Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff. He filed the suit for a declaration of title and recovery of the plaint schedule property. He claimed the relief of recovery of the property only on the strength of his title. 2. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has no title to the suit property and that he is not entitled to any relief in the suit. It is also contended that the relief claimed in the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in S.A.No.1002 of 1971. 3. The trial court as well as the appellate court held that the suit is barred byres judicata in view of the decision in S.A.No.1002 of 1971. The trial court dismissed the suit. The appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Now the plaintiff appeals. 4. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the finding of the courts below that the suit is barred by res judicata is correct or not. This court issued notice on the following question of law. "Whether the observation or finding regarding title in an earlier, suit for injunction would operate as a bar in a subsequent suit for recovery on title". In Second Appeal No. 1002 of 1971, this court held: "Though I was at one stage of the hearing inclined to grant a remand I do not think that I will be justified in doing so as the suit is of the year 1962. The only thing open to me is to dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has not established his title to the suit properties. I, therefore, set aside the decision of the court below and allow the second appeal dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The parties will bear their costs."(emphasis is mine). 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the question of title was not substantially and directly in issue in the earlier suit. He contends that the earlier suit was only a simple suit for injunction and a finding on the question of title was unnecessary for the purpose of deciding that suit. The counsel for the appellant cites before me the following decisions laher Singh v. Sarwan (A.I.R.1965 S. C. 948), Gangappa v. Rachawa (A. I. R.1971 S. C. 442) and Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (A. I. R.1974 S. C. 1126). The counsel for the appellant cites before me the following decisions laher Singh v. Sarwan (A.I.R.1965 S. C. 948), Gangappa v. Rachawa (A. I. R.1971 S. C. 442) and Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar (A. I. R.1974 S. C. 1126). In A.I.R. 1965 S.948, the Supreme Court held that the question whether a matter was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has to be decided (a) on the pleadings in the former suit, (b) the issues struck therein, and (c) the decision in the suit. In A. I. R.1971 S. C. 442, the court held that it is open to a court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law. If, however final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a court on its decisions on more than one point-each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties. In A.I.R, 1974 S. C. 1126, the court observed in Para.25 thus: "The finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was a colourable transaction was unnecessary for the decision of the suit because even if the court were to find that the partition was genuine, the mortgagee would only have bound the interest of the father as the debt was not of a character which, under the Hindu Law, would bind the interest of the sons. There is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the sons that if the partition was held to be genuine, the property would have been wholly freed from the mortgage encumbrance. The validity or the binding nature of an alienation cannot depend on a partition effected after the alienation; or else, a sale or a mortgage effected by the Karta of a joint Hindu family can easily be avoided by effecting a partition amongst the members of the joint family. As the matter relating to the partition was not directly and substantially in issue in the suit, the finding that the partition was sham cannot operate as resjudicata." 6. As the matter relating to the partition was not directly and substantially in issue in the suit, the finding that the partition was sham cannot operate as resjudicata." 6. In certain cases a matter directly in issue in the previous suit may not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit unless it was also substantially in issue in the former suit. (Vide A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 33). The phraseology used in the section is significant. "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court."' 7. The word "substantially" means "of importance and value" and a matter is substantially in issue if it is of importance and value for the decision of the case (Vide A.I.R. 1927 Madras 643). To illustrate, an unnecessary or irrelevant issue, the decision of which either way will not affect the decision of suit, cannot be of any importance or value for the decision of the suit and is, therefore, not substantially in issue. Courts have laid down that to constitute a matter directly and substantially in issue, it is not necessary that a distinct issue should have been raised upon it; it is sufficient if the matter was in issue in substance. The point whether a matter was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit is to be decided with reference to the fact, and circumstances of each particular case. It is essentially a question of fact. If the parties and the court considered the matter as if it formed a direct and principal issue, it must be taken to have been directly and substantially in issue. (Vide A.I.R. 1932 P.C.50). It is not possible to formulate any ground rules to decide whether a previous decision regarding title in a suit for injunction does or does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit for recovery of property on the strength of title. (Vide A.I.R. 1932 P.C.50). It is not possible to formulate any ground rules to decide whether a previous decision regarding title in a suit for injunction does or does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit for recovery of property on the strength of title. The question essentially depends upon the fact whether the issue as to title raised in the subsequent suit was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and was the ground for the ultimate decision, and this again depends upon the circumstances of each case. Certainly if the issue in regard to title was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, the finding on it would operate as res judicata if the determination of that issue constituted the stereobate for the ultimate decision. But if it was not in issue at all or was only collaterally and incidentally in issue, it would not so operate. Where for the purpose of deciding the suit for injunction, the question of title has been specifically considered and decided and that formed the principal ground for the ultimate decision, that decision will operate as res judicata between the parties. The fact that the former suit could have been decided without reference to the question of title may not be of any importance, when in a given case the suit has been decided solely on the basis of title to the property. In this context it has to be noted that the Supreme Court has held that: "A final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a court on its decisions on more than one point each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision the decision on each of these points would operate as res judicata between the parties". A finding which is the real ground of the ultimate decision will operate as res judicata even though there may have been other issues on which the case might equally well have been decided. A finding which is the real ground of the ultimate decision will operate as res judicata even though there may have been other issues on which the case might equally well have been decided. In other words, where the judgment is based on the findings on two issues one of which by itself is sufficient to sustain the judgment, the decision on both the issues will be res judicata inasmuch as the decision of the suit in such cases must be taken to have rested on the findings on both the issues, each being an additional or supplemental ground to the other for the disposal of the suit. 8. In sum, what I understand is that the only determinations which are necessary to the decision which are fundamental to it and without which it cannot stand will operate as res judicata. Other determinations, without which it would still be possible for the decision to stand, however definite be the language in which they are expressed, cannot support a plea of res judicata between the parties between whom those determinations were pronounced. I quote an ancient authority-a statement of the principle by Coleridge J, "The judgment concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide, and which was actually decided, as the ground work of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue." R. v. Harlington, Middle Quarter (Inhabitants) (1855) E & B 780 at pages 794 954) It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision, necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation, from matters which even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations.; yet are not in point of law the essential foundation or groundwork of the judgment. How to make this essential distinction I should savin order to delineate this essential distinction, one has always to enquire with unrelenting severity is the determination of the issue upon which it is sought to found a plea of res judicata, so fundamental to the substantive ultimate decision, that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing short of this will do. It is well settled that a mere step in the reasoning of the ultimate decision is insufficient. Nothing short of this will do. It is well settled that a mere step in the reasoning of the ultimate decision is insufficient. What is required is no less than the determination of law, or fact or both fundamental to the substantive decision. 9. The rule of conclusiveness of judgments, achieves that object that no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause. But for this rule there would be no end to litigation. The rule is intended not only to prevent a new decision but also to prevent a new enquiry, so that the same person cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same questions. 10. In this case in the former suit the decision was rendered solely on one point. The ground of the ultimate decision in the former suit has been stated in unmistakable terms in the judgment itself as, the failure of the plaintiff to prove his title to the suit property. I here repeat what has been quoted from the judgment in S.A. No. 1002 of 1971: "The only thing open to me is to dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has not established his title to the suit properties." In the suit, O.S.No. 83 of 1962 issue No.1 is as follows: "Whether the plaintiff has title to or possession of the plaint B schedule property? " Certainly the decision in the former suit was solely based on the ground of title. In the circumstances, the judgment in the former suit, namely, the judgment in S.A.No.1002 of 1971 will operate as res judicata in this suit. Both the courts have now found that the suit is barred by resjudicata in view of the earlier decision in S.A.No.1002 of 1971. I hold that the findings of the courts below are correct. I see no merit in this second appeal. I dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs.