S. R. ROY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's appeal arising of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Seventh Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 553 of 1983, reversing those of the learned Munsif, Sealdah passed in Title Suit No. 295 of 1980. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises as described in the schedule to the plaint and the defendant was a tenant under her in respect thereof at a monthly rental of Rs 150/- payable according to English calendar month. ( 3 ) THE defendant being a defaulter and the plaintiff also having required the suit premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of the other member of her family. She terminated the defendant's tenancy by a notice to quit which was served upon the defendant by registered post on April 20,1980. Beside this she also served another notice upon the defendant under certificate of posting. By the said notice the defendant was directed to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the month of may, 1980,but the defendant having failed and neglected to quit and vacate the suit premises, the plaintiff filed the instant suit for a decreed for ejectment and khas possession. ( 4 ) THE defendant contested by filing a written statement alleging inter alia that he was neither a defaulter as alleged not did the plaintiff require the suit premises for her use and occupation. He also denied the service of the notice to quit. ( 5 ) ON the aforesaid facts the parties went into evidence and on a perusal thereof the learned Munsif found that the defendant was not a defaulter as alleged. He, however, was of the view that the plaintiff had been able to prove her case of reasonable requirement, but since he found that the notice to quit was not served upon the defendant, he dismissed the suit. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved, the plaintiff moved up in appeal. He, however, was of the view that the plaintiff had been able to prove her case of reasonable requirement, but since he found that the notice to quit was not served upon the defendant, he dismissed the suit. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved, the plaintiff moved up in appeal. The learned lower appellate court upheld the finding of the learned Munsif that the plaintiff required the suit premises for her own use and occupation, but disagreeing with his finding that the notice to quit was not served upon the defendant, he found that the notice to quit was actually served upon the defendant and was legal, valid and sufficient. On the said finding he reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court and decreed the suit in plaintiff's favour. ( 7 ) IT is against the said judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court that the defendant has now come up in appeal before this court. ( 8 ) NOW, both the learned courts below having concurrently found on facts that the plaintiff required the suit premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family members, the said find was taken as concluded and was not challenged before me on behalf of the defendant appellant. ( 9 ) APPEARING on behalf of the appellant, the only point that Mr. Roy, the learned Advocate, urged before me was that the learned lower appellate court went wrong in holding that the notice to quit was duly served upon the defendant. According to Mr. Roy, the learned trial court was correct in holding that there was no service of the quit notice upon the defendant either by registered post or under certificate of posting and on a proper assessment of the evidence the learned lower appellate court should also have arrived at the same finding. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Ghosh the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, contended that there was due service of the notice upon the defendant by registered post as well as under certificate of posting and in view of the established legal position, no other finding is possible. He accordingly, urged that the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court should be affirmed. He accordingly, urged that the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court should be affirmed. ( 11 ) NOW, in the instant case, the plaintiff discloses that service of the quit notice was effected by two different modes, viz. , by registered post as well as under certificate of posting and the defendant has given a categorical denial to it in his written statement. ( 12 ) SO far the registered notice is concerned, the envelope containing the notice stands marked as Ext. 5, It appears that the envelope, which came back with the postal endorsement "not claimed", was opened in presence of the learned trial Judge and the notice Ext. 2 was brought out. ( 13 ) THERE is no dispute as regards to the notice being correctly addressed. On the envelope (Ext. 5) some dates have been noted, viz. , "16/4, 17/4 and 18/4" without any connecting endorsement to indicate what these dates signify. Incidentally, the notice to quit is dated April 16, 1980. It may be that on the dates noted on the envelope the postal peon went to the address and found the defendant abscond, but that obviously is of no consequence. The next date mentioned is 20/4' and here there is an endorsement to the effect "not claimed". ( 14 ) AS has been held in different judicial decisions, such an endorsement raises a presumption of due service unless properly rebutted. Whether mere denial by the defendant of the