The facts of the case may briefly be stated. A negotiated' marriage of the petitioner, Nihoto Seema, and the respondent, Kanili Kini Limi, took place in 1980. The parties are Christians. The marriage was solemnised in a local church in the presence of the witnesses, elders and parents of the parties. A daughter was born of their wedlock in the year, 1981. The name of dau­ghter is 'Vni' and she is aged about 31 at present. 2. On 17.4 85 respondent, Kanili Kini Limi presented a petition to the court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) Dimapur, for dissolution of the marriage against the petitioner Nihoto Sema, under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (for short the "Act") on the ground that the petitioner has been guilty of adultery coupled with cruelty. In the petition, the pe­titioner has prayed for interim custody of the minor child "Vni' v pending the hearing of the petition on the ground that the petitioner, Nihoto Sema, on 22.3.85 took the child 'Vni' away from Nursery Class of Montessori School, Dimapur without the knowledge and consent of the respondent and that at the time of the filing of the petition, she was separated from her child. On 17.4 85, the learned Additio­nal Deputy Commissioner directed the petitioner to restore the custody of the child, Vni, to the respondent Smt. Kanili Kini Limi on or before 27.4.85 and fixed 16.5.85 for submission of Written Statement of the petitioner. On 27.4.85 no order was passed and the records show that there is a petition dated 27.4.85 filed by the petitioner on which there is an endorsement dated 2.5.85 which reads : "Peskar - please put up record on date fixed. The Additional Deputy Commissioner on 29.4.85 passed an order to the effect that it was not known whether the service on the petitioner has been properly made or not as he as absent and that the welfare of the child requires expeditious execution of the court's order for restoring the custody of the child, Vni to the respondent. Therefore, he fixed 4.5.85 for the restoration of the custody of the child to the respondent. Therefore, he fixed 4.5.85 for the restoration of the custody of the child to the respondent. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner on 8.5.85 passed an order allowing the respondent to personally go up to Alicia and receive the custody of the child from the petitioner and directing the pe­titioner to hand over the child on or before on 16.5.85. In the said order, the learned Deputy Commissioner also requested the Su­perintendent of Police, Dimapurs to provide escort to the respondent Kanili Kini Limi. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the revi­sion petition in this Court challenging the orders of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner. 3. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the Indian Divorce Act is not in force in Nagaland; that the Additional Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to pass the interim order under section 43 of the Act; that assuming that the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to pass the order, the impugned orders are illegal as they were passed without giving him an opportunity of being beard; and that it would not be for the welfare of the child to handover the child to the mother who is a business person. The respondent has controverter the contentions. 4. A short question which arises for consideration is whe­ther the Indian Divorce Act is in force in the State of Nagaland. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner has sub­mitted that the Naga Hills District was one of the districts of the then Province of Assam. The Naga Hills District was also a part of the Scheduled Districts under the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. Under section 3 of the Scheduled Districts Act, the local government by notification in the official Gazette would declare what enactments were actually in force in any of the Scheduled Districts or in any part of such districts. But there was no such notification. 5. Shri B. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the Act has been in force in the State of Naga­land. He has referred me to the notification Published in the Gazette of Assam dated 23.7.1878 and the Part VII of the Nagaland Code, Vol. I, published by the Government of Naga­land in order to show that the Act has been in fore in the State. 6. He has referred me to the notification Published in the Gazette of Assam dated 23.7.1878 and the Part VII of the Nagaland Code, Vol. I, published by the Government of Naga­land in order to show that the Act has been in fore in the State. 6. I am of the opinion that it is not necessary to consi­der the rival contentions of the parties with respect to Scheduled Districts in view of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 made by the President in the exercise of his power under cla­use (2) of Article 372. The Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 came into force on 26.1.1950. Clause 2 of Article 372 gives the power to the President to adapt or modify the then exist­ing laws or all the laws in force by way of repeal or amend­ment, (see also Keshavan vs. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 Para 5). After the adaptation, section 2 of the Act runs as follows : "This Act extends to the whole of India except Part B States.” Section 2 of the Act was again amended by the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Act III of 1951), which came into force on 1.4.1951. In section 2 of the Act, for the words "Part B States", "the State of Jammu and Kashmir" have been substituted. After the aforesaid amendment, section 2 of the Act runs as follows : "This Act extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir." In this view of matter, the Act has been in force in the Naga Hills District. The State of Nagaland was formed with effect from 1.12.1963 under the State of Nagaland Act, 1962. Under sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the State of Nagaland Act all the laws in force, immediately before 1.12.1963, in "the Naga Hills District-Tuensang Area" shall continue to be in force in the State of Nagaland until altered, repealed or amended by the competent Legislature or other competent authority. "The Naga Hilis-Tuensang Area” is defined in sect­ion 2(a). Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 26 for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the state of Nagaland of any law before 1.12.63, the appropriate govern­ment may, within two years from 1.12.1963 by order makes adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient. Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 26 for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the state of Nagaland of any law before 1.12.63, the appropriate govern­ment may, within two years from 1.12.1963 by order makes adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient. The parties have not produced any material in order to show whet here was any adaptation under sub section (2) of the section 26 of the State of Nagaland Act. However, omission to adapt under section (2) in no way affects the question, whether the Act continues in force as the law in the State of Nagaland in "Naga Hills Tuensang Area'' even after the commencement of the State of Nagaland Act. The Supreme Court, in M.G. Desai TO- State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1312 held : “There is no substance in the contention that in the absence of adaptations which the President of India is competent to make under C1.2 of Art. 372, the Bhor State Ordinance lapsed. By Cl. 2 of Art. 372, the Pre­sident is authorised to adapt existing laws; but the application of the existing laws is not conditioned by the making of adaptations or modifications in that law by the President." 7. Mr. Choudhury has further submitted that divorce in­volves customary law of the Nagas and therefore, unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides under Art. 371A, the Indian Divorce Act shall not apply to the St­ate of Nagaland. Sub-clause (a) of the Clause (1) of Art. 371A provides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, no Act of Parliament in respect of (1) religious or social practice of the Naga, (ii) Naga customary Law and procedure, (iii) administra­tion of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of the land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless She Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides. 8. The next question for consideration is whether the In­dian Divorce Act is an Act of Parliament. The constitution of Parliament is provided under Article 79. Article 79 provides that there shall be a Parliament for the union which shall consist of President and two Houses to be known respectively as Council of States and House of the People. 8. The next question for consideration is whether the In­dian Divorce Act is an Act of Parliament. The constitution of Parliament is provided under Article 79. Article 79 provides that there shall be a Parliament for the union which shall consist of President and two Houses to be known respectively as Council of States and House of the People. Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act defines "Central Act". Under section 3(7) of the Ge­neral Clauses Act, a 'Central Act' means an Act of Parliament, and also includes an Act of the Dominion Legislature or of an Indian Legislature passed before the commencement of the Con­stitution and also an Act made before the commencement of &he Constitution by the Governor-General in Council or Cover. IF General acting in a legislative capacity. Therefore, the Indian Divorce Act may be a Central Act, but all the Central Acts and not Acts of Parliament. An Act of Parliament is an Act passed Meter Articles 245, 245 and 248 and other enabling provisions of 4iie Constitution by the Parliament constituted under Article 79. Indian Divorce Act cannot be said (o be an Act of Parlia­ment constituted under Article 79 as the Act was passed before the commencement of the Constitution. This view of mine also finds support from the decision in Jhaman Mian vs. State, AIR 1966 Pat 375 (DB). The Patna High Court in that case has held : "Since the expression used in paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule is "Act of Parliament" and not 'Central Act' it is manifest that the provisions contained in that pa­ragraph apply only to an 'Act of Parliament'. The Land Customs Act, 1924, passed as it was, long before the Constitution or the Indian Parliament came into exis­tence, cannot be held to have become applicable to the Santal Parganas by virtue of Para 5(1)." 9. Since I have already held that the Act is not an Act of Parliament, it is not necessary to discuss whether the Article 371 is attracted or not. 10. The next question which arise for consideration is whe­ther the District Court has jurisdiction to piss an interim order during the pendency of the suit before him under section 43 of the Act. 10. The next question which arise for consideration is whe­ther the District Court has jurisdiction to piss an interim order during the pendency of the suit before him under section 43 of the Act. A petition for divorce or dissolution of marriage be presented to for District Court or to the High Court by a wife under section 10 of the Act on any or all of the grounds provided there under. Under Section 16 of the Act, every de­cree for a dissolution of marriage made by the High Court, sot being a confirmation of a decree of a District Court, shall, in the first instance, be a decree nisi, not to be made absolute till after the expiration of such time, not less then six months from the pronouncing thereof, as the High Court by general or spe­cial order from time to time directs. Under section 17 of the Act, every decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a Dis­trict Judge (District Court) shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. 