JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J : The University of Calcutta, its Vice-Chancellor and another have preferred these two appeals against the interim orders dated 30th November 1984 passed by Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. directing that Rajib Sarkar and Subrata Mukhopadhaya, who are respectively the respondent no. 1 in the said two appeals, be admitted to Master of Surgery (Orthopaedic) Course of the University of Calcutta, for the year 1984, provisionally and on ad-hoc basis. Said Rajib Sarkar and Subrata Mukhopadhayay, who were both medical graduates, had appeared at the Entrance Examination for admission to the Master of Surgery (Orthopaedic) Course, 1984. But they were not selected. Said two candidates have filed two writ petitions in this Court, inter alia, for a writ or Mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the results of the said Entrance Examination and to cancel the same and for declaring that the petitioner of the respective writ petition had been selected and was eligible for admission to the said course. 2. Before considering the merits of these two appeals, we may first deal with the preliminary objection of the appellants as regards the maintainability of the writ petition in the Appellate Side of this Court. Mr. Gupta learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that the entire cause of action pleaded by the petitioners had arisen within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court and excepting the respondent No. 4 all the respondents to the two writ petitions had their officers within the limits of the said jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent No. 4 was not a necessary party. Therefore, according to Mr. Gupta, the trial judge sitting in the Appellate Side could not have entertained the writ petitions and passed the impugned interim orders. 3. We find no substance in the aforesaid preliminary objection about the maintainability of the two writ applications in question in the Appellate Side of this Court. It would not be quite correct to decide the said question of maintainability of writ applications by referring only to the provisions regarding the Civil Jurisdiction of this Court contained in the Letters Patent. We also fail to see how provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution support the appellants' submission that the writ applications ought to have been moved in the Original Side of this court. We also fail to see how provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution support the appellants' submission that the writ applications ought to have been moved in the Original Side of this court. Article 226 preserved prior jurisdiction of High Court in Part-A State and its power to make rules of Court subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature (vide majority judgment delivered by Chakravarti, C.J., in the case of Chairman, Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia AIR 1953 Cal. 433 (FB)). The majority decision in the said reported case was that a judgment of single Judge on an application under Article 226 whether arising within the Original Side or outside, was a judgment pursuant to S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and was therefore appealable under clause 15 of the Letter Patent. Chakravarti, C.J. in the aforesaid case had also pointed out that this court’s Rule making power for distribution of business was also ultimately derived from S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Chakravarti, C.J. in paragraph 28 of his judgment in the aforesaid case had however conceded that to certain extent and in a certain sense the jurisdiction under Article 226 was a new jurisdiction. The said Article applied of its own force to all High Courts. Such a power of the High Court was undoubtedly a new power. According to Chakravarti, C.J. while it was new in the sense that the power to act, to give relief in such manner or according to such procedure did not exists before but it was not new or special in the sense that it vested the High Court with a new function outside and unrelated to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was not original, in the case of the Presidency High Courts in the limited and technical sense of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Letters Patent which carried certain territorial limits. 4. This court under Clause 37 of the Letters Patent read with the aforesaid constitutional provisions, has power to make Rules and orders for regulation of its proceedings. Subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Chairman, Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia (supra), from time to time, this Court has framed comprehensive Rules relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. Subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Chairman, Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia (supra), from time to time, this Court has framed comprehensive Rules relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. All applications made under Article 226 of the Constitution both in the Appellate and the Original Side of this Court are now governed by the said Rules. Therefore, the question whether a particular application under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be made in the Appellate or Original Side ought to be decided with reference to the said Rules of this Court relating to Applications under Article 226 of the Constitution and not by relying upon the provisions of the Letters Patent Rule 4 of the said Rules is as follows:- "All applications for writs in the nature of Mandamus, Prohibition and Quo Waranto in which all the respondents reside or carry on business or have their offices situate within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this High Court, whether they relate to a person or Court, or Authority, whether exercising civil, criminal or other jurisdictions, shall be marked as 'Original Side' application." 5. Thus, Rule 4 applies only in case all the respondents reside or carry on business or have their offices within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Rule 5 deals with applications for writ of Certiorari. All other applications according to Rule 7 whether relating to a person or authority or court exercising civil or criminal or other jurisdiction shall be dealt with by the Appellate Side of this Court and marked as 'Appellate Side Application'. In the instant case, the Secretary, Institute of Post-Graduate Medical Education and Research has been made the respondent No. 4 whose office is situated outside the limits of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, Rule 4 of the High Court Rules relating to Article 226 of the Constitution is inapplicable and the matter is to be dealt with by the Appellate Side in term of Rule 7. 