JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - On June 23, 1984, was published in the U.P. Gazette a notification dated June 21, 1984 under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it was in respect of a large number of plots situate in villages Sachendi and Bhantipur in Pargana and District Kanpur. In the opening part it recited that the land mentioned in the schedule appended to the Notification was "needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of 400 Kv. Sub-station ........ through the National Thermal Power Corporation Limited." In Para 2, it was further said that "being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land, inasmuch as, the said land which is arable is urgently required for the construction of 400 Kv sub-station....... and that in view of the pressing urgency, it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act, the Governor is further pleased to direct under sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 of the said Act that the provisions of S. 5-A of the said Act shall not apply......" This was followed by a notification dated July 3, 1984 under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which was published in the U.P. Gazette dated July 7, 1985. In its opening part it said that in continuation of the Government notification dated June 21, 1984, under Sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, ".......the Government is pleased to declare under S. 6 of the said Act, that he is satisfied that land mentioned in the schedule below is needed for a public purpose, namely....., and under S. 7 of the said Act to direct the Collector of Kanpur to take order for the acquisition of the said land. The amount of compensation. to be awarded for the acquisition of the said sand shall be paid partly out of the public revenue of the State." In para 2 of this notification, the entitle is that, "the Governor being satisfied that the case is one of urgency is further pleased under sub-sec. The amount of compensation. to be awarded for the acquisition of the said sand shall be paid partly out of the public revenue of the State." In para 2 of this notification, the entitle is that, "the Governor being satisfied that the case is one of urgency is further pleased under sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the said Act to direct that the Collector of Kanpur though no award under S. 11 has been made, may, on the, expiry of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 9, take possession (,11 the land which is waste or arable mentioned in the schedule below for the said purpose." 2. Sarvsri Kishan Narain, Vishnu Narain, Kailash Narain and Prem Narain sons of Lala Ram Narain Garg approached this Court by presenting the present petition on Aug. 21, 1984. They claimed to be owners in possession of a number of plots detailed in para 1 of the writ petition situate in village Sachendi. They assailed the notifications and sought their quashing and also prayed that a mandamus may issue to the respondents. namely, the State of U.P. the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kanpur and the National Thermal Power Corporation of India not to acquire the land of the petitioners and not to interfere with their possession over it. According to the petitioners, the Thermal Power Corporation had approached them for parting with the land for the purpose of construction of the sub-station. These negotiations were held in the year 1982 but the petitioners refused to do so. Thereafter, these notifications were got issued. The land was neither waste nor arable. There was no urgency either so as to enable the Governor to dispense with the provisions of S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and, thus, deprive them of an opportunity to object to the land being acquired. They have also said that the acquisition was for a Company within the meaning of that term as defined in the Land Acquisition Act and compliance with Part VII of that Act was absolutely necessary. The land was not suitable for construction of a sub-station. The petitioners had pointed out to the Corporation land in the vicinity which was more suitable for the purpose. The land was not suitable for construction of a sub-station. The petitioners had pointed out to the Corporation land in the vicinity which was more suitable for the purpose. It has also been said that on an application made in that behalf, the Additional Collector, Kanpur passed an order on June 30, 1960 granting a declaration under S. 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at the appellate stage, reversing the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer to the contrary, and that in proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, the declaration was given effect to. The Governor was not entitled to ignore this fact and treat the land as arable as was done by him in the Notification under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act nor could the land be treated to be waste land in the circumstances of the case. 3. The State of U.P. and the Special Land Acquisition Officer as well as the National Thermal Power Corporation placed their version in the form of counter-affidavits and rejoinders thereto were filed by the petitioners. Since the petitioners had not been formally admitted to further hearing before the, exchange of' these affidavits, the petitioners as well as the aforesaid three : respondents prayed through their counsel that the matter be disposed of finally at this stage itself. On this request we have heard the counsel for the parties at some length and are proceeding to dispose of the petition finally in terms of R. 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court. 4. Sri R. C. Srivastava, Senior Advocate has appeared before us on behalf of he petitioners Kishan Narain and his brothers. The sole submission made by was that the provisions of S. 17 were not attracted in the case so that t`, . notification under S. 6(1) without opportunity of filing an objection and an enquiry under S. 5-A, was invalid. He urged that the acquisition of the land in question being for a public purpose, as recited in the two notifications, the exclusion of the enquiry under S. 5-A, was could only be made in respect of land which was arable, as it was the case of the State of U.P. that the land was arable by saying so in the notification under section 4(1). Arable, according to Sri Srivastava, could only be that `land' which was used for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry. The declaration under S. 