ORDER K.T. Thomas, J. 1. A landlady, whose only building is in the possession of a tenant, has been trying for nearly a decade now to get back her building for her residential purposes. When the oral request made by her and the notice sent through her lawyer were all unheeded, she had filed an application before the Rent Control Court in 1677 for eviction of the tenant on different grounds under the Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act (for short 'the Act'). 2. Though the Rent Control Court had dismissed her application, the Appellate Authority had found favour with the ground under S.11(3) of the Act and ordered eviction. But the District Court, in revision, has reversed the order and hence the landlord has come up to this court invoking the powers under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If is (fairly conceded that no reference to the other grounds for eviction need be made, because the landlord will win or lose this case on the ground under S.11(3) alone. 3. Some more facts have to be stated. The landlord in her petition has stated that this building is the only building belonging to her in this world, and even her husband has no building of his own and that she and her husband are residing now at Trivandrum in a rented building and her husband expects a transfer to a place in the suburbs of Ernakulam, and whether the transfer materialises or not, she wants to reside in her own building with her son, (who was then a student) and that she has been pressing the tenant to vacate the building to enable her to occupy it and the tenant has agreed to vacate it, but he has been delaying it. When the tenant expressed his refusal to vacate, in answer to her notice sent through the lawyer, she had filed the petition claiming that she bona fide requires the building for her own occupation. The tenant, in his counter, has repudiated this claim of the landlord which he has characterised as the consequence of his disinclination to agree for an exorbitant enhancement of the rent demanded by the landlord. Thus the tenant questions the bona fides of the landlord's claim. 4. The tenant, in his counter, has repudiated this claim of the landlord which he has characterised as the consequence of his disinclination to agree for an exorbitant enhancement of the rent demanded by the landlord. Thus the tenant questions the bona fides of the landlord's claim. 4. Though the Rent Control Court was not satisfied of the bona fides of the landlord's need, the Appellate Authority has found that in favour of the landlord. According to the Appellate Authority, since the petitioner owns only one building, the presumption must be that the claim is bona fide. The further reasoning adopted by the Appellate Authority is that as the landlord's near relatives are residing in the nearby house of this building, she may be feeling aloofness in the distant city of Trivandrum with none of her relatives to support her, especially because her husband's job requires lot of touring and hence she will be all alone in the house at Trivandrum. The Appellate Authority has chosen to believe the testimony of the landlord as PW. 1 on the above score. Taking into account, the above circumstances, and also her desire to put her son in the polytechnic Institute Kalamasseri, the Appellate Authority was persuaded to find that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, 5. The revisional court interfered with that finding on the assumption that the only ground alleged by the landlord is that since her husband was expecting a transfer from Trivandrum to a subrban place of Ernakulam she imperatively needs the residence in this building, and that since it is not known as to when the proposed transfer will materialise and since it is not revealed as to what efforts have been made to obtain the transfer, the above ground cannot be treated as bona fide. However the revisional court was not prepared to believe the tenant's allegation that this petition for eviction is the consequence of the tenants's refusal to accede to the demand of the landlord for an exhorbitant enhancement of the rent of the building. Nor was the revisional court inclined to accept PW. 1's version that her son is admitted in the Polytechnic at Kalamasseri and her husband's job involves a lot of touring which makes her feel lonely in Trivandrum, as these details do not appear in the pleadings. Nor was the revisional court inclined to accept PW. 1's version that her son is admitted in the Polytechnic at Kalamasseri and her husband's job involves a lot of touring which makes her feel lonely in Trivandrum, as these details do not appear in the pleadings. The revisional court was not persuaded to act on the testimony of the landlord alone to believe that her son is admitted in an institution at Kalamasseri. For these reasons, the District Court has reversed the finding of the Appellate Authority. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner (landlord) has contended that the District Court has gone far beyond its jurisdiction vested under S.20 of the Act, by coming to its own conclusion, different from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellants Authority. Is it enough that the revisional court has different reasons to come to a different conclusion from that of the Appellate Authority ? Going a step further, is it enough, for interference, that the revisional court has better reasons than the reasons adopted by the Appellate Authority ? 