ORDER B.D. Agarwal, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of the District Judge, Ballia, dated Nov. 3, 1982, and the order passed by the Munsif (East) Ballia. on July 15, 1982. 2. The dispute which relates to management of an educational institution is traced back to nearly two decades back. The suit was brought in 1963. Upon the matter coming up in this Court in Second Appeal No. 2464 of 1965 on March 5, 1968, there was a joint statement made by the counsel for the parties incorporated in the judgment which provided : "(1) That a meeting of the committee as declared by the court be held by 31st of May 1968, at which all the applications, whether received directly or through any member for enrolment as member of the Society shall be duly considered and accepted or rejected according to the majority decision of the members of the committee attending the meeting convened for the purpose. (2) That all the members of the Society who have so far been duly enrolled and who will be duly enrolled by 31st May shall constitute the electoral body for election of the office bearers of the Karyakarini Samiti of the said Society in accordance with the rules of the Society at a duly convened meeting of the general body of the Society or Samiti called not later than 30th June, 1968. (3) That from amongst the duly enrolled members of the Society whoever is elected in accordance with the above directions and the rules as the office bearers and members of the Karyakarini Samiti shall then take charge of the management and affairs of the Society forthwith. 3. The Court declared the composition of the Executive committee and directed in the operative portion of the judgment as below : "It is further ordered that a meeting of the committee as declared by the Court be held by 31st May, 1968, at which all the applications, whether received directly or through any member for enrolment as member of the Society shall be duly considered and accepted or rejected according to the majority decision of the members of the Committee attending the meeting convened for the purpose. That all the members of the Society, who have so far been duly enrolled and who will be duly enrolled by 31st May shall constitute the electoral body for election of the office bearers of the Karyakarini Samiti of the said Society in accordance with the rules of the Society at a duly convened meeting of the general body of the society, or samiti called not later than 30th June, 1968, and that from amongst the duly enrolled members of the Society whoever is elected in accordance with the above directions and the rules as the office bearers and members of the Karyakarini Samiti shall then take charge of the management and affairs of the society forthwith." This direction was modified on Aug. 22, 1968, whereby it was provided that the meeting of the Executive Committee for the enrolment of fresh members shall be held by Sept. 30, 1968 and thereafter a general meeting of the Samiti for election of the office bearers be held by 31st Oct. 1968. Oct, 31, 1968 was thus the date fixed for the finalisation of the process of the reconstitution of the Executive Committee. An application for execution under O. 21, R. 32(5) C.P.C. was moved on Sept. 25, 1968 to give effect to the decree and this was registered as Execution Case No. 150 of 1968 by the Munsif, Ballia. Objection was filed under S. 47 to the effect that meeting had already been held on 30th of Sept. 1968, in compliance to the requirements of the decree. This objection was rejected on Oct. 31, 1968; the appeal was also dismissed on May 13, 1970. The matter was brought to this Court in Execution Second Appeal No. 1125 of 1970 which was decided on Dec. 21, 1970. This Court found that the order had not been complied with and hence the time for compliance was extended by three months, but this was with other modification. The operative portion of this judgment : "In view of my findings that the order of this Court has not been complied with and considering the nature of the dispute, it is desirable to extend the period for compliance of this Court's order. It is also desirable that the right of inviting application and holding a meeting should not be left to the parties who have uptil now been playing with the institution for their selfish ends. It is also desirable that the right of inviting application and holding a meeting should not be left to the parties who have uptil now been playing with the institution for their selfish ends. This appeal, is, therefore, allowed and the case remanded to the learned Munsif who will under his direction appoint a Commissioner for inviting applications for enrolment of the members. The Commissioner will hold the meeting for enrolment of members and the enrolment will be in accordance with the rules of the Society. The election thereafter will be conducted under the supervision of the Munsif through the Commissioner. The learned Munsif will see that the whole process of enrolment of members and election is disposed of within a period of three months. Costs of this appeal shall be on parties. During the pendency of the final order, it will be open to the learned Munsif to issue direction for the management of the institution in a manner which is in the best interest of the institution." In terms of this direction the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the court below invited applications for enrolment of primary membership. More than 900 applications were received. The then Executive Committee met on 17th Sept. 1971 and framed certain rules laying down the norms and the procedure for seeking enrolment. Applying those Rules, 547 applications were rejected and 299 alone were accepted and enrolled. Those thus enrolled voted and appointed an Executive Committee. This was objected to by the other side. The objection was dismissed by the executing courts, but the appeal against the same was allowed in part on Dec. 7, 1971. This too was agitated before this Court in Ex. Second Appeal 1 of 1972, decided on March 15, 1972. It was held that eligibility for enrolment to primary membership could not be adjudged on the basis of rules framed subsequent to the applications received. The proper procedure, it was observed, should have been to formulate the rules and then to invite applications in the light thereof. Accordingly it was directed that "the Commission should advise inviting applications for primary membership mentioning the conditions laid down in the meeting dated 17-9-1971 and the applications so received be disposed of in accordance with the law and as directed by this Court in its earlier judgment" The election of the primary members and the Executive Committee held on 17-9-1971 was set aside. 4. Thereafter an application dated July 31, 1979 was moved, it appears purporting to be by one Rampujan Singh. The Munsif records in his order dated Sept. 19, 1981 that Ram Pujan Singh admitted that the application was not signed by him and hence this application was rejected. Objection was raised from the side of the petitioner to the effect that it was disputed between the parties which had to be gone into in execution, but since there was no application made for execution by any of the decree-holders, there arose no occasion for the court to exercise its jurisdiction. This was overruled with the observation "even if there is no application from any side, the case has to be disposed of and the compliance of the Court has to be made". In pursuance of this order dated 19th Sept. 1981, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed by the Munsif afresh on 15th July, 1982, to carry out the orders dated Dec. 21, 1970 and March 15, 1972 passed by this Court. The petitioner filed revision against the rejection of his objection preferred under S. 47, C.P.C. The objection was reiterated and the plea of limitation was also raised. From the respondents side it was argued that the Munsif was acting to give effect to the directions of this Court and any one aggrieved had to bring the matter to this Court instead of agitating in revision. The learned District Judge agreed with this contention and observed that it was in the discretion of the Munsif to move this Court for proper direction in the wake of inordinate delay adding; "..........this was strictly a matter between the Munsif and the Hon'ble High Court and the revisional court has no jurisdiction to entertain revision against any order passed by the Munsif in compliance of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court dated 21-12-1970. Hence I am unable to hold that I have jurisdiction to entertain this revision and dismiss the same." Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is manifest that the orders impugned suffer from basic fallacy. The assumption made is as if there is some direction in the nature of mandamus by this Court given on Dec. 21, 1970. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is manifest that the orders impugned suffer from basic fallacy. The assumption made is as if there is some direction in the nature of mandamus by this Court given on Dec. 21, 1970. As modified on March 15, 1972, and that the same had to be complied with in order to avert any indictment for contempt nothwithstanding the absence of an application by the parties moved in this behalf. It is in this light that the learned Munsif observed on Sept. 19, 1981 that even if there be no application for execution by any of the decree- holders and despite the fact that the application purporting to be by Ram Pujan Singh, respondent 5, (one of the decree-holders) was being disowned, the Court could proceed to implement the order of this court and the same approach has been endorsed by the District Judge with the observation that the matter is between the Munsif and this Court. It seems to be clearly overlooked that this Court had adjudicated is between the parties. This adjudication was made in Second Appeal No. 2464 of 1965. The composition of the executive committee had been laid and a direction was given to the executive committee initially to hold the meeting for deciding upon the enrolment of the primary membership and then getting the election done within the prescribed time limit. The time limit indicated on 5th March 1968 was extended on Aug. 22, 1968 so as to expire on Oct. 31, 1968. It was further extended by three months only on Dec. 21, 1970, and instead of leaving it to the Executive Committee to invite applications for enrolment to primary membership, it was directed that this be done by the Commissioner to be appointed by the execution court. The same direction was reiterated on March 15, 1972, but there was no extension of time limit thereunder. The underlying idea throughout was that there had to be the machinery of the Court set in motion by the process known to law and then alone the Munsif could act to implement the direction given by the Court. Unless the decree-holder stepped in invoking the jurisdiction of the court, there is no power acquired by the Munsif in accordance with the C.P.C. to act in the matter. Unless the decree-holder stepped in invoking the jurisdiction of the court, there is no power acquired by the Munsif in accordance with the C.P.C. to act in the matter. The orders of this Court cannot be interpreted to imply that, despite there being no move from the side of the decree-holder, the execution be set afoot by the court below suo motu for the relief envisaged being granted. The absence of an application to execute the decree cuts at the root of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly contends that, according to O. 21, R. 10, C.P.C. where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the court which passed the decree or to such court to which the decree may have been sent for execution. The desire on the part of the decree-holder is not achieved without an application in this behalf. R. 11(2) prescribes the particulars which every application for execution of the decree has to contain. Upon receiving such an application the court shall ascertain whether all the requirements of Rr. 11 to 14, as may be applicable to the case, have been complied with and if they have not been complied with, the court shall allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within the time fixed and if the defect is not remedied, the court shall reject the application vide O. 21. R. 17 C.P.C. the court below, therefore, could not have acted to implement or to give effect to the directions