PURI CONSTRUCTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA
1985-09-25
M.K.CHAWLA
body1985
DigiLaw.ai
M. K. Chawla ( 1 ) THE claimant, M/s. Puri Constructions Pvt. Ltd. entered into an agreement with the Union of India for the construction of an additional unit of hall of Industries for the Third International Trade Fair, Pragati Maidan, New Delhi. The structural work was completed on 30-10-72 and the respondent took over the building and put it to commercial use on 1-11-72, without recording completion certificate or finalising the bill of the claimant. The International Trade Pair started on 3-11-72. Thereafter, the contractor carried out additional work as per the directions of the respondent. The contractor in terms of the agreement claimed various sums, under numerous heads in his final bill. He was not paid any amount. The contractor ultimately invoked the arbitration agreement on 22. 2. 74 and approached the Chief Engineer for referring the disputes to an arbitrator in pursuance to clause 25 of the agreement. The Chief Engineer did not move into the matter. The claimant filed a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. After contest, the Chief Engineer was directed by this Court to appoint an arbitrator. In compliance with the directions, the Chief Engineer appointed Shri Kundania as the sole arbitrator. He entered upon the reference, heard the parties and finally made and published his award on 30-6-77. The claimant filed the objections which were accepted on 17-4-80 holding that the learned arbitrator has misconducted himself. The appellate court confirmed the order and set aside the award. Subsequently, as the respondent failed to appoint another arbitrator, the claimant moved a fresh application. Shri N. L. Kakkar, a retired Additional District and Sessions Judge was appointed as the sole arbitrator by the order of this Court on 30-7-84. ( 2 ) THE learned arbitrator directed the parties to file the statement of claim, counter claim and documents in support of their respective submissions. The learned counsel for the parties agreed that the proceedings before the previous arbitrator be summoned, taken on record and read in evidence in the case. The arbitrator also afforded the parties an opportunity of filing further documents, leading oral and documentary evidence. He also heard the parties at length and after going through the material made and published his detailed award on 26. 2. 85. ( 3 ) ON the next day, the arbitrator filed the award and the proceedings in this Court. The patitioner-claimant on 28.
He also heard the parties at length and after going through the material made and published his detailed award on 26. 2. 85. ( 3 ) ON the next day, the arbitrator filed the award and the proceedings in this Court. The patitioner-claimant on 28. 2. 85 moved an application under Section 17 of the arbitration Act praying for the issuance of notice of the filing of the award to the respondent and making it rule of the Court. I he respondents were duly served and within the stipulated period filed the objections under Sections 15, 16, 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act against making the award rule of the Court. The claimant filed the reply and on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :- ISSUES : "1. whether the award is liable to be set aside for the grounds taken in the objection petition by the respondent/union of India ? 2. whether the petitioner is entitled to the interest as given by the learned arbitrator ? If not, to what effect ? 3. Relief. " ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the parties agreed that the evidence in the case can be led by way of filing affidavits. The objectors preferred TO to file the affidavit of Sn. S. Jethawani, Executive Engineer, C. P. W. D. while the petitioner claimant relived upon the affidavit of Shri Mohinder Puri,managing Director of the petitioner Company. Subsequently, Sh Jethawani also filed the affidavit by way of rejoinder. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their help gone through the award, the objections and the relevant documents placed and proved on the file. My findings on the issues are as under: ISSUES NO. 1 and 2.
Subsequently, Sh Jethawani also filed the affidavit by way of rejoinder. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their help gone through the award, the objections and the relevant documents placed and proved on the file. My findings on the issues are as under: ISSUES NO. 1 and 2. ( 6 ) THE impugned award has been challenged by the respondent/union of India on the grounds that the award is contrary to law and evidence on record ; that the arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining and determining she matters not REFERRED TO to him ; that the arbitrator has not considered the material 1 evidence and the conclusions recorded by him are such as no reasonable person acting judicially would have reached ; that the award is in many respects vague, ambiguous and uncertain ; that the arbitrator failed to appreciate that the agreement for construction of additional unit of the hall of Industries was a separate and independent contract and has nothing to do with the agreement for the construction of other halls of Industries that the arbitrator has erred in awarding to the petitioner a larger sum than actually claimed in the statement of facts i. e. in relation to claim No. 8 and 13 which show non-application of mind and judicial misconduct ; that the profit of 20% allowed by the arbitrator is very high. Whereas, the normal profit percentage is 10% that the award of interest of 15% per annum with quarterly that to to say the least atrocious, very much on the higher side and is also penal in nature ; that the award of interest prior to the date of reference is actually illegal. ( 7 ) THE claimants in reply have taken up the stand tha t the impugned award is well reasoned, running into 70 pages and is based upon the evidence on record. The grounds for setting aside the award raised by the Union of India do not fall within the four corners of the provisions of Sections 16 and 30 of the Arbitration Act, inasmuch as the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence for the purpose of finding out whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of fact or law.
