Judgment :- 1. Hectic political activities marked the month of May this year in this State. On the 25th, a convention was held at Cochin by the Kerala Congress, a component of the 'Ruling Front' in the State. R. Balakrishna Pillai, the then Minister for Electricity also spoke on that occasion. Whether he made a seditious speech is controversial. That he made a speech is, however, not in controversy. 2. The speech had its repercussions in the State. They too got reflected in intense activities in diverse fields. Some activists even rushed to the Court. And the Court had necessarily, to undertake the adjudicatory process in relation to the legal and Constitutional issues involved in the case. 3. The first of its kind was a writ petition O.P. 5630 of 1985, filed by Sri. K. C. Chandi seeking a writ in the nature of Quo Warranto against Sri Balakrishna Pillai. The petition was filed on 4-6-1985 and moved on the next day. Some others with equally exuberant enthusiasm filed another writ implicating not only the Electricity Minister but also the other Ministers of the Kerala Congress who attended and addressed the convention: That is OP. No, 5538/1985. 4. The second writ petition was dismissed in limine by the single judge who heard it. The judgment was appealed against. The writ appeal against the later writ petition happened to be disposed of earlier by a Division Bench to which one of us (Sukumaran J.) was a party. The decision was rendered on 24-6-1985 and reported in Sukumaran v. Union of India, 1915 KLT. 567. 5. The other writ petition had a more chequered career, though doubtless, of short duration. The order of the learned Single Judge directing notice to the respondents contained some observations. That order also generated discussion in the political plane and legal field. A petition by Sri. Balakrishna Pillai for the exjunction of remarks, a reference of the case for decision by the Division Bench, and a further reference of the case for consideration by a Full Bench, a petition by the writ petitioner for permission to adduce evidence to prove the allegations, were some of the important intervening events. Ultimately, the writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 19-8-1985. The decision is reported in K. C. Chandy v. Balakrishna Pillai 1985 KLT. 762. 6. Ultimately, the writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 19-8-1985. The decision is reported in K. C. Chandy v. Balakrishna Pillai 1985 KLT. 762. 6. The period between the initiation of the litigation and its culmination, had also its marked and momentous events and sensations. As noted earlier, the order of the learned Single Judge who admitted the writ petition, was the subject-matter of debate and discussion, academic and otherwise. Sri. Balakrishna Pillai, a party to the writ petition was interviewed by Venu Menon, the correspondent of the Illustrated Weekly, sometime during the second week of June 1985. The interview was published in the issue dated 7-7-1985 of the Illustrated Weekly of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Weekly" for the sake of convenience) edited and published by Pritish Nandy. It was preceded by an article captioned "Troubled Times" written by Venu Menon, a correspondent of the Weekly. The article and the interview cover pages 14 to 17 of that issue, with their journalistic embroidery. The photographs of the prominent political figures covered by the article were also displayed; and with arresting titles. In the very first page of the article were exhibited the photographs of the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister. The caption below the former was: "Chief Minister Karunakaran: on a path of collision." The one above that of the Finance Minister was: "Finance Minister K. M. Mani: daggers drawn." Balakrishna Pillai had two of his photographs; one at page 15 and the other at page 16; the former having the title below it: "Pillai: inciting public to revolt?" and the latter: "Balakrishna Pillai: caught in a storm of controversy." A photograph of a learned judge of this Court was also given in page 17 but without any particular comment or caption. 7. The article contained some remarks and comments constituting clear contempt. This Court took suo mote action in relation to matters which directly and pointedly projected an attack against the image of the Court itself. And the court found that the statements in the article as extracted in the judgment, "clearly show that reckless and scurrilous attack has been made against a learned judge of this Court, imputing oblique motives in the discharge of bis judicial functions and suggesting unholy acquaintance and constant contacts with the Chief Minister, for the purpose of moulding reliefs in the pending writ proceeding". The Editor and reporter pleaded guilty and tendered apology. The apology of the Editor was accepted as bona fide and he was discharged accepting the apology. The contempt proceedings culminated in a conviction and sentence as against the reporter. The decision of the Court in reported in High Court of Kerala v. Pritish Nandy,1985 KLT 732. 8. That, however, was not the end of it. It was felt by some, that besides the passages which led to the contempt proceedings in 1985 KLT. 732, supra there were other passages in the article and in the interview which would constitute contempt of court. 9. Raju Bose, a student, the Law Society of India, Cochin, and M. O. Thomas of Muvatupuzha sought for and obtained sanction from the Advocate General under S.15(1) (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for the initiation of the contempt proceedings before this Court. They are respectively the petitioners in O.P. Nos. 6947, 7602 and 7697 of 1985. Pritish Nandy, Venu Menon and Balakrishna Pillai are respondents 1 to 3 in the first two writ petitions Balakrishna Pillai and Venu Menon are the only respondents in OP. No. 7697 of 1985. 10. Arguments were advanced in OP. No. 6947 of 1985. The petitioner in OP. 7602 of 1985 only adopted those contentions without any additional arguments. In OP. No. 7697 of 1985, some supplementary submissions were made, though only after the respondents had replied. 11. We shall now refer to the charges framed against the respondents. Some of the charges overlap those in respect of which action had been already taken suo mote by the High Court as referred to earlier. It has been rightly contended that the respondents cannot be proceeded against second time in respect of identical charges. We shall therefore eschew those charges which have been already dealt with earlier by this Court. 12. The charges framed against the three respondents (about which some comments will have to be made later), may be indicated, with as much accuracy as is possible in the circumstances. The gravamen of the charge as against the 3rd respondent is that he as a party to the pending writ proceedings before the High Court, made statements to the media in respect of matters which directly arose for decision by the High Court. The gravamen of the charge as against the 3rd respondent is that he as a party to the pending writ proceedings before the High Court, made statements to the media in respect of matters which directly arose for decision by the High Court. Such statements will interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice. As against the Reporter of the Weekly, the charge is that he caused to publish such statements, and as against the Editor, that he has actually published such statements. In both cases, it is alleged, the publication had interfered with the administration of justice. The offending passages in the interview have been referred to in the statement of allegations and extracted as part of the charges. 13. Though some of the charges also referred vaguely to a scandalisation of the court of lowering its authority, and even about the conspiracy between the reporter and the former Minister, those matters have not been pursued in the course of the arguments, and in our opinion, correctly. 14. The publication of the passages referred to in the charges is not disputed at all. The 3rd respondent admitted the pendency of judicial proceedings at the time when the interview was given and when it was published in the Weekly. 15. Sightly divergent stands were adopted by counsel appearing for the Editor and reporter of the Weekly on the one hand and by counsel for Sri. Balakrishna Pillai, on the other. 16. Sri. Santhi Bhushan, appearing on behalf of the Editor and Reporter put forward the following contentions: I. There was no publication during the pendency of a judicial proceeding, for a dichotomy of reasons: (a) A writ of Quo-warranto is not maintainable in relation to the forfeiture of office of a sitting minister. Such proceedings are without jurisdiction. Such proceedings are therefore nonest in the eye of law. It follows, as a corollary, that there were no pending judicial proceedings at all when the publication was effected. (b) Soon after the filing of the writ petition and immediately after the passing of the order ordering notice on the original petition the Minister resigned. The writ petition then became infructuous. There was no pending judicial proceedings in that view of the matter also. II. The article and interview were only a continuation of a public debate in relation to a matter of great public importance. The writ petition then became infructuous. There was no pending judicial proceedings in that view of the matter also. II. The article and interview were only a continuation of a public debate in relation to a matter of great public importance. The debate had already started. Such a debate, essential for the democratic process, does not amount to a criminal contempt This is particularly so in the light of the recent trends reflected in the Philamore Committee Report and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981 enacted in the United Kingdom. III. The passages really only put forward facts or statements already known, and which by and large constituted the defence of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai in the Quo-warranto petitions Making such statements of facts and events and making known a defence already put forward in the pending proceedings, will not prejudice, interfere with or tend to interfere with administration of justice. IV. In any view of the matter, there is no substantial interference with the judicial proceedings having regard to the nature of the statements made in the article and answers given in the interview. No punishment is therefore imposable under S.13. The object of the Act itself is punishment for contempt of court, and when no punishment is possible having regard to the circumstances, the entire contempt proceedings should be dropped altogether. V. Protection under S 4 of the Act is available in as much as the publications were substantially a report of the judicial proceedings as they were at the stage when the article and the interview were published. In any view of the matter, the principle of S.4 should be taken into consideration in entering a finding whether the publications satisfy the ingredients of S.2(c) of the Act. 17. On behalf of the 3rd respondent, as indicated earlier, a different stand was adopted. Protection under S.4 was not claimed on his behalf. There was no contention that the proceedings had terminated earlier than at the time of the final disposal of the writ petition on 19-8-1985. It was urged that the 3rd respondent had, through the interview, only indicated bis position, and his stand vis-a-vis various matters put to him at the time of the interview. There was no contention that the proceedings had terminated earlier than at the time of the final disposal of the writ petition on 19-8-1985. It was urged that the 3rd respondent had, through the interview, only indicated bis position, and his stand vis-a-vis various matters put to him at the time of the interview. They were all matters in respect of which defence bad already been made known; they could not therefore prejudice, interfere with or tend to interfere with the administration of justice His political future was at stake when accusations and allegations were hurled against him. It was necessary for him to clarify his position and his stand at that time. Such a clarification was not in any way intended to interfere with the judicial proceedings or deflect their course or affect the parties thereto. The arguments about the importance and necessity of continuing a public debate, and the element of freedom of speech dominating over the private interest of a suitor as urged by Sri. Santhi Bhushan were adopted by counsel for Sri. Balakrishna Pillai also. 18. We shall now consider the contentions seriatim. Pendency of Judicial Proceedings As noted earlier, the interview took place in the second week of June, 1985 and the interview and article were published on 7-7-1985. The writ petition bad been filed on 4-6-1985, and that the judgment therein was rendered only on 19-8-1985. The Act itself by the Explanation to S 3, indicates the starting point and culmination of judicial proceedings. The proceedings end only after the disposal and the expiry of the period of limitation for further proceedings. (See Explanation to S 3 of the Act). Ordinarily, there could not therefore be any doubt that the offending article and interview were published during the pendency of the Quo Warranto proceedings before this Court The pendency of the case is not dependant upon the ultimate conclusion reached in that case, either about the maintainability of the writ petition at that stage, or on other considerations including those on merits. It is not unknown that a writ petition could possibly be dismissed on jejune grounds of delay, acquiescence and the like. Being essentially a discretionary remedy, the court may decline relief on other considerations as well. It is not unknown that a writ petition could possibly be dismissed on jejune grounds of delay, acquiescence and the like. Being essentially a discretionary remedy, the court may decline relief on other considerations as well. If for some reason, the final disposal of the case bad got delayed, could it be said that there was no judicial proceedings pending, for the only reason that from the theoretical angle, possibilities of the court's interference in the matter were extremely remote? The answer would be an emphatic negative. In the present case, the judgment happened to be rendered within a short time after the institution of the writ petition. No doubt, having regard to the stage at which the writ petition was filed, and the principles applicable, the court took the view that a writ of Quo-warranto could not be issued. Such a final decision, however, has not the effect of obliterating the pendency of the proceedings. 19. It is not as though a writ of Quo-Warranto cannot be issued at all in any event, when a Minister forfeits his right to continue in office. In relation to Quo-warranto, the Division Bench in Sukumaran v. Union of India, 1985 KLT. 567 had pointed out: "It is also available to have the holding of an office declared forfeited, "if, having once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed, it has become forfeited for misuser or nonuser." " (emphasis supplied) (See para 5 of the judgment) That a person who enters office as a Minister lawfully and properly, could forfeit the right to continue so by the operation of the disqualifying provisions of the Constitution had also been pointed out in Para.8 of the judgment. The scheme under the Constitution relating to the circumstances in which the Minister may incur disqualification for holding that office and the modality for his removal were analysed thereafter. And then it was observed: 'The morality or propriety of an undesirable person continuing as a Minister is essentially a political question to be eminently dealt with and at any rate initially, at the political level" (emphasis supplied). (vide Para.12 of the judgment). 20. The Full Bench in K. C. Chandy v. Balakrishna Pillai 1985 KLT. And then it was observed: 'The morality or propriety of an undesirable person continuing as a Minister is essentially a political question to be eminently dealt with and at any rate initially, at the political level" (emphasis supplied). (vide Para.12 of the judgment). 20. The Full Bench in K. C. Chandy v. Balakrishna Pillai 1985 KLT. 762, expressed the view thus: "it would not be even expedient for this Court to exercise the discretion for the issuance of the writ asked for when the Chief Minister is already seized of the matter." (emphasis supplied) And the court proceeded to observe further: "In this view, we are taking, we are not thus acceding to the request of the petitioner to allow him to adduce evidence to prove the allegations." 21. The above decisions, on a proper understanding, cannot be construed as laying down an inflexible and inviolable rule that a writ of Quo-warranto will not lie at all against a Minister who had made a seditious speech, and under any circumstances. Thus for example, different considerations may weigh with this Court, when, despite the existence of any one or more of the eventualities referred to in Art.191 of the Constitution disqualifying the Minister from being a Member of the Assembly, he is permitted to continue as a Minister by the inaction or indifference of the Chief Minister or the Governor. The dismissal of the present Quo-warranto petition indicating the limited scope of scrutiny by the court in such a petition and at that stage, would not therefore detract from the fact that the judicial proceedings were pending before this Court at the time of the publications of the offending article and the interview. In the above circumstances, we are unable to accede to the contention that there was no pendency of the writ petition for the reason that this Court sketched the limited scope of the Quo warranto and declined to interfere with the matter having regard to the stage at which the question had been raised before this Court. 22. Equally unsustainable is the contention that the writ petition ceased to pend with the resignation of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai as the Minister. It may be that a petitioner may lose interest in prosecuting the writ petition if the substantial object of the writ petition had been attained by the Mrnisters's stepping down from the office. 22. Equally unsustainable is the contention that the writ petition ceased to pend with the resignation of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai as the Minister. It may be that a petitioner may lose interest in prosecuting the writ petition if the substantial object of the writ petition had been attained by the Mrnisters's stepping down from the office. However, a resignation need not necessarily induce the writ petitioner to withdraw the petition or otherwise terminate the pending proceedings. Other issues, incidental and ancillary may still survive for consideration. Till all matters which remain to be disposed of are actually disposed of, the proceedings should be treated as pending. This is particularly so when the Minister who had resigned, had clearly expressed his intention to stage a return to the Ministry, and bad taken the stand that the resignation itself was conditioned by the circumstances and limited in period of time. That is fairly explicit from the question contained in the article itself reading: "You have resigned on the grounds that once the case is over and if your innocence is established, you will return to the Cabinet. There are many Congrsss-I men who are opposed to your coming back, since they wanted you to resign in the first place." And the answer: "The Congress-1 has no say in the matter: It is for my party to decide and the Kerala Congress has decided that once the case is over I will return to the Ministry." (emphasis supplied) 23. Even Sri. Balakrishna Pillai did not have a case that with his resignation, the writ petition became infructuous and that the proceedings came to an end. The Full Bench decision clearly highlights bis contention that the resignation did not result in the original petition becoming infructuous. This is evident from the following observations contained in Para.17 of the judgment: "Petitioner's counsel submits that the writ petition has become infructuous, as the respondent has resigned his Ministership immediately after the writ petition was admitted On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent submits that the very wide language in which the prayer is couched in the writ petition, and the resignation after the writ petition, will not make the Original Petition infructuous. It is not necessary for us to pursue this controversy in the light of what we have stated earlier" In this connection, it has to be borne in mind that the judicial proceeding pending before this Court consisted not only of the main writ petition but also other matters incidentally raised including the petition for expunction of the remarks made by the learned single judge at the time of admitting the writ petition. We dismiss the second contention also. 24. The question whether the article and the interview would constitute criminal contempt as that term is defined under S 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, may now be considered. S.2 (c) defines criminal contempt as follows:' "2. Definitions: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. (c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;" 25. It is now well settled that the comments on a pending proceeding may interfere or tend; to interfere with or obstructor tend to obstruct the administration of justice. Trial by newspapers had been frowned upon from the times of Hardwick, C. J. The basic idea and principle has remained unshaken despite the passage of time; for the good reason that an abiding consideration sustains such principle throughout the period. The principle is that by the laws of this country, it has been given unto the courts to adjudicate such of the disputes and issues as are assigned to them by law. Such an adjudication by the Courts, with due observance of the provisions of law is a corner stone in the Rule of Law, and therefore of a democratic polity. 26. It would perhaps be advisable to be sure of the moorings as afforded by our Constitution, our own statute and our judicial precedents before we ply into distant seas of alien jurisdictions. The Constitution specifically preserves for the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power to punish for contempt. 26. It would perhaps be advisable to be sure of the moorings as afforded by our Constitution, our own statute and our judicial precedents before we ply into distant seas of alien jurisdictions. The Constitution specifically preserves for the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power to punish for contempt. (Vide Art.129 and 215). The fact that such a power has been constitutionally safeguarded is proof positive of the primacy accorded to the free functioning of the courts in Republican India. Art.19(2) again, specifically enumerates "law in relation to contempt of court" as one among permissible matters in which a reasonable restriction could be imposed by a law, on the otherwise wide and liberal freedom of speech guaranteed under the Constitution. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is such a law. That was enacted after an in-depth study of the allied aspects by eminent law-men and after careful legislative exercise. The provisions of the Act, have not been challenged by any of the respondents in the case as constituting an unjustified encroachment on the freedom of speech. The extent of the freedom for the press and for that matter, the freedom of speech has to be determined with reference to the detailed provisions contained in that enactment. It is impossible to posit a larger right than that has been recognised under that enactment or dehors that statute. In other words, the freedom of speech would necessarily be subjected to the positive provisions contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. The freedom of speech, has therefore necessarily yielded to the codified statutory provisions as contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, when that freedom comes in a collision course with the functioning of the courts. It is equally impermissible to allow any party to by-pass or ignore the mandatory provisions of that enactment. 