Judgment :- 1. The common question for consideration and decision in these revision petitions is whether arrears of profits decreed in favour of a sharer in a partition suit under the final decree is a debt, as defined in S.2 (3) of Act 17 of 1977. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, it falls under the exempted category in clause (c), in that it is a liability arising out of a breach of trust or in the alternative a tortious liability. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Kunhamina v. Ammotty Mariam (1979 KLT. 73), Narayanan v. Goindan (1964 KLT. 72), Prabhakaran Pillai v. Subhashani Amma (1980 KLT. 777). To decide the question what is relevant is not the description given in the decree but the substance of the claim. In a suit for partition and separate allotment of properties with the share of profits what is decreed in favour of the sharer is that part of the income of the property which be would have been entitled to on a distribution of the profits which had been collected by the party in actual possession. If that party in actual possession is not a trespasser or a person in the position of a trustee who had the legal obligation to account, his liability to pay off the share to a co-owner cannot be characterised either as a liability arising out of breach of trust or as in the nature of a tortious liability. What has been considered in Kunhamtna's case (1979 KLT. 73) and in Prabhakaran Pillai's case (1980 KLT. 777) is the case of a trespasser who was found liable to pay the profits for the period for which he was in wrongful possession and the Court has said that the possession of the trespasser being wrongful, his liability to account arises from tort This position was reiterated in Prabhakaran Pillai's case (1980 KLT. 777) pointing out that mesne profits will arise only in wrongful possession and in other words the person in possession must be a trespasser. A trespass over another's land is a tort and the liability arising therefrom is certainly a tortious liability. 777) pointing out that mesne profits will arise only in wrongful possession and in other words the person in possession must be a trespasser. A trespass over another's land is a tort and the liability arising therefrom is certainly a tortious liability. The court said that a decree for mesne profits is a decree for money and ordinarily it is understood as one for recovery of debt and the proviso which takes out the decree for possession with mesne profits from the category of a decree in respect of a debt mentioned in the Explanation cannot be understood to mean that a decree for mesne profits is a debt within the meaning of the word 'debt' or anything other than a decree for tortious liability exempted from the purview of the Act. 2. The question whether a decree for mesne profits in a suit for partition is a debt has not been specifically considered in these decisions. That question arose directly for consideration in the decision reported in Madhavi Amma v. Madhavi Amma (ILR.1979(2) Kerala 166). It was held: "Under S.55(4) of the Transfer of Property Act, where the ownership of a property has passed to a buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase price, the seller is entitled to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, any transferee without consideration or any transferee with notice of the non-payment, for the amount of the purchase money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. It is the liability as aforesaid that is exempted from the definition of the word 'debt' in clause (g) of S.2(3) of Act 17 of 1977 It is difficult to understand how a decree for profits passed on account of a sharer's liability to account for the same to the other sharers can be characterised as unpaid purchase money due from a vendee of an immovable property." 3. In Mariyamma v. Thresiamma (1959 KLT. 989) the court said: "The mesne profits is a debt as defined in Act 31 of 1958". In Mariyamma v. Thresiamma (1959 KLT. 989) the court said: "The mesne profits is a debt as defined in Act 31 of 1958". Pointing out that the liability does not arise on account of fiduciary relationship as between the plaintiff and the defendant and therefore the liability for the mesne profits decreed in the suit does not arise out of breach of trust or fall under the exclusion provided in S.2, clause (c) (iii) of the Act. 4. Whether the principle of trust could be introduced in such a case was considered by MY Menon, J. in the decision reported in Narayani Amma v. Eyo Poulose (1982 KLT. 956) thus: "The word "trust" in the context of an enactment like Act 17/77 should be understood in the legal sense, and not in the popular sense. A close examination of the exemptions disclose a variety of policy considerations. 'Breach of trust' is defined in S.3 as breach of duties imposed or trustees by law. It appears to me that what is attempted to be excluded by Cl. (c) of S.2(3) of the Act 17/77 is only a liability arising out of a breach of trust as understood in law. If reposing of confidence alone is sufficient, a bailee of goods will also be a trustee. There are also many other contracts based on confidence. If the term 'trust' is understood in that popular sense, many types of contractual liabilities will stand excluded from the definition of debt; and it is not easy to assume that the legislature wants to take away by the left hand what it gives by the right. To enlarge the scope of 'Trust' in S 2(3)(c) would be to deny the benefit of Act 17/77 to more and more people. A piece of beneficial legislation cannot be so interpreted unless there are other compelling reasons". 5. In the decision reported in Ratnamma v. Govindan (1960 KLT. 406) construing S.2(3)(c) of Act 31 of 1958, the Division Bench of this Court pointed out that the clause 'breach of trust' cannot be considered so as to include every case of contractual obligation. 6. Evidently in interpreting clause (c) in S.2(3) of the Act, the term breach of trust cannot be understood as in the popular sense and it is not every kind of liability where some amount of confidence is reposed that would fall under this category of exemption. 6. Evidently in interpreting clause (c) in S.2(3) of the Act, the term breach of trust cannot be understood as in the popular sense and it is not every kind of liability where some amount of confidence is reposed that would fall under this category of exemption. When the right of plaintiff to a share of the profits is pre-existing, the liability to pay of the debt is not on account of wrongful possession and even though the claim is referred to as mesne profits, the nature of the liability is altered. What has been decreed is only a share on distribution of the profits, which the plaintiff would have received had there been an earlier division. Such a liability cannot be properly brought under either category as liability arising out of breach of trust or arising out of a tort. In this view it has to be held that the profits that had been decreed in the final decree for partition does not come within the exempted category but is only a'debt' within the definition of the term in the Act. The court below was, therefore, right in upholding that the amount of mesne profits claimed is a liability excluded under S.2(3) (c) of the Act. There is no scope for interference in revision. The revision petitions are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Dismissed.