In this case the learned arbitrator has neither decided any question of law nor has propounded any provisions of law which can be said to be erroneous on the face of the award. All the objections raised are pure questions of facts and this Court will not reappraise the evidence sitting as an appellate court. The question of award of interest was specifically REFERRED TO and has been decided on the basis of the evidence and as such thearbitraor cannot be said to have misconducted, acted malafide and without jurisdiction. There being no everment that miscarriage of justice or failure of justice has crept in, the award is not liable to be set aside. The claimant also contiverted each and every ground on merits. ( 8 ) AT the outset it may be said to the credit of the learned counsel for the objectors that during the course of arguments no grievance was raised about the conduct of the arbitrator, in so far as the grant of a reasonable opportunity of being heard is concerned. It is also not alleged that the arbitrator denied any of the party the full presentation of its claim or did not grant a postponment of the hearing for good cause. The misconduct alleged against the arbitrator is that he intentionally committed the breach or naglect of his duties and responsibility as devolved on him acting judicially, inasmuch as he completely ignored the relevant documents, tried to mis-interpret others and did not appreciate or deal with the arguments in its right perspective in the substantial miscarriage of justice. These allegations on the face of it are devoid of any substance even if taken on its face value. The expression "misconduct" is of wide import. Misconduct would be a question of fact in each case and has to be ascertained from the facts of the entire proceedings. In this case, as a matter of fact the proceedings before the arbitrator continued for sufficient long time. Parties were allowed to leed oral and documentary evidence and address arguments. In view of these circumstances, to say that the arbitraor misconducted himself or the proceeding will be the misuse of the term. It is not misconduct to make a mistake of fact. It is also not a misconduct to go wrong in law so long as any mistake of law does not appear on the face of the award.
In view of these circumstances, to say that the arbitraor misconducted himself or the proceeding will be the misuse of the term. It is not misconduct to make a mistake of fact. It is also not a misconduct to go wrong in law so long as any mistake of law does not appear on the face of the award. It is neither alleged nor proved that the award has been improperly procured. ( 9 ) IN face of this hurdle, one has to examine as to what is the scope or the powers of the Court to deal with the present objections. The law on this subject is well settled. As observed earlier under Section 30 of the arbitration Act this Court exercises a very limited jurisidiction and can only deal with matters within the limited scope. When the arbitrator gives reasons for his award, as in the present case, this does not open the door of the Court to see what the contentions of each party was and what was the evidence given by the parties on it and then examine the evidence to see whether the disputed findings of facts are sufficiently supported by the evidence. The theory propounded before the Court that the Court can see "the reasonableness of the reasons" if accepted would cut at the root of the whole purpose of arbitration, the basic idea of which is that the arbitrator s decision shall be final. It is also not the misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision, whether his error is one of fact or law, and whether or not his finding of fact are supported by evidence. The Courts have gone to the extent of holding that it is no ground for coming to a conclusion on an award that the facts are wrongly found. The facts are got to be considered as found. . . . . . nor is it a ground for setting aside an award that there is no evidence on which the facts could be found, because that would be more error in law and it is not misconduct to come to a wrong conclusion in law and would be no ground for setting aside the award unless the error in law appear on the face of it. Furthermore, the weight of evidence and inferences are essential matters for the arbitrator.
Furthermore, the weight of evidence and inferences are essential matters for the arbitrator. It is just not possible to set aside the award on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to support it or that it was too tenuous or the like. One of the very reason for going to arbitration is to get rid of technical rules of evidence and so forth. ( 10 ) WITH this background, there is no scope for this Court to reappraise the evidence which has been led by the parties against each claim and to form or draw an independent conclusion. On this short ground, the objections are liable to be dismissed. However, the learned counsel for the respondent Union of India took pains to point out from the record that the arbitrator not only misconstrued the evidence but has also ignored the material documents/correspondence which amount to misconduct, the Court should examine the objections and set aside the award, Prima facie, there appears to be no substance in this submission also but with a view to dispel the doubts of the respondent Union of India I am inclined to go into the details of the claims and the findings of the learned arbitrator given therein. I will only confine to the claims which are substantial in nature and will ignore the claims against which a very meagre amount has been allowed in full or in part. ( 11 ) BEFORE the learned arbitrator the claimant raised 26 claims for the award of various amounts. On evidence the arbitrator rejected claims Nos. 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 23 24 and 26. The contractor withdrew claim No. 9 during the proceedings. The remaining claims were allowed in full. Learned counsel for respondent/union of India has mainly challanged the claims Nos. 8, 11, 12 and 13 against which more than Rs. 1 lakh has been awarded. He has also challanged the award of interest forming part of issue No. 28 before the arbitrator. ( 12 ) BEFORE dealing with the claims it will be relevant to keep in mind that the claimant agreed to construct the additional unit of "hall of Industries" on the same terms and conditions contained in the contract for the "hall of Industries" and "hall of Nations". The bare reference to the claimant s letter dated 8. 3. 1972 and the reply of Sh.
