S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This reference raises an important question of law with respect to interpretation of the words every month used in sec. 18 (1) (i) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (No. XXVII of 1957) (for short the Act). We may also state that the same words have been used in sec. 271 (1) (i) (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The provisions of sec. 18(1) (i) are in peri materia with sec. 271 (1) (i)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. The petitioner-assessee is H. U. F. The assessment year involved is 1973-74. The assessee was required to file return of wealth by August 15, 1973. The return was despatched by the assessee by registered post on September 12, 1973. It was received by the Wealth Tax Officer (W.T.O.) on September, 15, 1973. The W. T. O. was of the view that there was a delay of 31 days (one month) in filing the return. He issued show cause notice to the assessee regarding penalty. He held in his order dated December 5, 1975 that the assessee was a defaulter within the meaning of sec. 18(1) (a) of the Act and so imposed a penalty of Rs. 1577/- The assessee filed an appeal. The Appellate Assis-tent Commissioner (AAC) opined that the default in filing the return was to be computed on the basis of the completed month. According to him, as the return was due to be filed on August 15, 1973, and as it was received on September 15, 1973. a complete month has passed and, therefore, the penalty imposed by the W. T. O. is justified. A second appeal was lodged by the assessee and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal) concurred with the view taken by the A. A. C. in regard to the very same contention that was reiterated before it on behalf of the assessee. "In our opinion, a return of wealth is filed on the date on which it is received in the concerned office. The date of despatch of the return by post is not relevant for determining the date of filing of the return because post office is the agent of the assessee. In the present case the return of wealth was admittedly received by the Wealth-tax Officer on 15.9.73. The date of despatch of the return by post is not relevant for determining the date of filing of the return because post office is the agent of the assessee. In the present case the return of wealth was admittedly received by the Wealth-tax Officer on 15.9.73. Therefore, there was clearly a complete month of delay for which the penalty was rightly levied by the Wealth-tax Officer." The assessee submitted an application to refer the question of law arising out of its order dated June 16, 1977, passed in W.T.A. No. 114/JP/1976-77 (Assessment year 1973-74). The Tribunal was of the opinion that the question of law arose out of its order and, therefore, it has referred the following questions for our decision: "1. whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that there was delay of one month in filing the return under section 14 (1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in confirming the penalty levied by the Wealth Tax Officer?" We have heard Mr. R. Balia and Mr. B. R. Arora, for the assessee and Mr. C. R. Mehta, for the Revenue." 3. It is not in dispute that in accordance with sec. 14(1) of the Act, the assessee should have filed return of his wealth by Aug. 15, 1973. For the present purpose, the parties are further in agreement that the return despatched by registered post was received by the W.T.O. on September 15, 1973. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel appearing for the assessee that as there was no default of a compel month when the return was received by the W.T.O. on September 15, 1973, no penalty could be levied under sec. 18(l)(i) of the Act. In support of his contention Mr. R. Balia placed strong reliance on C.I.T. vs. Khadri Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd.(l) and C.I.T. vs. Brijlal Lohia (2). On the other hand, Mr. C.R. Mehta, appearing, for the Revenue submitted that when the return was received on September 15, 1973, which should have been filed by August 15, 1973, there was a default of a complete month within the meaning of sec. 18 (l)(i) of the Act and therefore, on admitted facts of the case, the imposition of penalty was justified. C.R. Mehta, appearing, for the Revenue submitted that when the return was received on September 15, 1973, which should have been filed by August 15, 1973, there was a default of a complete month within the meaning of sec. 18 (l)(i) of the Act and therefore, on admitted facts of the case, the imposition of penalty was justified. Reliance was placed on C.I.T. Vs. Laxmi Rattan Cotton Mills(3). 4. We have given our most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the assessee and the Revenue. 5. It is the admitted position that neither in the Act nor in the Income-tax Act the word month has been defined. Month has been defined in sec. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1977 (No. x of 1897), as under:- "(35) "Month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar:" According to sec. 4 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the definition of month as given in sec. 3(35) shall apply unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868 and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887. The Wealth Tax Act is of 1957 and, thus, the definition given in s. 3 (35) shall be applicable for interpreting the word month used in various sections of the Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. According to sec. 