Judgment :- 1. These revisions are directed against the order passed by the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli in I.A. No. 339 of 1983 in O.S. No. 686 of 1969. The first respondent in both the revisions is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 686 of 1969 and he filed that suit for partition and separate possession of his 1/4th share in the suit A to E Schedule properties. Defendants 1 to 3 are his brothers. The suit was resisted by the first defendant on the ground that the suit properties except. A Schedule were self-acquired properties. After full-fledged trial, the court below passed a preliminary decree for partition of plaintiffs 1/4th share in all the properties except item No. 5 of C Schedule and item No. 2 of B Schedule. The defendants filed an appeal in A.S. No. 669 of 1972 in this Court. Since the first defendant died, his legal representatives were impleaded as defendants 5 and 6. The first respondent herein/plaintiff and the defendants entered into a compromise and a joint memo of compromise was filed by the parties. As per the said compromise, the first respondent/plaintiff was given 1/4 share of all the items of A Schedule properties, 1/4th share of items 1 to 9, 11 and 12 of B Schedule properties, 1/4th share of items 2, 3 and 5 of C Schedule properties, 1/4th share in D Schedule properties and 1/4th share in the first item of B Schedule properties. It was also provided that the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share of the mesne profits in the immovable properties, allotted to the 1st respondent/plaintiff, under Cl. 3 of the compromise from the date of the plaint. Under Cl. 4 of the memo of compromise, the respondent No. 1 gave up his right in other items in the plaint not mentioned in Cl. 2 of the memo of compromise. In pursuance of the said compromise, this Court passed a compromise decree on 9th March, 1977. Even in the terms of the compromise decree, it has been provided that the plaintiff, viz., the first respondent herein has given up his claim in respect of the properties other than those mentioned in Cl. (1) of the decree that is allotted to the first respondent. Even in the terms of the compromise decree, it has been provided that the plaintiff, viz., the first respondent herein has given up his claim in respect of the properties other than those mentioned in Cl. (1) of the decree that is allotted to the first respondent. The first respondent/plaintiff filed a petition I.A. No. 283 of 1972 for passing of final decree and the said application was not pressed in pursuance of the compromise decree. The first respondent filed S.A. No. 339 of 1983 for amendment of the plaint for inclusion of certain immovable properties, movable properties and lease which were acquired subsequent to the filing of the suit and before the passing of the compromise decree on the ground that they were acquired out of the income from the suit properties. The said application was resisted by the petitioners in both the petitions. They filed a counter inter alia contending that in view of the compromise decree; wherein no such reservation for inclusion of any other property has been made, the first respondent herein is not entitled to ask for inclusion of the properties, which are now sought to be included by way of amendment of plaint. It is further contended that in view of the fact that the suit for partition has been filed after the issue of a notice, severance of status took place, in any event, on the date of suit, i.e., on 17th September, 1969 and that the first respondent herein is entitled to ask for mesne profits and he is not entitled to claim share in the properties treating them as joint family properties. It is further contended that if the amendment is allowed, it would cause serious hardship to them. It is also contended that these properties were admittedly available at the time of the compromise and in fact I.A. No. 283 of 1972 which was filed for inclusion of these properties was also pending and if the first respondent herein intended to claim any share in the said property, he would not have failed to include them in the compromise and also claim share in them. As such under law, he is deemed to have waived and abandoned his right to claim partition in respect of these properties. 2. As such under law, he is deemed to have waived and abandoned his right to claim partition in respect of these properties. 2. The learned subordinate judge allowed the application on the ground that till the final decree is passed, the suit is deemed to be pending and that all the properties acquired after the filing of the suit could be only joint family properties since they were acquired from the joint family income and that the court has got ample power to take note of subsequent events. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants have preferred these two revisions. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, mainly raised the following contentions, viz., that even though the amendment can be allowed at any time, the said proposition is not applicable to the facts of this case, that in view of the specific terms of the compromise decree, it is not open to the first respondent herein to seek inclusion of other properties by way of amendment of the plaint, that admittedly by instituting the suit after issuing notice, there was division in status and the first respondent is not entitled to contend that the properties acquired subsequent to the same are also joint family properties and he is entitled to a share; but he would be entitled only to claim share in the mesne profits and that in view of the fact that the properties were acquired after the suit and prior to the compromise decree and the first respondent was aware of the existence of the same, by failure to make any claim over the same, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right in the said properties. 4. It is clear from the term of the memo, of compromise and the compromise decree in pursuance of the same, the plaintiff gave up all his claim in respect of all the properties other than the one allotted to his share. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that at the time of the compromise, the properties were available, that even the first respondent filed a petition in I.A. 203 of 1972 for passing of final decree including the properties which are now sought to be included and that the same has been withdrawn as not pressed. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that at the time of the compromise, the properties were available, that even the first respondent filed a petition in I.A. 203 of 1972 for passing of final decree including the properties which are now sought to be included and that the same has been withdrawn as not pressed. If really the first respondent was very particular in claiming share in the properties, he would not have failed to insist the same at the time of the compromise. The learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that the compromise decree will bind only the properties included in the plaint and set the other properties which are not included in the plaint He also contended that in paragraph 18 of the plaint, the first respondent has reserved his right to include the other properties omitted to be mentioned during the later stage of the suit and in the circumstances, the first respondent is entitled to apply for inclusion even after the compromise, especially when the final decree was not passed. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proposition that in a partition suit, the properties can be included prior to passing of final decree, could not be disputed; but in the circumstances of this case and in view of the compromise entered into, wherein the plaintiff/first respondent gave up his right to claim share in the other properties, it is not open to the first respondent to claim any right, contrary to the terms of the compromise decree, in which no such reservation was made and on the other hand, the plaintiff first respondent herein has given up his right specifically in other items except the properties allotted to him. 5. The most important point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that after issue of a notice and filing of a suit for partition, there was division in status and the first respondent is not entitled to claim any share in the properties acquired subsequent to the same on the ground that they are the joint family properties. As already stated, it is not disputed that the properties were acquired after the suit and prior to the compromise decree. 6. As already stated, it is not disputed that the properties were acquired after the suit and prior to the compromise decree. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to the decision of this Court in Venkatasubramania Iyer v. Easwara Iyer 1 wherein at page 501 it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that: “After the division in status, the joint family with its incidents comes to an end, erstwhile coparceners become tenants-in-common and the approach to the character of the acquisition has to be from that perspective. “Amongst tenants-in-common where one tenant in common acquires property in his individual right, with no intention of making it common properly, the property will not be divisible. The second defendant or 1st defendant for that matter or the 4th defendant may have received the rents and profits of the share of the plaintiff or the third defendant in the properties which were admittedly ancestral and divided by the father but the persons in possession did not become thereby trustees of the rents and prof its so received on behalf of the others who have not joined in the realisation of rents and profits. As noticed in Kennedy v. De Trafford 1 : “There is no fiduciary relation between tenants-in-common of real estate as such. Nor can one tenant-in-common of real estate, by leaving the management of the property in the hands of his co-tenant impose upon him an obligation of a fiduciary character.” It is also further held therein that: “S. 90 of the Trust Act has no application to such a case There is no rule of Hindu Law which provides that the property which is acquired even after severance of joint family status, must be regarded as acquired for the family. It is only to the acquisition of property by coparceners in coparcenary that the rules as to sufficiency of nucleus, blending, throwing into common stock and impressing with the character of joint family property, etc., apply.” 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners also drew my attention to the passage in Principles of Hindu Law by Kulla, 14th Edition, page 410 paragraph 325, wherein relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Baghayamma v. Chenchurama 2 it has been observed that “The intention to separate may be evinced in different ways, either by explicit declaration or by conduct. It may be expressed by serving a notice on the other coparceners and the severance of status taken place from the date when the communication was sent and not when it was received. It may also be expressed by the institution of a suit for partition”. 8. Yet another decision reported in Parasumann Lakshmanier v. P.L. Krishnamachary and others 3 was referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, wherein at page 459, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that: “When once one of the members of the joint family, may be the son, unequivocally informs his father of his unambiguous desire to sever his connection with the joint family and so disrupts the joint family status, then the manager, though he is the father, would be treading on slippery or dangerous ground if he were to assume the garb of managership and deal with the joint family assets in his own right and particularly alienate them or gift them away to others including the kith and kin of the family. Undoubtedly, he could have done so prior to the disruption of the status of the family as a joint family. But, no sooner such an intention has became open and public, the conduct of the first defendant in having executed the gifts long after the submission of the disputes under the first compartment of Exhibit A103 to the arbitrators is certainly an act without authority and it would not bind