Judgment :- 1. The legal representatives of the original first defendant are the appellants. The suit was filed by the respondent herein for ejectment. The suit property is described in the schedule to the plaint as a vacant site measuring 210 ft. east-west and 65 ft. north-south in door No. 276 situate within Tuticorin Municipal limits. There is no dispute that the plaintiff is the owner of this vacant site. Some time in July 1949 this vacant site was leased to one Subramania Pillai, the husband of the first defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 45. It is stated that the said Subramania Pillai started an automobile workshop and later a rice mill in the property leased out by putting up some sheds and later installing certain machinery. That there are certain superstructures now existing on the property in respect of which there are also municipal assessments to property tax right from 1952-1953 is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff, neither put up those superstructures nor was it entitled to the same. The further case of the plaintiff is that Subramania Pillai continued to be a tenant till 23rd March, 1960 and on that date, under Ex. A14 a fresh tenancy agreement was executed in favour of his wife the first defendant in respect of the vacant site for a rent of Rs. 75 per month. The suit has been filed after terminating the tenancy, for ejectment and recovery of possession. The first defendant contended that she was the owner of the superstructure right from 1952-1953 and that she was entitled to the protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1922). She also filed I.A. 99 of 1975 under S. 9 of the said Act for a direction to the plaintiff to sell the property. The suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned District Munsif and I.A. 99 of 1975 was ordered directing the sale of the suit property to the first defendant for a sum of Rs. 50,451 which is the compensation fixed under S. 9 of the said Act. The suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned District Munsif and I.A. 99 of 1975 was ordered directing the sale of the suit property to the first defendant for a sum of Rs. 50,451 which is the compensation fixed under S. 9 of the said Act. On appeal, however, the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, held that the first defendant was not entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act on the ground that she was not a tenant entitled to compensation under S. 3. 2. Before we go into the question whether S. 3 is applicable, it is necessary to consider the question as to who is the owner of the superstructure. As already stated, the plaintiff never claimed to be the owner of the ( sic ) superstructure of the property. Subramania Pillai, husband of the first defendant, gave evidence as D.W. 1 and stated that he had sold the property even in the year 1952 to the first defendant. No sale deed has been produced. However, what is important is that the said Subramania Pillai did not claim any title to the property and accepted the title of the first defendant to the superstructure. It is not clear as to how the first defendant became the owner of the property. She has not made any specific claim as to how she became the owner In the written statement, but the evidence produced in this case discloses that there were entries in the account books relating to the year 1952-1953, which are marked as Exs. A15 and A17, that the superstructure of the value of Rs. 18,859-9-9 was given as a gift to the first defendant. Similarly, we have Exs. B1 to B6, marked in this case, which show that the property tax assessment in respect of the super-structure was in the name of the first defendant right from 1952-1953, assessment year, that the property tax had been paid by the first defendant, and that the licence fee in respect of the business carried on thereon, the profession tax, the Income tax assessment, the Commercial taxes assessments were all in the name of the first defendant. All these unimpeachable evidence produced by the first defendant had been held to be not enough to prove the claim of title to the property by the lower appellate Court only on the ground that there is no registered deed of gift produced in this case and that the first defendant had not specifically mentioned in the written statement that she derived title to the property by gift from her husband. I am of the view that this is a wrong approach. When she is admittedly in possession of the property and had produced all evidence of enjoyment in her own right carrying on business and paying income tax, profession tax, and other taxes and when the one and the only person who could claim ownership to the property, namely, her husband, had not denied her title and in fact specifically admitted her title to the property, the finding of the lower appellate Court that she had not established her title to the property, to say the least, is perverse. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that there is overwhelming unimpeachable evidence to show that the first defendant had become the owner of the property and has been asserting her title as such owner from 1952-1953 onwards. In fact the plaintiffs getting a rental agreement executed in its favour by the first defendant on 23rd February, 1960 in respect of the site alone clearly established the admission by the plaintiff of the title to the super-structure in favour of the first defendant. I have, therefore, no doubt that the first defendant had established her title to the superstructure on the day when Ex. A14 rental agreement was executed by her. 3. For the purpose of finding out the applicability of S. 3 of the Act, I will proceed on the assumption, though the first defendant had all along been contending that she had been a tenant right from 1952-1953, and the rental agreement executed in March, 1960 is only a renewal of the tenancy already existing, that her husband was a tenant of the site under the plaintiff till 23rd March, 1960 when the first defendant became a tenant directly under the plaintiff-landlord. Thus it is a case where a person who is already the owner of the building getting a lease deed of the site from the owner. Thus it is a case where a person who is already the owner of the building getting a lease deed of the site from the owner. S. 3 of the City Tenants Protection Act reads as follows:— “ Fayment of compensation on ejectment :—Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as compensation, the value of any building, which may have been erected by him, by any of his predecessors-in-interest or by any person not in occupation at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either of them and, for which compensation has not already been paid. A tenant who is entitled to compensation for the value of any building shall also be paid the value of trees which may have been planted by him on the land (and of any improvements which may have been made by him.)” The third clause, namely, by any person not in occupation at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either of them, is not applicable to this case, because, the tenant in this case is in occuption at the time of the ejectment. The first defendant is a tenant could not be disputed, firstly for the reason that there is a tenancy agreement and she will clearly come within the definition of ‘tenant’ in S. 4(4)(i). Therefore, she will be entitled to be paid as compensation the value of the building which may have been erected by her or by any of her predecessors-in-interest. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the phrase ‘by any of his predecessors-in-interest’ should be understood as implying that not merely the tenant had inherited or derived title to the building from the tenant who had put up a superstructure but to a case where he had inherited both the tenancy right as also the title to the super-structure. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The tenant who had put up the superstructure may deal with the tenancy separately and the building separately. I am unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The tenant who had put up the superstructure may deal with the tenancy separately and the building separately. If he had sold the building alone and retained the tenancy right in respect of the site and if subsequent to the acquisition of the ownership in respect of the building, the person who had acquired that interest later on gets the tenancy right also in his favour directly from the landlord, he would also be considered as a person who is entitled to be paid the value of the building because he is a tenant within the meaning of S. 2(4)(i) and the building had been erected by his predecessors-in-interest. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the first defendant would be entitled to claim the benefits under S. 3. A similar case came up for consideration in the decision reported in Devaraja Gramani v. Murugesan 1. In that case also a lessee of a vacant site erected a superstructure thereon and thereafter sold the superstructure to another, without, however, assigning the tenancy. Subsequently the purchaser attorned to the lessor and thereafter began to pay rent to the lessor for the land alone. It was held that the purchaser would be entitled to claim the benefit of S. 9. The learned Judge further held that there was no reason for limiting the scope of the phrase ‘predecessors-in-interest’ to a case where the assignment was of both the tenancy and also the superstructure. Giving the full meaning to the words ‘predecessors-in-interest’ it was held that S. 3 would apply even to an assignee of the superstructure alone when he is able to get a tenancy of the land from the landlord. There could, therefore, be no doubt that the first defendant in this case was entitled to claim the benefit of S. 3 and, therefore, entitled to file the application under S. 9 for purchase of the property. Pending the appeal before the lower appellate Court, the first defendant died and the appellants herein were brought on record as the legal representatives. As legal reprsentatives, they are also, therefore, entitled to claim the benefits of S. 9. The appeal and the C.R.P. are allowed and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court are set aside and the decree and judgment of the trial Court are restored. As legal reprsentatives, they are also, therefore, entitled to claim the benefits of S. 9. The appeal and the C.R.P. are allowed and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court are set aside and the decree and judgment of the trial Court are restored. The appellants are allowed to pay the value of Rs. 50,451 fixed in monthly instalments at the rate Rs. 4000 per month and the last instalment being whatever the balance out of Rs. 4000, the first of such instalment shall be paid on or before the 7th January, 1986 and every subsequent instalment on or before the 7th of succeeding months. If any amount had already been deposited as per the trial courts decree, that will be given credit to However, the instalments of Rs. 4,000 would continue as stated above to clear the balance if any. There will be no order as to costs both in the second appeal and the civil revision petition.