27. The scheme of the Act contains a clear indication that once the act complained of comes within the definition of 'contempt of court', the exoneration exclusively depends upon the exemption provisions engrafted in the enactment. It is not necessary to refer to all the provisions in the enactment, having regard to the limited issue arising here. 27. The scheme of the Act contains a clear indication that once the act complained of comes within the definition of 'contempt of court', the exoneration exclusively depends upon the exemption provisions engrafted in the enactment. It is not necessary to refer to all the provisions in the enactment, having regard to the limited issue arising here. As noted earlier, any publication on a pending judicial proceeding with the likely effect of interfering or tending to interfere with the administration of justice would be contempt, notwithstanding the fact that it was made as a continuation of a public debate on a matter of general importance. Explanation to S.3 gives the termini between the commencement and the culmination of judicial proceedings. In a sense, even a report of judicial proceeding or a stage thereof may interfere with the administration of justice. That result is avoided by S.4 which takes out of the mischief of the section reports of judicial proceedings. This is however, conditional. The report published must be a fair and accurate one The section gives an indication that comments or statements other than those falling under a fair and accurate report of the judicial proceeding would be within the mischief of the Act. Equally suggestive is the provision in S.5. Thereunder any fair comment on the merits of the case can be published without fear about punishment for contempt, if the case has been heard and finally decided. The statutory provisions are therefore clearly indicative that comments or statements in relation to pending judicial proceedings, with objectionable tendencies as envisaged under the Act, would be outside the pale of contempt only subject to the satisfaction of the requirements of the exceptional provisions such as S.4 and S. 28. As regards publications through the media in relation to matters pending before courts, the Supreme Court and our own High Court has spoken in very clear terms: The broadcast by trie Chief Minister of West Bengal is relation to matters pending before the Calcutta High Court was field as constituting contempt of court. (See In re, P. C. Sen, AIR. 1970 SC. 1821). When criminal proceedings were imminent, publication of statements about matters involved therein were held to be punishable contempt in K. P. Noordeen v. A.K. Gopalan, AIR 1968 Kerala 301:1968 KLT.157. (See In re, P. C. Sen, AIR. 1970 SC. 1821). When criminal proceedings were imminent, publication of statements about matters involved therein were held to be punishable contempt in K. P. Noordeen v. A.K. Gopalan, AIR 1968 Kerala 301:1968 KLT.157. (This decision of course is now to be read subject to the important amendment made under S.3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 under which there is no contempt unless the judicial proceedings are actually pending.) The decision, however, is very important in as much as it surveys and analyses the principles and precedents on the question till then. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y. V. Hanumantha v. K. R. Pattabhiram, AIR. 1975 A. P. 30 is yet another case (which arose after the 1971 Act) where the principle is discussed. The court observed: "When litigation is pending before a Court, no one shall comment on it in such a way there is a real and substantial danger of prejudice to the trial of the action, Even if the person making the comment honestly believes it to be true still it is a contempt of Court if he prejudices the truth before it is ascertained in the proceedings." (emphasis supplied) The article about which complaint was made in that case was found to be a purely academic one and for that reason not amounting to contempt. There could not therefore be any doubt that the publication in a newspaper of comments in relation to matters pending in the judicial proceeding would constitute a criminal contempt under S.2 (c). 29. The concepts in other jurisdictions like the "fair trial and free press" as obtaining in America, cannot be imported without caution, when the Indian field in relation to this jurisdiction is properly taken care of by the Indian Act, and the Indian decisions. 30. It was urged that there bad been extensive thinking in relation to the areas of contempt of court in England, on the basis of Philamore Committee Report and the 1981 Enactment. The fact that such developments have taken place in England would not justify the courts in India to apply the provisions of the English enactment to the cases in this country. What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly either. The fact that such developments have taken place in England would not justify the courts in India to apply the provisions of the English enactment to the cases in this country. What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly either. It is for the Parliament, to take note of the events, if any, which in its opinion would warrant further amendment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Till the supreme law making body of India speaks on that topic, the courts would not be justified in rewriting the provisions of the Indian enactment. We will, however, agree with Sri. Santhi Bushan that while construing the provisions of the enactment, the court would be zealous to harmonise the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Speech on the one hand and the necessity to protect judicial proceedings from unjustified interference, on the other. 31. Strong sentiments for excluding the trial by newspapers have been expressed in recent times even in England. The House of Lords, while recognising the role and importance of the press in a democratic society, was careful to preserve this basic requirement of excluding trial by newspaper, when the trial by court is envisaged by the law. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with the observations of the Law Lords who have poured out their minds on this question. It is only necessary to advert to two of the recent decisions of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (1973) 3 All. E.R. 54 and Attorney General v. English and another, (1982) 2 All E.R, 903. 32. Counsel on both sides invited our attention to extensive passages in Times Newspapers case supra, which discuss various facets of contempt of court. We shall presently refer to some of the passages which in our opinion are relevant. E.R. 54 and Attorney General v. English and another, (1982) 2 All E.R, 903. 32. Counsel on both sides invited our attention to extensive passages in Times Newspapers case supra, which discuss various facets of contempt of court. We shall presently refer to some of the passages which in our opinion are relevant. It is, however, desirable to note what one of the Law Lords, Lord Diplock, who was a party to the judgment, said about Times Newspapers case, in a later decision, in A-G v. English, (1982)2 All E.R. 903: "the criteria for determining where in a particular case the balance lay between fair trial and free press can hardly be said to have been rendered clear-cut by obiter dicta to be found in the five separate speeches in this House in A-G v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973) 3 All E. R.54, (1974) AC 273." The speeches in Times Newspapers case "made a distinction between the publication putting pressure on a litigant and thus constituting contempt, and publications constituting contempt on the ground of prejudging an issue. In the former context, the importance of a public debate was highlighted. However, it was clearly stated that the publications made pending trial, and having a tendency to prejudge the issue would amount to contempt, judged from the point of view of public policy. Lord Reid referred to the prejudgement of the