JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) GRADUAL emergence of the Directive Principles as an important norm of statutory interpretation cannot be over-looked today by this Court. Such a course is mandated by our judicial mentors. What has fallen for the decision of this Court in the instant case is the question of the manner of exercise of its power by the "appropriate government" to refer an "industrial dispute" for adjudication by a Labour Court or an industrial Tribunal. The kernel provisions Section 10 (1) and 12 (5) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, for short the Act, must act an antidote for labour unrest, construed in the context of the Directive Principles. A fair deal to "workers" is underwritten in Art. 43 A as also in Arts. 41-43 of the Constitution by which industrial peace is sought to be secured for national progress and prosperity. ( 2. ) FIRST, the facts which lie within a narrow compass. The second petitioner was appointed to the post of Cashier-cum-clerk w. e. f. 31-12-1976 in the Bank of India, gwalior Branch and he had been serving as such till 4-11-1982 when his services were terminated. Before that, on 4-9-1982, the petitioner was served with a memorandum in which it was stated that he had submitted a false certificate at the time of his appointment and, therefore, he should submit a written explanation therefor. Indeed, an explanation was duly submitted asserting correctness of the certificate and stating the fact that it was submitted in original to the Bank at the time of appointment. From the termination order (Annexure P-6) it is found that action to terminate the services of the petitioner was based on the declaration dated 22-64976 which the petitioner had given while applying for employment. It was to the effect that if any of the information or particulars furnished were found to be materially incorrect or false his services would be liable to be terminated without notice. First petitioner, the Union, espoused the cause of the employee (who is arrayed as petitioner No. 2 in the writ petition) and a telegram was sent on 10-11-1982 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner by the Zonal Secretary of M. P. Bank Employees Association Gwalior Unit (Petitioner no. 1) protesting against the action. On 17-11-1982 a letter (Annexure P-7) was also sent seeking his intervention. 1) protesting against the action. On 17-11-1982 a letter (Annexure P-7) was also sent seeking his intervention. On 20-12-1982 full particulars of the "dispute" were stated by the Union in its letter addressed to the said Commissioner, as per Annexure p-8. This was followed on 24-1-1984 by another letter (Annexure P-9) wherein the grievance that the service of the "workman" had been terminated without payment of retrenchment compensation though he had been in continuous service for six years, was vacally protected. It was also stated that the employers objection as to maintainability of conciliation proceedings on the score of pendency of a civil suit was not maintainable inasmuch as the civil suit was not filed by the Union but by the "workman" (petitioner No. 2) in individual capacity. It was further averred that services of the "workmen" were terminated on account of Union activities as he had been the Office-Secretary of the Union for a long time. ( 3. ) ON 8-7-1983 Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Bhopal, rendered his decision in the matter by addressing a letter (Annexure R-O) to the Secretary, government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi. Copies of the letter were sent to the Manager, Bank of India, Gwalior Branch, Gwalior (respondent No. 1) and Zonal secretary, M. P. Bank Employees Association, Gwalior (Petitioner No. 1 ). The case of the "union" as well as the "management" were stated with reference to Unions letters (dated 17-11-1982) and 24-1-1983 (Annexures P-7 and P-9) and to the Managements "comments" dated 20-12-1982. Eventually, on 23-9-1983, the impugned order rendered in the matter by the Government of India was communicated to the first petitioner as also to the second non-petitioner. Because the controversy in this case hinges on the terms of the order manifested in the said communication, the text thereof is extracted. ( 4. ) ON behalf of the petitioner, Shri H. N. Upadhyaya, drew my attention to two recent decisions of the Apex Court, reported in AIR 1985 S. C. 860 (M. P. Irrigation sangh vs. State of M. P.) and AIR 1985 S. C. 915 (Ram Avtar vs. State of Haryana) to submit forcefully that law is well settled and interpretation of the provisions of sections 10 (1) and 12 (5) is no longer res integra. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2 there is no appearance or return. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2 there is no appearance or return. Shri Dubey, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 (the Bank) contested this position and cited several authorities which, according to him, lends support to view canvassed by him. According to Shri Dubey the provisions of Sections 10 (1) and 12 (5)of the Act/must be construed to confer discretionary powers on the appropriate Government in the matter of making reference. However, I am not at all impressed by the arguments advanced and shall examine the decisions cited at the bar. Even so, I may as well say at once, that mere use of the words "may and "satisfied" in Sections 10 (1) and 12 (5) of the Act by no means conclusively establish legislative intent conferring a pure discretionary power on the authority concerned. In my opinion, the power conferred under Section 10 (1) and Sec. 12 (5) of the Act though discretionary in nature is coupled with a duty and as such the power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and not arbitrarily. Prof. S. A. de Smith has in his renowned work, Judicial Review of Administration Action (3rd Edn.), observed" at page 297 - "if the exercise of discretionary power has been influenced. . . . by the disregard of relevant consideration, a court will normally hold that the power has not been validly exercised. " What the learned author has said is, however, a mere recapitulation of judicial authority manifested in Padfields case, (1968) A. C. 997 and tameside case (1977) A. C. 1014. In both cases the House of Lords, while interpreting