Judgment :- 1. A Jewish Synagogue, once bristling with the activities of its large membership, has now come to a torpid stage due to fast plummeting down of its membership strength, reaching almost rock bottom with only two members now. All others have gone in exodus and perched in their promised land Israel. But the Synagogue is not totally bereft of any activities, for, the only two members have arrayed themselves into the petitioner and the respondent in the present Civil Revision Petition which is an off-shoot of a litigation started almost half a century ago. 2. A scheme has been settled for the administration of the Synagogue as early as 14-3-1123 (M. E.) pursuant to the final decree passed in the suit. The scheme contains a provision, inter alia, for its future modification. It is as follows: "If it appears that a modification on any of the provisions of this scheme is necessary on account of any reason whatsoever, the general body may take a decision on it and report to the court; the court shall, after conducting such enquiry as it deems fit, allow such modifications as are necessary". 3. The petitioner filed I.A. No. 183 of 1979 before the District Court, Ernakulam for modification of the scheme so as to bring about some changes. As per the present scheme only male members who have attained the age of 18 are recognised as members. The proposed modification is to include female members also. The other changes proposedare intended to meet the situation on account of the consequence of the dwindling down of its membership to just two in number. 4. The learned District Judge had dismissed I. A. No. 183 of 1979 and hence this Civil Revision Petition. 5. The learned District Judge himself seems to be appreciative of the modifications asked for by the petitioner. The women were not given the right to membership during a time when the society has not grown to a stage to recognise their equal rights along with men. But the efflux of half a century has brought about revolutionary changes in the approach to women, and the Constitution of India itself is the best document evidencing this awareness as it guarantees against the discrimination on the ground of sex only. But the efflux of half a century has brought about revolutionary changes in the approach to women, and the Constitution of India itself is the best document evidencing this awareness as it guarantees against the discrimination on the ground of sex only. Denial of right to membership to the females just because they are such, is now regarded on all hands as unjust and primitive. There is no contest from the other side on the proposition that the object of the modification suggested is a laudable one. The only way it could be forestalled, according to the respondent, is by saying that the procedure for modification must be in strict compliance with the existing stipulation in the scheme to bring about such modifications. But that stipulation has now been rendered practically unworkable because of the unforeseen depletion of the membership strength. Even the learned District judge has given expression to it in the following words: "It is true that there is no likelihood of this stipulation being carried out; only two members are left and they are at logger-heads; there is no possibility, even a remote one. of a meeting of the General Body convened." (emphasis supplied) After making the above comment the District Judge has concluded: "Still, the court is helpless to afford relief because its power will arise only when the pre-conditions are satisfied". 6. The argument in this case is mainly to persuade me to hold that the Civil courts have not reached such a stage of helplessness as it cannot afford protective measures when the administration of public trust, for which the court had framed a scheme, has come to a stand still. The scheme of administration is the by-product of the decree passed in a suit filed for settling a scheme under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A modification of the scheme does not involve the alteration of the decree. In fact the modification of the scheme, as and when the situation warrants it, is only a method for giving effect to the decree passed in the suit. Perhaps, even the absence of some modifications may render the very decree infructuous. Therefore it cannot be argued that a modification of the scheme would amount to an amendment of the decree. The stand adopted by the District Judge cannot be upheld that the remedy is only the institution of a fresh suit. Perhaps, even the absence of some modifications may render the very decree infructuous. Therefore it cannot be argued that a modification of the scheme would amount to an amendment of the decree. The stand adopted by the District Judge cannot be upheld that the remedy is only the institution of a fresh suit. He seems to have totally overlooked the practical impossibility of instituting a suit now under S 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for, such a suit can be instituted only if there are two or more persons joining as plaintiffs, unless the suit is filed by the Advocate General himself. 7. When the existing clause for effecting the modification has become ineffective and functionless due to the happening of unforeseen eventualities, it is the duty of the court to exercise its inherent powers to bring about such alterations in that clause itself to make it workable and efficacious. Such powers of the civil court, which are inherent in it as indicated in S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are meant to be used to advance the cause of justice. On the other hand its non-user would sometimes result in avoidable consequences for the trust and its beneficiaries. 