issues involved at page 64 in Times Newspapers case supra. And stated: "That I would regard as very much against the public interest." Lord Morris dealt with the topic at pages 68 and 69 and quoted with approval the words of Cotton Q. in Hunt v. Clark, (1889) 58 LJQB 490 at 491, 492 reading: "If any one discusses in a paper the rights of a case or the evidence to be given before the case comes on, that, in my opinion, would be a very serious attempt to interfere with the proper administration of justice." At page 73 the following statement of Lord Diplock occurs: "Similarly, 'trial by newspaper,' ie. public discussion or comment on the merits of a dispute which has been submitted to a court of law or on the alleged facts of the dispute before they have been found by the court on the evidence adduced before it, is calculated to prejudice the third requirement: that parties to litigation should be able to rely on there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide their dispute according to law." The views of Lord Cross are expressed in pages 83 and 84. The rationale behind forbidding publications which prejudge pending proceedings was given by him in the following words: "The reason is that one cannot deal with one particular publication in isolation. A publication prejudging an issue in pending litigation which is itself innocuous enough may provoke replies which are far from innocuous but which, as they are replies, it would seem unfair to restrain. So gradually the public would become habituated to, look forward to, and resent the absence of, preliminary discussions in the 'media' of any case which aroused widespread interest. An absolute rule though it may seem to be unreasonable if one looks only to the particular case is necessary in order to prevent a gradual slide towards trial by newspaper or television." The contention that responsible criticism should not be shut out was particularly considered by Lord Reid at page 65. The dangerous implications in accepting the argument were forcefully pointed out in the following passage: "I think that anything in the nature of prejudgement of a case or of specific issues in it is objectionable not only because of its possible effect on that particular case but also because of its side effects which may be far reaching. Responsible 'mass media' will do their best to be fair, but there will also be ill-informed slapdash, or prejudiced attempts to influence the public. If people are led to think that it is easy to find the truth disrespect for the processes of the law could follow and, if mass media are allowed to judge, unpopular people and unpopular causes will fare very badly." Commenting about the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981, and in particular about the cross heading 'Strict liability'. Lord Diplock again said in A-G v. English, supra: "The public policy that underlies the strict liability rule in contempt of court is deterrence. Lord Diplock again said in A-G v. English, supra: "The public policy that underlies the strict liability rule in contempt of court is deterrence. Trial by newspaper or, as it should be more compendiously expressed today; trial by the media, is not to be permitted in this country. That the risk that was created by the publication when it was actually published does not ultimately affect the outcome of the proceedings is, as Lord Goddard C.J said in R v. Evening Standard Co. Ltd. exp A-G, (1954) 1 All ER 1026 at 1028, (1954) 1 QB 578 at 582, neither here nor there. If there was a reasonable possibility that it might have done so if in the period subsequent to the publication the proceedings had not taken the course that in fact they did and Dr. Arthur was acquitted; the offence was complete. The true course of justice must not at any stage be put at risk." The above passage particularly emphasises the fact that actual interference in the course of justice need not be established to constitute contempt even under the 'Strict liability rule' in England. This position has been clearly brought out in the statement of law as contained in reputed legal compilations like Halsbury's Laws of England and the American Jurisprudence. Publications intended or likely to prejudice fair trial or conduct of proceedings are dealt with, among others, in Para.8. 9 and 16 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition. The aspect of prejudging issues has been covered in Para.26 which reads: "Comment on pending legal proceedings which purports to prejudge the issues which are to be tried by the court is intrinsically objectionable as being a usurpation of the proper function of the court. This it seems may be punished as a contempt irrespective of the effect or likely effect on the particular proceedings in question." The American Jurisprudence states the position thus: "The principle that a publication may constitute a contempt of court has been applied to newspaper articles Publication, analysis, and discussion of evidence to be produced in a coming trial may constitute contempt Contempt may also be committed by publication of petitions..." (See American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Vol. 17, Page 56, Para.55). 33. We shall now deal with two of the comparatively subsidiary submissions. 17, Page 56, Para.55). 33. We shall now deal with two of the comparatively subsidiary submissions. On behalf of the Editor and Reporter, the benefit of S.4 (relating to fair and accurate reporting of the judicial proceedings) was claimed. Neither the interview nor the article purports to be a report of the judicial proceedings. They cannot be treated as such a report. They were in truth and substance, projections of the views of the former Minister on the one hand and the ideas, comments and statements of the reporter on the other. Both the report and interview traverse matters other than those that had been covered by the writ petition, and the counter-affidavit filed before the court. The matters covered by the report and the interview, could not be treated, in the circumstances, as a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding. 34. Mr. Shanti Bhushan contended that the contempt (even if there be any), is not of the requisite degree of gravity as is referred to in S.13 and as consequently no punishment was possible. From this premise, it was further argued that as no punishment could be imposed on the respondents, the entire proceedings should be dropped. Counsel suggested that the only object of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was to punish and contended that where punishment is not possible, the proceedings have no relevance and should not be allowed to linger longer. We are unable to accept this submission. Contempt of courts proceedings are not purely criminal proceedings. It is well accepted that they are only quasi criminal proceedings. A reference to the scheme of the Act would establish that punishment is not the only deterrence employed under the Act. A variety of orders is visualised under the Act. A person can be found guilty of contempt of a punishable degree and sentenced thereafter. It is, however, discretionary for the court to inflict a punishment. It will be open to the court to express its displeasure, to admonish the contemner or to discharge him after accepting an apology tendered by him. Under the Act, unlike the position before the Act, even a qualified apology could be preferred and accepted. Tendering of an apology, however, need not necessarily result in the discharge of the accused. It will be open to the court to express its displeasure, to admonish the contemner or to discharge him after accepting an apology tendered by him. Under the Act, unlike the position before the Act, even a qualified apology could be preferred and accepted. Tendering of an apology, however, need not necessarily result in the discharge of the accused. It is open to the court to examine the bona fides of the apology, and if convinced otherwise, to reject it and to proceed with the sentencing of the contemner. Even an expression of the displeasure may be matter of advene consequences for the affected party. Under