The bare reference to the claimant s letter dated 8. 3. 1972 and the reply of Sh. M. N. Wadhwa, Executive Engineer (Exhibitions.) proved this fact. The contractor has agreed and confirmed his willingness to take up one more unit of "hall of Industries" on the same terms and conditions as in the previous contract to which Mr. Wadhwa replied that his offer has been accepted on behalf of the President of India. For the purpose of deciding the objections, now sought to be raised these have necessarily to be gone into and considered on the basis of the contract which the parties had entered into previously, for the construction of "hall of Nations" and "hall of Industries". ( 13 ) THE first and the foremost claim under challenges forms part of issue No. 8 which reads as under : "the contractors claim a further payment of Rs. 1,59,846. 24 as extra for centering and shuttering including shuttering proping etc. and removal of forms for space frame numbers in which shuttering was kept in possession for a period framing from 10 to 14 days over which items of shuttering is required to be kept in position only for a period of two days for a quantum of 4206. 48 sq. meter area at the rate of Rs. 31. 00 per square meter. "the learned arbitrator allowed the claim in full with interest the rate of 15% per annum calculated with quarterly rests right from 1. 1. 72 till the date of payment, or decree which ever is earlier. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent has raised two objections on this claim, the first being that the learned arbitrator has awarded an amount higher than claimed i. e. while the contractor had claimed a sum of Rs. 143,851. 95, the arbitrator had awarded Rs. 1,59,846. 24. His second objection is that the arbitrator has allowed a profit of 20 per cent on this item while the profit cannot be more than 10 per cent. On these grounds his sub-mission is that the arbitrator has acted in excess of hisjurisdiction and the whole claim has to be disallowed. There appears to be some substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. It appears that the arbitrator ignored the document Ex. R. 190 wherein the Government of India claimed a set off, of Rs. 12,515.
There appears to be some substance in the first contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. It appears that the arbitrator ignored the document Ex. R. 190 wherein the Government of India claimed a set off, of Rs. 12,515. 00 against this item of work. This omission, to my mind, appears to be an accidental slip which can certainly be rectified. Under Section 15 (c) of the Arbitration Act, this Court has the power to modify the award with regard to this amount. Learned counsel for the claimant concedes and agree to the modification. Under these circumstances, the award of the claim under this head is modified to Rs. 1,43,851. 95. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, I am not inclined to agree with the other objection rotating the award of 20 per cent profit. Unfortunately this objection was not made the subject-matter of dispute in their written statement nor they led any evidence to justify the figure 11) per cent profit. This point was also not taken up by the objectors ia their written submissions. The learned arbitrator, however, placed full reliance on the explanation of the claimant to justify the award of profit at this rate. Moreover, it is a pure question of fact, which prohibits the Court from examining the evidence as a Court of appeal. ( 16 ) AGAINST claim No. 11, the contractor asked for the payment of Rs. 6,23,103. 00towards the case of permanent steel staging to cater for space frams requirement manufcture on the basis of supplying fabrication, designing and erection steel staging as per revised design and revised specifications. The learned arbitrator posed the following additional questions to determine this issue : (A) "what was the effect of the revised design, specifications, the resulting special sequence of construction and requirement of ECI ? (b) Did the CPWD Specification Delhi, 1967 apply to the work done or was a special construction technique imposed as per the revised designs, specifications to cater to space frame technology ? (c) Did the claimant incur additional expenditure of staging platforms etc, as a result of the said change in design ? (d) Was the resultant work covered by clause 10 of the agreement ?" ( 17 ) THE learned arbitrator has gone into the minute details while dealing this claim and his discussion runs from page 33 to 40 of the award.
(d) Was the resultant work covered by clause 10 of the agreement ?" ( 17 ) THE learned arbitrator has gone into the minute details while dealing this claim and his discussion runs from page 33 to 40 of the award. While deciding this claim he has not only looked into the oral and documentary evidence but has also considered the arguments advanced before him. A consolidated sum of Rs. 5,90,836. 25 has been allowed. ( 18 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the Union of India, for setting aside the award under this head is, that the award should have been for the price of 210 metric ton of steel less 100 metric ton and not 210 metric ton less 25 metric ton; that the rate of Rs. ?,400. 00 for Steel work which has been allowed, should have been assessed at Rs. 2. 500. 00 per metric ton: and that the salvage value of the escape should have been assessed at Rs. 1,250. 00 per metric ton and not Rs. 450. 00 per metric ton. In support of these objections, the learned counsel contended that the learned arbitrator has not taken into consideration the important documentary evidence which throw light on this aspect of the matter and by ignoring it has reached a contrary conclusion which no reasonable person could have arrived at. This by itself is a misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In this behalf reliance was placed on the judgment reported as K. P. Paulose v. State of Kerala and Ors, (1975 (2) SC. C. 236) wherein during the course of judgment it has been observed as under:- "under Section 30 (a) of the Arbitration Act an award can be set aside when an Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings. Misconduct under Section 30) (a) has not connotation of moral lapse. It comprises legal misconduct which is complete if the - arbitrator on the face of the award arrives at an inconsistent conclusion even on his own finding or arrives at a decision by ignoring very material documents which throw abundant light on the controversy to help a just and fair decision. It is in this sense that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings in this case. " ( 19 ) I am afraid none of these arguments are borne out from the evidence.
