Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, an aided school teacher, applied for 255 days' leave on personal grounds, from 19-7-76 to 30-3-77. The application was forwarded to the D.E.O., but that officer wanted to know the real reason for the leave before it was granted. The petitioner was not inclined to disclose it, and leave was not granted. On 30-10-76 the Manager directed him to report for duty, but the petitioner stayed away from the school for the whole of the 255 days. He wanted to rejoin duty on 31-3-77 but was not permitted to do so as the Manager was thinking of disciplinary action against him for unauthorised absence. In the meanwhile, the petitioner approached the Educational authorities complaining that he was being illegally kept out of employment; and as per Ext.P1 dated 26-4-79 the State Government directed the manager to permit the teacher to rejoin duty, as he had not been kept under suspension. The Manager accordingly reinstated him on 4-6-79. 2. The question then arose as to how the petitioner's period of absence/non-employment from 19-7-76 to 3-6-79 was to be treated; and by Ext.P4 order dated 11-3-81, Government directed that: (i) he will be sanctioned leave without allowances for 255 days (19-7-76 to 30-3-77) subject to the condition that the leave period will not count for service benefits; and (ii) he will also be granted leave without allowances for the period from 31-3-77 to 3-6-79 when he was not actually on duty. And the only point urged by counsel is that Government should have treated the second of the above spells (31-3-77 to 3-6-79) as duty, and allowed full pay and allowances for the period. The argument is that the petitioner was willing to join duty from 31-3-77, that he was kept out of employment thereafter for no fault of his, and that consequently it would be unjust to deny him salary and allowances for that period. 3. What are the rights of an employee kept out of office by his employer, when the employer's action is subsequently found to be unjustified by a competent authority? There seem to be two or three theories competing for supremacy in this area. One is the theory of full and complete restitution: the person against whom a wrong is committed should be granted all the dues which would have been his, had the wrong been not committed. There seem to be two or three theories competing for supremacy in this area. One is the theory of full and complete restitution: the person against whom a wrong is committed should be granted all the dues which would have been his, had the wrong been not committed. A second theory is that salary and allowances are payable for rendering service in an office, and that when an employee has not rendered such service for a period, he cannot invariably claim full salary and allowances as compensation even if the fault was not his, but was that of the employer. Ordinarily, be could claim only damages; and whether the quantum of damages could be equivalent to full salary and allowances would depend on many considerations, and not on any inflexible rule. There is also the well-known principle that where a public authority dismisses an employee in violation of the mandatory requirements of a statutory rule governing the matter, the employee will be entitled to reinstatement and full back-wages, notwithstanding the rule against specific enforcement of a contract of service. The principle seems to be that a legal person like a statutory body could act only in accordance with law, and all its actions contrary to law are non-est: an illegal termination of service of one of its employees is something the law will not recognise. Views have also been expressed that instead of going by abstract principles, the attempt of the court should be to do justice by taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances. So far as public employment is concerned, there is a view that the public coffers should not be held fully liable for every mistake committed by one officer in dealing with a subordinate of his: to stretch the theory of fault-liability to such an extent would be against public interest, it has been suggested. Yet, where constitutional protections like those under Art.311 are overlooked, courts generally insist on full restitution. In the realm of pure master-and-servant relationship, improper or illegal termination of a contract of employment is normally followed by grant of damages only, depending upon the nature of the employment, the express or implied terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances. But where there are statutory rules governing the relationship, different considerations may arise. 4. But where there are statutory rules governing the relationship, different considerations may arise. 4. In Joseph v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT 607) Kochu Thommen J. held that when the termination of a Government servant is set aside by a court and that decision is allowed to become final, the Government cannot thereafter deny him salary and allowances for the period he was kept out of employment: to permit that being done would be allowing the Government to take advantage of its own wrong. More or less the same view was expressed by Khalid J. in Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT 29) in a different language when it was held that "when a person entitled to a particular post on promotion has been reverted or whose service has been wrongfully terminated for no fault of his but on account of the wrong committed by his employer, then he is entitled to the pecuniary benefit that he would have got had he continued in the post or promoted at due time." Speaking for a Division Bench of this Court in Eapen v. Union of India (1979 KLT 861), Eradi J. observed that where a person is discharged from service on ground of superannuation while a dispute regarding his date of birth is pending before a competent court, and that court ultimately holds that the claim for correction is justified, the employee prematurely retired "would be entitled to be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits". In Jane v. State of Kerala (1983 KLT 868) Sukumaran J. said that where there is a binding judgment directing retrospective reinstatement, it will have to be implemented "with all its concomitant consequences, including arrears of salary". 