Judgment :- 1. The accused in C.C.431/79 was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Wadakkancherry for an offence punishable under S.55(g) of the Abkari Act. He was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.1,000/-. In CrI.A. 97 of 1981 the Sessions Judge, Trichur confirmed the conviction and sentence. The revision petition was filed by her. 2. The allegation against her is that on 10-2-1979 he was found to carry fourteen litres of wash intended for the manufacture of illicit arrack in a mud pot. The sample of the wash on analysis was found to contain 1.86 per cent of ethyl alcohol. The concurrent findings of guilt based on the evidence was not seriously attempted to be challenged. The attempt was only to attack the conviction and sentence on certain alleged illegalities and irregularities. 3. The first contention was that sample of wash was not given to the revision petitioner and the report of analysis contains only the conclusions and not the data. These are contentions not raised before the trial court or the appellate court. There is no provision in the Abkari Act, as in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, enabling the accused to have a second analysis of the sample. So, also there is no provision to supply sample to the accused. The contraband articles are being produced in court by the excise officials with the necessary requisition for sending samples for analysis. Samples are sent from court and reports are received in court. There is absolutely no legal basis for the contention that trial and conviction are vitiated by the alleged irregularity or illegality of not supplying the sample of wash to the revision petitioner. There is no case that the necessary records enjoined by law were not supplied. Supply of sample is not a mandate of any legal provisions and hence the accused has no right to insist on such a condition. If the correctness of the result of chemical analysis is disputed that is also a contention which ought to have been taken up before the trial court and attempts made to substantiate the same before the trial court. No such attempt was made and no such contention was also raised before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge. Now it is too late to contend that the report of chemical examination is defective. No such attempt was made and no such contention was also raised before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge. Now it is too late to contend that the report of chemical examination is defective. The report shows that wash seized from the revision petitioner is a material for the purpose of manufacturing liquor. That is all what is required for proving the offence punishable under S.55(g). 4. The only other contention was that the provision of S.167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was violated and hence cognizance of the offence, trial and conviction are all vitiated. S.167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads: "If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary," In David v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 849) it was observed: "Sub-clause (5) of S.167 is mandatory, affects the jurisdiction to continue investigation and statutorily prescribes the period during which alone investigation can be conducted. Just as the police cannot continue investigation after the lapse of six months from the date of arrest of the accused in a summons case, so also, the court cannot take cognizance of the case on the basis of; an investigation continued thereafter. When there is a statutory termination of the investigation, prosecution which is a continuation of the investigation cannot also proceed. The cognizance taken subsequently in violation of S.167 (5) does not validate the investigation continued after the statutory period". In answer to the contention that S.167 (5) is applicable only on a police investigation in a summons case the revision petitioner relied on S.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads: "(1) Ail offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. In answer to the contention that S.167 (5) is applicable only on a police investigation in a summons case the revision petitioner relied on S.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads: "(1) Ail offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in fore regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences". The revision petitioner seems to be forgetful of the fact that S.4 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding investigation of offences under any other law other than the Indian Penal Code under the provisions of the Cr. P.C. is only subject to any enactment regulating such investigation. The Abkari Act does not provide for any investigation by the Police. Whether the police is entitled to investigate such offences is not a matter to be considered here. The fact that under S.36 of the Abkari Act all searches under the Act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Cr. P.C. do not indicate that offences under the Abkari Act will have to be investigated and charge-sheeted by the police under the provisions of the Code. The scheme of the provisions of the Abkari Act is that normally Abkari officials are the persons competent to detect crimes. Under S.50 of the Abkari Act what is required is only a report from the Abkari Inspector. It is on that report which is treated as a complaint that the Magistrate inquires into such offence and tries the person accused thereof in like manner as if a complaint had been made before him as prescribed under the Code. It is treated only as a complaint as defined in S.2 (d) of the Code. Under S.2 (h) of the Code investigation includes all the proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a magistrate) who is authorised by a magistrate. In an Abkari Case there is no such investigation by the police or any person authorised by the magistrate. Under S.2 (h) of the Code investigation includes all the proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a magistrate) who is authorised by a magistrate. In an Abkari Case there is no such investigation by the police or any person authorised by the magistrate. So also the report filed by the Abkari Inspector is not a police report under S.173 (2) of the Code as defined under S.2(r). It is only a complaint as defined under S.2(d). Investigation usually starts on information relating to the commission of an offence given to an officer in charge of a police station and recorded under S.154 of the Code. On the information the police officer or somebody deputed by him has to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances. That may include steps for discovery and arrest also in appropriate cases. Investigation includes all proceedings under the Code conducted by a police officer for the collection of evidence. Collection of evidence will consist of examination of various persons including the accused, reduction of their statements to writing if the officer thinks fit, search of places and seizure of things considered necessary, formation of the opinion as to whether a case is made out to place the accused for trial before the magistrate and if so taking necessary steps for filing a charge sheet under S.173 (2) of the Code. All these come under Chapter XII of the Code relating to information to the police and their power to investigate. 5. Nilratan Sircar v. Lakshmi Narayan Ram Niwas (AIR 1965 SC 1) relied on by the revision petitioner cannot improve his case. That decision was relied on to argue that when a Special Statute is silent the provisions of the Cr.P.C. will have to prevail. In that case the scope of S.19 and 19-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 was being considered. It was held that in the absence of any prescribed procedure for the issue of search warrant under S.19 of the Act the provisions of S.96, 98 and Form No. 8 of Sch. V of the Code would be applicable to search warrants issued under S.19. That aspect has nothing to do with the contention raised before me. 6. The excise officials are not conducting any investigation as envisaged by the Code. V of the Code would be applicable to search warrants issued under S.19. That aspect has nothing to do with the contention raised before me. 6. The excise officials are not conducting any investigation as envisaged by the Code. The report filed by them is only a complaint and not a police report. S.167 (5) of the Code is intended to speed up investigation by the police in order to avoid harassment. The scope and applicability of S.167 (5) and the consequences of violation are only matters of academic importance in this case to which that provision is evidently not applicable for the simple reason that here no investigation is involved, being a complaint. If so the argument based on S.167 (5) of the Cr. P.C. cannot stand. 7. On the merits no interference with the conviction is necessary because the conviction is based on acceptable evidence. Sentence awarded is the minimum provided under the Act and no argument was advanced regarding sentence. There is nothing to interfere with the sentence also. The criminal revision petition is dismissed. Dismissed.