It is in this sense that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings in this case. " ( 19 ) I am afraid none of these arguments are borne out from the evidence. At the outset it may be stated that the learned Arbitrator has not ignored the letter No. CONST/pur/367 dated March 8, 1972 as alleged. This very letter has been noted and considered on two occasions in the award. This latter was written by the claimant Shri Mohinder Singh Puri, Managing Director to Puri Construction (Pvt.) Limited to the Chief Engineer, C. P. W. D. , New Delhi regarding the negotiations for the construction of one additional unit of "hall of Industries" the requirement of steel for staging purposes. ( 20 ) AT pags 35 of the award also the text of the letter and correspondence exchanged between the parties on this subject have been REFERRED TO to and relied upon while allowing the claim under this head. At this stage, it cannot be said that the learned Arbitrator ignored any part of the documentary evidence relevant on the subject and as such the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel has no application. ( 21 ) RAGARDING the question about allowing the rate of Rs. 2,500. 00 per matric ton, unfortunately the Union of India did not plead this fact in their written statement, nor led any evidence before the learned Arbitrator. Even in the written arguments filed before the Arbitrator, there is not a whisper about the rate being Rs. 2,500. 00. On the baiis of the evidence the arbitrator held that as the work in space frame structure was complicated and the time to do the work was very short, the rate of Rs. 3,400. 00is more realistic and cannot be said to be excessive. The learned Arbitrator while dealing with this claim observed as under :- "the correspondence batween the parties clearly show that the parties were ad-idem that the investment on structural steel staging would not exceed 200 metric ton for the Hall of Nations and three units of Hall of Industries. From the correspondence it would emerge that both the parties were agreed that the contractor would have to invest for 200 metric ton of staging material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From the correspondence it would emerge that both the parties were agreed that the contractor would have to invest for 200 metric ton of staging material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The work of this additional unit went upto 210 metric ton according to the claimant and it was admitted to the extent of 157 metric ton by the respondent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The claimant has led oral evidence and given details to prove his contentions". The respondents have merely stated in their written statement "the analysis submitted by the claimant is, therefore, denied". The respondents led no oral evidence and there was no evidence to substantiate its case. " ( 22 ) THE learned Arbitrator was further of the view that the respondents did not controvert the details of the claims and drawings and the expenditure involved. Furthermore, a special construction technique was imposed by the respondents to cater to space frame technology on which the C. P. W. D. specificasions for work in Delhi 1967 did not apply. This was in fact the first structure of its type. In face of this overwhelming evidence, from the side of the claimant and no rebuttal from therespondent, will it be possible for this Court to draw a contrary inference. Certainly not, is the only answer. Any reasonable person would have reached the same finding as that of the Arbitrator under this claim. ( 23 ) THE next ground urged is with regard to scrap. Here also the respondents have not led any evidence, nor made the basis of attack in their written submissions. Rather, the argument is quite contrary to their own evidence of the Executive Engineer, C. P. W. D. , who appeared for the respondents. Shri Jethawani, Executive Engineer, on oath admitted that the scrap value was Rs. 700. 00 per metric ton. The finding of the learned Arbitrator is that the salvage value in evidence before him is established to be Rs. 450. 00 per metric ton. This finding, in fact, settle the issue.
Shri Jethawani, Executive Engineer, on oath admitted that the scrap value was Rs. 700. 00 per metric ton. The finding of the learned Arbitrator is that the salvage value in evidence before him is established to be Rs. 450. 00 per metric ton. This finding, in fact, settle the issue. ( 24 ) ON the additional issues, the learned Arbitrator on the basis of the evidence concluded that a special construction technique was imposed by the respondents, and the C. P. W. D. specifications for work in Delhi 1967 do not cater to space frame technology. This was the first structure of its type. ( 25 ) BEFORE concluding I am constrained to observe that the learned Arbitrator has not framed any question of law under this head and decided the claim on the basis of the evidence. The bare perusal of the arbitration proceedings and the way this claim was dealt with I have no hesitation to hold that the conclusion reached by the learned Arbitrator is correct and under no circumstances can be said to be perverse. There is no force in this claim, and I am left with no other course, but to over rule this objection. ( 26 ) CLAIM No. 12 relates to the payment of Rs. 2,66,2100. 00 (Rupees Two Lakh Sixty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Ten only) towards the cost of supplying of timber erection and dismentallmg of j hooks etc. in permanent firms for 268 cubic meter at the rate of Rs. l. OOO. 00. On the basis of evidence a sum of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 (. Rupees Two Laka only) have been awarded against this claim.- The objection of the respondent Union ot India is that supplying/ providing platforms was incidental to the execution of the work as per agreement and cannot be allowed to be paid for as a separate item. According to him, it was not the part of structure constructed as per agreement and the claim is thus inadmissible. In particular the learned counsel relied upon clause 18 of the contract in support of the objections. The questions passed by the learned Arbitrator against this claim were :- (a) Were the space frame joints were required to be propped up with platforms ? Were the space frame joints are extra items of work ?
