JUDGMENT : R.M. Sahai, J. Entertaining doubt about correctness of observation made in Savitri Devi v. Shobran Singh 1979 ARC 398 that an application for release of a building under Act XIII of 1972 could be allowed even though it was filed when Act was not applicable but became applicable during pendency of application as Supreme Court in Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and Another, (1976) 1 SCC 194 had observed that the right to relief must be judged to exist on the date a suitor instituted a legal proceeding a learned Single Judge of this Court referred this tenant's petition for hearing and decision by a larger bench as to whether the two authorities were justified in entertaining and allowing the application for release filed u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act) although the Act had not become applicable to the premises on the date when application was presented. Reference was made also as certain observations in Ram Nath Export Ltd. v. Addl District Judge, Allahabad 1984 ARC 397 on Rule 16, framed under the Act ran contrary to Smt. Chandra Devi v. XII Addl. District Judge 1983 CJ 627. As entree petition was being referred the learned Judge was of opinion that one of the pertinent question that arose for consideration was whether a tenant was entitled to invoke equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution specially when he did not bake by the terms agreed and was not prepared to deliver back possession to the landlord after expiry of the term. No arguments, however, were heard on Rule 16 because if the answer to the first question is in affirmative and it is held that application was not maintainable then the decision on Rule 16 would have been obiter dicta only. 2. For deciding the controversy regarding maintainability of application suffice it to mention that house in dispute was constructed in 1971 the application for release u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act was filed in July, 1980. The building, therefore, had not completed ten years, from the date of its construction, when the application was presented. 2. For deciding the controversy regarding maintainability of application suffice it to mention that house in dispute was constructed in 1971 the application for release u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act was filed in July, 1980. The building, therefore, had not completed ten years, from the date of its construction, when the application was presented. Thai; the application was not maintainable could not be seriously disputed as, Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act provides that, 'except as provided in Sub-section (5) of Section 12, Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Section 24-A, 24-B, and 24-C or Sub-section (3) of Section 29 nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years on the date on which its construction was completed.' It is not necessary to mention about the proviso or explanation 1 and 2 of this sub-section, as they are not very material for controversy in question. A bare reading of this sub-section indicates that barring the circumstances mentioned in it the Act does not apply to a building which had not completed ten years from the date of its construction, And the bar appears to be absolute. The language of the Section, its setting and objective all support the same conclusion. The Legislature while restricting and regulating, letting and rent of buildings situated in urban area has been keen to grant ten years exemption to provide impetus for building activity except where landlord or tenant has to vacate the accommodation in his possession either because the building was needed by the government or because the tenant had been directed to be evicted on application of landlord u/s 21. The sub-section, therefore, while exempting buildings from operation of the Act if it had not completed ten years created another exception in respect of those buildings, which were covered by various sections mentioned therein. It eliminates any scope for argument that the Act by virtue of section 1 applies to all buildings. Section 1 of the Act only extends the provisions of Act to every city, municipality, notified area, town area etc. But even there the Legislature left the option to State Government to exclude any area from applicability of the Act by issuing a notification to that effect. But from these areas that is, the Municipality, town area etc. the Legislature itself excluded certain buildings. But even there the Legislature left the option to State Government to exclude any area from applicability of the Act by issuing a notification to that effect. But from these areas that is, the Municipality, town area etc. the Legislature itself excluded certain buildings. In other words although the fact applies to the area where building might be situated but if a building is of the category mentioned in Section 2 then it stands excluded from operation of the Act. 3. It is an act which regulates letting and eviction of and from a building. They are dealt by Chapter III and IV of the Act. Section 11 prohibits letting of any building except in pursuance of allotment order, Section 12 raises presumption of vacancy of building in circumstances contemplated therein, Section 13 debars any person from occupying any building except on allotment order, Section 14 provides for regularisation of occupation by a tenant or licence of a building, Section 15 obliges a landlord or tenant to intimate the District Magistrate about vacancy of a building, Section 16 provides for allotment and release of vacant building. Similarly Section 20 provides for eviction of a tenant from a building in contingencies enumerated therein. Section 21 confers right on the landlord to move an application before Prescribed Authority to evict a tenant if the building was either bonafide required by him or it was dilapidated and needed reconstruction. It is thus clear that regulation of letting or eviction is contemplated in the Act in relation to a building. And if a building has not completed ten years from the date of its construction and stands excluded from operation of the Act then obviously the provision for filing an application u/s 21 for release also stands excluded. To put it differently a landlord has no right to file an application u/s 21 for release either under Clause (a) or (b) in respect of building which has not come within purview of the Act because of application of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. 4. A tenant u/s 21 could be evicted on an application of the landlord if he was satisfied that the building was bonafide required or it was in dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction. 