a statutory provision couched in "subjective form" observed that exercise of powers even in such a case must manifest proper "self-direction" to relevant facts and that the court was entitled to see if the donee of the power had failed to take into consideration relevant matters, in reaching its conclusion. ( 5. ) THE decisions relied upon by Shri Dubey, reported in AIR 1960 S. C. 1223, air 1964 SC. 1617 and AIR 1978 S. C. 1088were considered by their Lordships in their recent decisions cited by Shri Upadhyaya. The fact that Ram Avtar and M. P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh (supra) differs from the view canvassed by Shri Dubey destroys his contention. ) THE decisions relied upon by Shri Dubey, reported in AIR 1960 S. C. 1223, air 1964 SC. 1617 and AIR 1978 S. C. 1088were considered by their Lordships in their recent decisions cited by Shri Upadhyaya. The fact that Ram Avtar and M. P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh (supra) differs from the view canvassed by Shri Dubey destroys his contention. Still; I shall deal with the cases relied upon by Shri Dubey in due course but presently I prefer to first state the ratio of the decision in Ram Avtars case and M: P. Irrigation Karamchari Sanghs case. In the last mentioned case his lordship Khalid J;, speaking for the Court, observed that the Government had exceeded its jurisdiction in refusing to refer the dispute to the Tribunal by making its own assessment unilaterally of the reasonableness of demand on merits. The same view was expressed by his Lordship Desai J. speaking for the Court in Ram Avtars case where in his Lordship cited a passage from an earlier decision of the Court, reported in air 1970 S. C. 1205 (Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs. Western India Match Co. Workers Union) which I propose to reproduce below "in the State of Madras vs. C. Pi Sarathy this Court held on construction of S. 10 (1) of the Central Act that the function of the Appropriate Government thereunder is an administrative function. It was so held presumbly because the Government cannot go into the" merits of the dispute its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication so that the industrial relations between the employer and his employees may not, continue to remain disturbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible. " (Emphasis supplied by his Lordship.) ( 6. ) IN state of Bombay vs. K. P. Krishnan (AIR 1960s. " (Emphasis supplied by his Lordship.) ( 6. ) IN state of Bombay vs. K. P. Krishnan (AIR 1960s. C. 1223) the Constitution bench, speaking through his Lordship Gajendragadkar J. observed that whether S. M2 (5) is construed as making it obligatory on the Government to make a reference when it is satisfied that there is a case for reference or as only conferring a discretion, if in refusing to make a reference Government influenced by reasons which are wholly extraneous or irrelevant or which are not germane, then its decision may be open to challenge in a Court of law, In Bombay Union of Juornalists vs. State of Bombay AIR 1964 S. C. 1617 it was stated that On disputed questions of fact, the appropriate government cannot purport to reach final conclusions as that would lie within the province of the Industrial Tribunal. Indeed, question of law which arises in any dispute would also lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. In Shambhu nath vs. Bank of Baroda AIR 1978 5. C. 1088 it was held that from the material placed before it the Government reaches an administrative decision whether there exists an industrial dispute or an industrial dispute is apprehended and that in either event it can exercise its power under S, 10 (1 ). The Court cannot be canvassed that the order of reference be closely seen. But it was open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting efforts to show, what was referred was not "industrial dispute" and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain it. ( 7. ) LAW, in my opinion, is well-settled and crystallised beyond dispute. It is open to a party to come to this Court against any order passed by the appropriate government under Section 10 (1) or Section 12 (5) and it can successfully challenge the decision showing that the decision was beyond the purview of the statutory power vested in the Government under Section 10 (1) or Section 12 (5) of the Act and the manner of exercise of the power would be justiciable in such a case. It may be noticed in this connection that S, 12 (5) explicitly requires "reasons" to be stated and as such the validity of the reasons shall be open to challenge. Further, it requires "consideration" of the report of the Conciliation Officer. It may be noticed in this connection that S, 12 (5) explicitly requires "reasons" to be stated and as such the validity of the reasons shall be open to challenge. Further, it requires "consideration" of the report of the Conciliation Officer. Hence the Court can see if the same received due and proper consideration. It shall be open to the party to show that the decision was not based on any material or that in reaching the conclusion the appropriate Government failed to take relevant facts germane to the question raised under S. 10 (1) and S. 12 (5) of the Act. Indeed, if extraneous matters are taken into concideration which are not germane to the question, still the decision rendered can be challenged. The Court is not powerless to test the valid exercise of the power by the appropriate Government as exercise of any power by any public authority is subject to judicial review. Indeed, the test to be applied in determining validity of such orders, as alluded, is manifested in Padfields case and Tamesides case and in the opinion of prof. S. A. de Smith discussed above! ( 8. ) IN the instant case the impugned order has to be struck down on two grounds. There cannot be an iota of doubt that the Central Government transgressed grossly Its jurisdiction which has vitiated exercise of its power under Section 12 (5) of the Act inasmuch as in accepting employers case it rendered a decision on merits having mentioned in the impugned order that the caste certificate produced by the petitioner at the time of his appointment was a false document. It did not lie that the province central Government to record such a finding. What