In particular the learned counsel relied upon clause 18 of the contract in support of the objections. The questions passed by the learned Arbitrator against this claim were :- (a) Were the space frame joints were required to be propped up with platforms ? Were the space frame joints are extra items of work ? (b) Was the said work of platforms covered by Clause 18 of the agreement ? (c) What was the salvage value of the said platforms and to what amount, if any, the claimant is entitled to in respect of this item of work? While disposing of these quarries the learned Arbitrator held on facts that the work of space frame members was not covered by the work items of columns trust etc. The respondents also admit in R-188, the use of timber for permanent support wherein the platforms and scrap foldings are shown as separate items. He was further of the view that there was no salvage value of the platforms. ( 27 ) AT this stage, it will be worth-while noting that during the course of hearing arguments before the learned arbitrator, the counsel for the respondent Union of India, conceded that staging and platforms were payable as extra items and clause 18 of the agreement has no application. The relevant admissions reads as under ;- "the respondents when confronted with their own analysis admitted finally that clause 18 had no application". "the Union of India conceded that as per CPWD Specifications 1967 the work of staging and platforms was not covered and would be the extra item payable under clause 12. " ( 28 ) IN view of this concession/admission, the learned for the respondents now cannot be allowed to get out of this difficult situation and reiterate and rely on clause 18. Inspite of this admission, learned counsel for the respondent raised the plea that even though the admissions were made, but the same should not be treated as final. In this behalf, he REFERRED TO to the judgment in F. A. O. (O. S.) 67 of 1982 wherein no amount against this item was allowed, arising out of the other contract between the parties, for the construction of Hall of Nations and Hall of Industries. I do not agree with this argument and would rely upon the admissions made by the counsel for the Union of India before the Arbitrator.
I do not agree with this argument and would rely upon the admissions made by the counsel for the Union of India before the Arbitrator. It is not open to the party to resile or back out of the admissions, particularly when the award is largely based upon such admissions. Furthermore, no reliance can be placed on the connected case, firstly on the ground that it is subject matter of special appeal before the Supreme Court, and further that the correct position per as is reflected in the documents filed before the Arbitrator by the Union of India. Even otherwise, it was always open to the respondent to admits that clause 18 of the agreement had no application to the claim of staging and platforms, after the pronouncement of the judgment in F. A. O. (O. S.) 67 of 1982. On admissions, the situation completely changed, and the arbitrator was justified to allow the claim. This settles this objection and need no further comments. ( 29 ) THE contractor claimed further payment of Rs. 3,84,808. 48 as the cost of welding by electric plant, under claim No. 13. The learned Arbitrator, however, allowed a sum of Rs. 3,16, 246. 00 only, with 15% interest per annum calculated with quarterly rests right from 1-11-1972. This part of the claim is challenged on the following amongst other grounds :- (a) The contractor had accepted the rate of Rs. 0. 50 per C. M. vide his letter dated 7-2-1973. (b) The rate of Rs. 0. 51 was accepted by the Union of India and accor- dingly communicated. (c) This very claim has been disallowed by the Arbitrator Shri D. N. End ley in the connected contract and confirmed by the Division Bench in F. A. O. (O. S.) 67 of 1982. (d) The Arbitrator has acted beyond jurisdiction/reference in allowing a sum of Rs. 13,782. 04, Rs. 44,779. 76 and Rs. 65,060. 20. ( 30 ) AT the out set, it may be stated that before the learned Arbitrator the respondents admitted that this item of work wasdone beyond the deviation limit to the extent of 3,83,373 C. M. and payment had to be made at the market rate in terms of clause 12 (a ). The only challenge is the assessment of Rs. I. 00 per C. M. as the market rate which has been allowed by the learned Arbitrator.
The only challenge is the assessment of Rs. I. 00 per C. M. as the market rate which has been allowed by the learned Arbitrator. According to learned counsel, the Arbitrator completely ignored the claimant s willingness to accept Rs. 0. 50 per C. M. and allowed the rate of 1. 00 per C. M. without any evidence. None of these arguments are borne out from the pleadings. Regarding the first defence it can safely be brushed aside, by observing that this plea was neither raised nor pressed, by the respondents, in their objections or written arguments and as such rightly not taken note of by the Arbitrator. ( 31 ) SECONDLY, it is not disputed, that the purported acceptance of rate of Rs. 0. 50 C. M. , as conveyed by letter dated 7-2-73 was revoked by the claimants before the respondents acted upon the proposal. The withdrawal letter dated 16-5-73 reads as under :- "we wish to advise that our letter No. CIT/pur 151 dated Fabruary 7, 1973 is hereby withdrawn. " During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent was not able to point out by any cogent evidence, suggesting that at any point of time, the respondents accepted this offer. What is its effect; the law is well settled. A proposal may be revoked at any time, before the communication of its acceptance is complete and acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete. In order to convert a proposal into a promise, acceptance must (i) be absolute and unqualified, and (ii) be expressed in some unusual and unreasonable manner unless the proposal describes the manner in which it is to be accepted and acceptance must be unconditional resulting in conscience ad idem. The parties to the contract must agree upon the same thing in the same sense, which in this case is lacking. In view of these circumstances, no reliance can be placed on the letter dated 7-2 1973, ( 32 ) ON the other hand, the respondents by their letter dated 19-9-1973 informed the claimant that they did not propose to pay more than Rs. 0,40 per centimeter for welding thereby in a way rejected the offer. Furthermore, at no point of time the respondents ever informed the claimant that the demand of Rs.