services is sufficient to rebut such presumption, has been the subject of judicial controversies, which now seems to have been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Puwada v. C. V. Ramana, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 869, where it has been held that where a notice is returned with endorsement as 'refused' it is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect the service. A denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admission or conduct. A denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admission or conduct. ( 15 ) IN the instant case, however, the presumption of due service stands practically self-condemned in view of the fact that April 20, 1980, i. e. , the date on which the notice was allegedly not claimed by the defendant, was a Sunday, which is normally a postal holiday and it is beyond anybody's experience that a postman is found active even on Sundays. And that bring so the plaintiff should have examined the postal peon to clarify the position, which has, however, not been done. It was sought to be contended by Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, that possibly due to mistake the date was mentioned as April 20, but even for drawing such an interference the examination of the postman was necessary. ( 16 ) IN my judgment, the learned trial court, in the circumstances above, was right in holding that no presumption of the service of the registered notice could be drawn. The finding of the learned lower appellate court on the point that there was no bar to service on a Sunday depending upon the convenience of the postal peon is based on pure surmise and as such, is not acceptable. ( 17 ) IT was next contended by Mr. Ghosh that even if it be assumed that the notice sent by registered post was not duly served upon the defendant, there was no difficulty in accepting the service under certificate of posting. ( 18 ) IN this connection P. W. 2 Amal Krishna Bose, the plaintiff's son, who got himself examined on behalf of his mother, stated that a notice was also served under certificate of posting and in support thereof the certificate of posting was filed, which was marked Ext. 5, formal proof of it having ben dispensed with by the defendant. Significantly, P. W. 2 was not cross-examined on the point and it was not even suggested to him in cross-examination that no service was actually affected in the said manner. Whatever, cross-examination he was subjected to on the point, was as regards to the service of the notice by registered post? Significantly, P. W. 2 was not cross-examined on the point and it was not even suggested to him in cross-examination that no service was actually affected in the said manner. Whatever, cross-examination he was subjected to on the point, was as regards to the service of the notice by registered post? That being so, it may at least be presumed on the basis of the evidence of P. W. 2 Amal Krishna Bose that a notice to quit was also issued under certificate of posting. Regarding the address of the defendant as given in the certificate of posting, there is not dispute about its correctness. ( 19 ) IT is now well settled that a notice used under certificate of posting also carries with it the presumption of due service unless rebutted. ( 20 ) TRUE, that the defendant in his evidence has also denied service of notice upon him under certificate of posting, but the whole question is whether the presumption of due service of the notice can be said to have been rebutted on the mere denial of service by the defendant. ( 21 ) IN my judgment, this problem requires rather a pragmatic approach. A plaintiff with the object of getting an ex-parte decree against the defendant, may suppress the summons collusively or otherwise and that being so, mere assertion by the plaintiff that summons upon the defendant has been duly served, cannot be accepted as sacrosanct where such service is subsequently denied by the defendant. But service of a quit-notice in a suit for ejectment, stands on a different footing altogether. In a suit for ejectment, service of the quit-notice upon the defendant terminating thereby his tenancy, is a pre-condition to ejectment and it is to the interest of the plaintiff to see that such notice is duly served upon the defendant so that the suit may not be dismissed on the ground of non-service of notice even in case he succeeds in proving to the court's satisfaction his grounds for ejectment. Such being the position, it can never be to the interest of the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment even to dream about the suppression of the notice to quit, because any such suppression would be to his pearl. Such being the position, it can never be to the interest of the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment even to dream about the suppression of the notice to quit, because any such suppression would be to his pearl. ( 22 ) ON the hand, it is definitely to the interest of the tenant-defendant to give a blanket denial to the service of the quit notice, since non-service of such notice gives him a clear immunity from eviction even though the grounds for ejectment are proved by the best possible evidence. To the contrary the plaintiff's interest would be to see that the notice is served and it is only normal to presume that he should take all possible care as well as reasonable steps to assure due service of it. That being so, mere denial of service of the notice by the defendant in a suit for ejectment