ORDER 1. These two writ petitions can be dealt with under a common order and it is sufficient to note the facts in W.P.No.-6882 of 1985 because the point of law that requires to be decided is one and the same excepting that there were two applicants who have been arrayed as second respondent in each of the writ petitions. 2. The petitioner is a Hindu Harijan and is a repatriate from Sri Lanka. He was in Sri Lanka from 1947 till 1981 when he had to return to India. He settled down in his native village, Mayilodai, Kurumbur. He has lost all his assets in Sri Lanka and he has no employment. Consequently, he has no means of ‘livelihood. Since he has to support a large family, he made an application for the grant of licence for quarrying river sand in. the Thambaraparani in the stretch of Sriparangusanallur and Keepladagai Appankoil for fasli 1395. The District Collector, Tirunelveli (the first respondent in each of the writ tition) notified under rules 8 and 9 of e Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession lies, 1959 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’) at the right to quarry river sand and her minor minerals will be granted by public auction for fasli 1395. The said notification was published in Tiruneiveii District Gazette Extraordinary dated 25th May, 1985. It was stated the public auction would be held on 28th May, 1985 at the Taluk Office, Srivaikuntam. As far as the other case is concerned, the public auction was scheduled to take place on 13.6.85. That also was with reference to quarrying of river sand. The petitioner made an application on 7.6.1985 under rule 10 of the rules to the District Collector, the authority concerned. The application was presented, as the affidavit proceeds, to the District Collector when he was on camp in Courtallam, through his counsel. The petitioner furnished his Passport and his family card dated 4.7.1980 that as a Sri Lanka repatriate, he might be given the accessary preference. By memo dated 10.6.1985, the Collector informed the Tahsildar of Srivaikuntam that the auction of quarrying of river sand of the two villages he postponed until further orders. The petitioner furnished his Passport and his family card dated 4.7.1980 that as a Sri Lanka repatriate, he might be given the accessary preference. By memo dated 10.6.1985, the Collector informed the Tahsildar of Srivaikuntam that the auction of quarrying of river sand of the two villages he postponed until further orders. However, by his order in R.O.C. No.A. 3/1256/85 dated 10.6.1985, the Collector granted to the second respondent in each of the casts, lease for a period of three years from 1.7.1985 for the removal of river sand from Thambaraparam over an extent of 20 acres in the quarrying area of the two villages for a lease amount of Rs.2,700 per year in W.P.No.6882/85 and for a sum of Rs.74.200 per year in W.P.No.6883/85 over an extent of 10 acres. It is these orders which are sought to be quashed. It appears as the file discloses that the second respondent in each of the cases - in W.P.No.6882/85 Periannan preferred an application form in Appendix VII addressed to the Director of Industries and Commerce through the Collector, Tiruneiveii and likewise in W.P.No.6883/85 Batcha Saheb filed an application on 16.5.85 addressed to the Director of Industries and Commerce through the Collector of Tiruneiveii. Both of them claimed preferential privilege under rule 10. Further they submitted a letter dated 13.6.1985 reiterating their request for the grant of lease in accordance with their application dated 16.5.1985, The Collector approved these applications after enquiry on 3.6.3.1985 and the orders impugned, came to be passed. This is the factual position as obtainable from the records. Under these circumstances, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Collector has first of all no jurisdiction to grant the lease in favour of the second respondent in each of the writ petitions. First and foremost, there was no application before the Collector. Secondly, having notified the auction in accordance with rule 8(2), that cannot be given up merely because there were applications of the second respondent in each of the writ petitions; be it 16.5.85 and 7.6.85. The Collector should have seen that on the date when he passed the orders, there were the applications of the petitioners as well. Therefore, the question of straightaway preferring the second respondent in each of the case is totally unwarranted. 3. The Collector should have seen that on the date when he passed the orders, there were the applications of the petitioners as well. Therefore, the question of straightaway preferring the second respondent in each of the case is totally unwarranted. 3. If the object of the rule is to secure best revenue, the procedure contemplated under rule 8 ought to have been followed. Even assuming rule 10 applies, that merely talks of preferential right. There is nothing absolute about the same. It looks as if the whole thing’ is stage-managed to grant the right to quarry in favour of each of the second respondent. This is because preference means, preferring one to another. If there are two applicants from Sri Lanka repatriates, namely, those of the petitioners as well as the second respondent in each of the writ petitions, rule 10 may not strictly be applied. Even assuming it applies, there must be a comparative estimate of the rival claims of the parties. Lastly, the Collector has no jurisdiction because by the application of rule 3, his power to grant lease in question stands completely excluded. For these reasons, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside. 4. Learned Government Pleader would submit that rule 3 has