JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) REFUSAL of temporary injunction finally by the trial Court is the subject - matter of challenge in this petition. The admitted position, however, is that the petitioner is in possession of the premises and his counsel contends foreefully that the premises not being "public premises" within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Madhya Pradesh Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974 (for short, the act) he cannot be evicted therefrom pursuant to the notice served and any decision taken under the Act by any authority. In the suit, validity of notice as well as the decision rendered by the "competent Authority" was challenged. ( 2. ) SHRI Apte, learned counsel for the respondent (No. 3), has vehemently opposed petitioners prayer for temporary injunction, reiterated in this Court, which was refused by the trial Court. In the fore-front of his argument, Shri Apte has pressed a very forceful weapon, relying on the provisions of Section 10 of the act. It is contemplated thereunder that every order made by a competent authority or appellate authority under the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. ( 3. ) FOR disposal of Shri Aptes objection, I need not travel far because of the view 1 took in the case of State of Assam v. B. D. Patowari, 1984 1 GLR 66. wherein a similar question cropped up. It was held that the power of the trial Court to order temporary injunction in a case in which its jurisdiction to entertain the suit was barred did not lose its efficacy or potency wholly. The question of maintainability of the suit was question which had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and not any other law. The question of maintainability of the suit was question which had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and not any other law. I am also of the view in this case that the provision of Section 10 cannot be read as implied and omnibus repeal of any provision of Civil Procedure Code the settled law being that Courts frown upon exclusion of jurisdiction and hold that even when any statutory exclusion is pleaded, it would be a question for decision on the facts and circumstances of the case as to whether the provision could at all be invoked. It is only in the course of trial at any of the different stages indicated by the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 and Order 16 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code that the question relating to exclusion of jurisdiction can be decided by a civil Court and on the Courts jurisdiction refusing it power to issue a temporary injunction till is not to be countenanced. This view was taken in B. D. Patowari (supra) and I see no reason to depart from the view so taken even reading the provision of Section 10, relied on by Shri Apte. ( 4. ) FOLLOWING the universally accepted norm of strict construction in the matter of exclusion of jurisdiction, I have failed to discern in it any new strain of exclusionary rule. I extract, in extenso, Section 10: "10. Finality of orders,. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this act. Every order made by a competent authority or appellate authority under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. " The key expression obviously is, "under this Act" leaving wide open, as is usually done legislatively in such cases, the question of jurisdictional competence, for adjudication in a civil suit. The bar obviously is not total or peremptory. If any action not authorised by the Act is exercised, or is exercised in a manner which is not authorised by the Act, a civil suit will not be barred in such cases to challenge the action or exercise of the power under the Act. The bar obviously is not total or peremptory. If any action not authorised by the Act is exercised, or is exercised in a manner which is not authorised by the Act, a civil suit will not be barred in such cases to challenge the action or exercise of the power under the Act. ( 5. ) THE foremost question to be considered is the question of actual possession of the premises in such a case where prayer for temporary injunction is made. The fact is not denied that the plaintiff-petitioner is in possession of the premises. The balance of convenience is in his favour. He shall suffer irreparable injury if he is dispossessed from the concerned premises because right to shelter is a fundamental right embraced by Article 21, as held in Gopiram v. Bina Agrawal, (1985) 1 GLR 248, and denial of the right unreasonably and arbitrarily would be a void action, not to be suffered at any cost. That apart, the question mooted in the suit being related to jurisdictional competence of the authority concerned to issue the impugned notice in respect of the concerned premises, it would be difficult to say that the plaintiff did not have a prima facie case to go to trial. In this view of the matter, I have no doubt at all to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to an order of temporary injunction of course not until disposal of the suit, but until the question of maintainability of the suit was decided and this question has to be decided as expeditiously as possible. ( 6. ) ACCORDINGLY, I direct that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the premises in question for such time till a decision is rendered on a preliminary issue to be framed on the question of maintainability of the suit under Section 10 of the Act and decision thereon is rendered. This shall, however, be done within a period of two months. ( 7. ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Petition allowed.