for an indefinite period at the place.’ That is also a case arising under Sec.488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. The learned counsel also drew my attention to the Full Bench decision in Poonen v. Rathi Varghese, 1966 K.L.T. 454: I.L.R. (1966)1 Ker. 485: A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 1, wherein their Lordships of the Kerala High Court have interpreted the word ‘reside’ and the words ‘last resided’ under Sec.3, C1.3 of Divorce Act (4 of 1896) and enunciated the following propositions as emerging: ‘1. to constitute ‘residence’, it is not necessary that the party or parties must have his or their own house; 2. to constitute ‘residence’, the stay need not be permanent; it can also be temporary, so long as there is animus menendi or an intention to stay for an indefinite period; 3.’ Residence ‘ will not take in a casual stay in, or a flying visit to a particular place; a mere-casual residence is a place for a temporary purpose, with no intention of remaining, is not covered by the word ‘reside’; 4.’ Residence ‘ connotes something more than ‘stay’; it implies some intention to remain at a place and not merely to pay it a casual visit; 5. ‘as emphasised by the Supreme Court,’ by staying in a particular place, in order ‘to constitute ‘residence’, the intention must be to make it his or their abode or residence, either permanent or temporary; 6. the expression "last resided" also means the place where the person had his last abode or residence, permanent or temporary, 7. where there has been residence together of a more permanent character, and a casual or brief residence together. Courts have taken the view that it is only the former that can be considered as "residence together" for determining the jurisdiction; 8. where there has been residence together of a more permanent character, and a casual or brief residence together. Courts have taken the view that it is only the former that can be considered as "residence together" for determining the jurisdiction; 8. the question as to whether a particular person has chosen to make a particular place his abode, is to be gathered from the particular circumstances of each case." The learned counsel also submitted that in the instant case, in view of the admitted fact that the parties were living together only at Madras from 1974 till 1981, when the first , respondent herein left the house lastly and that notice of the petition was also served on the petitioner herein only at Madras, the lower Court does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The learned counsel also submitted that the Court which does not have any jurisdiction ought not to have entertained the application for amendment, relying on the decision of this Court in Varry Mutyalamma alias Murtyalu and others v. Dassary Narayanaswamy and others, (1949)1 M.L.J. 589 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 719. In the above quoted case, Mack, J., held that: "It is ordinarily not open to a Court, though there may be some exceptional circumstances which may justify the course, to allow an amendment of any plaint which may help to bring within its own pecuniary jurisdiction a doubtful plaint really within the jurisdiction of a higher Court. It is ordinarily its duty to decide its own jurisdiction to try the original plaint filed before it". 10. The learned counsel also submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a suit is to be determined by the allegations made in the plaint and not by the result of the suit and under law, the plaintiff is not prevented from amending the plaint which had been returned to him and to represent it to the Court which-would have jurisdiction to entertain the amended plaint, relying on the decision in Babi Sahai v. Ganga Sahai, A.I.R. 1954 All. 749, and in the instant case, the proper course is to return the petition to the respondent herein for carrying out necessary amendment and present the same before the Court, which is having jurisdiction and the Court below ought not to have allowed the amendment. 11. 749, and in the instant case, the proper course is to return the petition to the respondent herein for carrying out necessary amendment and present the same before the Court, which is having jurisdiction and the Court below ought not to have allowed the amendment. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to the decision in Premletike Sircar v. Provash Ch. Sircar, A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 242, wherein a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that: "In order that the District Court at a place may have jurisdiction, residence of both the parties within its jurisdiction and not merely of the petitioner is necessary." 12. The Court below relied on the decision reported in John Baptist D’Souza v. Lizzie Jane Labo, (1940)1 M.L.J. 651 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 584: 51 L.W. 523 and M.Gomathi v. S.Natarajan, (1973)1 M.L.J. 243: 86 L.W. 213: A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 247, for arriving at the finding in favour of the respondents herein. In John Baptist D’Souza v. Lizzie Jane Lobo, (1940)1 M.L.J. 651 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 584: 51 L.W. 523, it was held that "A person cannot be said to reside at a place where he spent only a day or two when he has got a fixed place of residence elsewhere; but where a person has no fixed place of residence the place where he actually lives must be taken to be the place where he resides". That decision is not helpful on the facts of this case as in the above quoted case, the husband and wife were actually living together from February, 1938 to April, 1938 at Mangalore and even though the husband was employed at Rangoon, he had no house of his own or a rented house or flat in Rangoon during that period and in the Circumstances of the case it was held that: ‘A person cannot be said to reside at a place where he spent only a day or two when he has got a fixed place of residence elsewhere but where a person has no fixed place of residence the place where he actually lives must be taken to be the place where he resides’. Further, the principles laid down in the said decision also support only the case of the petitioner herein and in the instant case, admittedly they were living together in a fixed place of residence at Madras, i.e., from 1974 to 1981, when the first respondent herein left the house. 13. Yet another decision which was relied on by the learned District Judge is M.Gomathi v. S.Natarajan, (1973)1 M.L.J. 243: A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 247: 86 L.W. 213. It was held therein that since the respondent was residing within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the said Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the petition. But, that is not the case herein, as admittedly, the petitioner herein is not living within the jurisdiction of the lower Court, but only at Madras. 14. Lastly, the learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention to the decision in T. Sareetha v. Venkata Subbaiah, A.I.R. 1983 A.P. 356, and submitted that the principle laid down in the above decision supports the contentions of the respondents. The above quoted case arose under the Hindu Marriage Act and while interpreting Sec.10(iii) and Sec.9 of the said Act, it was held that ‘In the third clause of Sec.19 of the Act, the’ residence ‘ spoken of is the joint residence. Combinedly read the third clause of Sec.19 refers to a place where the husband and wife lived together permanently or at least for a sufficiently long period of time. Such a place can only be a place of permanent dwelling taken up by the husband and wife jointly for their matrimonial purposes’. Combinedly read the third clause of Sec.19 refers to a place where the husband and wife lived together permanently or at least for a sufficiently long period of time. Such a place can only be a place of permanent dwelling taken up by the husband and wife jointly for their matrimonial purposes’. It has also been further held in the above quoted case that: ‘That place must be one to which the parties are bound by the solemnities of their matrimony, these ordinarily accepted descriptions of the word ‘reside’ in matrimonial cases would have the effect of excluding the places where the husband and the wife stayed temporarily on short sojourns pursuing temporary purposes such as seeking pleasure or visiting a friend or a temple or attending a function from the category of residence.’ Even applying the ratio laid down in the above decision, the fact that the petitioner and the first respondent herein lived together at Madras from 1974 and gave birth to a child in 1975 and till 1981 she lived in Madras and then left the house, it can definitely be stated that the place where they last resided together was only at Madras not at Nagercoil and their stay at Madras cannot be said to be temporary or casual. Hence, I am of the view that this decision also does not in any way support the contention of the respondents herein. 15. For all these reasons I am of the view that the Court below is not having jurisdica tion to try the main Original Petition No.24 of 1980 and that it is only the Court at Madras that has got jurisdiction to entertain the said petition. 16. In the result, these Revision Petitions are allowed and the orders passed by the Court below are set aside and the Court below is directed to return the Original Petition No.24 of 1980 on its file to the respondents herein for re-presentation before the Court which is having jurisdiction. There will be no order as to costs.