ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J. l. Shri Asbok Velankar has appeared in support of the petition to press the prayer for taking action against First Civil Judge, class I, Gwalior (Shri D.N. Joshi) in exercise of our powers to punish him for contempt to Court. 2. The petitioner figures as the plaintiff in the suit which was being tried by Shri Joshi. In the course of trial, on 5-7-1985, the impugned order was passed by the learned Civil Judge. By this order, the trial Court directed the plaint to be returned upon holding that section 80 (2) CPC mandated such a course. That this order has not been challenged on merits is admitted by Shri Velankar, who has, therefore forcefully voiced apparently not petitioner's but counsel's grievance. It is submitted that the rulings cited by him were not considered by the Court. Shri Velankar, while the judgment is being dictated, stands up to submit that it was not his grievance but it was a public duty that he was discharging Whatever that may be, the fact of the matter is that counsel alleges having cited certain decisions and those do not find any mention in the impugned order. Shri Velankar submits that a 'written argument' was filed and all rulings were mentioned in the written arguments but there is no reference in the impugned order even of the 'written arguments'. 3. To press his prayer for action against the Presiding Officer of the Court below for passing the impugned order, without referring to the cases cited, Shri Velankar insists that we must hear him. Though we have not an iota of doubt in our mind that this petition is wholly misconceived, we are taken by Shri Velaltkar to para 7 of the judgment in Fazlunbi v. K. Khadervali [ AIR 1980 SC 1730 ], wherein their Lordships deprecated the tendency of subordinate Courts to distinguish decisions on facts closing eyes to the ratio of the decision, which was binding on them. Similar observations, indeed more potent and portent, appear in Baradkanta Mishra v. Registrar Orrisa High Court [ AIR 1974 SC 710 ], in para 45, to which our attention is also drawn. Counsel prays that he may be allowed to read two lines there from. Similar observations, indeed more potent and portent, appear in Baradkanta Mishra v. Registrar Orrisa High Court [ AIR 1974 SC 710 ], in para 45, to which our attention is also drawn. Counsel prays that he may be allowed to read two lines there from. We, however, extract the whole paragraph: "In a country which has a hierarchy of Courts one above the other it is, usual to find that the one which is above is etrusted with disciplinary control over the one below it. Such control is devised with a view to ensure the lower Court functions properly in its judicial administration. A judge can foul judicial administration by misdemeanours while engaged in the exercise of the functions of a Judge. It is therefore as important for the superior Court to be vigilant about the conduct and behavior of the subordinate Judge as a judge, as it is to administer the law, because both functions are essential for administration of justice. The judge of the superior Court in whom this disciplinary control is vested functions as much as a judge in such matters as when he hears and disposes of cases before him. The procedures may be different. The place where he sits may be different. But the powers are exercised in both instances in due course of judicial administration. If Superior Courts neglect to discipline subordinate Courts, they will fail in an essential function of judicial administration and bring the whole administration of justice into contempt and disrepute. The mere function of adjudication between parties is not the whole of administration of justice for any Court. It is important to remember that disciplinary control is vested in the Court and not in a judge as a private individual. Control, therefore, is a function as conducive to proper administration of justice as laying own the law or doing justice between the parties. " 4. Our attention is also drawn to a decision of a learned Single Judge reported in Banarasilal v. Neelam [AIR 1969 Delhi 304] particularly to the following few lines which appeared in para 9 of the judgment: “.... No judiciary can function with the requisite efficiency in a set up like ours unless there is strong, efficient, conscientious and independent Bar and a weak, inefficient and unconscientious Bar is a somewhat ineffective corrective to an erring Court." 5. No judiciary can function with the requisite efficiency in a set up like ours unless there is strong, efficient, conscientious and independent Bar and a weak, inefficient and unconscientious Bar is a somewhat ineffective corrective to an erring Court." 