it could merely do was to see if there existed an industrial dispute within the meaning Sec. 2 (k) requiring the same to be referred for determination of the Industrial Tribunal. The fact that there was a "dispute" is manifested in the order itself inasmuch as there was a contest between the parties on the question of authenticity of the caste certificate. That was the dispute parties differed on the genuineness of the document. This question can be decided only by the Tribunal and in refusing to refer the dispute to the Tribunal the appropriat government clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. Both decisions relied upon by Shri H. N. Upadhyaya support this position. That was the dispute parties differed on the genuineness of the document. This question can be decided only by the Tribunal and in refusing to refer the dispute to the Tribunal the appropriat government clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. Both decisions relied upon by Shri H. N. Upadhyaya support this position. However, Shri Dubey contended that the appropriate Government still had a function to discharge under Sec. 12 (5) while considering the question of making reference and this function could not merely be of a post-office or letter-box. The appropriate Government had to consider "prima facie" case of the parties. But the question is, what "prima facie" case it had to consider. Certainly not the prima facie case on merits; it had to merely see if prima facie there was a "dispute" between the parties. In the instant case, as alluded, "dispute" was very much apparent and it was writ large on the face of the impugned order. In such a case, therefore, refusal to exercise its power to refer the "dispute" for adjudication by the industrial Tribunal must be held illegal. The facts of the case warranted exercise of jurisdiction to refer the "dispute". Central Government acted in excess of its jurisdiction by refusing the prayer. ( 9. ) HOWEVER, there is another cancer in the order which has to be treated and it has to be stated that the Central Government did not apply its mind to the materials before it in rendering the decision manifested in the impugned Annexure P-10. The decision came to be rendered on the "report" submitted by Assistant Labour commissioner wherein the case of each of the parties was stated. The "union" in its letter dated 24-1-1983 (Annexure P-9) while delineating the scope of the "dispute" stated that the service of the petitioner was terminate without payment of retrenchment compensation. This matter received no consideration at all. From this it becomes clear that the relevant materials were not taken into consideration in rendering the decision. The order is totally silent, jejune and barren on this aspect of the case. It is therefore, difficult to hold that the appropriate Government had at all acted with responsibility and due diligence in discharging its statutory duty in rendering the decision on the question of making reference as provided under the Act. The order is totally silent, jejune and barren on this aspect of the case. It is therefore, difficult to hold that the appropriate Government had at all acted with responsibility and due diligence in discharging its statutory duty in rendering the decision on the question of making reference as provided under the Act. The reasons given for refusing to make the reference were neither germane to the object of S. 10 (1) or S. 12 (5) nor supported by materials the report and documents mentioned therein. ( 10. ) ON merits, therefore, this petition must succeed but there is one objection which, though feeble, must not be left unheeded. Shri Dubey contended that the petitioner should be refused relief because he has not come to this Court with clean hands. He referred to certain facts. But in my opinion, these facts are of equivocal complexion and I find it very difficult to hold that on those facts it cart be definitely held that the petitioner either deliberately made any false statement or has deliberately suppressed any material fact from this Court. This position is not free from doubt and the benefit of doubt must go to the petitioner. In any case, when the order is found to be palpably devoid of jurisdiction, relief cannot be refused to the petitioner on a flimsy plea. ( 11. ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order (Annexure P-10) dated 23-9-1983 is quashed. The appropriate authority of the Central government is directed to consider the matter afresh in the light of the observations made above and render a legal and valid decision in accordance with law. This shall be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. Although shri Upadhyaya prays for a mere substantial relief that a mandamus should be issued to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 making them to refer the "dispute" to the Industrial tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case I do not consider that the petitioners case merits the relief prayed by his counsel. Prayer for this claim was based on the decisions he had cited but those decisions in my opinion, have a distinguishing feature. In both cases there was an inordinate delay of about six years and the petitioners had suffered several bouts of litigation. Prayer for this claim was based on the decisions he had cited but those decisions in my opinion, have a distinguishing feature. In both cases there was an inordinate delay of about six years and the petitioners had suffered several bouts of litigation. Therefore, in M. P. Irrigations case further litigation short-circuited while on the other hand, in Ram Avtar, Central government was still asked to reconsider the case, as I have done. Normally, the authority statutorily empowered to take a decision must be left with the freedom to exercise its jurisdiction. Ultimate relief by a leap-frog procedure is called for only in exceptional eases. ( 12. ) ON the question of costs", I have heard counsel on both sides. In the facts and circumstances I must accept Shri Dubeys contention that the respondents need not be saddled with any costs. Indeed, the matter is ex parte against respondents Nos. 1 and 2; further it has not been finally disposed of. The petitioner has only partially succeeded. Security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Order accordingly.