JUDGMENT : 1. This is a civil second appeal by the defendant in a suit for eviction the decree of which was granted by the Munsif, Nasirabad, confirmed by the Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer. 2. The only point argued by Shri C.K. Garg was that the counsel for the defendant conceded that the amendment Act of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act,1950 (hereinafter, for brevity 'the Act'), would not apply to the 'cantonment', and he was not justified in making this concession. 3. Shri A.K. Bhandari, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, submitted that the concession was made with the consciousness of the law on the point, and the concession is binding only unless it is shown to be vitiated on account of omission or commission of the counsel. 4. However, in view of the importance of the matter and question of construction and implication of law involved, I have heard Shri Garg at length even on the merits of the case about the applicability of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (control of Rent & Eviction) Act, which was introduced by an amendment. There is no doubt that Nasirabad is cantonment area. 5. In Nawal Mal v. Nathu Mal, AIR 1962 Raj. 190 Division Bench of this Court held as under : "A law pertaining to the control of rents in cantonment areas fall within the ambit of entry 3 of list 1 of the seventh schedule under the Constitution. The expression "including the control of rents" in this entry cannot be limited so as to exclude the control of rents" in this entry cannot be limited so as to exclude the control of rents as between private landlords and the tenants in the cantonment areas. The regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, having regard to the wide scope of this expression, cannot be confined to the acquiring or requisitioning or allocating the house accommodation therein. But such regulation may include the control of evictions from or the letting out of or fixation of rents generally for houses situate in cantonment areas. (para 11). It is not doubt true that the general subject of regulating the relationship of landlord and tenants within the meaning of the various Rent Restriction Acts is a concurrent subject; on which the Union Parliament as well as the State Legislature would be competent to legislate. (para 11). It is not doubt true that the general subject of regulating the relationship of landlord and tenants within the meaning of the various Rent Restriction Acts is a concurrent subject; on which the Union Parliament as well as the State Legislature would be competent to legislate. But it is a fundamental principle of this interpretation of entries in the legislative lists that, in case of any conflict between them, it is the duty of the Court to try and reconcile them between each other, and that as far as possible none of the entries become a dead letter, and the legislative power of each legislature under the different entries is maintained, and it is only as a last resort that the superior and predominant legislative power of the Parliament must be invoked. (para 11).Adopted this principle, any conflict between entire Nos. 6, 7 and 13 of list III on the one hand (or for that matter entry No. 19 of list II) and entry No. 3 of list I on the other can be satisfactorily resolved by holding that any legislation in the matter of control of house regulation including control of rent in the cantonment areas even if they are situated within the territory of a State, falls exclusively within the competence of the Union parliament, though such legislation in the rest of the territory of that State would be within its own competence, or that of the Union Parliament, as the case may be.So interpreted, the various entries present no conflict whatsoever and the legislative power of each legislature would be preserved without any undue invasion by the other. Legislation with regard to control of rents in a cantonment area is the exclusive field of the Union; and it must follow as a corollary from this that since Parliament has exclusive power so legislate with respect to these areas, as State Legislature cannot legislate with respect to any such matter even indirectly on the principle that what one cannot do directly, it will not be permitted to do indirectly. (para 11)The enactment of Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 by the Union Parliament leaves no doubt as to the true intention of the Parliament underlying entry 3 of list I and that intention undoubtedly was that even the subject of rent control, using the term in its general or extensive sense, in cantonment areas was to be within the exclusive competence of the Union Legislative field, and that such control was not intended to be relegated to the State field or the concurrent field of legislation. (para 12)In this view of the matter there is no warrant to hold that, on the doctrine of pith and substance, the power to legislate for control of rents and eviction of tenants in cantonment areas fall within the State or the concurrent legislative field, or that the extension of such law as is prevalent in the rest of the State to the cantonment area, by the State Legislature would be merely in incidental encroachment and, therefore, unobjectionable as any invasion on the legislative field of the Union Parliament. The doctrine of pith and substance is not at all attracted in a case like the present, because what really takes place in the circumstances, is clear and unmistakable encroachment on the Union field of legislation and this is not at all permissible. For the same reasons Article 254 of the Constitution can have no application in such a case. (para 12)It follows, therefore, that Section 291) and (2) of the Rajasthan Act of 1950, as amended by Act 34 of 1957, in so far as they apply to the cantonment area of Nasirabad, are beyond the legislative competence of the legislature of Rajasthan State inasmuch as the control of rent within cantonment areas is within the exclusive competence of the Union Parliament by virtue of entry 3 in list I of the seventh schedule read with Article 246 of the Constitution. It may also be added that the Notification No. F. 7. (1)(H)(D)/57 dated the 27th November, 1957 by which Sections 5 to 26 of the Act of 1950 were made applicable to the cantonment area of Nasirabad, was beyond the competence of the State Government and is, therefore, of no legal effect." (para 17) 6. The above decision was confirmed by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi, AIR 1970 SC 228 . The above decision was confirmed by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi, AIR 1970 SC 228 . It was observed that, in the Constitution, the effect of entry 3 of list 1 is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters contained in that entry, notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any entry in list II of list III. It was then observed that when power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommodation which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation required for military purpose or must be accommodation that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military. In para 13, the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Nawal mal v. Nathulal (supra) was referred, and it was observed that in Rajasthan case, it was held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in entries 6, 7 and 13 of list III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in entry 18 of list II, and that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under entry 3 of list I. 7. After referring the judgment of this Court in Nawal mal v. Nathulal (supra) , it was observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhusan v. Rama Sundari (supra) , as under : "That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in the appeal before us. We think that the decision given by he Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld." It is not the case of Shri C.K. Garg, that this view taken by the Apex Court, which wholly applies and the power to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, is exclusively governed by the law made by the Parliament; have been subsequently changed or watered down. 8. 