should, in my view, be taken with a grain of salt, being the evidence of a person highly interested to deny such service. ( 23 ) IN the instant case, the plaintiff was more than vigilant in the matter since she did not remain satisfied simply by serving the notice by registered post but sh4e also took recourse to an alternative method, viz. , service under certificate of posting. There can be no denial of the fact that a properly addressed quit-notice was sent to the defendant by registered post, though it has been found to be ineffective due to the carelessness of the postal peon. Under no circumstances it can be presumed that the plaintiff or anybody else on his behalf could be instrumental in getting the endorsement "not claimed" dated April 20, 1980 recorded on the registered envelope by the postal peon, against her own interest. ( 24 ) NOW, the plaintiff having actually issued a registered notice upon the defendant, it is only normal that in her own interest she would post the notice under certificate of posting. There can, in my view, be no scope for presumption that the plaintiff would simply obtain the certificate from the post office for displaying it to the court, without actually posting the envelope containing the notice, because there would absolutely be no motive for such suppression. There can, in my view, be no scope for presumption that the plaintiff would simply obtain the certificate from the post office for displaying it to the court, without actually posting the envelope containing the notice, because there would absolutely be no motive for such suppression. In such a situation, direct evidence regarding the actual posting of the letter may, in my view, be dispensed with, because the strongest presumption would be in favour of the actual posting and there can be no presumption in favour of suppression, which will be against the plaintiff's interest. ( 25 ) IN my judgment. In the matter of service of a quit-notice in an ejectment suit, the court should be more inclined to presume in favour of the service than against it unless of course, in the peculiar circumstances, of a case it is unsafe to draw such presumption. As already stated, this is for the obvious reason that the plaintiff would be highly interested and motivated to see that the notice is actually served upon the defendant, and the defendant to the contrary would highly interested to denying such service. ( 26 ) THIS approach I think, will also help the court in coming to a decision whether examination of the serving postal peon would be necessary in a given case following denial of service of the quit-notice by the tenant-defendant, because as observed by the Supreme Court in Puwada v. C. V. Ramana (supra) that on a closer examination of the evidence on record, the court may reach the conclusion that the defendant in spite of his having full knowledge of the notice, refused it knowingly. ( 27 ) 1981 SC 1284 is that the presumption of due service both under sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well a under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act are rebut table but in the absence of proof to the contrary the resumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. ( 28 ) IN the matter of service of a quit-notice in a suit for ejectment, the court, in the above view of the matter may now consider whether mere denial of the service by the defendant may take the place of "proof to the contrary". ( 28 ) IN the matter of service of a quit-notice in a suit for ejectment, the court, in the above view of the matter may now consider whether mere denial of the service by the defendant may take the place of "proof to the contrary". ( 29 ) IN the instant case, the certificate of posting is dated April 25, 1980 and I am inclined to presume on whatever evidence has been led by P. W. 2 Amal Krishna Bose that the letter containing the notice was posted on that very day (since the plaintiff would be interested to see that it reached the defendant in time so as to give him clear one month's time to vacate) and it reached the defendant in due course of official business. By the notice (Ext. 2) the defendant having been asked to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of May 1980, the notice may be held to be sufficient in the absence of anything to prove to the contrary. ( 30 ) THUS, the plaintiff-respondent having been able to prove that the requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation and the notice to quit having been duly served upon him which efface is legal, valid and sufficient, the learned lower appellate court in my view, was justified in decreeing the plaintiff's suit. ( 31 ) THE appeal, as such, fails and is dismissed on contest and the impugned judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court be affirmed. However, in modification thereof the defendant is allowed time till the expiry of the month of March 1986 to quit and vacate the suit premises failing which he shall be liable to be evicted in execution of the decree. ( 32 ) THE defendant should, however, go on depositing amount equivalent to rent in the trial court month by month by the 15th of the next following month. In default of payment of any one of the installments the decree shall become executable at once. ( 33 ) THE parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal. No formal decree need be drawn up. Let the records be remitted to the learned trial court with a copy of this judgment as expeditiously as possible. Appeal dismissed.