K. P. MOHAPATRA. J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore affirming the conviction of the petitioner under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (TI. P. C for short ). ( 2 ) THE prosecution case was that the petitioner and six others (acquired by the trial court) entered inside the Ban of P. W. 3, Dinabandhu on 1-4-1973 at 10 a m. in a body, cut and removed a portion of the fence which separated the Ban from a Gram Panchayat fishery tank and damaged vegetable plants and unripe mangoes causing substantial loss to him. When P. W. 3 protested against the highhanded action, he was surrounded and assaulted by the petitioner and 01 hers. P. W. 2, Haramani, his wife arrived there to protest. The petitioner assaulted her on the head by means of a Kata resulting in a bleeding injury. The petitioner and the other accused persons also assaulted their son (P. W. 4), Narahari who arrived at the scene of occurrence. F. I. R. (Ext. 1) was lodged at the police station and after investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner and six others under sections 147, 323 and 426 I. P. C. The defence plea was that there was party faction in the village. The prosecution witnesses belonged to one party and the petitioner and others belonged to the rival party. Therefore, due to previous enmity, a false case was brought against the petitioner and others. ( 3 ) THE trial court did not believe the assault on P. Ws. 3 and 4 and so acquitted six accused persons of all charges. He believed the prosecution case with regard to the assault on P. W. 2, Haramani by the petitioner and convicted the latter under section 324 I. P. C. He sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The learned Sessions Judge, on appeal, while maintaining the conviction, reduced the sentence to a period of two months. ( 4 ) MR. B. N. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following contentions: (1) The prosecution evidence with regard to the assault on P. W. 2 by the petitioner by means of a Kata was discrepant and unbelievable. (2) The trial court disbelieved the prosecution witnesses with regard to assault on P. Ws. ( 4 ) MR. B. N. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following contentions: (1) The prosecution evidence with regard to the assault on P. W. 2 by the petitioner by means of a Kata was discrepant and unbelievable. (2) The trial court disbelieved the prosecution witnesses with regard to assault on P. Ws. 3 and 4 and acquitted six of the accused persons. The self-same evidence should not have been believed in convicting the petitioner. (3) There was a strong party faction in the village. The prosecution witnesses were partisan and interested and so without independent corroboration it was hazardous to accept their evidence as true; and (4) The Investigating Officer, a material witness having not been examined by the prosecution, the petitioner was seriously prejudiced in his defence. ( 5 ) THE courts below were mostly influenced by the evidence of the injured (P. W. 2), Haramani and her husband (P. W. 3), Dinabandhu with regard to the assault by the petitioner on the former by means of a Kata corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 1 the Medical Officer who had examined P. W. 2 and had found an incised wound on the parietal temporal region of her head which could have been caused by a sharp cutting weapon. They did not commit any illegality in appreciating the evidence. They accepted them as witnesses of truth after having closely scrutinised their evidence with due caution and arrived at pure findings of fact. There was also no irregularity in the procedure. The jurisdiction under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code, for short) is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in, the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice (see Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shami Bose and another ). Ordinarily the Court will not disturb the concurrent findings of fact in the absence of the above requisite condition. Therefore, so far as the first three points urged by Mr. B. N. Misra are concerned, they are concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the courts below and are not available to be challenged in this revision. Ordinarily the Court will not disturb the concurrent findings of fact in the absence of the above requisite condition. Therefore, so far as the first three points urged by Mr. B. N. Misra are concerned, they are concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the courts below and are not available to be challenged in this revision. ( 6 ) THE last point of challenge with regard to the serious prejudice that was alleged to have been caused for the defence of the petitioner for non-examination of the investigating officer is a point of law and is worthy of consideration. It appears from order dated 14-5-79 passed by the trial Court that the investigating officer was summoned to appear on 5-7-79. He did not appear on that day despite the fact that wireless message had been sent to him. The order does not disclose that the prosecution applied for adjournment for production of the investigating officer. Therefore, on that day the trial Court passed order adjourning the case to 6-7-79 for recording the statements of the accused. ( 7 ) P. W. 2, Haramani was asked only one question in cross-examination to bring about a contradiction with reference to her statement under section 161 of the Code. The answer translated into English is to the following effect: It is not true that I did not state before the 1. 0. that the accused persons cut down our fence on the southern side upto a length of ten cubit. TI Assuming that the above statement amounted to a contradiction, it was not a material one because, it had no effect on the main theme of the prosecution case relating to assault on the head of P. W. 2, Haramani by the petitioner by means of a Kata. P. W. 3. Dinabandhu was similarly asked one question in relation to his statement under section 161 of the Code. His answer translated into English was to the following effect: It is not true that I did not state before the police that none saw the assault on my wife. Assuming that the witness had stated before the investigating officer that none had seen the assault on P. W. 2, he thereby meant that no outsider had seen such assault. His answer translated into English was to the following effect: It is not true that I did not state before the police that none saw the assault on my wife. Assuming that the witness had stated before the investigating officer that none had seen the assault on P. W. 2, he thereby meant that no outsider