the very wide provisions relating to appeal under S.19, all orders or decisions, even when unaccompanied by an actual sentence, could be appealed against. Suffice it to say that the scheme of the Act does not justify a contention that if punishment is impossible, proceedings would automatically abate. We reject this contention also. 35. We shall now come to the actual charges and consider whether they constitute criminal contempt and whether they are contempts punishable under S.13 of the Act. Charge No.1 "The judge made such remarks that were unprecedented in the judicial practice." This is the first sentence in the reply of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai to the question of the reporter reading: "The immediate cause of your resignation was the remarks of the High Court Judge while admitting a petition against you. What prompted you to take the extreme step?" 36. Ordinarily it would not have been possible to characterise a comment (that the order dated 5-6-1985 was unprecedented in judicial practice) as one interfering with the pending issues in the Quo-warranto petition. It would have been essentially a statement of view, even if in a critical strain. However, the justifiability of such remarks was itself an issue which arose for decision in the case. That is evident from the judgment of the Full Bench in 1985 KLT 762 supra. Para.17 of that judgment contained the following observations: "The counsel for the petitioner submits that the resignation of the respondent was of his own accord while the counsel for the respondent submits that the resignation was on the basis of certain observations made by this Court. Para.17 of that judgment contained the following observations: "The counsel for the petitioner submits that the resignation of the respondent was of his own accord while the counsel for the respondent submits that the resignation was on the basis of certain observations made by this Court. It is not necessary for us to pursue this controversy in the light of what we have stated earlier though we see considerable force in the petitioner's contentions We need only state that the jurisdiction of the judge to make observations is beyond doubt " . (emphasis supplied) The above observations of the Full Bench strongly suggest that the nature and justifiability of the observations of the learned judge at the time of admitting the writ petition, were directly and substantially involved in the case itself. 37. Though OP. No. 6947 of 1985 does not clearly make out a charge on this aspect, the charge and necessary averments are found in OP. No. 7697 of 1985. The petition contains specific reference to the above observations and also the petition filed by Sri. Balakrishna Pillai for the expunction of the remarks, CMP. No 16617/1985. It is thereafter alleged in the petition that the statements including the one referred to above were made by Balakrishna Pillai when the case against him was pending before the Court; and that the issues involved in the writ petition OP. No. 5360 of 1985 and the interview published covered the same subject matter. There is a further reference to "the stage at which litigation has reached.." In the counter-affidavit of the 3rd respondent, the pendency of the case involving matters to which the remarks related, and which bad been linked with the writ petition and the civil miscellaneous petition specifically, had not been denied. 38. These remarks did have a tendency to prejudice or interfere with the pending judicial proceedings, in that view of the matter. Charge No. 2 "I have not made such a speech and the (Judge's) remarks have resulted in my resignation," The statement was in answer to a comment by the reporter touching the remarks of the learned judge in the order dated 5-6-1985. Ext. P3 which among others contained the passage: "If the reports came (sic) in the newspapers are established, the allegations in the original petition also will stand established. Ext. P3 which among others contained the passage: "If the reports came (sic) in the newspapers are established, the allegations in the original petition also will stand established. If there is a breach of the oath taken while assuming office, the incumbent is not entitled to continue in office. He. on his own accord should step down Observing the high traditions of the Parliamentary system of Government provided for under the Constitution; if not the machinery provided under the Constitution to restrain him from functioning as minister can be set in motion by any citizen of this country." The reporter's comment and question to Sri. Balakrishna Pillai was: "You have filed a petition seeking the removal of those remarks." The petition referred to as the one seeking the expunction of the remarks appears to be C M. P. No. 16617 of 1985, which has been specifically referred to in Para.2 of O. P. No. 7697 of 1985. 39. The second remark also has a similar tendency. Whether the speech was made or not was a live issue in the Quo-warranto petition. This is particularly so when it is remembered that in the writ petition, the petitioners sought even an opportunity to adduce evidence in substantiation of their contentions that the Minister made a seditious speech. As stated by Oswald (2nd Edn. see page 95) in the Contempt of Courts Act, the publication of a defence itself can amount to contempt of court. The remarks contained in charge No. 2 also touch upon matters directly and substantially in issue in the case, and consequently they too had the tendency to interfere with the judicial proceedings and the due course of justice. Charge No. 3 "We found that although there was an 'IF' to the judge's remarks, the second sentence after the full-stop is almost categorical and very clear that there is no "IF'" This answer was in the background of a comment of the reporter reading: "The content of the judge's remarks is that if the charge against you can be interpreted as going against a minister's oath of office, then you should have resigned of your own accord. There is an'IF' involved." 40. Charge No. 3 which refers to actual text of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 5-6-1985 may not interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice. There is an'IF' involved." 40. Charge No. 3 which refers to actual text of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 5-6-1985 may not interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice. There is no comment on the pending judicial proceedings, which could in any way interfere with those proceedings. Charge No. 4 "I am told that the Addl. Advocate General was asked by the court to give his remarks. He said categorically that he is not representing me He only helped the court in accordance with the court's direction." These remarks of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai in the interview were in the background of a comment of the reporter reading: "The Additional Advocate General seems to have argued for you when the petition was admitted." 41. We have already pointed out above that the question whether the observations of the learned judge at the time of admission were justified and correct formed the subject matter of an important issue in the case. In that context, the question whether the Additional Advocate General appeared only as an amicus curiae or for and on behalf of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai was a matter very much germane in the adjudication of the issue. We are not concerned in this case about the correctness of one version or the other. The fact remains that the role in which the Additional Advocate General made the submissions before the learned single judge before Ext. P3 order containing the observations had been made, was a matter in controversy and which was in active consideration in the pending judicial proceedings. Tendentious statements in relation to such an issue, would in such circumstances amount to contempt of court. They may also constitute a prejudging of the issue. Charge No. 5 "At least a sentence of that speech should have been carried by the national papers. I have submitted copies of these newspapers to the court." These sentences occur towards the close of his reply in answer to the question of the reporter reading: "There has been a joint-declaration by seven newspaper reporters that you made a seditious speech. Are you saying that their stand is false?" 