JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - In this appeal, the Appellant has challenged the order passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur convicting him u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and u/s 409 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'I.P.C.') and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months more for the earlier offence and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the latter offence with a further direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The facts leading to the prosecution case which are mostly undisputed are stated in brief. The Appellant was serving as an Agriculture Sub-Overseer under the State Government and was posted at Bargarh. On 31-3-1975, he took charge of the stock and store of oil seeds kept in the godown from his predecssor Kulamani Misra. P.W. 4, the District Agriculture Officer ('D.A.O.' in short) passed an order (Ext. 16/1) on the application of one Dakhila Padhan (Ext. 16) for sale of mustard seeds kept in the godown under the charge of the Appellant. Dakhila Padhan purchased only 2 quintals of the stock and gave Ext. 3 in writing declining to purchase the remaining stock of 35 quintals of mustard seeds valued at Rs. 6,300/-. Thereafter, P.W. 4 by order (Ext. 4/1) directed the aforesaid stock to be sold by public auction. Accordingly, notice (Ext. 5) was issued fixing 18-6-1976 as the date of auction of 35 quintals of mustard seeds. On 18-6-1976, P.W. 3, the Agriculture Supervisor, P.W. 5, the Assistant District Agriculture Officer accompanied by the Appellant and two intending bidders (p. ws. 7 and 8) came to the godown for verification of the stock. The Appellant opened the godown doors and it was found that there was no stock of 35 quintals of mustard seeds. The fact of missing of 35 quintals of oil seeds from the godown was reported to P.W. 4 who called for an explanation of the Appellant. The Appellant submitted the explanation (Ext. 10) on consideration of which by two orders (Exts. 11/2 and 11/1) dated 9-9-1976, P.W. 4 directed recovery of the entire cost of 35 quintals of oil seeds at the rate of Rs. 180/- per quintal from the Appellant. The Appellant submitted the explanation (Ext. 10) on consideration of which by two orders (Exts. 11/2 and 11/1) dated 9-9-1976, P.W. 4 directed recovery of the entire cost of 35 quintals of oil seeds at the rate of Rs. 180/- per quintal from the Appellant. In accordance with the aforesaid orders, some amounts were recovered from the Appellant evidenced by receipts (Ext. 14 series). The Investigating Officer (P.W. 9) came to know the aforesaid facts and submitted a written report on 16-12-1976 (Ext. 21) which was treated as F.I.R. (Ext. 21/2). After close of investigation, he submitted charge-sheet against the Appellant. 3. The Appellant admitted that he was in charge of the oil seeds godown set Bargarh and was entrusted with 35 quintal a of mustard seeds. His specific defence as is apparent from his explanation (Ext. 10) was that Dakhila Padhan purchased only 2 quintals of mustard seeds and did not purchase the balance, because, the mustard seeds were mixed with foreign materials and were attacked by pests. They were discoloured and had deteriorated. In order to save the balance stock from further deterioration, he cleaned the stock and found only 13 quintals of mustard seeds in disposable condition. So he disposed of the same to a person of Bargarh. He offered to deposit the cost of 13 quintals of mustard seeds and further prayed for being excused for not obtaining the prior orders of the D.A.O. 4. The learned trial Judge on the facts admitted by the Appellant came to hold that the entrustment and criminal breach of trust were proved. He did not at all consider the Appellant's defence supported by documentary evidence. 5. Mr. Palit, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant urged that the explanation offered by the Appellant in Ext. 10 was found by P.W. 4, the D.A.O. as satisfactory. But in order to recoup the pecuniary loss to Government, he directed recovery of the cost of 35 quintals of mustard seeds at the rate of Rs. 180/- per quintal from the Appellant. Accordingly, recovery of specific amounts were made from the Appellant evidenced by Ext. 14 series. According to him, therefore, the criminal charges brought against the Appellant were not sustainable, although, disciplinary action could be taken against the Appellant. 6. 180/- per quintal from the Appellant. Accordingly, recovery of specific amounts were made from the Appellant evidenced by Ext. 14 series. According to him, therefore, the criminal charges brought against the Appellant were not sustainable, although, disciplinary action could be taken against the Appellant. 6. In order to establish its case against the Appellant for offences u/s 5(1)(c) of the Act and u/s 409, I.P.C., the prosecution must prove entrustment and dominion over the property, as well as, dishonest and fraudulent misappropriation of the same or its conversion for his own use. The ingredients of the offences u/s 5(1)(c) of the Act and u/s 409, I.P.C. are identical. In the instant case, the first part of the offence, namely, entrustment of 35 quintals of mustard seeds to the Appellant was not only proved, but also, was specifically admitted by the Appellant himself in his statement u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another Vs. The State of Bombay it was held as follows: The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach or an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where be is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made. Relying upon the aforesaid observation it was held in Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 43 (1977) C.L.T. (S.C.) thus: Having regard to the stand taken by the parties, the matter lies within a very narrow compass. So far as the entrustment of Rs. 10,000/- is concerned that it undoubtedly admitted by the Appellant, and the only explanation given by him is that he had returned the money to the Nazir after his return from the village Balichandrapur and he had also directed the Nazir not to deposit the money in the treasury. So far as the entrustment of Rs. 10,000/- is concerned that it undoubtedly admitted by the Appellant, and the only explanation given by him is that he had returned the money to the Nazir after his return from the village Balichandrapur and he had also directed the Nazir not to deposit the money in the treasury. If once the explanation of the accused is disbelieved, or proved to be absolutely false, then it is quite natural that he must be presumed to have retained the money with himself for a period of six months. Although the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused, yet where the entrustment is proved or admitted it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove the actual mode or manner of misappropriation and in such a case the prosecution would have to rely largely on the truth or the falsity of the explanation given by the accused. