JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - This is an appeal under 5ec. 39 of the Arbitration Act directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge setting aside an award passed by the arbitrator on the objection of the respondents. 2. The appellant had entered into an agreement with the respondents in relation to supply of electrical energy. The respondents enhanced the tariff rate unilaterally and submitted the bills to the appellant at such enhanced rate. The appellant protested against such bills and requested that the bills should be prepared in accordance with the rate agreed upon. The respondents, therefore, threatened to disconnect the electric supply and ultimately disconnected the line on 30-12-1976. The appellant filed an application u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act invoicing the arbitration clause of the agreement and the said application was numbered as O. S. No. 127 of 1977. Before the learned Subordinate Judge the appellant also prayed for restoration of the electric line pending final adjudication by the arbitrator to be appointed. The Subordinate Judge having allowed the prayer of the appellant, the respondent preferred a miscellaneous appeal against the said order being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 120 of 1978. In the said miscellaneous appeal, a joint memo was filed and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, re-connection was given and the appellant paid at the new tariff rate and further the appellant agreed that if ultimately the arbitrator decided that the appellant was liable to pay arrear at the new tariff rate, then he would pay the same and Justice H. Mohapatra retired Judge of the Patna High Court, was appointed as arbitrator. The learned arbitrator entered into the reference and the respondents filed their statement of claims, Certain evidence was also taken before the learned arbitrator. After hearing both parties, the arbitrator passed an award on 19-2-1983. Against the said award, the respondents filed objection under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. The learned subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the award if the arbitrator contained error apparent on the face of the award so far as reference No. 3 is concerned inasmuch as the arbitrator held that the whole of the demand raised by the defendants prior to 17th May, 1979, was barred by {limitation. The learned subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the award if the arbitrator contained error apparent on the face of the award so far as reference No. 3 is concerned inasmuch as the arbitrator held that the whole of the demand raised by the defendants prior to 17th May, 1979, was barred by {limitation. The Subordinate Judge further held that in view of the provisions of Orissa Act 19 of 1981, which came into force before the arbitrator passed the award, the proceeding before the arbitrator stood abated and, therefore, the award was illegal on that score. The learned Subordinate Judge also held that the finding of the arbitrator that Orissa State Electricity Board is not entitled to receive any claim from the plaintiff in respect of their agreement dated 28th of April, 1951, was erroneous and beyond the scope of the reference since there was no reference on this score. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Subordinate Judge by the impugned order set aside the award in exercise of his powers u/s 30 of the Arbitration Act. Hence the present appeal. 3. Mr. R. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the power of the Court to interfere with an award of the Arbitrator is very limited and unless the Court finds an error apparent on the face of the award, it would not interfere with an award of the arbitrator. According to the learned counsel, the award being a non-speaking award, it is not possible for a Court to find any error on the face of the award. Relying on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Champsey Bhora Company v. The Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd. A. I. R. 1923 PC 66 the learned counsel submitted that an "error apparent on the face of the award" would mean an error which ex facie is apparent either on the face of the award or from any document appended thereto or incorporated therein. Since the award in question is a non-speaking and non-reasoned one, no error apparent on the face of the award could have been found by the learned Subordinate Judge and consequently, the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained. In support of this contention, the learned counsel places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Vulcan Insurance Co. In support of this contention, the learned counsel places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Maharaj Singh and Another. According to Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the appellant, the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to investigate into the question of limitation decided by the arbitrator and even if the arbitrator has committed any mistake of law, since no proposition of law is stated in the award which forms the basis of the award, the Court will have no jurisdiction to enter into the same. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Chellappan Vs. