Judgment :- 1. This revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority, viz., II Judge, Court of Small Causes at Madras in H.R.A. No. 507 of 1981 confirming the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller in H.R.C. No. 3071 of 1980. The tenant is the petitioner herein. 2. The respondents herein had filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner herein on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises in question for own occupation and also alleging acts of waste, under S. 10(3)(a) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 18 of 1960. The case of the respondents herein is that the petition mentioned premises is a residential building and that the petitioner herein is a tenant of the same on a monthly rent of Rs. 60. The first respondent has been living with her husband and her child, sharing with the other employees of her fathers provision stores the common hall in the upstairs of No. 42, Village Road, Nungambakkam, Madras-34. She requires the residential portion in the occupation of the petitioner herein for the purpose of her own occupation and that of her husband. It is further alleged that they do not own any other residential house of their own in the city and that the requirement is bona fide . The further allegation is that without the prior consent of the respondents herein, the petitioner has put up a wall obstructing the bathroom being enjoyed by other tenants of the same building and thereby caused structural alteration impairing the value and utility of the building. The said petition was resisted by the petitioner herein and he contended that there is no relationship of landladies and tenant between the respondents herein and the petitioner herein and that he has not committed any waste by obstructing the bathroom by putting up any wall and that the wall in question was put up even in the year 1962 by one V.T. Abdul Rahiman Sahib, father of the respondents herein. It is further alleged that the first respondent herein is residing in a house of her own at Melvisharm and that the second respondent herein is put up at Bangalore and that the respondents herein are entitled to a share in a house bearing door No. 42, Village Road, Nungambakkam. It is further alleged that the first respondent herein is residing in a house of her own at Melvisharm and that the second respondent herein is put up at Bangalore and that the respondents herein are entitled to a share in a house bearing door No. 42, Village Road, Nungambakkam. On the side of the respondents herein, P.W. 1, husband of the first respondent herein was examined and on the side of the petitioner himself was examined as R.W. 1 and Exs. P1 and P2 and R1 to R. 7 were marked. The learned Rent Controller, on the basis of the evidence adduced before him, held that there is relationship of landladies and tenant between the respondents and the petitioner herein and ordered eviction on the ground that the requirement of the petition mentioned premises for own occupation of the respondents herein is bona fide . He also held that the respondents herein have not established that the petitioner herein had committed acts of waste as alleged. The petitioner herein was unsuccessful in the appeal and hence this Revision. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Hariharan mainly contended that admittedly P.W. 1 and the respondents herein are living along with the other employees at Door No. 42, Village Road, Nungambakkam, wherein the business is carried on by the father of the first respondent herein under the name and style of ‘Rahman Stores’ and P.W. 1 was employed there. After the death of the said Rahman, the two respondents herein, who are also the heirs of the said Rahman have got shares in the said building as well as in the business and as such, since they own another house, the respondents herein cannot be said to be not in occupation of any other building of their own within the city as contemplated under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of this Court in Vasudevan v. Ramachandran 1, wherein Balasubrahmanyam, J. held that: “Every co-owner is in a real sense, the absolute owner of the entirety of the interests in the joint property. In this sense, a co-owner is by no means the agent of the other co-owners in respect of any interest in the property. In this sense, a co-owner is by no means the agent of the other co-owners in respect of any interest in the property. On the incontrovertible position in law of co-owners who must be distinguished from agents, properly so called, S. 10(8) has absolutely no application to the petition filed in the present case for eviction of the tenant.” Reliance was also Placed in the above quoted case to the earlier Supreme Court decision in Sri Ram Paricha v. Jaganath 2. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner also drew my attention to the decision In Associated Sales of India v. Pani & Co. , 3 wherein Jagadisan, J. held that: “Where the owner of a premises is a partnership firm, a case of owners occupation under S. 10(3)(a) (i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1960 can be made out only by the partners of the firm not in occupation of any other building of their own under S. 10(3)(a) of the new Act, a landlord can apply for possession of a non-residential building of his own for his business even if he has other business premises on rent.” 5. On the other hand, Mr. S. Balasubramaniam, who was appointed as amicus curie on behalf of the respondents, submitted that those decisions are not at all applicable to the facts of this case, as they relate to the case of instituting the proceedings for order of eviction against the tenant by one co-owner. Only in those circumstances, as could be seen from the decision in Sri Ram Parricha v. Jaganath it was held that the co-owner is