no application to the facts of the present case. In so far as the application of rule 10 is concerned, the moment the Collector receives the application for quarrying from a Sri Lanka Repatriate, there is no other choice open to the Collector than to grant it in favour of that applicant. In this case, the only valid applications before the date of the impugned order were those of the second respondent in each of the writ petitions. The petitioners’ contention that their applications were presented earlier, is totally unsustainable. A Division Bench of this Court has ruled in Thirusulam A.H.B.M.W. I. Co-op. Socy. v. Venkataraman Thirusulam A.H.B.M.W. I. Co-op. Socy. v. Venkataraman (1983)2 MLJ.484 that only after exhausting the procedure laid down under rule 10 resort should be had to rule 8. That contingency did not arise at all here. Having regard to the fact that the applications of the second respondent in each case are on the date of grant for which even the procedure set out in rule 10 gives preferential rights to these respondents and therefore, the grant is fully in order. 5. That contingency did not arise at all here. Having regard to the fact that the applications of the second respondent in each case are on the date of grant for which even the procedure set out in rule 10 gives preferential rights to these respondents and therefore, the grant is fully in order. 5. Merely because the public auction came to be notified under rule 8, it does not mean the Collector cannot resort to rule 10 when circumstances warrant such procedure. Mr. D. Raju, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent supporting the arguments of the learned Government Pleader would further contend that if the procedure laid down under rule 10 cannot be followed, in so far as the petitioner also seeks the same procedure to be applied, the application of such procedure under rule 10, will be equally bad. Therefore, the petitioners cannot in one breath say that rule 8 should be applied and in another breath contend that they must be given preferential right under rule 10. Besides, there is a remedy of appeal under rule 30-A. There is no justification for the petitioners in not exhausting that right. It is not correct to contend that there is no application before the Collector. Though the application dated 16.5.1985 by the respective second respondents were addressed to the Director of Industries and Commerce, the Collector if he is competent under rule to grant leases in question, no question of want of jurisdiction would ever arise. Therefore, that argument also will have to be rejected. Rule 3 would apply only to cases of excavation and not to applications being made for the purpose of confirmation of lease. Thus, it is submitted that there are no merits in the writ petitions and the same may be dismissed. 6. In view of the controversy as to the scope of the rules, I would rather prefer to extract the relevant rules. Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules apply to all the lands in the State of Tamil Nadu including the lands in the estates taken over by the State Government under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 During the course of the arguments in these cases, I had occasion to peruse the rules framed closely many a time. I am emboldened to say that these rules glimpse at one and other equally. I am emboldened to say that these rules glimpse at one and other equally. What I mean by this, is that it will be very easy to discern. Rule 3(1) lays down as follows: “3(1). Authorities empowered to sanction quarrying in Government lands - Applications for quarrying in Government lands shall be disposed of by the Deputy Tahsildar or the Tahsildar concerned, in cases in which the value of the minerals sought to be removed does not exceed Rs.25, by the Revenue Divisional Officer, in cases in which such value exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.100 by the Collector of the district, in cases in which such value exceeds Rs.100 but does not exceed Rs.500 and in other cases by the Director of Industries and Commerce.” Normally by reading of this rule, one can understand it as an application for mere quarrying and not to grant of lease to quarry. If the matter had stood there, there would have been no difficulty. Unfortunately in Sub- rule (2) of the same rule, it says the lease shall be executed in the form set out in Appendix I to the rules. Therefore, for the first time in sub- rule (2) the subject of lease comes in. On a reference to Appendix I, 1 find that it is a common form of lease prescribed for all situations contemplated under rules 3(2) 8 ,8-A ,8-B ,8-C and9. But a reading of the rule does not give the idea of leases because sub- rule (1) talks of the authority empowered to grant the applications for quarrying. This cannot be by way of a lease since there are other rules to deal with the situation. Therefore, it stands to reason to hold, that this rule 3 dealt with mere excavation. The succeeding rules like rules 4 ,5 6 and7 also do not talk of lease. Thus, it should be concluded that rule 3 has nothing to do with rule 8. Coming to rule 8, 1 find that this rule elaborately lays down the procedure for lease to quarrying to private persons. That rule may be extracted in full as follows: “8. Lease of quarries to private persons - (1) ;(a). The Collector shall publish a notice in the District Gazette, inviting applications for the lease of quarries. Such application shall contain particulars about the lease amount. That rule may be extracted in full as follows: “8. Lease of quarries to private persons - (1) ;(a). The Collector shall publish a notice in the District Gazette, inviting applications for the lease