11. Section 43 of the Act runs as follows : "In any suit for obtaining a dissolution of marriage for decree of nullity of marriage instituted in, or removed to a High Court, the court may from time to time, before making its decree absolute or its decree (as the case may be) make such interim orders, and may make such provision in the decree absolute or decree, and in any such suit instituted in a District Court, and Co­urt may from time to time, before its decree is confirmed' make such interim orders, and may make such provision on such confirmation, as the High Court or District Court (as the case may be) deems proper with respect to the custody, maintenance 1 and education of the minor children, the marriage of whose parents is the subject of the suit, as may, if it thinks fit, direct proceedings to be taken for placing such children under the protection of the Court." (emphasis added) 12. Mr. D.N. Choudbury has submitted that the expression ''before its decree is confirmed'' in the second part of Section 43 implies that there must be a provisional decree. Mr. D.N. Choudbury has submitted that the expression ''before its decree is confirmed'' in the second part of Section 43 implies that there must be a provisional decree. The jurisdiction of the District Court to pass such interim order would therefore be the period between the date of the provisional decree passed by the District Judge and the date of the confirmation of decree by the High Court, and not before the passing of the provisional decree. 13. The expression "before its decree is confirmed'' cannot be read in isolation from others. Under the first part of Section 43, the High Court may from time to time before making its decree absolute or its decree as the case may be, make interim orders as provided therein, and may make such provision in the decree abso­lute or decree The expression "before making its decree absolute or its decree as the case may be" has been used for expressing time and to fix, or refer to, a point in time and to refer to a certain period. The terminal point in time is the date of decree or decree absolute. However, the use of the word "before" excludes the date specified, that is, the date of decree or decree abso­lute. But the High Court may make provision in the decree or decree absolute as provided in Section 43. Therefore, the High Court under Section 43 can pass interim orders from time to-time during the period from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of its decree or its decree absolute. That being the position, the expression under the second part of Section 43 before its decree is confirmed' is to be interpreted in the light of the discussion above. Therefore, the expression "before its dec­ree is confirmed'' has been used for expressing time and to fix, or refer to, a point in time and to refer to a certain period. In this view of the matter, Section 43, inter alia, provides for ma­king interim orders pendente lite and the District Court has juris­diction to pass interim orders as provided under Section 43 during the period from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of the confirmation of the decree. 14. In this view of the matter, Section 43, inter alia, provides for ma­king interim orders pendente lite and the District Court has juris­diction to pass interim orders as provided under Section 43 during the period from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of the confirmation of the decree. 14. Shri B. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent, has submitted that if the interim order cannot be granted under Sec­tion 43, it can be granted under Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 runs as follows : ''Subject to the provisions contained in this Act, the High Courts and District Courts shall, in all suits and procee­dings hereunder, act and give relief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said Courts, are as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief : Provided that nothing in this section shall deprive the-said Courts of jurisdiction in a case where the parties to a marriage professed the Christian religion at the time of the occurrence of the facts on which the claim to re­lief is founded. (emphasis added) 15. A statute may incorporate the provisions of another staff by specific reference. A statute may also incorporate the law concerning a particular subject by general reference. (See Bajya, AIR 1978 SC 793 ). Section 7 has not incorporated any statute rela­ting to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England. It only refers to the principles and the rules, as nearly as may be. The word "rules'' in Section 7 do not mean statutory rules. It is to be construed/understood genesis with the word ''princi­ples'', more particularly so, after the commencement of the Cons­titution. After the Constitution came into force. Legislatures cannot abdicate its functions by passing any Act to the effect that the future amendments of Foreign Act would continue to apply to the territory of field of that Legislature, (see Shamarao vs. U.P. of Pond Cheri, AIR 1967 SC 14W). After the Constitution came into force. Legislatures cannot abdicate its functions by passing any Act to the effect that the future amendments of Foreign Act would continue to apply to the territory of field of that Legislature, (see Shamarao vs. U.P. of Pond Cheri, AIR 1967 SC 14W). The reasons for using the expression "as nearly as may be'' in Section 7 of the Act appears to be that the technicalities of the law relating to Divorce and Matrimonial causes in England should not be applicable and it show' only an approximation and the Court shall be guided by the principles and rules of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes followed in practice in England. This view is strengthened by the decision in T. M. Bashiam, AIR 1970 Mad 12 . 