Judgment :- By the proceedings dated 7th August, 1985 of the second respondent, the petitioner has been held to have suffered a disqualification on the ground that he was in default to the society in question. The provision invoked is Sec.28(l)(b)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act (53 of 1961), hereinafter reffered. to as ‘the Act’. The said provision reads as follows: ‘28(1) No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a Committee if he -- (b)(i) is in default to the Society or to any other registered Society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him for such period as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the Society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months;’ The rule invoked by the second respondent to exercise the power of removal is Rule 40 of the Rules framed under the Act. The show cause was issued on 8th April, 1985. The default relates to February, 1980. Admittedly, the dues have been collected in December, 1980. Hence either on the date of the show cause or on the date of the passing of the order by the second respondent, the petitioner could not be held to be in default to the society in question within the meaning of the said provision. The set of expressions used in the provision extracted above is ‘is in default to the Society’. Sec.28(2)(a) merely says that a member of the Committee shall cease to hold office, if he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sub-sec.(l). If a member of the Committee ‘is in default to the Society’ within the meaning of Sec.28(i)(b)(i) of the Act, on the date of the initiation of the action under Rule 40, the exercise of the power of removal may be held to be competent. We can take it that if on the date of the show cause, namely, on 8th April, 1985, the petitioner was in default within the meaning of Sec.28(l)(b) (i) and if there was a clearance of the dues only after the show cause and before the passing of the order, that may not bring him any amelioration with regard to the default. Such view has been expressed by Kailasam, 3. (as he then was) in Ramakrishna Reddiar v. The Deputy Registrar, (1970)1 M.L.J. 197 . Such view has been expressed by Kailasam, 3. (as he then was) in Ramakrishna Reddiar v. The Deputy Registrar, (1970)1 M.L.J. 197 . But here long before the date of the show cause, namely 8th April, 1985, the petitioner had cleared the dues, and he could not be held to have been in default to the society in question, on the date of initiation of action. Hence, it is not possible to bring the matter within the ambit of Secs.28(l)(b) (i) and 28(2)(a) of the Act. The facts being what they are, the proceedings of the second respondent dated 7th August, 1985 against the petitioner cannot be sustained at all. The petitioner did prefer an appeal against the proceedings of the second respondent to the first respondent, and sought for stay. The first respondent has neither granted the stay nor has he fixed a date for the disposal of the appeal. The result, from the view point of the petitioner, is really oppressive and prejudicial. The proceedings of the second respondent are contrary to the terms of the provisions themselves. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner has rushed to this Court seeking to quash the proceedings of the second respondent as well as impeaching the order of the first respondent declining stay. It is true that the prayer is not happily worded, but that does not alter the substance of the grievance of the petitioner and the real remedy he is after. 2. In the peculiar circumstances of the case and in view of the patent error of law staring on one’s face, I feel obliged to quash the proceedings of the second respondent. Accordingly, the proceedings of the second respondent in R.C.20085/84 ASSI, dt.7th August, 1985 are quashed. In view of this, the first respondent need not pass any order in the appeal pending before him. I make no order as to costs in this writ petition.