the other members of the family including the plaintiff.” Thus, it is clear that in view of the admitted fact that these properties were acquired after the issue of notice and after the institution of the suit there was division in status between the first respondent herein and other members of the family and the first respondent herein is not entitled to claim any share in these properties. But, certainly he is entitled to claim mesne profits in respect of the suit properties so far as his share is concerned. The said proposition is not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the first respondent. But, on the other hand, he has submitted that all these matters have to be enquired into only after the properties were included and there is no bar for the inclusion of the properties till the final decree is passed. The said proposition is not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the first respondent. But, on the other hand, he has submitted that all these matters have to be enquired into only after the properties were included and there is no bar for the inclusion of the properties till the final decree is passed. He also further submitted that the court below had already exercised its discretion in favour of the respondent and this Court ought not to interfere with such discretion. The learned counsel for the first respondent dried on the decision of this Court in T.P. Palaniswamy and another v. Deivanai Ammal and others 4 wherein Nainar Sundaram, J., upheld the amendment of plaint in a suit for partition for inclusion of a well, which has been omitted to be mentioned at the time of the suit and which came to light only at the time of the inspection of the Commissioner and in the circumstances, it was observed that: “In a suit for partition, the quantum of the estate is a question in issue and if there had been inadvertence or omission to include a particular item, the court is duty bound to allow the amendment and while doing so, it will be inappropriate to adjudicate, upon the questions which would arise on the amendment being allowed and that stage will come only later, after the amendment is allowed, issues are framed and the parties placed their evidence and made their submission through arguments.” The learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that in the above quoted case admittedly the well which was available at the time of the filing of the suit was omitted to be mentioned by inadvertence and the same was subsequently included by way of amendment after the report of the commissioner, and it was upheld by this Court. But, that is not the case here. Certainly, if there are any properties which were available on the date of filing of the suit which were omitted to be included, the plaintiff is entitled to apply for occlusion at any time before the final decree is passed. 9. The court below also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vereekutty v. Mathukutty 1. Certainly, if there are any properties which were available on the date of filing of the suit which were omitted to be included, the plaintiff is entitled to apply for occlusion at any time before the final decree is passed. 9. The court below also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vereekutty v. Mathukutty 1. That was also a case where certain properties had not been fully and correctly described in the original plaint Schedule and due to ignorance some properties had been omitted and they were allowed to be included by way of amendment of the plaint and that case is not in respect of the properties acquired after the filing of the suit, as in this case. Hence, that decision is not at all applicable to the facts of this case. 10. The learned counsel for the first respondent relied on the decisions reported in R. Durgaraju v. S. Dadda Venkataraju 2, and in Luxmi & Co. v. Dr. A.S. Deshpande 3, for the proposition that the court can take note of subsequent events after the filing of the suit. That proposition is not disputed. The question is, in the circumstances of the case, whether the first respondent herein is entitled to ask for inclusion of these properties which were acquired subsequent to the filing of the suit. 11. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent that this Court would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the court below in allowing the amendment and for that proposition be relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Panchdeo Narain v. jyoti 4 and in Maitreyee Barterjee v. Prabir Kumar 5 Even in the above quoted cases, it has been held that if irreparable injury or injustice is caused to the opposite party, amendment should not be allowed and the High Court can interfere, It is to be noted that in Haridas Aildas v. Godrej Rustom 6 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that: “The court should be extremely liberal in granting a prayer of amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. A revisional Court also ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in allowing amendment in absence of cogent reasons and compelling circumstances.” As has been discussed in the order already, there are compelling circumstances and cogent reasons for interfering in these revisions. Further, it is a case where by allowing the amendment, serious injury would be caused to the opposite party. Hence, the principle laid down in both the decisions quoted above are not applicable to the facts of this case. 12. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the order passed by the Court below is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. 13. In the result, both the revisions are allowed and the order passed by the court below is set aside and the petition for amendment of plaint is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in these revisions. However, it is open to the first respondent to claim mesne profits as per the compromise decree in respect of the properties which were available at the time of the filing of the suit and he is entitled to enforce his claim of mesne profits by proceeding against the properties of the defendants including the properties acquired by them.