V. D. GYANI, J. ( 1 ) FOURTEEN years of litigation starting with a reference under section 55 (2) of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Acta virtual exile from service for the respondent No. 1 Suraj Prasad who was removed from service as a Samiti Sewak of Dharampuri Kendra (Groups of Societies) while he was so posted as such at Dharampuri in District Indore his services were terminated oa 5-12-1965 and more than 20 years thereafter he is still facing the litigation at this stage where the Bank has chosen to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in challenging the order passed by the Revenue Board on 20-1-1982 in Appeal No. 433-PBR/81 upholding the respondent's reinstatement in service, as ordered by the Deputy Registrar and affirmed on appeal by the Registrar. ( 2 ) THE facts as they emerge from this petition are rather shocking that a poor Samiti Sevak, drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 45/- was sacked out of service on 5-12-1965 and still not reinstating him in service inspite of the first order by the Deputy Registrar passed on 31x3-1978. As though this fourteen years litigation was not enough the Bank has chosen this petition challenging the order dated 20-1-1982 (Annexure-P) passed by the Revenue Board. All that the respondent No. 1 has been able to secure so far after this fourteen years litigation in his reinstatement in service as Samiti Sevak. But even this has proved to be a mere paper relief and the Bank has been successful in seeing to it that the poor respondent No. 1 is not reinstated in service. Respondent No. 1 has not been awarded the back wages. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 stated at the Bar that he has not yet been reinstated in service, for which execution proceedings as well as even contempt proceedings have baen instituted and there is no reason to disbelieve the statement made by the learned Counsel at the Bar. Learned counsel also submitted that even the suspension allowance, which ought to have been regularly paid during the period of suspension, has been paid just two months back. It is to be noted with regret that the petitioner-Bank should have avoided to comply with the directions of these Courts below and still invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel also submitted that even the suspension allowance, which ought to have been regularly paid during the period of suspension, has been paid just two months back. It is to be noted with regret that the petitioner-Bank should have avoided to comply with the directions of these Courts below and still invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. In fact such a conduct is itself sufficient to disentitle the petitioner form a right of hearing under Articles 226/2 7 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances facing a mighty body like the petitioner-Bank too much to aspect of a poor Samiti Sevak, serving under the Co-operative Societies. It is surprising to note that after the order passed by the Deputy Registrar for reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service it was the petitioner-Bank who sought a stay against the reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 and still more surprising is that the appellate authority granted such a stay. The respondent No. 1 remains out of job and the petitioner-Bank coming out with the finances of law from stage to stage and from Court to Court. ( 4 ) THIS litigative attitude on the part of the petitioner-Bank for that matter any statutory corporate body or society, deserves to be deprecated. It is high time that they should realise that in such matters. even when fine points of law are sought to be urged and raised in such petitions the least which is expected of such bodies is to see that the employee concerned is not kept out of service in face of order passed by the authorities or Courts for reinstatement. The appellate authorty should also note that normally such stay against reinstatement should rot be granted and that tco without imposing any conditions. If at all, reinstatement is to be objected to on very cogent and convincing grounds. Instead of staying the reinstatement in service, the authorities should adopt the procedure which ensures reinstatement as also the interest of the employer by imposing conditions of reinstatement. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has raised one and one specific point that the services of the respondent No. 1 were not governed by any rules and consequently he was not entitled to any protection in service and could not have been legally ordered to be reinstated in service. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has raised one and one specific point that the services of the respondent No. 1 were not governed by any rules and consequently he was not entitled to any protection in service and could not have been legally ordered to be reinstated in service. Perusing the written statement (Annexure-B) filed by the petitioner-Bank before the Deputy Registrar, it is significant to note that ro such plea has been taken even in the written statement. In fact what was contended in the written statement was that the respondent No. 1 wss not in the employment of the Bank. This fact is further corroborated by the order dated 31-3-1978 passed by the Deputy Registrar (paragraph 5) who has also made a note of this denial of service of respondent no. 1 with the Bank. Even before the appellate authority, this point does not appear to have been raised. So far as the applicability of rules is concerned, the appellate authority has found the absence of rules framed by the petitionerbank, but the same order refers to the service rules framed and issued by the registrar. However, the fact remains that now the point which is sought to be raised was not raised at all. Both the Deputy Registrar and the Joint Registrar have come to a concurrent finding that the respondent's services were terminated without affording him any opportunity whatsoever to defend himself against the charges levelled against him and this concurrent finding also finds a mention in the impugned order (Annexure-P) dated 20-1-1982 and even this concurrent finding has further been reaffirmed by the Board of Revenue in its order dated 20-1-1982 which reads :"the respondent was not given an opportunity to set up his defence against the charges which were levelled against him and there is a concurrent finding of fact in this regard by the two Lower Courts. It is for this reason specifically that the order of termination was set aside and the respondent was ordered to be reinstated. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel has placed reliance on Krishna Chandra v. Registrar, co-operative Societies, [ air 1963 MP 298 ] and U. P. S, S. Corpn. , Lucknow v. C. K. Tyagi, [air 1970 SC 1344]. It is for this reason specifically that the order of termination was set aside and the respondent was ordered to be reinstated. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel has placed reliance on Krishna Chandra v. Registrar, co-operative Societies, [ air 1963 MP 298 ] and U. P. S, S. Corpn. , Lucknow v. C. K. Tyagi, [air 1970 SC 1344]. Before proceeding to consider these authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel it is worthwhile to go through the order passed by the Board of Revenue on 20-1-1982 (Annexure-P ). A perusal thereof goes to show that this point was not raised at all before the Board of revenue and as a matter of settled practice it should not be allowed to be raised at this stage. However considering the authorities, which the learned Counsel has placed reliance on it is found that they are of no assistance for supporting the proposition advanced by the learned Counsel for consideration. The decision in the case of Krishna Chandra (supra) does not cast the applicability of the principles of natural justice. All that it holds is that bye-laws permitting the governing Body or the Managing Body of a Society to terminate the services, when action is in conformity with such bye-laws or rules, it cannot be made a matter of grievance. By citing this case the learned Counsel propounds that the relationship between the petitioner-Bank and its employees is that of Master and servant and the service depends OB the pleasure of the Master. The case of c. K. Tyagi (supra) pertains to a contract of personal service and in this context the Supreme Court held that a contract of personal service is not enforceable at law. In the present petition no such question has either been urged or raised nor does it arise for consideration at this stage. The other decision relied upon by the learned Counsel is Sevaram v. Board of Revenue, M. P. , [ 1983 MPLJ 645 ] for the proposition that when statutory rules do not govern the service conditions of an employee there is no question of reinstatement of such an employee which such reinstatement is ordered by the Court, if his termination is challenged. In this case also reinstatement has been granted and a larger Bench in this case was required to be constituted because a situation arose where the Judgment in Gwalior District Co-operative Bank Ltd. , Gwalior v. Ramesh Chandra mangal, [ 1979 MPLJ 631 ] needed reconsideration and it was this Judgment which has been relied upon by the Board of Revenue in its order. It is significant to note that this Judgment w hich has been reconsidered by the present full Bench itself has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Gwalior District Cooperative central Bank Ltd. v. Ramesh Chandra Mangal, [1984 MPLJ 682]. This is what the Supreme Court has observed about the Division Bench judgment: -"we are in agreement with the conclusion to which the High Court has come though for somewhat different reasons which are as follows ; the Board of Directors of the appellant-Bank was superceded by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies by an order dated july 25, 1967 and its powers were vested in the Madhya pradesh State Co-operative Bank. Jabalpur which is an Apex bank as "officer-in-charge" of the superceded Bank. By resolution No. 23 dated May 19, 1968 the Apex Bank confirmed the action of its Chairman/vice-Chairman in deputing amongst others S. P. Jain as the Chief Executive Officer of the superceded Bank. The Apex Bank had no authority or power so to appoint S. P. Jain for two reasons : In the first place the apex Bank being an appointee of the Registrar had no authority to divest itself of the power conferred upon it by the registrar and to invest S. P. Jain with that power. The only authority which could have conferred the necessary power on s. P. Jain under Section 53 (4) of the Act was the Registrar. The Registrar did not confer that power upon S. P. Jain under section 53 (4) of the Act". The appeal preferred by the Co-operative Bank, Gwalior was dismissed by the supreme Court. Thus the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner do not prove to be of any assistance for supporting the proposition which he has placed for consideration. The appeal preferred by the Co-operative Bank, Gwalior was dismissed by the supreme Court. Thus the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner do not prove to be of any assistance for supporting the proposition which he has placed for consideration. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel want to the extent of saying that even if there is violation of elementary rules of natural justice in removal or termination of service of an employee, still the employee cannot make a grievance against such removal or termination if his service were not governed under any rules. This concept by itself is out-dated and does not hold filed particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India, [ air 1984 sc 636 ]. Service Jurisprudence has make a rapid strive and it is not the fanciful whim of the employer, like the petitioner-Bank which determines the tenor of office of an employee. Reason and fairness of actions is not divorced from such bodies. If an order of removal or termination is found to be palpably violative of the principles of natural justice it cannot be said that for want of rules such violations cannot be made a ground for seeking the relief. ( 8 ) ALL these foregoing points and authorities have been discussed at the instance of the learned Counsel. Even otherwise the petition is bound to fall for the simple reason that no ground for interference as such has been made out under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for interference with the impugned order dated 20-1-1982 (Annexure-P) passed by the Revenue board. In fact the order results IB substantive justice being done to the parties. Reinstatement of the employee without back wages should have satisfied the petitioner-Bank and particularly when as many as three authorities have so held. There was absolutely no scope for coming before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) THE order Annexure-P read as a whole does not even indicate that the point which is now being urged was in fact raised before the Board. In such circumstances this petition must fail. There was absolutely no scope for coming before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 9 ) THE order Annexure-P read as a whole does not even indicate that the point which is now being urged was in fact raised before the Board. In such circumstances this petition must fail. ( 10 ) FROM perusal of the impugned order the following prominently emerge that there has been a concurrent finding of fact before all the authorities and the Tribunal that dismissal from service was viplative of the principles of natural justice and all the authorities have hold with one voice that the respondent was entitled to reinstatement and even before the Revenue Board this entitlement of reinstatement has been affirmed and upheld. Relevant part of para 3 of the impugned order reads thus :"yet another point with regard to limitation when the dispute was raised by the respondent before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative societies was raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant-Bank but it is seen from the text of the orders passed by the two lower courts that there is a concurrent finding of fact that the dispute was raised within time and hence that objection cannot be sustained". The order is very clear and succinctly discussed the point raised and the conclusion arrived at as warranted by facts and law. It cannot be said that there is any error, much less an apparent error on the face of the order which calls for any interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel also submitted that respondent No. 1 moved the authorities against his wrongful termination from service at a very late stage. The point that he wants to make out is about limitation. Suffice it to any in this behalf that the question of limitation, maintainability or rejection of claim on ground of limitation are not the points ordinarily to be entertained in such petitions. The point that he wants to make out is about limitation. Suffice it to any in this behalf that the question of limitation, maintainability or rejection of claim on ground of limitation are not the points ordinarily to be entertained in such petitions. That apart it is rather unjust to deny a citizen his proved claim merely on the ground of limitation and that too at such a late stage when the matter passed through all stages of its likely litigation and by way of a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution that the petitioner-Bank seeks to challenge the order of reinstatement on the ground of limitation. Such bodies as the petitioner-Bank, have to act in their dealings with their employees with all sense of fairness and even if technicalities of low permit raising of a question of limitation justness and fairness demand that the honest claims should not be allowed to be defeated by raising such technical pleas of limitation. For these reasons even the question of limitation as rajsed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Bank also fails. ( 12 ) WHETHER the services were governed by the service rules, prevailing at the relevant time in a question of fact depending appreciation of evidence, which cannot be allowed to be gone into at this stage and as held earlier was not urged at any earlier stages. It is also significant to note that the record (the written statement orders etc.) is silent on this point, ( 13 ) A queor submission has been made by the learned Counsel urging that mere violation of rules of natural justice by itself does not entitle an employee to reinstatement unless there are statutory rules governing the employee's service conditions and providing for such reinstatement. It is too vide a preposition to be accepted and at the same time it is erroneous in its conception. Violation of principles of natural justice has always been held to be a good ground for extending relief in almost every sphere of admininistrative action and activity. ( 14 ) THIS petition, for the foregoing reasons, fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/- if certified. The outstanding account of security, after deduction of costs, if any shall be refunded to the petitioner. .