Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in a suit for redemption is the appellant. The question that has been agitated before this Court is whether S.4A(1) (a) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended would apply in the case. The suit was instituted for redemption of a mortgage evidenced by Ext Al dated 16-7-1122. The respondents had been in possession of the property since the date of Ext.B3 lease deed dated 10-2-1094. Ext.B3 mortgage was taken by him in 1094. That mortgage was released under Ext.A3 in 1119 and on the same day Ext.B2 mortgage was executed. On execution of Ext. Al the mortgagee continues to be in possession. On the basis of this transaction the 1st respondent has claimed that he is a deemed tenant falling under S.4A(1) (a) of the Act. That claim was upheld by the lower appellate court. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the requirements of sub-section (1) (a) of S.4A are not satisfied and the respondent cannot therefore be deemed a tenant falling therein. The contention taken up is that the respondent cannot be deemed to have been in continuous possession for 50 years as mortgagee since the mortgage of 1094 had been released under Ext.A3 in 1119 and a fresh mortgage has been executed in favour of the respondent. He sought reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kali Karthiyayani v. Pappu (1980 K L.T. 541) and also referred to Samuel v. Abraham (1975 K.L.T. 372) and Prithi Nath v. Suraj Ahir (A.I.R.1963 S.C.1041) in support of his contentions. The decision in Parameswaran v. Krishnan (1980 K L.T. 280) which has been relied on by the lower court was also sought to be distinguished. 3. Under S.4A(1) (a) of the Act the mortgagee with possession of land shall be deemed to be a tenant if the mortgagee was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. One of the essential requirements of this section is that the mortgagee should have been in actual possession under a subsisting mortgage as on 1-1-1970. He has also to satisfy the requirement of continuous possession for not less than 50 years in the capacity as mortgagee. One of the essential requirements of this section is that the mortgagee should have been in actual possession under a subsisting mortgage as on 1-1-1970. He has also to satisfy the requirement of continuous possession for not less than 50 years in the capacity as mortgagee. This section does not state that the possession should have been under the same mortgage for the entire period. What is required is only possession in the capacity of mortgagee without interruption. The Act itself has been intended for the benefit of persons in continuous possession of land. The section has necessarily to be interpreted liberally in order that the rights of such parties are not defeated. If there had been no interruption in the actual possession of the person holding the land as mortgagee during the period of 50 years and if he continued to be in possession as mortgagee as on 1-1-1970 such a person would squarely fall within the purview of this clause. This position has been clearly stated by the Division Bench in the decision in Parameswaran v. Krishnan (1980 K.L.T. 280). The Court said: "A person who has taken mortgage of the property and who later advances a further amount and takes a fresh mortgage from the same mortgagor adjusting the mortgage amount under the original mortgage, continues as a mortgagee. One sees no reason why such a person should be excluded from the benefit of S.4A. It is difficult to envisage such a situation as falling outside the scheme of S.4A." There can be no material distinction between a mortgagee who on a further advance continues to be in possession and a mortgagee who had already been in possession continues to be in possession after termination of the prior mortgage but on simultaneous execution of a fresh mortgage in his favour. In both cases there is no interruption of the possession nor any change in the character of such possession in the capacity of a mortgagee. The principle stated therein squarely applies on the facts of the present case. 4. In both cases there is no interruption of the possession nor any change in the character of such possession in the capacity of a mortgagee. The principle stated therein squarely applies on the facts of the present case. 4. What has been pointed out by the Full Bench in the decision in Kali Karthiyayani v. Pappu (1980 K.L.T. 541) is that in order to satisfy S.4A the person claiming to be a mortgagee must have been in possession for a period of 50 years or more immediately preceding the date of commencement of the Act and the possession contemplated by S.4A(1) (a) must continue till 1st January, 1970. That proposition cannot be disputed. It has also been stated that in a case where the mortgage money is paid off and the mortgage terminated, subsequent possession is not in the capacity as mortgagee. In the decision in Samuel v. Abraham (1975 K.L.T. 372) also the same principle has been stated pointing out that S.4A gives protection to mortgagees with possession of certain lands by treating them as deemed tenants from 1-1-1970 and that the jural relationship between the mortgagor and the mortgagee implied in the expression "mortgagee with possession" in the section must subsist on the date S.4A came into force. 5. As held by the Supreme Court in the decision in Prithi Nath v. Suraj Ahir (A.I.R.1963 S.C.1041) in the case of usufructuary mortgage with the payment of mortgage money by the mortgagor the mortgage comes to an end and that cannot be said to exist thereafter though the mortgagee has to perform certain acts mentioned in S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The principle that the mortgage comes to an end and does not exist after payment of the mortgage money would be applicable in a case where after such termination no fresh rights as mortgagee are created before 1-1-1970. Where the termination of the earlier mortgage is contemporaneous to the creation of the fresh mortgage without any effective change in the character of possession, the subsequent possession under the fresh mortgage would entitle the mortgagee to tack on the earlier possession as mortgagee for the purpose of computing the period of 50 years required under S.4A(1) (a) of the Act. I am not, therefore, persuaded by the argument that because the 1094 mortgage had been terminated on execution of Ext.A3 release and Ext.B2 mortgage had been taken on fresh terms, the respondent cannot tack on earlier possession for the purpose of claiming the benefit under S.4A of the Act. The mere fact that two documents have been brought into existence apparently terminating one mortgage and creating another without any effective change or interruption in the possession will not disentitle the person claiming the benefits so long as he had been in continuous possession and that possession was only in the capacity of a mortgagee of the land. In this view the court below was right in upholding the claim under S.4A of the Act. 6. It has also been contended that the court below in accepting additional evidence has acted illegally and that vitiates the finding. I see no merit in that contention, when the lower appellate court has admitted the material evidence in exercise of its discretion in compliance with the provisions of Order XLI R.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No other question arises for decision in this appeal. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will no order as to costs. Dismissed.