8. The observations of the Supreme Court in Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao (A. I. R.1961 S. C. 1206) are apposite in this context. The Supreme Court in that case has considered the validity of a clause in a scheme of the administration of a public trust providing for bringing about modifications in the scheme itself. In that context it observed: "If the scheme is amended in pursuance of such a clause in the scheme it will not amount to amending the decree. The decree stands as it was, and all that happens is that a part of the decree which provides for management under the scheme [is being given effect to. It seems both appropriate and convenient that a scheme should contain a provision for its modification, as that would provide a speedier remedy for modification of the manner of administration when circumstances arise calling for such modification than through the cumbrous procedure of a suit." 9. It seems both appropriate and convenient that a scheme should contain a provision for its modification, as that would provide a speedier remedy for modification of the manner of administration when circumstances arise calling for such modification than through the cumbrous procedure of a suit." 9. The learned counsel for the respondent has tried to distinguish the aforesaid decision contending that when there is already a clause for bringing about modifications in the scheme, no alteration of that clause is possible, and all modifications necessary must be is adherence to the procedure contained therein. In support of that contention reference has been made to two decisions in Chameli Bibi v. Kanhaiyalal (A.I R.1973 Cal. 328) and Rangaswami Raju v. Rajapalayam Municipality (A.I R.1977 Madras 287). In the facts of the Chameli Bibi's case (A. I. R.1973 Cal. 328) there was no clause at all in the scheme for its modification and therefore that court expressed its opinion that a remedy of a party in such circumstance will be to file a fresh suit. But the learned single judge who rendered the decision has expressed in Para.19 of the judgment that in exceptional cases the court will be justified in exercising the inherent powers, otherwise the court should be extremely cautious to make use of that power. The Madras decision, cited supra, has considered a scheme which also did not contain a provision for the amendment or modification of any of its clauses. It took the view that the amendment sought for, if allowed, would modify the decree itself as there is no provision in the existing scheme. In the light of the Supreme Court decision cited above, I find it difficult to agree with the reasoning adopted by the Madras High Court that the civil court has no inherent power to modify the scheme by adding a clause thereto prescribing the mode of bringing about the modification. Such a reasoning is only self-imposing a restriction on the powers of the civil court which neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor any other law contemplated. Sometimes, due to inadvertence during the framing of a scheme, the framers would have omitted to include such a safety clause, but that inadvertence cannot be allowed to govern the whole working of the scheme in future and thereby render the scheme itself otiose. 10. Sometimes, due to inadvertence during the framing of a scheme, the framers would have omitted to include such a safety clause, but that inadvertence cannot be allowed to govern the whole working of the scheme in future and thereby render the scheme itself otiose. 10. The Bombay High Court in Gangaram v. K. R. Vinchurkar (A.I.R.1948 Bom.146) (DB) has held that the court can amend the scheme under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure even in the absence of a specific clause provided in such scheme. A single judge of the Allahabad High Court in Kailash Chandra v. Addl. Dist. Judge (A.I.R.1966 All.509) has considered a similar question. Following an earlier Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Ram Nath Bhargava v. Swami Goverdhan (A.I R.1936 All. 97), the High Court held that a scheme of administration framed in a suit under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be amended by exercising the inherent power of a civil court under S 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to meet the ends of justice. 11. I am in respectful agreement with what the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts have expressed regarding the use of the inherent powers in such a situation. The Supreme Court in the case reported is Ahmad Adam V. M.E. Makhri (A I.R. 1964 S C. 107) had justified alterations or modifications to be made in a scheme framed in a suit instituted under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of supervening considerations. Their Lordships made clear in Para.25 of the judgment that "by modifying the clause in a scheme, if in future an occasion arises for changing or altering the terms of the scheme, it should not be necessary to file a separate suit." I therefore hold that it is within the powers of the District Court to suitably amend the particular clause in the scheme which deals with the procedure to modify the scheme either by deleting the now unworkable limb of that clause or by adding to it such other words to make it effective and workable. That can be done, and must be done, by the court in order to enable itself to make such other modifications as are necessary to make the scheme attuned to the needs of the time. 12. That can be done, and must be done, by the court in order to enable itself to make such other modifications as are necessary to make the scheme attuned to the needs of the time. 12. In the light of the above stand that I take, I set aside the impugned order and remit the case back to the District Court for fresh disposal of I.A. No.183 of 1979 as per law and in accordance with the directions made above. No costs.