had seen such assault. The above statement did not have the effect of a contradiction so far as his own ocular evidence relating to the assault on P. W. 2 by the petitioner was concerned. Therefore, the statement made by this witness did not have the effect of a material contradiction. Questions were also put to P. Ws. 4, 5 and 6 in order to bring out material contradictions with regard to the assault on P. Ws. 2 and 3. Even though their evidence is not taken into consideration, the evidence of the injured (P. W. 2) and her husband (P. W. 3) who were natural witnesses was sufficient to uphold the finding of fact recorded by the learned courts below with regard to the assault by the petitioner on P. W. 2 by means of a Kata, a sharp cutting weapon causing an incised wound on the parietal temporal region. ( 8 ) MR. B. N. Misra, relied on two decisions reported in Narain and Drs. v. State of Punjab, and State v. Bhourilal Agarwala, in support of his contention that the investigating officer was a material witness and it was the duty of the prosecution to examine him. In the case of Narain (supra) it was held as follows: The question then is, was Raghbir a material witness? It is an accepted rule as stated by the Judicial Committee in Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, (A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 289) that witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based, must, of course, be called by the prosecution. It will be seen that the test whether a witness is material for the present purpose is not whether he would have given evidence in support of the defence. The test is whether he is a witness essential to the unfolding of the. , narrative on which the prosecution is basedtt. It will be seen that the test whether a witness is material for the present purpose is not whether he would have given evidence in support of the defence. The test is whether he is a witness essential to the unfolding of the. , narrative on which the prosecution is basedtt. Whether a witness is so essential or not would depend on whether he could speak to any part of the prosecution case or whether the evidence led disclosed that he was so situated that he would have been able to give evidence of the facts on which the prosecution relied. It is not however, that the prosecution is bound to call all witnesses who may have seen the occurrence and so duplicate the evidence. But apart from this, the prosecution should call all material witnesses. It was also held that if a material witness has been deliberately and unfairly kept back, then a serious reflection is cast on the propriety of the trial itself and the validity of the conviction resulting from it may be open to challenge. This court in the case of State v. Bhourilal Agarwala (supra) followed the principle of the Supreme Court decision. The principle laid down is indisputable. In the instant case, however, the investigating officer was not a material witness in the sense that his evidence was not essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution was based and that he could speak to any part of the prosecution case or that his evidence disclosed, that be was so situated that he was able to give evidence on the facts on which the prosecution relied. The learned counsel called him an essential witness for the purpose of proving omissions which, according to him, were material contradictions. But it bas already been discussed above that even if the omissions amounted to contradictions in the statements of P. Ws. 2 and 3, they were not material and on the ratio to the decision in the case of Narain (supra) they did not affect the main theme of the prosecution case which was assault by the petitioner on P. W. 2, Haramani by means of a sharp cutting weapon, Kata which fact was proved by the unimpeachable character of evidence of P. W. 2, the injured herself. ( 9 ) THE next case which was relied on by the learned counsel was Fakirchand v. The State. The Full Bench in the said case condemned non-examination of the Sub-Inspector of Police who was in- charge of investigation. It was held that non-examination of the investigating officer was fatal to the prosecution because, opportunity was denied to the accused for proving omissions and contradictions with reference to the statements of witnesses recorded by the investigating officer under section 161 of the Code. In Ratha Jena v. The State of Orissa this Court referred to a decision reported in Hiriana Shetty v. State of Mysore, and held that it was essential to examine the investigating officer not only to prove material contradictions and omissions but also to prove through him many other essential facts in support of the defence case which might have come to light during investigation. ( 10 ) IT is indisputable as a general proposition that in a case where there are vital contradictions and omissions, the accused shall be seriously prejudiced in his defence. But in a given case, in which the contradictions and omissions sought to be proved through the investigating officer are not material and otherwise the prosecution evidence relating to the offence committed by the accused is clinching and established by cogent and trustworthy evidence and the court is convinced that the accused is not prejudiced in his defence in any manner; in such a case, even if the investigating officer is not examined, the trial and conviction of the accused will not be vitiated. In this particular case, the evidence of P. W. 2, Haramani, the injured and her husband (P. W. 3), Dinabandhu was of a trustworthy character and the omissions were not material so as to discard their testimony. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the concurrent findings of fact upholding the conviction of the petitioner under section 324 I. P. C. cannot be disturbed. ( 11 ) THE occurrence took place in 1973. A period of twelve years has already elapsed. At this point of time it is not expedient to put the petitioner into prison. Interest of justice can be served if he is sentenced to fine. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the revision is dismissed and the conviction of the petitioner under section 324 IPC is upheld. The sentence, however, is modified. At this point of time it is not expedient to put the petitioner into prison. Interest of justice can be served if he is sentenced to fine. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the revision is dismissed and the conviction of the petitioner under section 324 IPC is upheld. The sentence, however, is modified. Instead of substantive term of imprisonment, the petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Revision dismissed.