42. The petitioners were more vehement in their submissions relating to the 5th charge. They particularly pointed out that the statement: I have submitted copy of these newspapers to the Court" was factually incorrect. Are you saying that their stand is false?" 42. The petitioners were more vehement in their submissions relating to the 5th charge. They particularly pointed out that the statement: I have submitted copy of these newspapers to the Court" was factually incorrect. It was demonstrated that no newspapers had been produced by Sri. Balakrishna Pillai either with the counter-affidavit or otherwise. That position has not been disputed by his counsel. The attempted justification on that aspect was that the extracts from the newspapers had been given in the counter-affidavit. This submission also is not correct. Though there is reference to the limited publication of the speech in the counter-affidavit, the actual extracts of the speech had not been given in the counter - affidavit. The statement of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai is thus proved to be incorrect. The statement is much more than the indication of a defence already made. It gives a thrust to the case of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai in a wider range and more forceful manner than had been attempted by way of defence in the counter-affidavit. That statement and argument involved in the earlier sentence in the charge, would in the circumstances, constitute contempt of court. Charge No. 6 "After all, I was an innocent man persecuted because of newspaper reports." This is part of a statement given by Balakrishna Pillai in answer to the question of the reporter reading: "There was a lot of pressure from the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee on the Chief Minister seeking your resignation. So when you go back to the Cabinet don't you think the tension will increase?" 43. In a lesser degree, the statements in charge No. 6 also have the tendency to interfere with the judicial proceedings and constituting a pre judgment of the issue. 44. In the light of our above discussion, we have no doubt that the interview given by Sri. Balakrishna Pillai to the reporter of the Weekly, the reporting of the same by Sri. Venu Menon and the publication of it by Pritish Nandy in the Weekly, all come within the purview of criminal contempt as defined in S.2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 45. We now come to another important and crucial question; are the respondents punishable for contempt of Court? The answer depends upon the satisfaction of the requirements of S.13 of the Act which reads: "13. 45. We now come to another important and crucial question; are the respondents punishable for contempt of Court? The answer depends upon the satisfaction of the requirements of S.13 of the Act which reads: "13. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice." (emphasis supplied) The petitions do not even contain formal allegations or charge that the statements substantially interfered with, or tended to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. The proceedings of the Advocate General (Ext. P1, granting sanction for the initiation of the contempt proceedings) also does not refer to this important aspect relating to the ingredients of S.13. The charge framed in OP. No. 7697 of 1985 is probably nearer the mark But even the charges therein do not clearly refer to the important ingredients of S.13 alluded to above. (Charge No.1 therein refers to civil contempt. This charge is totally unsustainable, having regard to the definition of 'civil contempt' contained in the Act. There was no attempt to justify such a charge in that matter even in the course of arguments.) The last sentence in charge No. 2 in OP. 7697 of 1985 refers to "a real and substantial risk of serious prejudice of a pending matter." But that was, however, with reference to an allegation of "indirectly abusing persons concerned in litigation." That refers to an aspect entirely different from the one in relation to publication of the offending passages as referred to above. 46. We are of the view that a charge containing the ingredients of S.13 with supporting allegations therefor is essential, if the contemners are to be punished. That view would find justification in the approach made by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. English supra. Lord Diplock (while discussing about S 5 of the English enactment) observed: "So It was for the Attorney General to show that the risk to the fair trial " (emphasis supplied) 47. The omission of such ingredients in the charge and the statements of allegations in the petitions, would be fatal in relation to the prayer of the petitioners to punish the contemners. The omission of such ingredients in the charge and the statements of allegations in the petitions, would be fatal in relation to the prayer of the petitioners to punish the contemners. Having regard to the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings, the contemners would be justified in seeking umbrage under such a fatal defect in the charge and the supporting statement of allegations. 48. The net result is that though the interview given, report made and publication effected all constitute 'criminal contempt' under S 2 (c) of the Act, the respondents cannot be punished under S.12, in view of the operation of S.13 of the Act. 49. In the view that we have taken about the absence of a charge under S.13, it is not necessary to discuss in detail about the submissions of the respondents that publication of a defence which had been already made would not substantially interfere with or tend to interfere with the due course of justice. Nor is it necessary to discuss at length the American decision in Wood v. Georgia, 370 US 375 (a case referred to in para 59 of American Jurisprudence, Vol. 17) where it was emphatically stated that there could not be a substantial interference with the judicial proceedings, when what is published is only a defence which had already been made before the Court. 50. There has been some general discussion about the circumstances which may constitute substantial interference as contemplated under S.13 in the decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Dayal v. State of M.P., AIR. 1978 SC. 921. The case related to a scurrilous publication by an Advocate about a judge who gave a verdict unfavourable to the Advocate. Circumstances which existed in that case, according to the Supreme Court attracted S 13. Attorney General v. English supra also contains discussion on the words 'substantial' and 'serious' with reference to the requirements of S.2 of the English enactment. S.2 reads: "2. (1) The strict liability rule applies only in relation to publications, and for this purpose "publications" includes any speech, writing, broadcast or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public. (2) The strict liability rule applies only a publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. (2) The strict liability rule applies only a publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. (3) The strict liability rule applies to a publication only if the proceedings in question are active within the meaning of this section at the time of publication. (4) Schedule I applies for determining the time at which proceedings are to be treated as active within the meaning of this Section." (emphasis supplied) 51. Watkins, Lord Justice, in the Court of Appeal observed about the word 'substantial' as follows: "We are faced with a word of common usage, which Parliament, we think, intended to bear its common understanding when used, as here, as a qualifying adjective. Apart, therefore, from saying that it means a risk which is real, we think that any further definition is unnecessary and undesirable and would probably introduce confusion where we think there is none." The following paragraph contains a discussion of that aspect: "Next for consideration is the concatenation in the subsection of the adjective 'substantial' and the adverb 'seriously', the former to describe the degree of risk, the latter to describe the degree of impediment or prejudice to the course of justice. 