not an agent of the other co-owner and one co-owner can maintain an action to evict the tenant who is in occupation of the premises, as jurisprudentially he owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property and that the position will change only when a partition takes place. He also submitted that it is settled law so far as this question is concerned and this Court has he ld in number of cases that the words “of his own” occurring in S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act must necessarily mean “exclusively his own.” The learned counsel Mr. He also submitted that it is settled law so far as this question is concerned and this Court has he ld in number of cases that the words “of his own” occurring in S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act must necessarily mean “exclusively his own.” The learned counsel Mr. S. Balasubramanian drew my attention to the decision of this Court in S.M. Abdul Makki v. N. Abdul Azeez 1, wherein Ismail, J. held that: The words “of his own” must necessarily mean “exclusively his own”. It may not be that the share of a co-sharer may be as much as to be slightly less than the whole or it may be as little as infinite, as it may very often happen if the parties are Muslims where the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance applies to them. Ultimately solely on the ground that the landlord is in occupation of another residential building in the city as a co-sharer, it cannot be held that such a person is not entitled to obtain relief under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. Having regard to their condition, the use of the word ‘of his own’ will include that it must be “exclusively his own”. It is to be noted that in the instant case also, the landladies are Muslims and the ratio laid down in the said case, is on all fours, applicable to the facts of this case. 6. Mr. S. Balasubramanian, learned counsel also drew my attention to another decision in K.S. Shantilal v. B. Benny Biber 2 wherein Nainar Sundaram, J. had elaborately considered the earlier rulings and ultimately held as follows: “Unless it can be stated that the landlord is the sole and exclusive owner of the building stated to be in his occupation, it is not possible to discountenance his claim for evicting the tenant from the premises occupied by the tenant, under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The ownership contemplated under the provisions must be exclusive and it cannot be equated to joint ownership, which will leave the matter nebulous and one cannot predict either the quantum or the quality of his rights with reference to the said premises, so as to negative his claim for occupation of another building which, admittedly, belongs to him exclusively. That could not be the intendment of the statute. That could not be the intendment of the statute. The landlord must be in a position to command the full benefits of ownership by being unable to be in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the building. Such could not be the situation in the case of joint ownership. This view of mine is not without the support of judicial precedents. 1961 1 MLJ 184 ; AIR 1965 AP 435 ; 90 LW 47; 19 78 TLNJ 312; C.R.P. No. 2522 of 1977, dated 14th July, 1978.” Thus, it is clear from the ratio laid down in the above quoted cases and under the provisions of S. 10 (3)(i) of the Act, the mere fact that the respondents are entitled to a fractional interest in another building, their claim for own occupation cannot be negatived on the said ground. Further, the Courts below have also held that the building bearing Door No. 43, Village Road, Nungambakkam Madras-34 is a non-residential building and there is no residential portion convenient for the respondents herein for living with their family. 7. Mr. Balasubramanian, learned counsel, also submitted that both the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority had concurrently found that the requirement of the petition mentioned premises for own occupation of the respondent herein is bona fide and the same is also based on evidence and acceptable reasons and this Court exercising its powers of Revision under S. 25 of the Act 18 of 1960 ought not to interfere with the said finding, especially when there is nothing to hold that the said finding suffers from infirmity whatsoever, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangasamy 1. I find much force in the said contention. 8. For all these reasons, the orders of eviction passed by the learned authorities below are confirmed and this Revision fails and stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 9. I wish to express my appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Mr. S. Balasubramanian, member of this bar as amicus curie in this Revision on behalf of the respondents. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the petitioner may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. There will be no order as to costs. 9. I wish to express my appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Mr. S. Balasubramanian, member of this bar as amicus curie in this Revision on behalf of the respondents. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the petitioner may be granted six months time to vacate the premises. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that the petitioner has been in occupation of the premises for a long period, I am of view that his request can be complied with and accordingly, six months time from to-day is granted to the petitioner herein to vacate the premises; but subject to the condition that he files an undertaking affidavit within four weeks from the date of this order that he would vacate the premises within the said six months time and that he would pay the future rent regularly without committing any default.