5. The decision in Rajppan Nair v. State (1984 KLT 141) apparently proceeded on the assumption that full restitution should be the normal rule in all cases where a person is prevented from discharging the functions of his office for no fault of his. But Philomina v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 59) struck a slightly different note: the observations there proceeded on the basis that subject to exception, the normal rule would be that "no government servant is entitled to be paid for work which he has not done". But Philomina v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 59) struck a slightly different note: the observations there proceeded on the basis that subject to exception, the normal rule would be that "no government servant is entitled to be paid for work which he has not done". The above difference in approach between Rajappan Nair (1984 KLT 141) and Philomina (1984 KLT 59) was noticed by a third Division Bench in Gracy v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 269). but the matter was disposed of by holding that the particular case before their Lordships fell "under the class of cases of the first category". And in State of Kerala v. Narayanan (1985 KLT 695) another Division Bench observed that Government should not try to enrich itself by denying arrears when promotions are ordered belatedly. If I may say so with respect, Gopalan Nambiyar C. J. and Balagangadharan Nair J. were mere circumspect in their approach to a similar question, in W. A. 251/78: their Lordships said that there could be no "universal rule or principle" applicable to all situations. Probably more directly in point will be the decision in W. A. 209/ 78 where Eradi J., again speaking for a Division Bench, said that where a teacher is wrongfully kept out of employment by the Manager of a school, there could be no absolute liability on the part of the Government to pay him the full salary and allowances for the period of unemployment. 6. A contract of employment being not specifically enforceable, the ordinary remedy for a person complaining breach of such a contract is to claim damages only. But as noticed by Chandrasekhar Menon J. in S. M. Rebello v. E. Zouppas and 2 others (1982 KLJ 414) there are exceptions to this rule. But the exceptions also do not appear to set a pattern from which general or abstract principles could be deduced. 7. That the Supreme Court has also not recognised any invariable rule regarding grant of arrears of salary in a case of wrongful denial of promotion to a Government servant, is clear from Krishnamoorthy v. General Manager (1976) 4 SCC 825. 8. The proper course therefore seems to be to examine the facts of the case on hand in the light of the rules governing the relationship between the parties, and to see whether the Government's decision in Ext. 8. The proper course therefore seems to be to examine the facts of the case on hand in the light of the rules governing the relationship between the parties, and to see whether the Government's decision in Ext. P4 is so illegal or improper as to call for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. The first thing to be noticed in this connection is that though the manager of an aided school is the employer of a teacher under him, he has no unrestricted power of hire and fire over such a teacher, as a master ordinarily has over his servant. Under the Kerala Education Rules, the appointment of a teacher by the manager requires the approval of the Educational authorities; and a teacher cannot also be dismissed by the manager, except after obtaining the previous sanction of such authorities. Under R.65 of Chapter XIV-A any dispute between a teacher and manager can be referred to the decision of the Educational Authorities. The power of a manager to suspend a teacher is severely circumscribed by the requirements of R.67, and the provisions of R.75 curtail his disciplinary power also. R.92 confers a very wide power of revision on the Government, in respect of orders passed by the subordinate authorities under the Chapter. In short, the Education Act and the Rules make considerable inroads into the relationship between a manager and a teacher working under him. The second thing to be noticed is that the responsibility to pay salary and allowances to the aided school teachers is taken over by the Government (under S.9 of the Act): another unusual feature in relation to employment of one by another, Now, if the petitioner in this case was wrongfully kept out of employment from 31-3-77 to 3-6-79, that was done by the manager: the "fault", if any, was that of the manager, and he alone need suffer for it. If that is so, how can the Government be called upon to pay the salary and allowances of the petitioner for the above period? The fault theory, the theory of undue enrichment, of taking advantage of one's own wrong etc., all break down when we try to apply them to a case like the present. If that is so, how can the Government be called upon to pay the salary and allowances of the petitioner for the above period? The fault theory, the theory of undue enrichment, of taking advantage of one's own wrong etc., all break down when we try to apply them to a case like the present. The principles relevant for a declaration of nullity are also of doubtful application, because even if it was possible to issue such a declaration, the consequences could not be imposed on a third party like the State. 9. What then is the answer to the petitioner's claim? One way of answering it is to hold that unless he is able to place his fingers on some statutory provision obliging the Government to pay the salary and allowances of a teacher placed in similar circumstances, this court cannot, by mandamus compel the Government to pay the same to him. Another way of looking at the problem is to think that as the petitioner was able to invoke Government's benevolence in his favour, in the matter of getting a direction for reinstatement as per Ext. P1, he should also be satisfied with the further orders he was able to obtain from the same authority in the matter of regularising the period of absence. This approach may be negative but so long as the source of Government's power to issue Exts. P1 and P5 is not traced or traceable, this Court cannot be called upon to test the legality of one of them alone, without reference to any statutory or legal standards. Admittedly, the petitioner had stayed away from his post for nearly the whole of an academic year without leave or sanction, and if the manager chose not to readmit him to duty on the day he returned, but thought of taking some action against him, that could not be characterised as wholly unjustified. At least that appears to be the conclusion reached by Government before issuing Ext. P4, when it declined to grant salary and allowances to the petitioner for the period after 31-3-77 also. Having due regard to the decision in W. A. 209/78 noticed earlier, and after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the present is not a case where this Court should be called upon to interfere with the directions in Ext. P4. Having due regard to the decision in W. A. 209/78 noticed earlier, and after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the present is not a case where this Court should be called upon to interfere with the directions in Ext. P4. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.