0,40 per centimeter for welding thereby in a way rejected the offer. Furthermore, at no point of time the respondents ever informed the claimant that the demand of Rs. I. 00 was in excess of the market rate or that it is not acceptable to them. In fact, they did not raise any dispute till the work was completed by the claimant. On the basis of the evidence, the Arbitrator also found as a fact that the other contractors being Kailash Nath and Associates and Delhi Constructions were being paid Rs. I. 00 for welding by the C. P. W. D. at the same point of time. He was also of the view that the evidence on record support the case of the claimant that the market rate was Rs. I. 00 or C. M. end that there is no justification to reject this evidence. This being the position I would not like to sit in appeal and up set the finding of fact. ( 33 ) REGARDING the second aspect that the rate of Rs. 0. 51 was accepted by the Union of India and accordingly communicated, the evidence on record show that as per final Bill R-190, the respondents Union of India were actually paying Rs, 0. 17 per centimeter and did not calculate at the rate of Rs. 0. 50 or Rs, 0. 51 per centimeter. The learned Arbitrator under those circumstances, in my opinion, was justified in giving the credit of Rs. 67,056. 00 and awarded sum of Rs. 3,16,246. 00. . The third objection can be disposed of by mentioning the fact that against the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, in the connected case, the claimant has already filed the Special Leave Petition. which is under consideration before the the Supreme Court. While allowing this claim, the learned Arbitrator has neither made a mistake in law or of fact. The conclusion is a pure question of fact, with which I entirely agree. ( 34 ) THIS claim relates to the payment of Rs. 38,916. 36 for the items of centring and shuttering, including shutting, propping etc. with 38 M. M. planks. Triangular panels with 1/16" off sets between planks texture for exposed finishes, repairing band due to alleged bad structural design for guniting plates.
( 34 ) THIS claim relates to the payment of Rs. 38,916. 36 for the items of centring and shuttering, including shutting, propping etc. with 38 M. M. planks. Triangular panels with 1/16" off sets between planks texture for exposed finishes, repairing band due to alleged bad structural design for guniting plates. Learned counsel for the respondent Union of India objects to the grant of this claim on the short ground that this job was covered by the agreement, and was duly paid. It was not an extra job for which extra amount was required to be paid. The learned Arbitrator, on the other hand, took a note of the findings of the committee constituted by the Engineer-in-Chief, C. P. W. D. to investigate into the causes for cracks in the guinting cladding panels. The findings of the committee indicate that the tests were done at the spot and the material used by the contractor was found to be inconfirmity with the specifications prescribed for guinting with the tender document. The load tests result was also found satisfactory. It was also found as a fact by the committee that the initial structural analysis of cladding panels did not take into account, wind load and its local effects. After considering the other relevant facts, the committee was of the view that there was a change in specifications as set out in the contract between the parties for which the claimant was required to take up the extra job, and on that basis the learned Arbitrator was of the opinion that the extra amount claimed by the claimant under this head was justified. It is now here shown that this item was ever claimed or paid as alleged by the respondent Unionof India. Unfortunately, the respondents in their written statement have not challenged or controverted the analysis of costs of this item. The relevant documentary evidence relied upon by the parties has been taken into consideration and correct conclusion reached. The existence of the committee is not in dispute. It is not misconduct to rely on the findings, which are relevant on this issue. The Arbitrator understood the issue, and decided the same on the basis of the evidence. No material part of the evidence has been ignored, nor it has been pointed out to be so during the course of arguments.
It is not misconduct to rely on the findings, which are relevant on this issue. The Arbitrator understood the issue, and decided the same on the basis of the evidence. No material part of the evidence has been ignored, nor it has been pointed out to be so during the course of arguments. This leaves no scope for this Court to interfere in this claim. ( 35 ) ON the same analysis the learned Arbitrator allowed the additional payment of Rs. 30. 75l. 60to the contractor under claim No. 15. This work was an additional item of work involving the use of extra cement which have not been paid for by the respondent. In the written statement the respondents did not dispute an element of 20% profit being excessive. The contractor in his evidence has clarified that 20% included charges for water, electricity, staff salaries, over heads, labour amenities as per the contract conditions which evidence has been accepted, there being no contrary oral or documentary evidence. ( 35 ) I do not propose to deal each and every remaining claim as the amounts awarded are very meagre in comparison to the main items. Further-more, these claims arose out of the facts that the space framed structure of the construction was the first of its kind ever attempted in India, which did not attract the rates based upon 1967 C. P. W. D. specification. The additional constructions, modification etc. carried out by the contractor fell outside the scope of the main contract. Moreover, these claims have been decided purely on the basis of the documentary evidence placed and proved before the learned Arbitrator. No question of law arises nor REFERRED TO to or decided. There- is no use of repeating over the arguments that even the erroneous decision by the arbitrator, whether on law and facts, can be gone into. It is not possible to set aside an award merely because there was no evidence supporting a particular finding, unless is appears from the award itself which in this case is missing. In view of these circumstances, the objections to claim Nos. 16, 17,20 and 1 to 4 are not tenable.