6. Mr. Therefore, Rule 4 of the High Court Rules relating to Article 226 of the Constitution is inapplicable and the matter is to be dealt with by the Appellate Side in term of Rule 7. 6. Mr. Gupta, the learned Additional Advocate General, tried to submit before us that the Secretary, Institute of Post graduate Medical Education and Research was not a necessary party to the writ applications and the allotted causes or action of the writ petitioners are really against the remaining respondents to the writ applications all of whom have their offices situate within the limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. We are not prepared to entertain at the appellate stage the objection, for the first time, raised regarding the propriety of joinder of the Secretary, Institute of Post-graduate Medical Education and Research as a respondent in the two writ applications. The writ applications have yet to be heard on merits and in these two appeals preferred against interlocutory orders of temporary injunction, we cannot adjudicate upon points outside the scope of the appeals before us or pass orders for exhuming of the name of any respondent Rule 4 of the Rules of this Court relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution does not apply to the two writ applications out of which the appeals before us arise. Since the office of at least one of the respondents is outside the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, the writ applications are to be dealt with by the Appellate Side of this Court. 7. The question whether a particular writ application is to be dealt with in the Appellate or the Original Side of this Court cannot be decided by referring to clause (1A) of Article 226 of the Constitution inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963 and since renumbered as Clause (2) by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976. The object of the said clause is to vest the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action wholly or in part, I may arise to exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution notwithstanding that the seat of such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. The object of the said clause is to vest the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction cause of action wholly or in part, I may arise to exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution notwithstanding that the seat of such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. As already observed, the question whether a particular writ application is to be dealt with in the Original or the Appellate Side of this Court pertains to distribution of business of the court and same is regulated by Rules framed by the High Court. 8. We may also observe that it is well-settled principle of law that no decree or order shall be reversed or substantially varied in appeal on account of any mis-joinder of causes of action or any errors, defect or irregularity in any proceeding not affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court (S. 99 of the Civil Procedure Code embodied these principles of law). For the foregoing reasons, we are not prepared to allow the appellants to raise objection at the appellate stage to the filing of the writ application in the Appellate Side of the High Court. 9. Subrata Mukhopadhyay and Rajib Sarkar, the respondent No.1 in the respective appeals, had appeared in the Master of Surgery (Orthopaedic) Admission Test, 1984 held by the Calcutta University. The total number of seats in the Master of Surgery (Orthopeadic) Course was eight out of which two seats were reserved for the West Bengal Health Service sponsored candidates. In the said test, 95 objective type questions were set and the candidates were required to put only one answer number in the box provided against each question. For each correct answer one mark was to be given. For each wrong answer half mark was to be deducted. Neither Subrata Mukhopadhyay nor Rajib Sarkar was selected in the said admission test. While Rajib Sarkar was awarded 76 marks Subrata Mukhopadhyay was awarded 75½ marks. 10. In their respective writ petitions the two writ petitioners have alleged that some of the questions mentioned by them were ambiguous. According to them, in respect of some other questions different text books gave different answers. Some of the questions admitted more than one correct and appropriate answers. Some of the questions set were either wrong or absurd. 10. In their respective writ petitions the two writ petitioners have alleged that some of the questions mentioned by them were ambiguous. According to them, in respect of some other questions different text books gave different answers. Some of the questions admitted more than one correct and appropriate answers. Some of the questions set were either wrong or absurd. The appellants have denied the said allegations and according to them, none of the questions set were ambiguous, inappropriate or wrong. 11. Mr. Gupta, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Krishna Priya Ganguli & ors. v. University of Lucknow & ors. AIR 1984 SC 186 , Abhijit Sen & ors. v. State of U. P. & ors AIR 1984 SC 1402 , Arun D. Desai v. High Court of Bombay 1984 Suppl. SCC 372 and has submitted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down that the court could direct provisional admission to academic course only when the petitioner has a cast-iron case which is bound to succeed or the error committed by the authorities is so gross or apparent that no other conclusion was possible. According to Mr. Gupta the petitioners failed to establish that any of the key answers for the question set in the written test were demonstratibly wrong. Therefore, the trial Court ought not to have made a mandatory interim order for their admission. 12. While the correctness of the above propositions of law cannot be disputed, the Supreme Court itself had often recognised that the cases relating to admission to educational courses false sensitive human issue. Delay in disposal of the writ application creates difficulties in adjusting equities between the students who are wrongly admitted and who are unjustly excluded. Therefore, in such cases the court inevitably has to rest content with the academic pronouncement of the true legal position (vide the observations of Chandrachud, C. J., in the case of Punjab Engineering College v. Sanjoy Gulati & ors. AIR 1983 SC 580 ). In the two cases before us, as early as 30th of November, 1984 the trial court passed the impugned interim order for provisional admission of the two writ petitioner. Only on 7th of February, 1985 the University of Calcutta, its Vice-Chancellor and the Selection Committee presented the instant two appeals. AIR 1983 SC 580 ). In the two cases before us, as early as 30th of November, 1984 the trial court passed the impugned interim order for provisional admission of the two writ petitioner. Only on 7th of February, 1985 the University of Calcutta, its Vice-Chancellor and the Selection Committee presented the instant two appeals. After lapse of further time on 12th February, 1985 the appellants filed application for stay of the operation of trial court's aforesaid interim order dated 29th November, 1984. On 3rd July, 1985 we concluded hearing and reserved our orders. At the time of hearing the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in the two appeals, informed the Court that that theoretical classes of the Post-Graduate Courses in question have been already concluded. 