7. It is true that the words used in S.20 of the Act are wider than the ambit provided in S.115 of the C. P. C. Even then the function of the District Court while exercising jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act is subject to inherent limitations Three indications pointing to those limitations can be had from the Act itself. S.18(5) says that the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in S.20. This is a note caution struck by the legislature that finality must be attached to the finding of the Appellate Authority and it is only in exceptional cases that the District Court is permitted to disturb the said finality. The second indication can be gathered from the title given to S.20 itself, that, it is only a "revision". A revisional jurisdiction, as is" well known, is only a supervisory jurisdiction. It is not a jurisdiction co-extensive with that of a fact finding court. The third indication can be found in the body of the Section itself that the purpose of calling for the records and examining them is "to satisfy itself" as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceedings. It is not a jurisdiction co-extensive with that of a fact finding court. The third indication can be found in the body of the Section itself that the purpose of calling for the records and examining them is "to satisfy itself" as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the order or proceedings. In a series of decisions rendered by this court, the limitations of the scope of the revisional powers of the District Court under S.20 of the Act have been repeatedly stressed. e. g. Doraiswami Chettiar v. Nhandammadan Kunhiraman ( 1969 KLJ 227 . Kadeersha v. Venkitaswamy (1976 KLT 260), Varkey v. Raman Pillai ( 1981 KLT 213 ). The trend of those decisions is to remind that the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority under S.20, to interfere with the finding of fact is limited to cases where the impugned order is perverse or arbitrary, in the sense that no reasonable tribunal would have come to such a decision on the basis of the evidence on record. A reappraisal or even a reconsideration of the evidence on record is permitted in revision only for a limited purpose of satisfying about the legality, regularity and propriety of the order under attack. The consideration of the Revisional Authority should not even be whether a more reasonable conclusion is possible in the process of the reappraisal of evidence. If the revisional court feels that two conclusions are possible, then it is not open to the revisional court to substitute its conclusions for the conclusion arrived at on facts by the Appellate Authority. 8. In Rajalekshmi Dyeing Works v. Renga Swami (AIR 1980 SC 1233), the Supreme Court was considering the scope of S.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960, which is analogous to S.20 of the Act. There, the power of revision is conferred on the High Court to call for and examine the records of the Appellate Authority "to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration it may pass orders accordingly". Dealing with the scope of the said S.25 of the said Act, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "The language of S.25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstance that both the expressions 'appeal' and 'revision' are employed in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression 'revision' is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression 'appeal' In fact it has to be noticed that under S.25 the High Court calls for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words 'to satisfy itself under S.25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under S.25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in S.25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority". 9. It has to be noted that despite a slightly wider language employed in S.25 of the said Act than the language used in S.20 of the Kerala Act, the Supreme Court has pointed out the restrictions and limitations in exercise of the jurisdiction. Judging it from this stand, the District Court has beyond its jurisdiction in finding out its own different reasons in substitution for the reasons adopted by the Appellate Authority. 10. The learned Counsel for the tenant has very strenuously contended that the landlord ought to have mentioned in the application, all the facts necessary for his relief. According to him, the version that his son is studying in the Polytechnic at Kalamasseri should necessarily have found a place in the pleadings. Without mentioning those facts in the pleadings, according to the learned counsel, no weight can be attached to the testimony of PW. 1, when she had spoken about such things for the first time in her evidence. He has referred me to the decision reported in Valiyil Moideenkunhi v. Edacherikkandi ( 1982 KLJ 698 ) in support of this line of argument. 11. It is true that the factual foundation for the grounds taken up by a landlord must find a place in his petition, for, otherwise the tenant will be prejudiced by the absence of such facts in the petition. 11. It is true that the factual foundation for the grounds taken up by a landlord must find a place in his petition, for, otherwise the tenant will be prejudiced by the absence of such facts in the petition. But it does not mean that every detail and every circumstance which are matters of evidence must also find a place in the petition. It has now become well nigh settled that in Rent Control proceedings, meticulous application of the principles of pleading need not be insisted upon. Here in this case, the landlord had laid the factual foundation in her petition to support the ground under S.11(3). She has specifically mentioned in the petition that she wants to reside with her son and that she has no other building nor her husband has any building of his own and now they are residing in a rented building in a far away place. From these facts, it cannot be said that the tenant is in any way prejudiced by lack of pleadings. Therefore I am not impressed by this line of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. 12. As the District Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction conferred by S.20 of the Act, I hold that the order under attack is vitiated by jurisdictional error. In the result, I allow this revision and set aside the order of the District court and restore that of the Appellate Authority. The learned councel for the respondent, as a last resort has submitted that atleast six months time may be granted to the tenant to vacate from the premises. If the tenant gives an undertaking in the execution court that he will vacate from the premises within six months from this date, that court should grant such time to the tenant. If no such undertaking in made by the tenant, the execution court is not bound to grant the said time. This revision is disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.