of quarries. Such application shall contain particulars about the lease amount. (b) If only one application for the lease of quarries is received in response to such notice from a private person, the Collector shall reject the application and publish another such notice inviting applications for lease of quarries. (c) If only one application is received even after the publication of the second notice, the Collector, may, if he is satisfied that the lease amount is reasonable and the grant of lease to the applicant will be in the interest of mineral development, grant the lease to the applicant for a period not exceeding ten years, subject to condition that lessee pays both the ordinary assessment and seigniorage fee for all minor minerals at twelve and half per cent of the local market value of the minerals subject to a minimum of six paise per cart-load. Explanation: The local market value of the mineral shall be fixed by the Collector either for the district as a whole or for each taluk. The local market value so fixed shall be liable to revision at the end of each period of ten years. (2) (a). In cases where more than one application for lease of quarries are received the privilege of quarrying shall be put to public” auction. The auction shall be conducted by the Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area after giving due publicity to the auction in the following manner, namely: (i) by notice published in the District Gazette; (ii) by notice in the language of the district put up at office of the Collector, Revenue Divisional Officer, Tahsildar and Deputy Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area; (iii) When the anticipated bid amount is expected to exceed ten thousand rupees by advertisement in two successive issues of one Tamil daily newspaper circulating in the district and in the State. (b) Every notice and advertisement published under clause (a) shall inter alia specify --- (i) the date and time of auction; (ii) The place of auction. (b) Every notice and advertisement published under clause (a) shall inter alia specify --- (i) the date and time of auction; (ii) The place of auction. (iii) the amount of earnest money to be deposited for participating in the auction; (iv) the upset price, if any, when reauction is ordered under clause (h) below: (c) There shall at least be ten clear days between the date of the publication of notice or the date of advertisement whichever is later and the date of auction; (d) The auction shall be subject to confirmation by the Collector; Provided that if the bid amount does not exceed five hundred rupees in respect of all minor minerals the auction shall be subject to confirmation by the Revenue Divisional Officer concerned. (e) (i). The Collector shall ordinarily confirm the auction in favour of the highest bidder: Provided that where the Collector is satisfied - (a) that the highest bid amount is not reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case; or (b) that the bid amount is lower than the upset price specified in sub- rule (1) or (c) that it will not be in the interests of mineral development to grant the lease to the higher bidder, he shall pass orders refusing to confirm the auction, recording the reasons therefor in writing. (ii) An order confirming the bid shall be deemed to be the acceptance of the bid. (iii) Notwithstanding anything in clause (i) - (a) Where the period of lease exceeds ten years, the lease shall not be confirmed except with the sanction of the Director of Industries and Commerce. (b) When the minerals are to be worked out by or on behalf of any person who is not a citizen of India, the lease shall not be confirmed except with the previous sanction of the State Government. (f) Where the privilege of quarrying is put to auction no seigniorage fee shall be collected in addition to the bid amount and assessment. (g) Any offer of an amount higher than the highest bid amount and request for reauction based on such offer shall be made within 30 days from the date of the auction or before the date of confirmation whichever date is earlier. (g) Any offer of an amount higher than the highest bid amount and request for reauction based on such offer shall be made within 30 days from the date of the auction or before the date of confirmation whichever date is earlier. (h) If any person offers within 30 days from the date of auction to bid in a reauction at a price which shall not be less than two times the highest bid amount, the Collector may direct the person concerned to deposit the amount offered by him. On the deposit of such amount, the Collector shall reject all the bids, and order a reauction with the upset price of the amount offered for the privilege of quarrying. (3) In the case of lease in respect of lime shell and kankar, the Personal Assistant to the Collector may also exercise the powers of the Collector specified in sub- rules (1) and (2). (4) In the case of lease of quarrying in any forest declared to be a reserved forest under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882 (Tamil NaduAct V of 1882 ) or in any land at the disposal of the Government in respect of which rules under section 26 of the said Act have been made, the procedure referred to above shall be followed by the District Forest Officer concerned and where the period of lease exceeds ten years the lease shall not be confirmed by the District Forest Officer except with the sanction of the Chief Conservator of Forests. (5) The lessee shall deposit as security --- (1) ten per cent of the lease amount bid amount when leased out by public auction in case such lease/amount bid amount can be calculated and specified; and (2) one hundred rupees in other cases. (6) The