4. A tenant u/s 21 could be evicted on an application of the landlord if he was satisfied that the building was bonafide required or it was in dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction. It the building itself stood excluded from operation of the Act (here could not be deemed to be a Prescribed Authority for it who could entertain the application or on application of landlord record his satisfaction. Filing of application before Prescribed Authority of an area to which Act extends in respect of at building which is outside its purview is not a pre-mature application but a futile exercise incapable of setting the machinery in motion which could finally result in recording of satisfaction by the Prescribed Authority as contemplated In Section 21. The entire process beginning from presentation of an application lo manner provided under rule specifying the grounds for eviction etc. and its allowing or rejection is linked with cause of action Accruing in favour of landlord on the date when application is presented. If the provisions of Act do not apply then there is no ground available to a landlord which be could specify in the application. An application u/s 21 is presented u/s 21(1)(a) or (b) only, 'if the building is bonafide required in its existing form or after demolition and construction by the landlord for reoccupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and reconstruction. Therefore, when an application is presented the landlord has to show that the building is needed by him. And this need must exist on the date of presentation of application. That is the cause of action must have arisen on the date when application is presented. If the Act did not apply the grounds which could famish cause of action for i presenting of application were non-existent as such the application could not 1 have been presented. 5. And this need must exist on the date of presentation of application. That is the cause of action must have arisen on the date when application is presented. If the Act did not apply the grounds which could famish cause of action for i presenting of application were non-existent as such the application could not 1 have been presented. 5. Realising the difficulty in which he was in, the learned Counsel fell back on Section 21 and urged that even if the application was filed before the building completed ten years from the date of construction and it was not maintainable, it could not be thrown out or rejected on the date it matured forbearing namely, 23rd April, 1983 when it vas allowed by Prescribed Authority as the Act became applicable from 1981, therefore, the Prescribed Authority did not commit any error in taking notice of subsequent event. It was also urged that filing of application was a matter of procedure only. And that was not altered or effected so long cause of action had not changed. Reliance was placed on Vifteet Kumar v. Mangat Jain 1984 ALI 102 : 1984 AWC 128 and Radhey Shyam v. District Judge 1982 ARC 462 and it was urged that on ratio laid down in that case the application was rightly allowed as the building completed ten years during pendency of the application. None of these submissions appear to have any merit. In Vineet Kumar's case (supra) the Hon'ble court was construing Sections 39 and 40 of the Act which specifically provide that even if during pendency of suit for eviction the provision of Act become applicable the tenant shall be entitled to certain benefit. In absence of similar provision express or implied the application could not be held to have become maintainable by the building completing ten years during pendency of the application. In fact these sections are more concerned, with relief. Nor is there any merit in submission that filing of application was a matter of procedure only. It was exercise of substantive right and if could not be exercised on the date it was purported to have been exercised because there was no cause of action then it was non est. That which was dead from its Inception could not be revived or resuscitated. Life could be injected in living and not in life less. 6. It was exercise of substantive right and if could not be exercised on the date it was purported to have been exercised because there was no cause of action then it was non est. That which was dead from its Inception could not be revived or resuscitated. Life could be injected in living and not in life less. 6. Reliance was placed on Janardan Reddy and Others Vs. The State of Hyderabad and Others, AIR 1951 SC 217 and it was urged that action of Prescribed Authority in entertaining application might have been without jurisdiction but if an action with out jurisdiction could be correct in appeal as appeal ties against orders with or without jurisdiction then the application became maintainable once the act became applicable. The Supreme Court in different context had observed: It is well settled that if a Court acts without jurisdiction its decision can be challenged if it had acted without jurisdiction, an appeal would lie to the Court to which it would lie if its order was without jurisdiction. It has no application to the problem with arises for consideration in this petition. The decision which can be said to be on point is P. Venkatesfwarlu v. Motot and General Traders AIR 1975 SG 1409, It was held: It is basic to our procedural jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to rilief or the manner of moulding it brought diligently to the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stiltify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies binding The rules of procedure where no specific provision or fair play is violated with a view to promote substantial justice......We affirm the proposition that for making right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful in accordance with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of proceedings provided the rules fairness to both sides are scruplously obeyed. This decision brings out fully the two principle of judging right on date of suit and taking note of subsequent events. In this case the application was filed by landlord for eviction as he needed shop to start a shop of automobile spares. While the matter was pending in High Court it transpired that landlord came into possession of another, therefore, his application was dismissed. It obviously pertained to domain of granting relief. The Court felt that as after filing of application for eviction the landlord came in occupation of another shop his necessity to seek eviction came to end as the purpose for which eviction was being sought had already been achieved. That is the right of landlord to institute proceedings was there when application was presented but the relief could not be granted as landlord had already attained his objective. 7. In Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and Another,(supra) the principle enunciated in P. Venkateshwar's case was taken further and it was observed that statement of law made in that case clearly established that: right of party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right because as explained earlier had the court found his facts to be true the day be sued be would have got his decree. The Courts procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystalised in the initial cause of action. Applying these principles to the facts of the case there can be no hesitation in saying that the application was liable to be dismissed. There was no cause of action in favour of landlord which he could have enforced on the date application was presented. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 envisages decision of the application filed for eviction u/s 21 as far as possible within two months of its presentation. If the application would have been decided it was bound to have been dismissed as not maintainable. Trie procedural delay could not deprive Petitioner of legal justice. If the application remained pending and the building completed ten years could it be allowed by invoking principle of, subsequent events. Here again since right bad to be decided as it existed on the date it was instituted the application could not be allowed. Trie procedural delay could not deprive Petitioner of legal justice. If the application remained pending and the building completed ten years could it be allowed by invoking principle of, subsequent events. Here again since right bad to be decided as it existed on the date it was instituted the application could not be allowed. In Rameshwar's case (supra) it was observed, impact of subsequent events may nave, bearing on right of action, on the nature of relief and third, on its importance to create or destroy sustantive rights. The Hon'ble Court held, 'where nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of development subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that relief is moulded? But, subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation.... Conversely where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is applicable at any stage...where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the court may in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation permit amendment and continue the proceedings provided no prejudice is caused to the other. 8. In a case where application is presented when building bad not completed ten years and it completes it during pendency of application it cannot be case of molding relief. Nor it is a case of deficient cause of action. In fact application could be allowed if it was found that landlord's need was bonafide. But this had to be on the date application was filed. If the Act did not apply to a building on that date the question of benafide or otherwise was immaterial. The position does not change by application of the Act on a subsequent date as I he bonafide need had to be seen on or after the date the building came under the purview of the Act. Any date prior to it was irrelevant. 9. Even otherwise it is fraught with grave danger. The position does not change by application of the Act on a subsequent date as I he bonafide need had to be seen on or after the date the building came under the purview of the Act. Any date prior to it was irrelevant. 9. Even otherwise it is fraught with grave danger. If it is accepted that a tenant against whom an application is filed when building bad not completed ten years becomes liable to ejectment if it completes ten years then it shall result in filing of application before hand. It is no doubt a provision for benefit of landlord but it cannot be construed in a manner in which it may defeat very objective of the Act namely, protection of tenant. 10. Reliance was placed on Shri Lachoo Mal Vs. Shri Radhey Shyam, (1971) 1 SCC 619 and it was urged that it was open to landlord to file a suit for eviction under general law but he waived the benefit available to him, therefore, the application filed by him could not be dismissed. How will the ratio of this case apply in advancing this argument is difficult to appreciate. It was held by Hon'ble Court that so long an agreement was not contrary to law it could be entered between landlord and tenant. And this was not effected even if the landlord gave up certain benefit available to him under law. The act of not filing suit under general law could not result in validating the application which was not maintainable. Even assuming that the landlord gave up the benefit available to him and did not file the suit how could his action effect the tenant. He is to thank himself for that. That cannot create any estoppel against tenant. It was not by his consent or under-some agreement that suit was not filed. 11. Reliance was placed un Purshottam Das v. Smt. Raj Mani Devi 1968 ALJ SC 1023 and it was urged that if suit instituted without permission and thus invalid under U.P. (Temporary) Rent and Control Act of 1947 could become valid by grant of permission subsequent to filing of suit then there was no reason to hold that the application did not become maintainable after the building completed ten years during pendency of application. It is a complete misreading of decision. It is a complete misreading of decision. Under the law as it then stood suit for eviction could be filed after obtaining permission u/s 3(1) of the Act. The suit was filed on 14th October, 1961 after obtaining permission on 14th October, 1961. The permission was, however, revoked by Commissioner u/s 3(3). It was lettered by State Government. The Hon'ble Court held that once order of Commissioner was set aside the order u/s 3(1) granting permission revoked and suit stood validly instituted. 12. In Smt. Savitri Devi's case (supra) it was held that as building had completed ten years on the date the application was allowed it could not be held that application remained premature. Similar view was taken in Surendra Kumar Bhatia v. V AddI. District Judge 1978 ARC 444. This decision appears to proceed on principle contained in Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. But these are beneficial provisions directed towards protecting the tenant. They fall more appropriately in realm of relief. If a suit for eviction from a building is pending and provisions of the Act become applicable to it granting immunity from eviction then subsequent events have to be taken into account. The cause of action for eviction does not change but it becomes incapable of enforcement if conditions mentioned in Sections 39 and 40 are complied. In a case where application is presented for eviction from a building which completes ten years during pendency of application the cause of action changes. The prescribed authority could not have allowed the application merely because the building had completed ten years, when the order was being passed. It was further to be found if the landlord had bonafide need. And this had to be seen on the date when application was filed. The necessity or need of applicability of Act, a date when application was not maintainable or the grounds specified prior to could not furnish material for granting application when Act became maintainable The decision, therefore, so far they hold that application for eviction filed u/s 21 prior to completion of ten years could be allowed if the building completes ten years during pendency of application do not appear to have been correctly decided. 13. Coming to the conduct of Petitioner the mere fact that he did not vacate the premises after expiry of term did not disentitle him from approaching this Court. 13. Coming to the conduct of Petitioner the mere fact that he did not vacate the premises after expiry of term did not disentitle him from approaching this Court. Normally, this Court refused to interfere where a person invoking extraordinary jurisdiction does rot come with clean hands or his conduct is such that the Court's conscience is not awakened. 14. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders passed by opposite parties 3 and 4 are quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.