8. Shri Garg on the contrary invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nandlal v. Motilal, AIR 1977 SC 2143 , and submitted that in view of the decision in nandlal v. Motilal earlier judgment of the Apex Court in Indu Bhusan v. Rama Sundari (supra) and judgment in Rajasthan case of Nawalmal v. Nathulal (supra) can no longer be held to be a good law on the point. 9. In nandlal v. Motilal (supra) the question was, whether the notification under the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 extending provisions of Chapters II and IV to certain Municipalities which was existing at that time could be deemed to be defective or would be extended to the Municipalities formed thereafter. It was observed that no further notification was necessary even in the case of those municipalities which are formed later on. 10. It is difficult to appreciate how the Brear judgment (supra) where question canvassed and adjudicated was not about the powers of the State Government in contract to the powers of the Parliament or Central Government can be pressed into service for holding that earlier view taken by this Court in Nawalmal v. Mathulal upheld by the Apex Court in Indu Bhusan v. Rama sundari (supra) no longer holds good law. 11. Shri Garg also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Chunnilal v. Vaspujaiji Maharaj . In that case, it was held that in the Rajasthan area, where the Main Act (Rajasthan Premises (control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950), was applicable earlier, the amendment introduced in Section 13-A was also applicable automatically, and, therefore, no notification was necessary. 12. There cannot be any dispute debate or doubt about the above view when the competence of the State Legislature is not in question. In the instant case, most important feature is that the parliament, in its wisdom, has kept exclusive to its power to regulate the house accommodation in cantonment areas, and that being so, the State Legislature cannot make any laws on the principle that it is a case of "occupied field". The doctrine of 'occupied field' in constitutional law is well known and I need not deal with it at length. The doctrine of 'occupied field' in constitutional law is well known and I need not deal with it at length. According to the constitution provisions, referred to in the judgment of the High Court and the Supreme Court, both in respect of Nasirabad cantonment area case, as squarely upheld by the Apex Court the powers of regulation of house accommodation in these cantonment areas are exclusively with the parliament for the purpose of legislation. That being so, any departure from it can only be made under the law of parliament and the State Government howsoever it may be, making laws for its own State, is powerless on account of the legislative incompetence in the cases of "occupied field". 13. The question which now emerges for consideration is, however, earlier notification which was issued in 1971 when Section 14 had not seen light of the day, would cover it also. In this respect, it is significant to note that as would be clear from the notification of 3rd September 1982 (published in the Gazette of India) : September 18, 1982 Part I Section 4 p. 324), which was issued in suppression of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence No. SRO 367 dated the 23rd September, 1971, the various modifications were made at the time of the application. 14. It is of great importance and significance that while introducing these modifications sub-clause (2) of this notification makes it explicit that all suits pending immediately before the commencement of this notification before any court shall continue to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said notification as if the same had continued in force and this notification had not been issued, provided that the provisions for appeal under the said notification shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder. 15. It is not in dispute that so far as the amendment introduced in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, by introduction of Section 14 is concerned, the Government of India never issued a separate notification applying to this cantonment area and Shri Garg laid much emphasis that the concession was only to the limited extent to the lower Court. Irrespective of the concession no such notification has been shown even in this Court by which Section 14 was made applicable in the cantonment area or the amendment Act, by which Section 14 was introduced was made applicable to the cantonment area of Nasirabad. 16. In view of the above legal constitutional situation which has emerged out of various decisions and constitutional provisions, there is no escape but to hold that so far as Nasirabad cantonment area is concerned, since the amending Act inducting Section 14 was not applied expressly, and there is no legislative competence of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly in this respect this being 'occupied field' of the parliament, there cannot be any automatic extension or application of Section 14 of the Act. Incidentally, the proviso introduced by notification No. 1982 also expressly bars any such attempt to apply that even in the cases which were pending earlier. 17. In view of the above, the judgment of the first appellate Court calls for no interference and this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 18. Shri Garg prays that the appellant may be allowed time to vacate the premises. This prayer appears to be reasonable. 19. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs, but the appellant is allowed three months' time to vacate the premises as prayed, on the conditions that he would pay arrears of rent, if any due, within three months from today; that he would continue to pay regularly the rent by 10th of next every month during this period of three months; and that he would also given undertaking that he would vacate and hand over the possession of the premises in question on expiry of three months from to day unless he is successful in getting any stay order from the Apex Court. The undertaking would be given within one week from the date of receipt of this judgment in the office of Registry.