arising out of the second appeal suo motu without the machinery on the execution side being moved by an application prescribed for the purpose. For the respondents, learned counsel argued that Ram Pujan Singh had stated that he had given an application to his counsel, but nothing of the kind is forthcoming from the record. On the contrary, the Munsif observes categorically in the order dated 19-9-1981 that Ram Pujan had admitted that he did not sign any such application and it was rejected accordingly. This is further made clear from his observation that even if there is no application from any side, the case had to be disposed of in compliance to the direction of this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the execution application No. 150 of 1968 filed on Sept. This is further made clear from his observation that even if there is no application from any side, the case had to be disposed of in compliance to the direction of this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the execution application No. 150 of 1968 filed on Sept. 25, 1968 had not been struck off and, therefore, the court below could act in pursuance thereof. Though it is disputed from the petitioner's side that application was alive, assuming that there was no order formally striking off the same, it cannot be overlooked that the application made on Sept. 25, 1968 was in terms of the order originally passed on 5th of March 1968, and as modified on Aug. 22, 1968, while deciding the second appeal. There is no allegation nor has it been shown that this application at any stage was modified to incorporate the subsequent decisions arrived at on Dec. 21, 1970 and March 15, 1972 in Execution Second Appeal No. 1125 of 1976 and Execution Second appeal No. 1 of 1972. It follows that there was no prayer from the side of the decree-holders before the court for implementing any of these subsequent orders. For the petitioner it was argued also that, in terms of the decision taken by the Executive Committee on Oct. 13, 1979, the election was held on Jan. 20, 1980, and the Managing Committee constituted on that date has been given recognition by the District Inspector of Schools under his order dated 15th of Oct. 1980. and it also got the registration made with the amended bye-laws under the order dated July 9, 1982. Leaving all this aside the conclusion upon facts found seems inescapable that the jurisdiction of the execution court had not been invoked in the manner laid down in O. 21, R. 10/11 of the C.P.C. for giving effect to the directions dated Dec. 21, 1970 and Mar. 15, 1972 passed by this Court. 7. Another infirmity which is patent on the face of it is the failure on the part of the court below to have taken note of the bar of limitation. Article 135 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, lays down the limitation of three years from the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for the purpose, such other date for the enforcement of the decree granting mandatory injunction. Article 135 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, lays down the limitation of three years from the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for the purpose, such other date for the enforcement of the decree granting mandatory injunction. The relief claimed in the suit giving rise to the Second Appeal, referred to above, was declaration and injunction. The composition of the executive committee was declared by this Court and this was coupled with the mandatory injunction to the executive committee for ensuring the election of a fresh committee after the enrolment of primary members. The subsequent orders also injected the Executive Committee to bring about a new Executive Committee through the process of election and this was intended to be enforced with the aid of Commissioner to be appointed by the execution court. In the absence of any other time limit given in the ultimate order dated Mar. 15, 1972, the limitation could not extend beyond Mar. 14, 1975, in accordance with Article 135 aforementioned and there could be no question of appointment of a Commissioner by the trial court as such which had become functus officio after having decided the suit. The Commissioner could be appointed by the execution court as such on an application made to execute the decree within the limitation prescribed. For that reason as well the direction of the Munsif dated 15th July, 1982, appointing an Advocate Commissioner in pursuance of the approach adopted by him on 19-9-1981 could not be sustained and the District Judge was clearly in error in failing to exercise the revisional jurisdiction conferred under S. 115 read with S. 47 of the C.P.C. Nor is there provision for the court to act suo motu where the application for execution has become barred by limitation. 8. For the Petitioner there is also an application made on Nov. 22, 1982 in Ex. Second Appeal No. 1125 of 1970 in which the prayer is that this Court may clarify that the direction given on Dec. 21, 1970 need not be complied with and the decree has become inexecutable. The application in my view is misconceived. The order dated 21-12-1970 sought to be clarified does not suffer from ambiguity of any short. Second Appeal No. 1125 of 1970 in which the prayer is that this Court may clarify that the direction given on Dec. 21, 1970 need not be complied with and the decree has become inexecutable. The application in my view is misconceived. The order dated 21-12-1970 sought to be clarified does not suffer from ambiguity of any short. The question if it has been given effect to or requires still to be implemented is one of execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree which is the subject matter of objection under S. 47. C.P.C. The petitioner cannot forestall that indirectly through the mode of seeking such a clarification. The application is, therefore, rejected. 9. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The order passed by the District Judge, Ballia, Respondent 1, dated Nov. 3, 1982 which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition is quashed. The respondent is directed to redecide after hearing Civil Revision No. 215 of 1982 on merit in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.