'Substantial* is hardly the most apt word to apply to 'risk' which is noumenon. In combination I take the two words to be intended to exclude a risk that is only remote. With regard to the adverb 'seriously' a perusal of the cases cited in A-G v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973) 3 All ER. 54, (1974) AC. 273 discloses that the adjective 'serious' has from time to time been used as an alternative to 'real' to describe the degree of risk of interfering with the course of justice, but not the degree of interference itself. It is, however, an ordinary English word that is not intrinsically inapt when used to describe the extent of an impediment or prejudice to the cause of justice in particular legal proceedings, and I do not think that for the purpose of the instant appeal any attempt to paraphrase it is necessary or would be helpful. The subsection applies to all kinds of legal proceedings, not only criminal prosecutions before a jury. The subsection applies to all kinds of legal proceedings, not only criminal prosecutions before a jury. If, as in the instant case and probably in most other criminal trial on indictment, it is the outcome of the trial or the need to discharge the jury without proceeding to a verdict that is put at risk, there can be no question that that which in the course of justice is put at risk is as serious as anything could be." 52. On behalf of the 3rd respondent it was contended that he was an active politician and that it was essential to clarify his stand to the public, so as to protect his political reputation and keep untarnished his political image. We do appreciate the anxiety of a public figure, in safeguarding his reputation. Sir. Harold Mc Millan indicated in his biography the various difficulties of a politician; including that involved in having "one eye on the political weather, and the other on his political conscience.") That, however, has to be done consistent with the requirements of law. The 3rd respondent occupied a position of trust and responsibility. He should have, therefore, bestowed serious thought before being tempted to be interviewed by a reporter and allowing his interview to be published even while serious issues covered by the interview were under active and live consideration by this Court. 53. In the light of our aforesaid discussion, we hold that the action of Sri. Balakrishna Pillai (respondent No. 3 in O. P. No. 6947, and respondent No.1 in O. P. 7602 and 7697 of 1985) in giving the interview, the action of Sri. Venu Menon (respondent No. 2 in OP. 6947 and OP. 7697/1985 and respondent No. 3 in OP. 7602/1985)) in reporting the interview and the action of Pritish Nandy (respondent No.1 in OP. 6947/85, respondent No. 2 in OP. 7602/1985) in publishing the interview in the Weekly constitute'Criminal Contempt', coming under S.2(c) of the Act. We, however, declare that no sentence is imposable on the respondents in as much as no charge under S.13 had been laid against them. We dispose of the matter, as did the Calcutta High Court with approving affirmation in the sensational Sen's case in AIR. 1970 SC. 1821, by expressing our displeasure at the 3rd respondent making the interview, and respondent 2 in reporting it and respondent No.l in publishing the same. 54. We dispose of the matter, as did the Calcutta High Court with approving affirmation in the sensational Sen's case in AIR. 1970 SC. 1821, by expressing our displeasure at the 3rd respondent making the interview, and respondent 2 in reporting it and respondent No.l in publishing the same. 54. Counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 posed a question whether public discussion should be totally gagged merely for the reason that some litigation is pending in some Court in some place of this vast country. He illustrated a case with reference to an important topic of public debate like the necessity to have atomic weapons in a given situation. Could such a debate be stopped altogether, for an indefinite duration of such legal proceedings? he queried. It is unnecessary to answer this hypothetical question in this proceeding. The view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in AIR 1975 A.P. 30 supra, that purely academic or theoretical discussions would not be tabooed during the pendency of such judicial proceedings may furnish a clue, an answer or an approach. It may be noted in passing that the importance of a national issue (opposing tendencies jeopardising the unity and integrity of India) projected in the speech of a Prime Minister of India did not stand in the way of the Madras High Court scrutinising the speech to find out whether that speech had repercussions on a pending trial. (See Ramaswami v. Jawaharlal, AIR. 1958 Madras 558.) 55. Before parting with the case, we may make some general observations regarding contempt proceedings. They are undoubtedly very serious matters. Courts are therefore anxious to deal with them with all the seriousness they require. When the proceedings are initiated against the press, a greater responsibility rests with the Court in balancing the considerations of safeguarding the freedom of speech on the one hand and preserving the purity of the judicial proceedings on the other. Those who come with contempt petitions have therefore necessarily to shoulder serious responsibilities. Before petitions are actually filed is Court, every attempt should be made to cogently arrange the factual details, marshal the evidentiary items, and correlate the relevant legal provisions. Minute attention should be given in framing the charge clearly, pointedly, with all essential ingredients and in such a manner as not to cause any prejudice to the respondents. Before petitions are actually filed is Court, every attempt should be made to cogently arrange the factual details, marshal the evidentiary items, and correlate the relevant legal provisions. Minute attention should be given in framing the charge clearly, pointedly, with all essential ingredients and in such a manner as not to cause any prejudice to the respondents. We regret to note that elementary aspects had not been fully borne in mind by the petitioners herein. We ignore the harassing array of typographical errors, baffling omissions, and stunning superfluities, in the petition and the memo of charges. Even then, the petition cannot claim much of the requisite lucidity. The present petitions could not be effectively prosecuted due to the sad omissions as indicated earlier. It may be possible to come across passages in the article and the interview of a graver nature. They also, however, have not been made subject matter of the charge. 56. The petitions seeking sanction of the Advocate General for initiation of contempt proceedings were also not as clear and self contained as would have been desirable. Probably it would have been better, if the Advocate General had insisted upon petitions with clearer allegations and satisfactory charges, before he accorded sanction. That would have perhaps saved considerable time and energy for all concerned. The English decisions already referred to above, inter alia, indicate the heavy responsibility imposed and confidence reposed by courts on the Attorney General in this matter. Those guidelines could usefully be adopted in the Indian situation too. 57. There were justification for the petitioners in moving the present contempt petitions, though they have failed on certain technical grounds indicated earlier. The petitioner in OP, 6947/85, we feel, would deserve award of costs. We are of the view that it is the Editor of the Weekly that has the maximum responsibility in this offending publication. We would therefore direct the Ist respondent in OP. No. 6947/1985 to pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate's fee Rs. 500/-.