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act, 1947, the month does not necessarily mean 30 days and it is according to Gregorian calendar unless the context-otherwise requires. The words used in sec. 18 (1)(i) are "for every month during which the default continued". As stated hereinabove, in sec. 271 (l)(i) (b), the very same words have been used, namely "for every month during which the default continued." 6. The question for consideration in these circumstances is, whether the words every month used in sec. 18(1) (i) or for that matter in sec. 271(1)(b) mean month according to Gregorian Calendar or thirty days or a Lunar month. 7. The question that arose before the Madras High Court in CITs case (1) was whether the word month occurring in sec. 271 (l)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has to be reckoned according to the British Calendar according to sec. 271(1)(b) mean month according to Gregorian Calendar or thirty days or a Lunar month. 7. The question that arose before the Madras High Court in CITs case (1) was whether the word month occurring in sec. 271 (l)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has to be reckoned according to the British Calendar according to sec. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It was held that the word month occurring in sec. 271 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act has to be reckoned according to the British Calendar as defined in sec. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. C.I.T.s case (3) was dissented from. 8. The question that arose in C.I.T.s case (2) was whether the words "every month during which the default continued" occurring in sec. 271 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 refer to only a month during the whole of which the default continued and not also to a month during only a part of which the default continued. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as he then was, speaking for the Division Bench, held that where month is not defined, we should go to the expression used under sec. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and "month" should be the English Calendar month. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court expressed its agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C.I.T.s case (1). We have considered the reasoning given in C.I.T.s case (I) and C.I.T.s case (2). There is absolutely nothing in the context of sec. 18(1) (i) of the Act to exclude the application of the definition of the word month occurring in sec. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. There is nothing in the context to include the invocation of the definition in s. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to construe the words used in s. 18(l)(i) of the Act. The view taken in C.I.T.s case (3) is that the word "month" occurring in sec. 271(1) (a) must be taken to mean a period of thirty days The reasons for this view are that sec. 27(d) (a) was enacted for the purpose of imposing a penalty on an assessee who has not filed his returns within the prescribed time and its object was to serve as a deterrent for such lapses. 271(1) (a) must be taken to mean a period of thirty days The reasons for this view are that sec. 27(d) (a) was enacted for the purpose of imposing a penalty on an assessee who has not filed his returns within the prescribed time and its object was to serve as a deterrent for such lapses. According to the learned Judges it may in some cases, lead to defaulting assessee escape penalty altogether. This has been illustrated by stating that if the time given to an assessee to file his returns is upto 31st January of a particular year and he files it on the 27th of February, he would not be liable to pay any penalty and that such a result is not contemplated by the sub-section. In our opinion, the escape or non-escape of penalty to such a limited intent, cannot constitute a proper and sound basis for holding that there is something in the subject or context of sec. 271(b) of the Income Tax Act repugnant to the definition of the word month occurring in s. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 9. Having considered the reasons given in the aforesaid three authorities, we prefer to adopt the view taken in C.I.T.s case (1) and the C.I.T.s case (2) and express our respectful dissent with the view taken in C.I.T.s case (3). 10. We are of opinion that the word month used in s. 18(1 }(i) of the Act should be the English Calendar month, and it has to be reckoned as provided for in s. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In this view of the matter, the return, which was received by the W.T.O on September 15, 1973, was within month and not after a completed month and therefore, the Tribunal was not right in holding that there was a delay of one month in filing the return under s. 14(i) of the Act. 11. The answer to the first question is in the negative, i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. QUESTION No. 2. 12. 11. The answer to the first question is in the negative, i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. QUESTION No. 2. 12. In view of the answer given by us to Question No. 1, it, necessarily, follows that no penalty could be imposed under s. 18(1) (i) of the Act on the assessee for the return which was received on September 15, 1973, by the Wealth Tax Officer as there was no delay of one completed month. 13. The answer to the second question is in the negative, i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. 14. Let a copy of the judgment be sent to the Tribunal as required by s. 27(6) of the Act.