JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) PROCEEDINGS under section 248 of the Madhy a Pradesh Land Revenue code, 1959, for short, the code, were initiated against the petitioner and an order therein was passed for his summary eviction. A revision was taken to the Collector on the ground that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to place his case. In these proceedings, the petitioner succeeded and the matter was remitted to the Tahsildar for de novo proceedings. Now came the real problem and this matter arises out of the controversy that has arisen in the de novo proceedings. ( 2. ) THE matter was again heard ex parte as appears from the order passed on 20-4-- 1976. Deputy Government Advocate Shri Roman contends that it was not an ex parte order. But, this contention is not open to him, because of the subsequent event. It has all along been accepted by the parties on both sides in subsequent proceedings that it was so. Indeed, an application under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Code was filed by the petitioner, contending that he could not be present on the date of hearing of the matter. However, this application was rejected, against which, he took an appeal under sub-section (4) to the Sub-Divisional Officer, where also, he had a bad luck and his ill-fate unfortunately pursued him further when he failed in the second appeal, filed before the Commissioner. As a result, the order passed on 20-4-1976 got confirmed. But, that is not the crux of the matter, on which decision is sought in this petition. The grievance with which the petitioner has come before me is that the Board of Revenue, which heard his revision not against the order passed on 20-4-1976, but against the orders passed subsequently in proceedings arising out of sub-section (4) of section 35, did not give him relief on an erroneous view of law, which resulted in a jurisdictional failure on the part of the Board. Indeed, the Board took the view that the second appeal, filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner, was incompetent as such an appeal was not contemplated under the law. The Board did not discuss or consider the merit of the petitioners grievance made under sub-section (3) of section 35, on which the Tahsildar passed order on 13-5-1976. Indeed, the Board took the view that the second appeal, filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner, was incompetent as such an appeal was not contemplated under the law. The Board did not discuss or consider the merit of the petitioners grievance made under sub-section (3) of section 35, on which the Tahsildar passed order on 13-5-1976. Whether the petitioners application under sub-section (3) of section 35 was rightly rejected by the Tahsildar was the heart of the controversy, but the board directed its attention to the matters on fringes only. It is true, as Shri Roman, at this point of dictation submitted, that the Commissioner had dismissed petitioners appeal, observing that the Sub-Divisional Officer, in the first appeal, had also dealt with the merits of the case. But, in my opinion, that has little relevance on the point in issue. ( 3. ) THE short point for decision in this petition, according to me, is the question of boards jurisdictional failure. Whether the grievance has any merit or not? It is not disputed that the Board, in rendering the impugned decision, dismissed the revision on the sole ground that the second appeal before the Commissioner was not maintainable. The first question, therefore, is, whether this point was rightly decided. This short question has a short answer, but in dealing with this point, I have to consider not merely provisions of section 35, but also section 44 of the Code. Shri Roman contended that section 35 is the complete Code. However, this argument has not appealed to me. ( 4. ) LET me, therefore, look at the scheme of the Code. The provisions of section 35 find place in Chapter IV, which deals with "procedure of Revenue Officers and revenue Courts" while Chapter V deals with provisions for "appeal, Revision and review". Shri Roman relied on sub-section (5) of section 35, which I extract along with sub-section (4), as conclusive of the matter: " (4) Where an application filed under sub-section (3) is rejected, the party aggrieved may file an appeal to the authority to whom an appeal lies from an original order passed by such Officer. (5) Except as provided in sub-section (4) or except where a case or proceeding before any Revenue Officer has been decided on merits no appeal shall lie from an order passed under this section. " I find myself unable to accept this contention. (5) Except as provided in sub-section (4) or except where a case or proceeding before any Revenue Officer has been decided on merits no appeal shall lie from an order passed under this section. " I find myself unable to accept this contention. However, there, is no force in the contention also of Shri Tomar, because the provision relied by Shri Tomar, petitioners counsel, does not affect the validity of the contra centention. Reliance was placed by shri Tomar on sub-section (2) of section 44, of which, the opening clause is very. material and relevant. It says : "save as otherwise provided. . . . . . . A second appeal is contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 44 but the opening clause, obviously restricted the right. Reading sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 35 together, therefore, I have no manner of doubt at all that only a single appeal is contemplated for challenging an order passed under sub-section (3) of section 35. The party is not left remedy less. A revision shall still be maintainable under section 50 of the Code, but the intention of the legislature was to provide only one appeal in such matters with an obvious and whole-some object of avoiding prolixity in litigation. I have no doubt, therefore, that the boards decision, in so far as it decided the law, is unassailable. The Board rightly held that second appeal before the Commissioner was not competent. ( 5. ) THAT, however, does not dispose of the matter. It was incumbent on the Board not to deal and decide the matter summarily in, that manner, in its revisional jurisdiction. Indeed the Board was not merely to touch the validity of the order passed by the commissioner. It was open to the Board to consider the validity of the impugned order passed under sub-section (3) of section 35 by the Tahsildar on 13-5-1977. In failing to do so, the Board failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and this Court, in its supervisory jurisdiction, must correct the jurisdictional error. It was open to the Board to consider the validity of the impugned order passed under sub-section (3) of section 35 by the Tahsildar on 13-5-1977. In failing to do so, the Board failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and this Court, in its supervisory jurisdiction, must correct the jurisdictional error. That the power of revision of the Board is very wide is writ large on the face of its language and the power is advisedly conferred on the highest Revenue Authority by the Legislature with the deliberate intention of enabling it to interfere in a matter to prevent failure of justice in deliberate intention of enabling it to interfere in a matter to prevent failure of justice in any case. The Board should have borne in mind the scope and ambit of its jurisdiction. It failed to do it. It failed to consider that it should act sow motu in such matters; and it was necessary for it to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of "any order" passed by any revenue Officer subordinate to it; and in a case where the records were called, it was incumbent on the Board to consider the validity of such an order by which any party felt aggrieved. In the instant case, the petitioner was aggrieved, undoubtedly, not only by the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in appeal, but also by the original order passed by the Tahsildar under sub-section (3) of section 35, which exercise, the Board refused to undertake. This approach of the Board is not supportable and on this ground, the impugned order, passed by the Board, has to be set aside, ( 6. ) ACCORDINGLY, this application is allowed. The Board is directed to reconsider the matter, to take back the revision to file and consider the grievance of the petitioner not only with reference to the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in appeal on 20-12-1976, but also the order passed on 13-5-1976 by the Tahsildar. The Board shall render its decision afresh on the merits of petitioners grievance in so far as it falls within the ambit of sub-section (3) of section 35. ( 7. ) IN the result, the application succeeds to the extent indicated above and the matter is remitted to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration in the light of observations herein made. ( 7. ) IN the result, the application succeeds to the extent indicated above and the matter is remitted to the Board of Revenue for reconsideration in the light of observations herein made. Outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.