JUDGMENT 1. We have heard Sri L.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner, at some length. The petitioner is an employee of the respondent, Geep Industrial Syndicate, Ltd., Allahabad, a company incorporated under the Companies Act. The petitioner is currently employed in the marketing section at Allahabad in the supervisory grade II. He has been ordered to proceed to Patna (Bihar) for field training and future assignment. Annexure VII to the writ petition contains the above order, dated 8 February 1985, passed by the sales manager of the company, and indicates that the training period will extend to two months. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 2. The primary question is whether the writ petition is at all maintainable. The petitioner is an employee of a company owned by shareholders and is not a subsidiary of any Government company, nor controlled by Government, nor has been taken over by the Government under any Act. The terms and conditions of service are governed by the contract of employment. But Sri K.P. Agrawal argued that the company is an industrial enterprise manufacturing among other things torch and dry cell. Conditions of service are governed by the Standing Orders, which have been certified under the 1946 Act, and have statutory force. The Standing Orders prohibit transfer of any employee but any workmen may be transferred at the discretion of the management from one department to another or from one section to another provided the transfer is on an equivalent and same type of job and the emolument and status of the workman are not affected. Learned counsel submitted that the order of transfer is in breach of certified Standing Orders. Consequently, he urged that it is open to the petitioner to seek redress of his grievances in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel in support of his contention cited a number of authorities to urge that the principles laid down in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1981-I L.L.N. 270, when extended would be applicable to a company incorporated under the Companies Act. 3. Learned counsel in support of his contention cited a number of authorities to urge that the principles laid down in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1981-I L.L.N. 270, when extended would be applicable to a company incorporated under the Companies Act. 3. We are of the opinion that it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether a writ petition would lie or not in the matter of an employee of a company in respect of an order concerning the terms and conditions of his service, as raised by the learned counsel. We feel that the matter can be disposed of on a short point, viz., whether the Standing Orders apply to the petitioner at all. This would depend on whether he was employed in an industrial enterprise or not. If he was employed in a commercial enterprise the Standing Orders would not be applicable. 4. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the company, it has been stated that the petitioner is employed in the marketing section of the company is posted in the office which is recorded as a shop and commercial establishment and is not a 'factory." The Standing Orders are made in respect of industrial establishment wherein 100 or more workmen are employed. The factory as defined in section 2(m) of the Factories Act is an industrial establishment. 5. The question whether the marketing office is an industrial establishment or not raises a disputed question of fact. Admittedly, where the petitioner works is neither a factory nor is it a workshop nor establishment in which articles are produced, adapted on manufactured, nor is it an establishment of a person who for the purposes of fulfilling a contract with the owner of any industrial establishment employs workmen. In Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962, "commercial establishment means any premises not being the premises of a factory or a shop. 6. It will, thus, be seen that a disputed question of fact has arisen in the present case, v/z., whether the place where the petitioner works is an industrial establishment or a commercial establishment. It is not necessary to give a finding on this question in this proceeding. Suffice it to say that the stand taken by the petitioner will not prevail until the fact is well established. It is not necessary to give a finding on this question in this proceeding. Suffice it to say that the stand taken by the petitioner will not prevail until the fact is well established. Consequently, the provisions of the Standing Orders would have no application and, as such the petitioner cannot seek the benefit of the Standing Orders. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order can be challenged in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7. This petition is dismissed at the admission stage.