It is not possible to set aside an award merely because there was no evidence supporting a particular finding, unless is appears from the award itself which in this case is missing. In view of these circumstances, the objections to claim Nos. 16, 17,20 and 1 to 4 are not tenable. ( 37 ) IN the on eluding portion of his award the learned Arbitrator observed as under :- "i, therefore, direct the respondents to make payment of the awarded amounts along with interest within 30 days of the receipt of the award. The rate of interest charged by the national banks for commercial transactions is 18% per annum compounded quarterly. In case the money is not paid within the period of 30 days, then the claimant shall be entitled to an enhancement of rate from 20th February 1981 being the 18% per annum calculated with quarterly rests, till the date of payment or decree whichever is earlier. Interest upto 20th February 1981 will be paid by the respondents at 15% per annum compounded quarterly as REFERRED TO to above. " ( 38 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that 15% interest with quarterly rest is not only unreasonable, it is harsh, unscionable and expropriety, with the result that even though the total principal amount comes to Rs. 16 lakhs but the interest calculated thereon has reached the figure of near about 80 lakhs. His further submission is that the question of interest was not specifically REFERRED TO to the Arbitrator and should not have been considered or awarded. Lastly, it is contended that under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure the learned arbitrtor could not award interest for the period prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. In this behalf learned counsel relied upon the judgment reported as Lakshmi Chand v. Indore Improvement Trust Indore and Ors1 wherein on this aspect of the matter it was held as under- "section 34 authorises the Court to sward interest from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and thereafter to the date of payment.
In this behalf learned counsel relied upon the judgment reported as Lakshmi Chand v. Indore Improvement Trust Indore and Ors1 wherein on this aspect of the matter it was held as under- "section 34 authorises the Court to sward interest from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and thereafter to the date of payment. Section 34 therefore would not come to the aid of the Tribunal under the M. P. Town Improvement Trust Act to award interest from the date of deliveiy of possession of the land to the date of determination of compensation for acquisition of land under the Act. " ( 39 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel interest before the suit can be awarded only if there is an agreement or a usage having the force of law or a provision of a substantial law, which in this case has neither been alleged nor proved. This by itself is a misconduct on the part of the learned Arbitrator. ( 40 ) NONE of these arguments according to the learned counsel for the claimants, are substantiated from the record or tenable in law. It is not disputed that when the claimant was not being paid his dues he invoked the arbitration clause and asked for the appointment of an arbitrator by serving a notice on the respondents. Union of India. Admittedly, the disputes were REFERRED TO to the arbitrator on 22nd February 1974. The award of interest amongst others was one of the claims of the claimants before the learned Arbitrator. In the statement of claim filed before the Arbitrator the claimants clearly stated : "all this resorted to the crippling of the financial resources of the claimants and compelling the claimants to resort to borrowing in a tight market and thereby inflicting loss on the claimants by which they are entitled to be compensated. "this was notdenied by the Union of India in their counter statement. Later on, in the presence of the parties the issues were framed. Issue No. 28 reads as under:- "what is the rate of interest that is to be awarded on the sums, if any, held as being payable to the claimants?" ( 41 ) THE parties were allowed to lead evidence on this issue.
Later on, in the presence of the parties the issues were framed. Issue No. 28 reads as under:- "what is the rate of interest that is to be awarded on the sums, if any, held as being payable to the claimants?" ( 41 ) THE parties were allowed to lead evidence on this issue. The claimant tendered documentary evidence in the shape of bank certificates indicating the securing of loan and the rate of interest charged by the Bank on the borrowings. The claimant also while appearing as his own witness stated as under :- "they have withheld right from 3-11-1972 till date. We are borrowing money on commercial terms and are at present paying interest at 18% per annum compounded quarterly. It is the market practice in the construction industry that payments not made within 30 days of material being done, we are liable to pay 18% interest compound quarterly. "for reasons best known to the respondents neither the claimant was cross- examined on this aspect nor they cared to file any oral or documentary evidence to rebut this evidence. The respondents, on the other hand, admitted that the transaction between the parties was a commercial one. During the course of the proceedings before the Arbitrator, Sh, M. A. Sujan on behalf of Union of India conceded that in case payments are found due to the claimant then interest is payable. He further admitted- "it has been suggested on behalf of the respondents that due money, if any, will be paid to the claimant on receipt of judgment or award and the claimant will be entitled to interest in respect of the period of default. " ( 42 ) BEFORE this Court also, learned counsel for the Union of India expressly or by implication admitted :- " (1) That the arbitrator had full powers to award interest pondente lite; (2) That the arbitrator or could award interest even prior to the date of reference on the basis of agreement or usage in the trade. "in a way the payment of interest was not only conceded before the arbitrator but before, this Court also.
