JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) ON 3-8-1968, Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior granted a stage carriage permit to the petitioner on Shivpuri-Berad route and since then, he is running his vehicle on the said route despite several boutes of litigation at different fori. Lastly, on 8-7-1973, State Transport Appellate Authority (S. T. A. A. for short) passed an order in an appeal preferred by Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short m. P. S. R. T. C.) which is impugned in this petition because the permit granted to the petitioner was set aside finally by the said order. ( 2. ) UNFORTUNATELY, M. P. S. R. T. C. was not an applicant for the route. It was merely an objector and indeed, the objection, which was vocally pressed before the S. T. A. A. below and canvassed once again before me by Mr. Nigudkar, appertains the statutory ritual prescribed under Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act for, short ). Shri Nigudkar forcefully submits that no permit can be granted to any person on any route before taking action under Section 47 (3) of the Act, which prescribed for limiting the number of stage carriages which may be plied on the route. The provision relied on may be extracted : "a Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. " ( 3. ) IN my opinion, the objection is wholly meritless though a number of decisions have been cited in support of the proposition canvassed. On a plain reading of sub-section (3) of Section 47, it appears clear to me that the power to "limit" does not exclude the authority conferred thereunder to delimit or vary the "limit" at any time in any manner coforming albeit to the requirement of sub-section (1) and of property vested right of existing operations on any routes to serve mainly public interest. Indeed, power to alter and modify any order made or passed by any public authority is granted under Sections 14 as well as 21 of the General Clauses Act. Indeed, power to alter and modify any order made or passed by any public authority is granted under Sections 14 as well as 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is not necessary, according to me, to take action under Section 47 (3) every time a permit is granted as the Regional authority is not required to under any representation in acting thereunder. The decision under Section 47 (3) is confined to its own administrative policy and order of the authority :- the limit" once fixed may be altered though not necessarily on the particular decision of granting a permit as there cannot be any change of policy on such occasion. ( 4. ) THREE decisions are cited by Shri Nigudkar to which I may refer immediately. In AIR 1969 SC 1130 ( R. O. Naidu vs. Addl. S. T. A. T. , Madras), the Court observed that an application for stage carriage permit on a route should be entertained after action under Section 47 (3) of the Act was taken to fix the number of stage carriages for which permits were required to be granted. In Jeewan Nath Wahal ( AIR 1970 SC 1704 ), which was relied on by a Full Bench of this Court in Rambharose ( 1975 MPLJ 863 = AIR 1976 MP 71 ), which was also cited by Shri Nigudkar, the Court referred to the scheme of section 48 under which a permit is granted was subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)of Section 47 and, therefore, a "general order" contemplated under Section 47 (3) was pre-requisite for grant of the permit. This Court, in Rambharose (supra) held that the procedure prescribed by Section 47 (3) applies not only to the new routes, but also to the existing routes. ( 5. ) THERE can be no quarrel with the propositions projected in the decisions cited, but the moot point for consideration of this Court in the instant case, is the interpretation of Section 47 (3) mainly of the word "limit", which finds place in sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act The view I have taken is not negatived by the decisions cited by Shri Nigudkar. On the other hand Shri N. K. Shejwalkar has drawn my attention to the decision in M. Chinnaswamy ( AIR 1977 SC 2095 ), which supports the view taken by me. On the other hand Shri N. K. Shejwalkar has drawn my attention to the decision in M. Chinnaswamy ( AIR 1977 SC 2095 ), which supports the view taken by me. Their Lordships, in that case, held that the authority empowered to grant permit, has to direct its attention to the salutary consideration of public interest to be served by allowing a particular number of vehicles on any particular route. In that case, two vehicles had been plying on the same route for 16 years and the Court took the view that to discontinue any vehicle would not serve public interest. ( 6. ) ON facts, in the instant case, the admitted position is that there did exist a "general order" with a feed "limit" or ceiling in respect of the concerned route, as contemplated under Section 47 (3), but the order was revoked and in doing so, there can be no doubt that the competent authority took the view that public interest would be served not by fixed, but by an open ceiling being prescribed for the concerned route. This policy decision could also be changed at any time but the permit in the instant case was granted during its currency. The existing policy was not changed merely for granting the impugned permit. Learned Member, S. T. A. A. misdirected himself in taking the view that a composite order was not contemplated under the law despite the fact that no composite order was at all passed in this case; it was a puerile, futile and faulty finding. The order which was impugned in appeal, was an order of grant of permit simpliciter. However, the S. T. A. A. also took the view that R. T. A. should have first followed the procedure laid down in Section 47 and thereafter, applications could have been invited and grant for permit considered. In taking this view, the S. T. A. A. evidently misread the provision of Section 47 (3) in the context of the factual position obtaining above. There was one "general order", which was revoked and on the date on which the permit was granted to the petitioner, though the ceiling was not fixed yet a ceiling, an open ceiling prescribed because of the revocation. It was not a case of total absence of a ceiling. There was one "general order", which was revoked and on the date on which the permit was granted to the petitioner, though the ceiling was not fixed yet a ceiling, an open ceiling prescribed because of the revocation. It was not a case of total absence of a ceiling. If the "general order" was revoked, under which the number of vehicles was fixed, it tantamounted to taking action under Section 47 (3) itself by considering that public interest was best sub-served by an open ceiling. It was within the power and jurisdiction of the Authority concerned to do so. Another "general order" under Section 47 (3) to order in a fixed ceiling was not necessary. The permit could be granted during the currency of the open ceiling. ( 7. ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order Annexure e, passed on 9-7-1973, by the State Transport Appellate Authority, is quashed. However, in facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.