lease deed shall be in the form set out in Appendix 1 to these rules.” Sub- rule (1) of Rule 8 requires applications being invited by the Collector for which a notice in the District Gazette shall be published. Then it talks of the situation when application received is only one in number and in which case requiring the Collector to republish that notice. Even after that republication if there is only one applicant, as to what should be done is indicated in rule 8(1)(c). Then it talks of the situation when application received is only one in number and in which case requiring the Collector to republish that notice. Even after that republication if there is only one applicant, as to what should be done is indicated in rule 8(1)(c). In the instant case, it is admitted by all sides that at no point of time, the Collector caused publication of the notice in the District Gazette inviting applications. This is an important fact to be borne in mind because much turns upon the same. What has been done in this case is, as the procedure indicated under sub- rule (2) of rule 8, it was this notice dated 25.5.85 which was published in the District Gazette for public auction of the quarry right for Fasli 1395. The auction in the stretch in two villages of an extent of 20 acres was notified on 28.5.1985. The auction in the stretch of the villages of an extent of 10 acres was fixed on 13.6.1985. In so far as there is no other rule which contemplates the publication of notice, it has to be attributed to sub- rule (2) of rule 8. Even at this stage, 1 will have to note one important fact. The Collector, 1 am informed by the learned Government Pleader, had sent notices for publication sometime in April, 1985. This clearly indicates how the Collector has not chosen to familiarise himself with the rules. The publication in the Tirunelveli District Gazette itself should have been done only after invitation of applications under rule 8(1) because rule 8(2)(a) extracted above clearly states that in cases where more than one application are received, the privilege of quarrying shall be put to public auction. I will take it in this case for the purpose of highlighting the procedure for notifying the auction, that there was only one application, namely that of Batcha Saheb dated 16.5.1985 and equally Periannan dated 16.5.85, If that were so, there was no scope for applying rule 8(2). But in this case, admittedly on the date when the information relating to publication was sent, namely, on 13.5.85, there was not even one application. I do not understand under what authority the Collector proceeded to notify the auction under rule 8(2) without having not even one application. But in this case, admittedly on the date when the information relating to publication was sent, namely, on 13.5.85, there was not even one application. I do not understand under what authority the Collector proceeded to notify the auction under rule 8(2) without having not even one application. As I stated above, there were applications of Batcha Saheb and Periannan by the time the publication had come to be made, it really passes my comprehension as to how the Collector had failed to note that neither of these second respondent in each of the writ petitions ever made applications to the Collector at all. They made applications only to the Director of Industries and Commerce; of course through the Collector. That does not mean the Collector, even if he is empowered, can arrest those applications, take them on the file and grant the lease under rule 10. As to what exactly is the overriding effect of rule 10 , I will consider a little later, 1 am now purely on the scope of rule 8. All that I want to state at this stage is by reading all these rules, it is very clear that when a notice inviting applications for the lease to quarry, anybody can just thrust an application on the authorities concerned, be it the Collector or the Director of Industries and say “grant me the privilege of lease to quarry in the minor mineral.” It is worthwhile to remember that these are all properties of the Government. For aught, one knows that Government may not lease it out. Therefore, factually rule 8(1) postulates a situation for applicator in response to invitation by notification in the Gazette. That has never been done in this case at all. Therefore, I am completely taken by surprise that two applications have been given in these cases when they were called for. Of course, one can well appreciate the anxiety of repatriates from Sri Lanka that to eke out their livelihood they are seeking the privilege. But that does not mean that the Collector who is entrusted with powers under these rules should completely put aside the rules and proceed to grant lease as though he was conferring benefacation. Of course, one can well appreciate the anxiety of repatriates from Sri Lanka that to eke out their livelihood they are seeking the privilege. But that does not mean that the Collector who is entrusted with powers under these rules should completely put aside the rules and proceed to grant lease as though he was conferring benefacation. Coming to rule 10 now even at this stage, what the relevant part of that rule is as follows: "Lease of repatriates from Ceylon and Co-operative Societies: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rules 8 and 9, preference shall be given to application for leases of quarries received from repatriates from ‘Ceylon and any labour co-operative society. The lease amount to be collected from any such repatriates or society shall be an amount equal to the average of the lease amount for the preceding ten years or the average of seigniorage fee specified in rule 8 for the preceding ten