5. We have surveyed the authorities cited and given our anxious consideration to all submissions made by Shri Velankar. We accept his forceful submission, in support of which Banarasilal was cited, that independence of the Bar has to be respected. We are in re8pectful agreement with the view expressed by Dua, C.J. (as his Lordship then was) in accepting counsel's contention that sitting at the highest seat of justice in the State, we should encourage a strong Bar to grow and behave independently and efficiently. We are alert to our duty in this regard. But in discharging this duty, we must also bear in mind that an independent Bar should also behave with a sense of responsibility to the system; it should also be alert to its own duty of upholding the independence and dignity of the Judiciary. Bar and the Bench are equally partners engaged in the process of just dispensation of justice, which must be attuned to the societal need of the hour if the system has to survive. On both sides, the same motivation must, therefore, reign supremely. Bonafide lapses on either side are always excusable. Indeed forums exist in law for people who are aggrieved by any act or omission of any branch of the Court system to ventilate their grievances. 6. The law of contempt has one crucial aspect which is of paramount consideration. No body has any right to impede the due process of administration of justice and it is the duty of Courts to safeguard this "public interest". Indeed, the whole law of contempt revolves around this basic concept. We have not an iota of doubt that mere omission to refer in its judgment by any Court, any decision cited by any counsel in the course of arguments, unless ex facie the order manifests malice, would not, per se, be contemptuous disregard of due process of law. The decision rendered without consideration of the case-law cited may be erroneous on Jaw and for that the aggrieved party would not be remedy-less. The decision rendered without consideration of the case-law cited may be erroneous on Jaw and for that the aggrieved party would not be remedy-less. However, if that is done deliberately, with a malicious intention, to impede the process of due administration of justice, the person resorting to such an act, may he be the Presiding Officer of the Court, would render himself liable to face a charge of contempt of Court. This proposition, according to us, is not negatived by the decisions which counsel his cited and we have referred above in our order. The Courts have to act under several constraints but importantly, they cannot ignore societal compulsions which bear the impress of the Directive Principles and in here Constitutional values. Cry of the day is for dispensation of quick justice Courts' dockets are over-crowed; they are not required to fritter away and squander judicial energy, man-power and time, dealing with trivial pleas, in unnecessary detail. 7. On facts, in the instant case, no malice on the part of Shri Joshi is pleaded. The only grievance is that decisions cited have not been referred in judgment. We cannot be oblivious of that aspect of judicial process which is invisible. A judicial mind, trained to work judicially reacts judicially to all fact-situations. Even if decisions cited are not referred in any case, if considerations having a bearing thereon are not ignored, the Court cann0t be faulted. No malice, whether in law or on facts, can be attributed to the officer who presided over the Court and rendered his decision in the case in a judicial manner, without any bias. 8. When we have reached this stage of the judgment, Shri Velankar has again stood up and requested us to have it noted in the judgment that he had filed written arguments in this matter also, in this Court. In our opinion, written arguments have little value when the counsel is heard on merits at length; it is not necessary, according to us, to deal with those in detail merely to enlarge the corpus of this judgment because the points taken therein have been borne in mind by us. 9. Before parting with the records, we are constrained to observe that the superior judiciary has a constitutional duty to ensure proper working of the Court system by upholding the independents of the subordinate judiciary. 9. Before parting with the records, we are constrained to observe that the superior judiciary has a constitutional duty to ensure proper working of the Court system by upholding the independents of the subordinate judiciary. The facts of the case, according to us, manifestly disclose the position that the petitioner is not pursuing this petition bona fide. The petitioner-plaintiff has not appealed and the remedy which was available to him against the impugned order to challange the merits of the matter has been deliberately avoided to pursue merely a vindicative course. According to us, any attempt to pooh-pooh or brow• beat any judicial officer cannot be allowed to succeed under any circumstances. 10. In the result, we find no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed in limine. Later: 11. After the judgment is pronounced, Shri Velankar stood up and made a prayer for leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. We have to regretfully refuse the prayer because no ground exists to entertain the prayer. We are firmly of the opinion that no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case which has to be decided by the Supreme Court.