ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment dated 2-4-1976 rendered by the Board of Revenue and the judgment dated 11-8-1971 rendered by the Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital in a suit under Ss. 59/61 of the U.P. Tenancy Act filed by the present petitioner which was decreed by the trial Court in respect of both the plots, but on appeal it was dismissed in respect of plot No. 31. 2. The facts of the case are few and simple. A suit under sections 59/61 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was filed by the petitioner claiming declaration of hereditary tenancy rights in respect of plot Nos. 13/2 and 31 on the allegations that he was hereditary tenant on the basis that the land in dispute belonged to the State of U.P. and it was allotted in the name of Hardwar Raj, father of respondent No. 4 but the petitioner was in possession over the same since the date of allotment and his name was also entered in Varg 10 and later on in the record the land was allotted in the name of Daya Nath, Respondent No. 5, who has no right over the land in dispute. Hence the petitioner claimed the relief for being declared hereditary tenant. 3. The suit was contested by the State of U.P. denying the rights of the petitioner and any allotment made in favour of the petitioner and that the petitioner claims himself just to be a Karinda or a representative to manage the land allotted in favour of Hardwar Raj, the father of Respondent No. 4, and that the land of the public utility land as provided in Section 30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Hence no hereditary tenancy right can accrue in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No. 6 also denied the claim of the petitioner. 4. The trial Court has earlier dismissed the suit vide its judgment dated 10-7-1968 and an appeal was filed by the petitioner which was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial Court for decision afresh after affording opportunity to the petitioner to explain the admissions made by him in his applications dated 11-8-1966 and 2-9-1966 in which he himself admitted to be just a representative or Karinda. After remand the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to explain his admissions and he was frank enough to admit on 10-8-1966 that he has certainly made applications dated 11-8-1966 and 2-9-1966 and those applications contain his signatures and he was Member of Legislative Assembly those days and he has certainly made admissions in those applications that he was cultivating the land as Karinda of Hardwar Raj, father of Respondent No. 4. He explained that at the instance of Vijai Bahadur who was a son of Hardwar Raj that he had made these statements. The trial Court, however, by judgment dated 25-1-1971 decreed the suit in respect of both the plots. An appeal was filed by Sri Daya Nath, Respondent No. 5 which was partly allowed in respect of plot No. 31 and the suit was dismissed. The petitioner's second appeal was dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated 2-4-76. The present writ petition is directed against these two judgments rendered by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. 5. I have heard Sri R. S. Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P. C. Srivastava, the learned standing counsel appearing for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri R. N. Singh who appeared for Respondent No. 5. 6. It has been urged by Sri R. S. Misra that the petitioner acquired hereditary tenancy rights and section 30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act did not apply to the land in dispute inasmuch as it has nowhere come in evidence that the land in dispute was a land of public utility. Hence it cannot be assumed that the hereditary tenancy rights would not accrue. Further it was urged that the admissions contained in the aforesaid applications were satisfactorily explained that it was at the behest of Vijai Bahadur son of Hardwar Raj and hence hereditary tenancy rights would accrue in favour of the petitioner under section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Further it was urged that the admissions contained in the aforesaid applications were satisfactorily explained that it was at the behest of Vijai Bahadur son of Hardwar Raj and hence hereditary tenancy rights would accrue in favour of the petitioner under section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Sri P. C. Srivastava, the learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, refuted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and urged that the land vested in the State of U.P. wasof Public Utility and, in view of Section 30 of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 no hereditary rights would accrue in favour of the petitioner and he was bound by his admissions contained in the applications dated 11-8-1966 and 2-9-1966, Sri R. N. Singh has, however, supported the impugned orders. 7. As regards the admissions made by the petitioner in the applications dated 11-8-1966 and 2-9-1966 that he was cultivating the land as Karinda on behalf of Hardwar Raj was unequivocal and it cannot be explained just on the statement that the said admissions were made at the behest of respondent No. 4 who is the son of Hardwar Raj. The petitioner being M.L.A. those days was a responsible person. It cannot be assumed that he had made a statement just at the behest of anybody else. Hence this admission itself is sufficient to prove that the petitioner was not in possession over the land in dispute in his own rights nor he can be assumed to be in possession otherwise than in accordance with law against the consent of the true owner. For acquiring rights under section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act it is necessary that the person should be taking or retaining the possession of the land without the consent of the person entitled to admit or to occupy such plot otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force. In this case it has not been proved by the petitioner on the basis of the evidence on record that he was taking or retaining the possession of the land without the consent of the person entitled and otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law. In view of his unequivocal admissions made it was clear that he was cultivating the land as a Karinda of Hardwar Raj and not in his own capacity. In view of his unequivocal admissions made it was clear that he was cultivating the land as a Karinda of Hardwar Raj and not in his own capacity. No other mode was indicated as to how the possession of the petitioner became adverse against the consent of the person entitled to admit him or it became otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law, further being a Karinda of Hardwar Raj in whose favour the allotment was made, the possession of the petitioner would be at the best that of a person in permissive possession and that would not ensure any benefit for acquiring any legal right in favour of the petitioner. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, accordingly, without any substance. 8. The next submission that there was no evidence that the land was held by the State Government for a public purpose as provided under section 30(3) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, has only to be stated to be rejected as being devoid of merits. The land held by the Government was certainly for the public purpose or for a work of public utility. This was land held by the Government for being allotted to persons belonging to the category of freedom-fighters and other-persons whom the Government wanted to "rehabilitate or ameliorate their conditions on political reasons. If such was a nature of the land in dispute, it was certainly a land held by the State Government, for public purposes or a land of public utility. On the other hand, there was no evidence led by the petitioner to prove that the nature of land held by the State Government was not for public purposes. It cannot, therefore, be, assumed even for a moment that the present land was held by the State Government for any purpose other than public purpose. 9. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me. 10. In view of the discussions hereinbefore, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to costs.