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Another, and a decision of this Court in the case of Secretary in-charge of Central Public Works Department of the Union of India and others v. Smt. Janaki Dei and others 46 (1978) C L. T. 171. On the question of abatement of the proceedings on account of Orissa Act 19 of 1981, the learned counsel contends that under the said Act, challenge to the validity of the tariff is barred and there is no award relating to the tariff of the respondents. So far as the third conclusion of the Subordinate Judge is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant says that the conclusion is erroneous and without jurisdiction and further having regard to the terms of reference, it was incumbent on the arbitrator to record a finding whether any sum remained legally to be paid under the agreement of 1961 Therefore, it cannot be said that the said finding of the arbitrator was beyond the scope of the reference. Alternately, the learned counsel submits that even if it is held that the said finding is beyond the scope of the reference, the same is severable from the rest of the award and, therefore, that part can be struck down by maintaining the remaining portions of the award. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relies on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mattapalli Chelamayya and Another Vs. Mattapalli Venkataratnam and Another, and The Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd. Vs. The U.P. Electricity Board, . 4. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relies on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mattapalli Chelamayya and Another Vs. Mattapalli Venkataratnam and Another, and The Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd. Vs. The U.P. Electricity Board, . 4. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. C. Rath, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that an award which runs contrary to the agreement is liable to be set aside and the Courts of law are to give effect to the agreement. The award in derogation of a binding contract between the parties is par no illegal and, therefore, it was within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to find out whether any portion of the award is contrary to the terms of the contract and for that purpose a Court can look into the contract. In that view of the matter, the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge cannot be held to be illegal. Mr. Rath, the learned counsel for the respondents, relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI). On the question of limitation, it is contended that the inference drawn from the facts by the Arbitrator is a clear question of law and therefore, the award of the arbitrator regarding the same being on the face of it erroneous, the Court was justified in setting aside the said conclusion. On the question of applicability of Orissa Act 19 of 1981, Mr. Rath, the learned coursel submits that in view of Section 3 of Orissa Act 19 of 1981, the arbitration proceeding stood abated and, therefore, it is the duty of the Court to see that an arbitrator follows and applies the law. The award of the arbitrator on this score ignoring the statutory provisions is manifestly erroneous and the Subordinate judge was justified in setting aside the award on that ground. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Seth Thawardas Pherumal Vs. The Union of India (UOI), and Iftikhar Ahmed and Others Vs. Syed Meharban Ali and Others. Coming to the last ground, i.e., with regard to the conclusion of the arbitrator that nothing is payable by the appellant, Mr. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Seth Thawardas Pherumal Vs. The Union of India (UOI), and Iftikhar Ahmed and Others Vs. Syed Meharban Ali and Others. Coming to the last ground, i.e., with regard to the conclusion of the arbitrator that nothing is payable by the appellant, Mr. Rath submits that it was not a point of reference to the arbitrator and, therefore, the conclusion of the arbitrator on that score is vitiated by legal misconduct. It is well-settled that an award cannot be sustained in law if it exceeds the scope of reference; Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. Vs. Prannath Vishwanath Rawlley, ; Gobardhan Das Vs. Lachhmi Ram and Others, and the decisions of this Court in Chairman, Chairman, The Orissa State Electricity Board and Another Vs. Jayashree Chemicals Ltd. and Others, and Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vs. Jajodia Overseas (P) Ltd., . 5. The rival contentions require careful examination but before examining the rival contentions, it would be profitable to note the points of reference made to the arbitrator and some general propositions of law governing the arbitration. The disputes referred to the arbitrator are : (1) Whether the minimum demand of the first party-consumer is to be deemed to have been reduced at any time to 35 K. W. without execution of a fresh agreement reducing the contracted demand ? (2) Whether the bills raised by the second party-Board from time to time after August, 1966, till the current agreement are legally payable either wholly or in part of the consumer ? (3) Whether any part of the demands raised by the Board is barred by limitation ? (4) Whether the petitioner (consumer) is liable to pay the delayed payment surcharge in respect of the demands raised prior to the current agreement on the facts of the case? (5) Whether the Board was justified to disconnect as they did in the present case for non-payment of the demands as per bills raised? In answer to these points of reference, the learned arbitrator came to the following conclusions : (1) The minimum contract demand of the Balasore Technical