16. In T.M. Bashiam vs. M. Victor, Mr. 1970 Madras 12, the Special Bench of the Madras High Court has held that a wife can obtain a decres for dissolution of marriage under section 10 of the Act only on the grounds exhibited under that section. The provisions of Section 7 (1) to (3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 of the United Kingdom cannot be invoked by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. The Madras High Court has further held; "Since, admittedly, the Matrimonial Causes Act has been subsequently amended, in several respects, it cannot be contended that those future amendments must also be accepted as applicable to India by virtue of Section 7. In our view. Section 7 does not incorporate the statu­tes of some other country as part of the law of this land; it merely makes a provision for conforming to the practice and principles of the matrimonial Courts in England in the matter of Divorce or Dissolution of marriage subject to the provisions and the scheme of the Indian Divorce Act." However, recent principles and rules (not being statutory rules) followed in practice in England can be considered as nearly as may be, as a guidance for acting and giving relief. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders have been passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner without hearing the petitioner. Mr. B. Sartna, learned Counsel for the respondent has submi­tted that the order was an ad interim exparte order to be made absolute after bearing the parties. 18. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders have been passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner without hearing the petitioner. Mr. B. Sartna, learned Counsel for the respondent has submi­tted that the order was an ad interim exparte order to be made absolute after bearing the parties. 18. The order dated 17.4.1985 shows that 16.5.85 was fixed for submission of the written statement of the petitioner. Although the orders of the lower court have not been happily worded, it appears that the Additional Deputy Commissioner passed an ad interim ex parte order. The petitioner has filed his written objection or show cause on 27.4.1985 as already stated against the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner directing the petitioner to restore the custody of the child, Vni, to the respondent on or before 27.4.1985. But the petit­ioner was absent when the orders dated 29.4 1985 and 8.5.1985 were passed. On 16.5.1935, the date for filing written state­ment, the petitioner was absent. The Additional Deputy Commi­ssioner in his order dated 16.5.1985 observed that a petition was filed on 15.5.85 by the Petitioner informing the court that the High Court has stayed the proceeding. In this view of the matter, it will meet the ends of justice, if the petitioner is gran­ted or given opportunity of being heard. 19. As regards the custody of the child, the first and the paramount consideration is the welfare, happiness and interest of the child. The court shall consider and weigh all the relevant circumstances. The learned Additional Deputy Commi­ssioner, in his order dated 17.4.1985, has observed that it is also seen that the child had all along been with the mother at Dimapur and the fact that the child is still a mere child of 3 year?, she requires more of motherly care and protec­tion. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, in his order dated 8.5.1985, has further observed that the custody of the child was of urgent nature therefore he passed the order exparte directing the petitioner to restore the custody of the child to the respondent. In this view of the matter, the Additional Deputy Commissioner found only a prima facie case and circumstance for making the ad interim exparte order, it is made clear that in making this observation, I must not be presumed to have ex­pressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy raised. 20. In this view of the matter, the Additional Deputy Commissioner found only a prima facie case and circumstance for making the ad interim exparte order, it is made clear that in making this observation, I must not be presumed to have ex­pressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy raised. 20. For the foregoing reasons, while maintaining the im­pugned orders it is directed that the Additional Deputy Commi­ssioner (J), Dimapur, shall hear the petitioner on the point whe­ther the impuged orders relating to the custody of the child will be made absolute or not. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with the above observation and direction. The parties shall app­ear before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J), Dimapur, on 10.10.1955 for the purpose of receiving directions of that court as to further proceeding in the suit. If the party do not appear on 10.10.1985 the learned Additional Deputy Co­mmissioner (J), Dimapur, shall proceed in accordance with law. The stay order stands vacated. I was away from the Principal seat for holding court in the outlying Bench at Imphal Circuit Town. This has delayed the delivery of the judgment.