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement, it is now to be considered by preponderance of probabilities as disclosed by the prosecution evidence as to whether the explanation given by the Appellant was true or false. If it would appear that the explanation was true, reasonable or justifiable, then the Appellant can not be convicted of misappropriation or criminal breach of trust. If on the other hand, the explanation offered by him is found to be false, unreasonable or unjustifiable, then the second part of the offences i.e., misappropriation or criminal breach of trust with dishonest intent may be readily inferred. 7. The Appellant took charge or mustard seeds on 31-3-1975. Dakhila Padhan by Ext. 16 applied for purchase or the stock or old mustard seeds at the rate of Rs. 180/- per quintal. The D.A.O. approved the proposal by orders (Exts. 16/1 and 15/2). It is undisputed that Dakhila Padhan purchased only 2 quintals of the stock and declined to purchase the balance by his application (Ext. 3) dated 24-1-1976. He stated therein that the price or mustard seeds had come down and so it was not possible on his part to purchase the balance stock which could be sold to others. The Appellant by his endorsement (Ext. 3/1) submitted Ext. 3 to the D.A.O. who by order (Ext. 4/1) directed that the balance stock of mustard seeds should be sold by public auction. The Appellant by his endorsement (Ext. 3/1) submitted Ext. 3 to the D.A.O. who by order (Ext. 4/1) directed that the balance stock of mustard seeds should be sold by public auction. It is further not in dispute that 18-6-1976 was fixed for the public auction and on that day the balance stock or mustard seeds was round missing in the godown. In his explanation (Ext.10), the appellate stated that Dakhila Padhan declined to purchase the balance stock because of deterioration, discoloration and presence or foreign materials in the stock of mustard seeds which had become infested by pests. Therefore, he cleaned the same and round only 13 quintals of clean mustard seeds which was sold to a person. It is to be noted that he took charge of the stock of mustard seeds more than a year prior to the date of auction. Ext. 2, the stock register shows that mustard seeds had been procured in the month of April, 1975. So during the course of storage of more than one year, it was not unlikely or impossible that the stock had deteriorated as stated in the explanation. So the Appellant appeared to have exercised his discretion for cleaning the stock and sale of 13 quintals of mustard seeds so as to avoid total loss to Government. The only laches, Day irregularity that appears to have been committed was that the Appellant did not report the fact of deterioration and the further action of cleaning and sale of the stock to his immediate superior, P.W. 4. But, because he did not do so, which could be due to lack of foresight, knowledge of his job and/or inefficiency, his intention was neither disclosed to be dishonest nor did his action amount to misappropriation or criminal breach of trust. For laches or for committing irregularities, he could be proceeded departmentally and as a matter of fact it was done and orders (Exts.11/2 and 11/1) were passed on 9-9-1976 by P.W. 4 to recover the entire cost of 35 quintals of mustard seeds at the rate of Rs. 180/- per quintal. In pursuance of the orders, recoveries have been made from him as evidenced by receipts (Ext.14 series). The explanation offered by the Appellant obviously did not fully satisfy P.W. 4, but considered along with other facts and circumstances, it does not appear to be false, unreasonable or unjustifiable. 180/- per quintal. In pursuance of the orders, recoveries have been made from him as evidenced by receipts (Ext.14 series). The explanation offered by the Appellant obviously did not fully satisfy P.W. 4, but considered along with other facts and circumstances, it does not appear to be false, unreasonable or unjustifiable. Once the above conclusion is arrived at, it cannot be held that the offences of misappropriation or criminal breach of trust have been brought home to the Appellant. It is necessary to remember that an accused is not required to prove his defence to the hilt. If his defence is probable, then normally the Court should accept it so as to hold that because of probability of the version of the accused, doubt has been thrown to the prosecution case, which cannot be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. In support of the above proposition, I quote the following from Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 43 (1977) C.L.T. (S.C.), (supra): ...The Evidence Act does not contemplate that the accused should prove his case with the same strictness and rigour as the prosecution is required to prove a criminal charge. In fact, from the cardinal principles referred to above, it follows that, it is sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he succeeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the mode or proof, by standard of benefit of doubt, is not applicable to the accused, where he is called upon to prove his case or to prove the exceptions of the Indian Penal Code on which he seeks to rely. It is sufficient for the defence to give a version which competes in probability with the prosecution version, for that would be sufficient to throw suspicion on the prosecution case entailing its rejection by the Court. Also see Harbhajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, and State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup and Another, . 8. Fur the reasons aforesaid, the explanation of the Appellant appears to be true, reasonable and justifiable. Also see Harbhajan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, and State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup and Another, . 8. Fur the reasons aforesaid, the explanation of the Appellant appears to be true, reasonable and justifiable. The elements of misappropriation or criminal breach of trust have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Appellant is entitled to an acquittal. It is, however, made clear that the authorities are free to proceed against the Appellant departmentally if they are so advised. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of conviction and sentence is set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of the charges. His bail bond is cancelled. Final Result : Allowed