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act made in the year 1960. which was duly recognised even in proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, made it clear that the land could not be used for these purposes. The exclusion of proceedings under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act by invoking the provisions of S. 17(1) and (4) could not be resorted to in these circumstances. The submission was expanded by saying that after the declaration was made, the plots in question ceased to be land. They could not, then, be treated as arable land for purposes of S. 17(1). Our attention was invited to some decisions of this Court. First of these was by a Division Bench in Mewa v. Baldeo, 1966 All WR (HC) 597 : ( AIR 1967 All 358 ). In that case, while dealing with the plea whether a suit for cancellation of a document along with relief of possession would lie before a Civil Court or before the Revenue Court only by virtue of S. 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Bench referred to the definition of land as contained in S. 3(14) of that Act and observed (in para 14 of the report), inter alia, that "there is no provision now for land automatically ceasing to be "land" if it is covered by buildings. On the contrary, an elaborate provision has been made in S. 143 onwards whereby land ceased to be land only after a declaration has been made to that effect by the Collector and ........................ Under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, therefore, land remains land until that declaration is given .............." It is obvious that the Bench was examining the question only with reference to the definition of land for purposes of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, therefore, land remains land until that declaration is given .............." It is obvious that the Bench was examining the question only with reference to the definition of land for purposes of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The next decision was rendered in Alauddin v..Hamid Khan, 1971 RD 160 : ( AIR 1971 All 348 ) where C. S. P. Singh, J. observed (in para 8 of the Report) that" ........till such time that a Bhumidhar does not get the requisite declaration he continues to be governed by the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act irrespective of the fact as to whether he uses his land for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture etc. or not. The case involved, as one of the questions, the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court qua the Revenue Court. The last is a recent decision of this Court in Pratap Rai v. Board of Revenue, 1980 All LJ 846. to which we shall advert a little later. 5. We may read the material part of S. 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act and it is in these words : "143. Use of holding for industrial or residential purposes. - (1) Where a bhumidhar uses his holding or part thereof for a purpose not concerned with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming, the Assistant Collector in charge of the sub-division may. suo motu or on an application, after making such enquiry as may be prescribed, make a declaration to that effect. (1-A) ......................... (2) Upon the grant of the declaration mentioned in sub-section (1) of the provisions of this Chapter (other than this section) shall cease to apply to the bhumidhar with respect to such land and he shall thereupon be governed in the matter of devolution of the land by personal law to which he is subject." 6. Section 143 occurs in Chapter VIII of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act which consists of several sections from S. 129 to S. 230. Of these, many relate to bhumidhars in particular. 7. Section 169 read with Sections 171 to 175 deal with devolution to the holding of a bhumidhar. The effect of a declaration under section 143(1) would in terms of sub-sec. Of these, many relate to bhumidhars in particular. 7. Section 169 read with Sections 171 to 175 deal with devolution to the holding of a bhumidhar. The effect of a declaration under section 143(1) would in terms of sub-sec. (3) of S. 143, also, be that succession would be governed by personal law, In Pratap Rai's case (1980 All LJ 846) this court was called upon to decide the question whether the land in respect whereof a declaration under sub-sec. (1) of S. 143 had been made could be sold for recovery of a loan given by the U.P. Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act or the proceedings could only be held under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The view taken was that, inasmuch as, the land in question had ceased to be land within the meaning of that term in S. 2(14) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the provisions of that Act could not be applied for recovery of the loan given by the U.P. Financial Corporation. The view of the Board of Revenue, to the contrary, was held to be incorrect. `Land' has been defined in S. 