years, whichever is higher, in addition to the ordinary assessment.” Of course, the rule starts with a non-obstante clause. But one cannot give greater meaning to non-obstante clause without noting the succeeding words ‘anything to the contrary contained in Rules 8 etc. Therefore, one must endeavour to find out what is the contrary situation contemplated under rule 8. If this is not noted, one is likely to err and that is the error in arguments committed by the learned Government Pleader and the learned Counsel for the second respondent as though the rule has any absolute terms,. It is not so at all, Reliance is also placed by the learned Government Pleader on the decision reported in (i983)2 MLJ.484. A Division Bench of this Court made the following observation: Rule 8-A was introduced subsequently in 1973 and it reads as follows: “8-A. Lease to the industries: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rule 8 the Collector may sanction leases in favour of the applicants who require the mineral for their existing industry or industries or, who are having a district industrial programme to utilise the mineral in their own industry. The lease amount to be collected from any such applicant shall be an amount equal to the average of the lease amount for the preceding three years or the average of seigniorage fee specified in rule 8 for the preceding ten years which is higher, in addition to the ordinary assessment.” That the words ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rules 8 and 9 occurring in rule 10 will govern rule 8-A also, which was introduced subsequent to rule 10, need not be gone into since Mr. P. Chidambaram learned Counsel appearing for the Stone Crusher Owners’ Association, fairly concedes that rule 10 of the Rule will have to be first exhausted and thereafter, the authority must go to rule 8-A and then only rule 8 will come into play. That this is the proper working of the Rules has not been seriously disputed by any of the counsel and in any event, we do not find any other formula which should govern the working of the Rules presented by any of the counsel. Hence, in the scheme of the rules, preference shall be given to application for leases of quarries received from repatriates from Ceylon and any Labour Co-operative Society, under rule 10. If such preference is not feasible, the authority will necessarily have to go to rule 8-A and if rule 8-A is exhausted, rule 8 will come into operation,” I am afraid that this case is not in any manner helpful to the respondents. The situation there is different altogether. Nor again can it be held to be an authority as to what the Collector should do in a case like the one in hand where the Collector had wittingly or unwittingly notified the auction and abandoned the same and in the middle resorted to rule 10. Rule 10 merely talks of preference being given to applications from repatriates from Sri Lanka (though the word is ‘Ceylon’ I would rather call it as Sri Lanka). Then again, the amount to be collected is also mentioned. As to what the Oxford Dictionary says about ‘preference’ is as follows: “Preference n. Liking of or for one thing better than (to or over) another (do this in preference to that), thing one prefers; prior right esp. Then again, the amount to be collected is also mentioned. As to what the Oxford Dictionary says about ‘preference’ is as follows: “Preference n. Liking of or for one thing better than (to or over) another (do this in preference to that), thing one prefers; prior right esp. to receive payment of debts; bond, share, stock, (on which dividend is paid before any is paid on ordinary stock) favouring of one person or country before others in business relations esp. favouring of a country by admitting its products at lower import duty.” Obviously therefore, Sri Lankan repatriate has to be preferred as against somebody. If really the intention, of the rule makers was that Sri Lanka repatriates must straightaway by granted the lease and the power is absolute as is contended by the counsel for the respondents, nothing would be easier than to state so. Their arguments proceeds to completely dilute the very preference. If really as stated above there could be no application except by way of invitation, the stage is one to work out the right of the parties under rule 10. If there were applications in response to invitation under rule 8(1) , at this stage, the preference should be given to Sri Lanka repatriate because thereafter, the question of notifying public auction under rule 8(2) would never arise. This appears to my mind as the harmonious reading of rules 8 and 10. In other words what I mean by this is that in response to invitations two applications were received for the privilege of lease of quarry, one from an Indian citizen and another from Sri Lanka repatriate. Though procedural rule 8(2) will have to be followed that procedure has to be dispensed with by the interposition of rule 10. This is because, rule 10 clearly states… ‘application for leases of quarries received from repatriates’ etc. etc’ Therefore, it is open to Sri Lanka repatriate to apply in response to invitation under rule 8(1) and contend that he shall be given preference. In such a case, there is no scope of auction at all for two reasons: (1) as I stated above, rule 10 interposes itself and (2) the conduct of public auction would be an exercise in futility. It is true, the object of this section is to secure best revenue to the State. In such a case, there is no scope of auction at all for two reasons: (1) as I stated above, rule 10 interposes itself and (2) the conduct of public auction would be an exercise in futility. It is true, the object of this section is to secure best revenue to the State. But here within the framework of rule 10, the question of obtaining such best revenue is circumscribed completely. That rule talking of the amount to be recovered as lease amount again cannot be upheld. It requires to be carefully noted that the object of rule 10 is, notwithstanding the loss of revenue to the State which otherwise could have been auctioned under rule 8(2) to give solace and comfort to those unfortunate repatriates from Sri Lanka who have been obliged to leave their hearth and home and come back to their native soil almost as destitudes facing a desperate situation. Therefore strictly speaking rule 10 does not care about loss of revenue but merely extends a helping hand to these repatriates from Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, the Collector has completely missed all these important things and has not even understood the spirit of these rules. That is the legal position. What about the procedure? The order impugned refers to application dated 16.5.1985 of the respective second respondent in each of the writ petitions. searched the file in vain for these applications addressed to the Collector. There is no such applications addressed to the Collector. There is no such application at all by either of these persons addressed to the Collector. I am totally unable to accept the arguments of the respondents that because the Collector is empowered though the applications are directed to the Director of Industries and Commerce, he can take up the applications on his file. That is an argument borne out of frustration which I have not the slightest hesitation in rejecting. Then it is claimed that there is another application on 3.6.85 to the Collector himself. I have perused the file again carefully. That is not an application in the strict sense of the term. Nor is it in the proper form. it merely reiterates the request made in the app cation dated 16.5.1985; couch of course in an elaborate style. Whatever it is, the order does not refer to these applications dated 3.6.1985. 7. I have perused the file again carefully. That is not an application in the strict sense of the term. Nor is it in the proper form. it merely reiterates the request made in the app cation dated 16.5.1985; couch of course in an elaborate style. Whatever it is, the order does not refer to these applications dated 3.6.1985. 7. Then comes the question as to when the petitioners have filed the applications. It is stated before me in the affidavit filed by members of the Bar that these applications were filed on 7th June, 1985 when the Collector was on camp and therefore, by the time the impugned orders came to be passed, there were yet other applications from the petitioners who are repatriates from Sri Lanka. If really there were two applications in each of the cases from two Sri Lanka repatriates, what should be done, is not even contemplated under rule 10. Therefore, there is possibility of the Collector applying rule 10 in favour of the second respondent in each of these cases. This again shows an important lacuna in the rule. But it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide whether actually the petitioners preferred their applications on 7.6.1985 or later because that would mean an attempt to find out the correctness of the averments made by the advocates who were incharge of filing of the applications of the petitioners when the Collector was on camp. Suffice it to hold that the Collector has misguided himself without following any of the procedures contemplated under the rules. To make it clear even at the risk of repetition, I will have to say that the Collector failed to invite applications by notice in the District Gazette under rule 8(1), and he merely had the applications from the individuals which applications could not have been received. Even assuming they could be received when the publication in the gazette was made on 28.5.85 under rule 8(2), that is wholly unwarranted for reasons stated above. Then again, the power of privilege under rule 10 does not mean an absolute power to be exercised. It must be exercised conjointly. Lastly, I may also note that even till today, there is no cancellation of the Gazette notification dated 25.5.85 though I am informed by the second respondents in each of the cases that they started quarrying operations. Then again, the power of privilege under rule 10 does not mean an absolute power to be exercised. It must be exercised conjointly. Lastly, I may also note that even till today, there is no cancellation of the Gazette notification dated 25.5.85 though I am informed by the second respondents in each of the cases that they started quarrying operations. I may add in the end that inspite of repeated adjournments, the Collector has not chosen to file a counter-affidavit. Of course, this Court would only note its displeasure over the conduct of the Collector in not filing the counter-affidavit and for want of counter-affidavit the cases cannot be kept pending when the records are before me though the course of hearing of these, writ petitions had undergone several adjournments. 8. In the result, these writ petitions will stand allowed with costs. The second respondents in each of the writ petitions are directed to stop their quarrying operations on or before 22.9.1985 by 6 p.m. However, they would be allowed to carry out whatever materials they have hereto quarried. This order should be obeyed punctually, and the Collector shall see to the same. I am awarding costs against the Collector which I fix at Rs.500 as counsel fee one set in both the writ petitions. The costs in another set at Rs.500 should be paid by the second respondent in each the cases. Petitions allowed.