13. The balance of convenience appears to be in favour of allowing the two writ petitioners to complete the rest of their courses subject to decision at the final bearing of the Rules obtained by them. It would be unjust to prevent the two writ petitioners from completing the remaining part of their courses. In case their writ applications ultimately succeed still they would be practically denied any effective relief inasmuch as in all probability, as by that time all the students except the two writ petitioners would complete their courses. Therefore, hereinafter there could be no question of either allowing the petitioners to complete their courses or to appear in the final examination. 14. Even after hearing elaborate submissions made on both sides, we find serious difficulty in pronouncing at this stage whether the petitioners are right in contending that many of the key answers to questions set in the test were demonstrably wrong or what her the University of Calcutta is right in contending that the said key answers were Correct and did not suffer from any defect as alleged by the petitioners. A proper decision would require assistance of impartial export or experts. At this stage appointment of such expert or experts would have necessitated further delay. The difficulty of deciding whether the question set and the key answers prepared are gross and patently erroneous has been enhanced because of the absence of any prescribed test-book for the Test. It is not unusual that some time authors of different medical books give different and even conflicting views about the symptoms of diseases, their treatment, etc. The difficulty of deciding whether the question set and the key answers prepared are gross and patently erroneous has been enhanced because of the absence of any prescribed test-book for the Test. It is not unusual that some time authors of different medical books give different and even conflicting views about the symptoms of diseases, their treatment, etc. When both sides rely on various authorities to establish their respective views the court finds itself in a quandary. Such difficulties may be largely obviated if the University or the academic body conducting the test may prescribe text-books which would be considered authoritative for the purpose of the particular test. If such course be adopted, disputes regarding correctness of questions and their key answers could be resolved by consulting the said prescribed authorities. When matters come before the Court the Court itself would be in a position to consult such prescribed text books. 15. Thus, the provision for prescribing text-books for such admission tests is likely to result in minimising controversies about the correctness of the key answers. In case, coming up before it, the court would be also in a position to look into the said prescribed text-books in order to decide whether the petitioner has a cast-iron case and whether temporary injunction ought to be granted in his favour. We are tempted to observe that in the absence of recognised text-book, tests with objective type of questions may become counter productive. Because when there are no prescribed textbooks, there would be very wide scope for raising controversies about the questions set and the key answers prepared. 16. When writ applications are filed challenging admission tests for educational courses, the court ought to insist upon service of prior notice to the authorities so that only after hearing both set of parties the court may decide whether or not any ad interim order or provisional admission of the unit petitioner ought to be passed. Otherwise once ex parte ad interim orders for admission to a course is made, after hearing both parties at a later stage the court may be placed in a very embarrassing position because in the meantime the writ petitioner has probably covered a substantial part of the course. We understand that the learned trial judge had heard the appellants before passing the interim order in the writ application filed by the respondent, Subrata Mukhopadhyay. We understand that the learned trial judge had heard the appellants before passing the interim order in the writ application filed by the respondent, Subrata Mukhopadhyay. But in case of other writ petitioner the trial court made ex parte interim orders. 17. Mr. Gupta has pointed out that by reason of interim orders for granting ad hoc admission, the University is unable to conform to the directives of the All India Medical Council regarding student/teacher ratio and several other conditions for giving recognition to the post-graduate medical courses. Undoubtedly, this is a matter which ought to be taken into consideration by the court. As far as possible court ought not to make any order which might result in contravention of the directives/rules framed by the All India Medical Council. But in oases where students who under alders of the court had already completed major part of their courses; on grounds of balance of convenience the court might allow them to complete their studies subject to the final decision and subject to the All India Medical Council deciding whether or not because of such extraordinary circumstances over which the University had no control, the relevant rules/directives might be relaxed for the particular year. In this connection, Mr. Lakshmi Prasad Gupta, learned advocate for the writ petitioners drew our attention to somewhat similar observation made by the Supreme Court in some of the reported Cases. 18. For the foregoing reasons, we dispose of these appeals. The provisional admissions of the two petitioners would be subject to the decisions upon their writ applications and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the both parties at the final hearing. Let the writ applications be expeditiously disposed of in accordance with law. Certified copy of the order, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously. Shamsuddin Ahmed, J.: I agree. Provisional admission subject to final decisions on writ application.