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act by saying that :- "3(a). The expression "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth." It is not confined to the land which is used for purposes of agriculture etc. as in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Irrespective, the before, of the declaration made in the year 1960 under S. 143, in respect of these plots, they would not cease to be land for purposes of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. The question is whether, after the declaration is made, it can be termed as "arable land". The declaration under S. 143(1) is envisaged in respect of a holding of a bhumidhar where it is used for a purpose not connected with agriculture etc. The declaration can be sought by a bhumidhar by making an application, as was done by the petitioners in this case. This was necessary because otherwise the provisions of Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be applicable to it. The declaration can be sought by a bhumidhar by making an application, as was done by the petitioners in this case. This was necessary because otherwise the provisions of Chapter VIII of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be applicable to it. The bhumidhar can seek, under S. 144, a declaration in respect of land held by him and not used for purposes connected with agriculture etc., a declaration that the land was being used for these purposes.. The provisions of Chapter VIII would then become applicable to it. The idea seems to be that if user of land other than that connected with agriculture etc. is contemplated by a bhumidhar, he can obtain a declaration under S. 143. It is implicit in the request of a bhumidhar for a declaration under S. 143(1) that the land could otherwise be used for purposes of agriculture etc. 9. Sri Srivastava drew our attention to the order passed by the Additional Collector on June 30, 1960, granting the declaration under S. 143. He referred to a sentence in the order saying that, ".....The only ground mentioned by the Sub-Divisional Officer for not doing so was that the duration of these camps was a few weeks only which does not appear to be a sufficient non-agricultural use. I do not think this is enough justification for refusing the grant of declaration in face of the unchallenged facts that the land was not being used for agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry but was being used for other purposes like camps etc. The District Agriculture Officer has also given a certificate on file to the effect that the land was not suited for the agriculture purposes at all and as it adjoined the appellants textile mill it was eminently suited for industrial purposes......." The counsel for the respondents referred to annexure `3' to the counter-affidavit sworn by Sri Sukhdeo Singh, Under Secretary to the Government of U.P. in the Energy Department, on Oct. 19, 1984. This annexure contains the certificate and order of Collector, Kanpur dated May 8, 1984. Para 5 of this certificate says that "the land proposed to be acquired is under cultivation." The respondents have also asserted in their counter-affidavits that the land in dispute was agricultural land. There is, thus, serious dispute between the parties on the question whether the land was arable or not. 10. Para 5 of this certificate says that "the land proposed to be acquired is under cultivation." The respondents have also asserted in their counter-affidavits that the land in dispute was agricultural land. There is, thus, serious dispute between the parties on the question whether the land was arable or not. 10. What is arable within the meaning of S. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has been a matter of judicial pronouncements. We may refer to only one decision of the Supreme Court in Ishwar Lal Girdharlal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 . While reversing the decision of the Gujarat High Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed the matter at some length in paras 18 to 25 of the Report. In essence what was held by the Supreme Court was that land which is capable of cultivation can be treated to be arable land under S. 17(1) of the Act. Counsel for the petitioners does not say that the land in dispute in the present petition was not capable of cultivation. What he says is that after the declaration made in the year 1960 it could not be used for cultivation. That, in our opinion, will not take it out of the category of arable land and, if that is so, S. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act would apply to it so as to enable the State to invoke S. 17(4), as has been done in the instant case. We may read these provisions of the Land Acquisition Act at this stage : "17. Special Powers in cases of urgency.- (1) In cases of urgency whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S. 9, sub-sec. (1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purpose or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. (2) & (3) ........................... (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. (2) & (3) ........................... (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that. the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after . the publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-sec. (1)." 11. Sri Devendra Pratap Singh appearing for the National Thermal Power Corporation, in a bid to provide another prop to the validity of the two notifications, urged that even on assumption that the land was other than arable, the exclusion of enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act by applying sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 was justifiable in view of S. 17(1-A) added to the Land Acquisition Act in Uttar Pradesh whereby the power to take possession under sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 could also be exercised in the case of a land other than waste or arable land where the land was being acquired in connection with planned development. We are not going into this aspect of the matter for the simple reason that, in our opinion, the exclusion of S. 5-A was justifiable even under S. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and the only submission in that respect made by Sri R. C. Srivastava before us is not sustainable. 12. In consequence, the petition fails and is dismissed. We would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. The interim order shall stand discharged. 13. After we pronounced the judgment, Sri M. C. Misra, orally prayed for a certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment in terms of Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. Since we have based our decision on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its pronouncements including one in the case of Ishwar Lal Girdharlal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 to which we have made a specific reference in our judgmen a are unable to accede to the prayer mode by Sri Misra and decline to grant it.