"in a way the payment of interest was not only conceded before the arbitrator but before, this Court also. At this stage, it will be relevant to bear in mind that the claimant had agreed to work in respect of the additional unit on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to the Halls of Industries, which had been accepted by the respondents in writing. Payment of interest was one of the clause. It does not now lie in the mouth of the respondents to argue that the claim of interest was nor within the ambit of the provisions of the contract. ( 43 ) NOW the only question that requires going to whether the award of interest by the learned arbitrator at the raule given by him is reasonable or exorbitant and that he could award interest for the period prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings, or not. At the outset, it may be stated that the respondents took possession of the complete structure on 30th October 1972 and put to use on 3rd of November 1972. From that very day the unpaid amount of the various claims become due to the claimants, even though the arbitration clause was invoked only on 22-2-74. The law on the subject is very clear. Russel on arbitration (19th Ed.) on this aspect observed :- "in a commercial transaction if the plaintiff has been out of his money for a period, the usual order is that the defendant should pay interest for the time for which the money has been outstanding. No exception should be made except for good reasons "in the Hallsburys Law of England Vol. II, 4th Ed. , similar observations have been made at para 580. The relevant portion is reproduced below : "an arbitrator or umpire has power to award interest on the amounts of any debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the award. "furthermore, in a judgment reported as State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Saith and Skelton Pvt. Ltd. 2 the contractor was held entitled to interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold.
"furthermore, in a judgment reported as State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Saith and Skelton Pvt. Ltd. 2 the contractor was held entitled to interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold. The relevant findings of the Supreme Court in this behalf are reproduced below: "in the case before us there is no controversy that all the disputes including a claim for payment of the amount with interest was REFERRED TO to the arbitrator. The arbitrator, as pointed out earlier, found that the firm was entitled to the payment as price in the sum of Rs. 1,79,653. 18. The arbitrator has further found that this amount became payable as balance price for the goods supplied by the firm on June 7, 1958, on which date the final inspection took place. If that is so, Section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 squarely applies and it saves the right of the seller (in this case the firm) to recover interest, where by law interest is recoverable. Sub-Section (2) of Section 61, which is material reads as follows : "61 (2) In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the Court may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the price : (a) to the seller in a suit by him for the amount of the price from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable, (b) to the buyer in a suit by him for the refund of the price in a case of a breach of the contrac on the part of the seller-from the date on which the payment was made. " In the case before us, admitted the contract does not provides that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price become due and payable on June 7, 1958.
If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price become due and payable on June 7, 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India v. A. L. Rallia Ram (supra) which related to an arbitration proceeding, under sub-section (2) of Section 61, in the absence of a contract to the contray, the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on amount of the price for the goods sold. On this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7, 1958 is justified. " ( 44 ) THIS judgment fairly and squarely applies to the facts of the present case and I see no reason to adopt a different view. On the other hand, the judgmants relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents relate to the payment of interest by way of damages for breach of control. None of the other authorities relate to a case where no interest is payable from the date the money become due and payable. There was sufficient evidence before the Arbitrator to show that the transaction between the Union of India and the claimant Company was a commercial one. All along the claimant Company had been demanding interest at the rate at which the monies are lent or advanced by the Nationalised Banks. The evidence before the Arbitrator further show that interest at the rate of 18% P. A. compounded quarterly was payable in terms of the market practice. Even certificate from the Banks were also produced on record. No evidence was led by the Union of India with regard to interest, whether oral or documentary. ( 45 ) EVEN otherwise, in the ordinary course of business, a contractor while submitting his tender in response to an invitation to tender, for a work contract reasonably expects to make profits. In the case in hand, even the amounts due to the claimant had been withheld since the date of the possession of the structure. Once the award on venous claims is held payable there is no earthly reason to deprive the claimant of the interest due thereon. ( 46 ) THE learned Arbitrator, in my opinion, had every reason to rely upon the evidence of the claimant.
Once the award on venous claims is held payable there is no earthly reason to deprive the claimant of the interest due thereon. ( 46 ) THE learned Arbitrator, in my opinion, had every reason to rely upon the evidence of the claimant. The finding in this behalf is not only factually correct but is legally sound. No part of it has been shown to be irrelevant or illegal. It is also not shown as to how the Arbitrator can be said to have misconducted himself in allowing the interest. There is no force in this objection also. ( 47 ) AS a result of the above discussion, I see no ground to interfere in the award of the learned Arbitrator. The objections are hereby dismissed. The Award is made rule of the Court. The claimant shall also be entitled to future interest 18% per annum from the date of the decree till realisation, if the amount is not paid within one month from today, the decree be drawn one month from today.