Judgment Ramnandan Prasad, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in C. W. J. C. No.4226 of 1973 whereby he has allowed the writ application filed by respondents 1st party and set aside the orders of the revenue authorities, as contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 of the writ application. 2. It appears that the present appellants initiated a proceeding under section 16 (3) of the Bihar and Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Samasti-pur, claiming pre-emption in respect of 2 kathas 19 dhoors and one and a half kanawa ol land bearing plot No.4414 under Khata No.927 of village Khas-Tabhka, which was purchased by the present respondents 1st party from respon dent 2nd party through a sale deed executed on 19-6-1972 and registered on 13-9-1972. The plea of the pre-emptors i. e. , the present appellants was that they were the owners of the adjoining lands, whereas tne respondent the wife of mahendra Mishra, the alleged co-owner of the boundary lands on the east and west and there is no presumption under the law that the land standing in the name of wife shall be deemed to belong to the husband. In the present case it may be pointed out that the pre-emption is being claimed against Smt. Inchan mishra and not against her husband Mahendra Mishra, besides Sukhdeo Mishra who is the son of Shivanandan Mishra. It was also pointed out that it was not the case of the respondents 1st party that Mahendra Mishra had purchased the land in question through the said sale deed in the Benami name of his wife. In such a situation, it would be presumed that the purchase was made by the wife herself, as the theory of advancement is not applicable in India. Regarding respondent No.2 Sukhdeo Mishra it was stated that he does not hold any land on the boundary and there is concurrent finding of fact of the revenue authori-ties in this regard and this Court, in this writ jurisdiction, should not ordinarily disturb such a finding of fact. In my opinion, there is substance in the submis sions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. 3. In my opinion, there is substance in the submis sions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. 3. It would be relevant to point out here that the learned single Judge has not gone into the question as to whether respondent No.1 was a Benamidar of her husband. Indeed, there is nothing in the decision to indicate that respondent no.1 had made out a case that she was the Benamidar of her husband or that the husband was the real purchaser. The learned Judge seems to have refused the claim of the pre-emptors on the sole ground that the husband of respondent no.1 was the owner of the adjoining lands on two sides of the land in question, and as such the ground of pre-emption advanced by the pre-emptors was neutra lised. With great respect to the learned single Judge, the claim of a pre-emptor cannot be refused, simply because the husband of the transferee of the sale deed was the owner of adjoining land, as the wife has a separate identity of her own and the property standing in her name shall be deemed to be her own property, and as such the husband cannot be presumed to be the real owner of the land, unless a case of Benami purchase is made out and established. This aspect of the matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the caseof Ramjiwan singh and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, (AIR 1970 Patna 253 ). The following observations of Honble U. N. Sinha, J. (as he then was) with whom honble the Chief Justice and Honble S. N. P. Singh, J. (as he then was)agreed, make the position clear :- "learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the sale-deed in question states that the disputed properties had been sold to the three ladies, and even if their husbands were raiyats of the adjoining lands, the ladies must be compelled to transfer the disputed lands in favour of the petitioner, if they themselves are neither co-sharers of the transferred lands, nor are they raiyats of adjoining lands. So far as the petitioners are concerned, reference is made to paragraph 3 of the writ application where the petitioners have mentioned their interest in the adjoining lands, a fact which is said to have gone unchallenged in this Court. So far as the petitioners are concerned, reference is made to paragraph 3 of the writ application where the petitioners have mentioned their interest in the adjoining lands, a fact which is said to have gone unchallenged in this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to the case of kankarathanammal V/s. V. S. Loganaih Muddier, AIR 1965 SC 271 and to the case of Hazaribagh Mica Mining Co. Ltd. V/s. Ashalata kapoor, AIR 1952 Pat 61 urging that when the husbands had not proved that they were, in fact, the purchasers of the disputed lands, the petitioners application under Sec.16 (3) of the Act should not have failed. Learned counsel for opposite parties Nos.4 to 9 has referred to paragraph 5 of the rejoinder, quoted above, and has argued that the husoands had purchased the disputed properties from Srimati Urmila Devi, in the name of their wives, who were really Benamidars, and, therefore, the husbands were justified in contesting the application for re-transfer as raiyats of adjoining lands. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion, that the main contention urged on behalf of the petitioners must prevail on the facts and circumstances of the case and the order of re-conveyance passed in favour of the petitioners had rightly been made under Sec.16 (3) (lii) of the Act. The ladies had not proved that they were either co-sharers of the vended lands or that they were raiyats of the adjoining lands and, therefore, the Additional member of the Board of Revenue had erred in reversing the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. " 4. The Full Bench has further observed as follows :- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the general question of a Benami transaction raised by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, it is enough to state that the matter had not been urged before the Addtional collector and the Commissioner, and the learned Additional member of the Board of Revenue has not decided the question, and so it is not necessary to deal with this matter at this stage. " 5 In the present case also the question of Benami transaction was not urged before the revenue authorities and as such it is not necessary to deal with this matter in this appeal. 6. In view of the aforesaid Full Bench decision, respondent No.1 cannot claim protection against the claim of pre-emption made out by the appellants, simply because her husband was a co-sharer of some of the adjoining lands of the land in question. That being so, the question of neutralising the claim of the pre-emptors, in the circumstances of the case, cannot arise, and the impugned order has, therefore, to be set-aside. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs againts respondents 1st party and the orders of the revenue authorities, as contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 are restored. Appeal allowed.