School is to be deemed to have been reduced to 31 K. W. from the 29th September, 1972, without the execution of fresh agreement incorporating the reduced quantity. In answer to these points of reference, the learned arbitrator came to the following conclusions : (1) The minimum contract demand of the Balasore Technical School is to be deemed to have been reduced to 31 K. W. from the 29th September, 1972, without the execution of fresh agreement incorporating the reduced quantity. (2) The bills raised by the Orissa State Electricity Board from time to time on the basis of C. P. Tariff rates after August, 1966, till current agreement are not legally payable either wholly or in part by the Balasore Technical School. (3) The whole of the demand raised by the Orissa State Electricity Board prior to the 17th May, 1979, is barred by limitation. (4) On the facts of this case, the Balasore Technical School is not liable to pay the delayed payment surcharge in respect of the demands raised by the Orissa State Electricity Board prior to the current agreement. (5) The Orissa State Electricity Board was not justified in disconnecting the supply, as they did on the 30th December, 1976 for non-payment of the demands as per the bills raised by them. Having answered the aforesaid points of reference made to him, the learned arbitrator further held : "The Orissa State Electricity Board is rot entitled to be paid anything by the Balasore Technical School in respect of their claim relating to the agreement dated the 28th April, 1961." 6. The position of law is rather well-settled that a civil Court does not sit in appeal against an award and the power of the Court when an award is challenged is rather limited. In the case of Union of India (UOI) Vs. A.L. Rallia Ram, the law was stated as thus : ".....An award being a decision of an arbitrator whether a lawyer or a layman chosen by the parties, and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary Courts. The Court is also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form or clerical errors, or decision on questions not referred. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary Courts. The Court is also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form or clerical errors, or decision on questions not referred. The Court has also power to remit the award when it has left some matters referred undetermined or when the awards indefinite, or where the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of the award. The Court may also set aside an award on the ground of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator, or that a party has been guilty of fraudulent concealment or wilful deception. But the Court cannot interfere with the award if otherwise proper on the ground that the decision appears to it to be erroneous. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement The award is the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the civil Courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the awards cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement. But it is now firmly established that an award is bad on the ground of error of law on the face of it, when in the award itself or in a document actually incorporated in it, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. An error in law on the face of the award means." you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. An error in law on the face of the award means." you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in a narrative a reference is made to contention of one party, that opens the door to setting first what that contention Is, and then going to the contract on which the parties' rights depend to see if that contention is sound.'...." An arbitration award cannot be set aside except on the specific ground provided for in the Act. No Court will have the power to review the arbitrator's conclusion or findings if he has acted within his authority and according to the principles of fairplay. The object of the Arbitration Act, in substance, is to oust the jurisdiction of the normal Courts except for the purpose of controlling the arbitrator and preventing misconduct. A Court in an application u/s 30 or Section 33 of the Arbitration Act cannot make sifting investigation and normally the Court should not set aside an award where the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of a tribunal of their own selection unless there has been something radically wrong and vicious in the arbitration proceeding. If an arbitrator in deciding a dispute before him does not indicate the principles of law on which he has proceeded, nor does he record any reasons, the award cannot be invalidated on that ground. It is only when the arbitrator proceeds to give reasons and lay down the principles which he has followed in arriving at his decision, then the Court would be competent to examine whether those reasons and principles are in accordance with law. It is not open to the Court to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion In the oft-quoted decision of the Privy Council in Champsey Bhora's case AIR 1923 PC 65 the Privy Council approved the decision in the case of Hodgkinson v. Fornie. It is not open to the Court to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion In the oft-quoted decision of the Privy Council in Champsey Bhora's case AIR 1923 PC 65 the Privy Council approved the decision in the case of Hodgkinson v. Fornie. (1857) 3 C. B. 189 where William, J. observed : "The law has for many years been settled, and remains so at this day, that, where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator, whether a lawyer or a layman, he is constituted the sole and final Judge of all questions both of law and of fact.........The only exceptions to that rule, are, cases where the award is the result of corruption or fraud, and one other, which though it is to be regretted, is now, I think, firmly established, viz., where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award, or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of the award. Though the propriety of this latter may very well be doubted, I think it may be considered as established." The aforesaid decision of the Privy Council has been followed by the Supreme Court in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan Vs. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., Indore, and Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Private Limited A.l.R. 1967 S. C. 1032. As to the meaning of the phrase "an error of law apparent on the face of the award" and as to when a Court can examine a document filed in an Arbitration proceeding, the best exposition of law has been made by the Supreme Court in the case of Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI), New Delhi. It was held in the said case by their Lordships; "The question whether a contract or a clause of it is incorporated in the award is a question of construction of the award. The test is, does the arbitrator come to a finding on the wording of the contract? If he does, he can be said to have impliedly incorporated the contract or a clause in it whichever be the case. But a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The principle of reading contracts or other documents into the award is not to be encouraged or extended. [See, Babu Ram v.. But a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The principle of reading contracts or other documents into the award is not to be encouraged or extended. [See, Babu Ram v.. Nanhemal, C. A. No. 107 of 1966, Dt. 5-12-1968 (SC)]. The rule thus is that as the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in the dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore, even when an arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him, but such mistake does not appear on the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it, the award will neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake." The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case quoted a passage from the decision of Lord Justice Diplock in 1962 (2) All. E. R S3 (Glacomo Costa Fu Andrea v. British Italian Trading Co, Ltd.), which may be profitably extracted hereunder : "It seems to me, therefore that, on the cases, there is none which compels us to hold that a mere reference to the contract in the award entitles us to look at the contract. It may be that in particular cases a specific reference to a particular clause of a contract may Incorporate the contract, or that clause of it in the award. I think that we are driven back to first principles in this matter, namely, that art award can only be set aside for error which is on its face, It is true that an award can incorporate another document as part of the award and, by reading them together, find an error on the face of the award." 7. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles of law, let me now examine the submissions of the learned counsel for either side. At the outset, it can be said without hesitation that the arbitrator neither has given any reasons for his findings nor has he laid down any principles of law on the basis of which he has formed his conclusion. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles of law, let me now examine the submissions of the learned counsel for either side. At the outset, it can be said without hesitation that the arbitrator neither has given any reasons for his findings nor has he laid down any principles of law on the basis of which he has formed his conclusion. Further no document has been appended to or has even formed a part of the award by implication and consequently, it would not be open for a Court to delve into any document and to find out the mental process of the arbitrator or the reasonings which weighed with the arbitrator and to examine the same. In paragraph 3 of the impugned Judgment of the learned Subordinate judge, he has held the conclusion of the arbitrator to be erroneous. The point of reference to the arbitrator was- "Whether any part of the demands raised by the Board is barred by limitation?" and the arbitrator's finding was, "the whole of the demand raised by the Orissa State Electricity Board prior to the 17th May, 1979 is barred by limitation". In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned arbitrator neither has given any reasons nor has he stated any legal basis for coming to the aforesaid conclusion. In that view of the matter, it was not open for the Subordinate Judge to hold that the finding of the arbitrator constitutes an error on the face of it. A similar question had come up before the Supreme Court in N. Chellappan Vs. In that view of the matter, it was not open for the Subordinate Judge to hold that the finding of the arbitrator constitutes an error on the face of it. A similar question had come up before the Supreme Court in N. Chellappan Vs. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Another, Rejecting the contention of the Board, the Supreme Court observed : "Where an arbitrator makes a mistake either in Jaw or in fact in determining the matters referred, but such mistake does not appear on the face of the award, the award is good not with standing the mistake, and will not be remitted or set aside." The Court had also observed : "...It is only when a proposition of law is stated in the award and which is the basis of the award and that is erroneous, can the award be set aside or remitted on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the record." The finding of the arbitrator so far as this head of claim is concerned, in the present case, is not based on any proposition of law and, therefore, no mistake of law can be said to have matter the Subordinate Judge is wholly without jurisdiction in holding that the finding of the arbitrator on reference No. 3 is an error on the face of it. 8. Coming to the question whether the arbitration proceeding stood abated in view of Orissa Act 19 of 1981, the learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that in view of the said provision, the arbitration proceeding shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from the arbitrator and the proceeding would be ceased to have effect. Orissa Act 19 of 1981.The Electricity (Supply) (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1981, came into force on May 15, 1981, the date on which the same was published in the Orissa Gazette and the award of the arbitrator is dated 19.2.1983. By the said amendment, Section 49A was introduced authorising the Board to revise certain tariffs. Section 3 of the said Amendment Act validates any amount realised or demand made or created by the Orissa State Electricity Board or by the State Government notwithstanding any agreement, undertaking, commitment or concession, referred to in Sub-Section (1) of Section 49-A or in any judgment or order of any Court. Section 3 of the said Amendment Act validates any amount realised or demand made or created by the Orissa State Electricity Board or by the State Government notwithstanding any agreement, undertaking, commitment or concession, referred to in Sub-Section (1) of Section 49-A or in any judgment or order of any Court. Section 3(c) of the Amendment Act is relevant for appreciating the correctness of the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge and the said provision is extracted hereunder : "all suits, applications or proceedings pending on the date of commencement of this Act in any Court or before any arbitrator, whether appointed by any Court or by the parties to such agreement, shall, in so far as they question the power of the said Board to levy uniform tariffs in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act or to revise the special tariffs fixed in such agreement, in disregard of the terms of such agreement, abate and any such proceeding before the said arbitrator shall cease to have effect and any reference for such arbitration shall be deemed to have been withdrawn from such arbitrator." The aforesaid provision makes it abundantly clear that what is prohibited is continuance of any arbitration proceeding where a consumer had questioned the power of the Board to levy uniform tariff in accordance with the principal Act, as amended by the Amendment Act or the power of the Board to revise the special tariff fixed in such agreement in disregard of the terms of such agreement. No part of the reference of the disputes referred to the arbitrator in the present case touches the question of the power of the Board to levy uniform tariffs in accordance with the principal Act, as amended by Orissa Act 19 of 1981 and in that view of the matter, the said provisions cannot have any application to the present arbitration proceeding. In fact, the appellant did not challenge the power of the Board to revise the tariff nor has the arbitrator given any finding on that score. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Subordinate Judge committed an error in conning to the conclusion that the arbitration proceeding stood abated by virtue of the provisions of Orissa Act 19 of 1981. Mr. Mohanty's contention on this score must be sustained. 9. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Subordinate Judge committed an error in conning to the conclusion that the arbitration proceeding stood abated by virtue of the provisions of Orissa Act 19 of 1981. Mr. Mohanty's contention on this score must be sustained. 9. The only other ground on which the Subordinate Judge has set aside the award is that the arbitrator gave an extraneous finding which is erroneous on the face of it. He has discussed this aspect of the case in paragraph 5 of the impugned order. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, the conclusion of the arbitrator to the effect that the Orissa State Electricity Board is not entitled to receive any claim from the plaintiff in respect of their agreement dated 28th of April, 1961 is on the face of it erroneous and is beyond the terms of the reference. Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits that it was not permissible for the Subordinate Judge to refer to different paragraphs of the plaint and some correspondence between the Board and the appellant in order to come to the conclusion that the finding of the arbitrator is erroneous, since neither the plaint nor the documents referred to by the Subordinate Judge formed a part of the award nor have they been appended to the award. There is ample force in the said submission of Mr. Mohanty. In accordance with the principles decided in Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI), New Delhi, referred to supra it was not permissible for the Subordinate Judge to refer to those documents to find out the so-called error in the conclusion of the arbitrator. Mr. Mohanty's contention, therefore must be sustained on this score. But the Subordinate Judge, in my view was fully justified in holding that it was outside the terms of the reference and therefore, must be held to be extraneous. Mr. Rath, the learned counsel for the respondents, very much relies on this aspect of the case. Mr. Mohanty's contention, therefore must be sustained on this score. But the Subordinate Judge, in my view was fully justified in holding that it was outside the terms of the reference and therefore, must be held to be extraneous. Mr. Rath, the learned counsel for the respondents, very much relies on this aspect of the case. There is no manner of doubt that an award must conform to the submissions both in substance and in form and if an arbitrator goes beyond the scope of the reference and decides questions not referred to him by the parties, then he must be held to have misconducted the proceeding and the award must be held to be vitiated on that score. The arbitrator's decision is final so long as it is within the scope of his authority, but the moment, the the arbitrator enlarges the scope of the reference, he commits an error to be corrected by a Court of law. In this particular case the terms of reference contained five disputes which were referred to the arbitrator. The arbitrator did answer these disputes. After answering all these disputes, however, the arbitrator further held: "The Orissa State Electricity Board is not entitled to be paid anything by the Balasore Technical School in respect of their claim relating to the agreement dated the 28th April, 1961" In my opinion, the arbitrator clearly excluded his jurisdiction in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion as it was not included within the terms of reference and the award must be held to be bad to that extent. 10. Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for the appellant, however submits that the aforesaid conclusion of the arbitrator is rather redundant and superfluous and in fact does not traverse beyond the scope of reference if the five disputes referred to him and the answers to those reference by the arbitrator are read together. I am unable to persuade myself to agree to the aforesaid submission of Mr. Mohanty. When five definite items of dispute had been referred to the arbitrator which he had answered he had no further jurisdiction to give any finding in respect of which no dispute had been referred to him. In my opinion, the arbitrator clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by stating something which is beyond the scope of the reference. 11. Mohanty. When five definite items of dispute had been referred to the arbitrator which he had answered he had no further jurisdiction to give any finding in respect of which no dispute had been referred to him. In my opinion, the arbitrator clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by stating something which is beyond the scope of the reference. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is whether on this ground the entire award has to be set aside or the rest of the award is to be allowed to be sustained by setting aside the invalid part, referred to earlier. The law on the subject has bee/i laid down by the Supreme Court in the The Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd. Vs. The U.P. Electricity Board, and Mattapalli Chelamayya and Another Vs. Mattapalli Venkataratnam and Another. According to the view expressed by their Lordships in the aforesaid cases, where an error which has occurred in the award relates to a matter which is distinct and separate from the rest of the award, the part which is invalid being separable from that which is valid, there is no justification for setting aside the entire award. In fact, in The Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd. Vs. The U.P. Electricity Board, after declaring a part of the award invalid and setting aside the same, the Supreme Court corrected the award itself. If a Court comes to a conclusion the same portion of the award is void but the remaining part contains a final determination of all questions submitted to the arbitrator, then the valid portion must be maintained after rejecting the invalid portion. At the same time, the invalid portion must be clearly separable in order that the award may be good in respect of the residue. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present award, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the portion which has been held by me to be invalid is separable from the rest of the award and the arbitrator has given his final decision on the five disputes referred to him which can remain even after the invalid portion being set aside. There is no inter-dependance and, therefore, the course of separation has to be adopted in the present case. There is no inter-dependance and, therefore, the course of separation has to be adopted in the present case. Consequently, the award of the arbitrator must be sustained and the portion of the award to the extent: "The Orissa State Electricity Board is not entitled to be paid anything by the Balasore Technical School in respect of their claim relating to. the agreement dated the 28th April, 1961. " Occurring at the end after answering the five disputes referred to the arbitrator, only must be set aside. The award, therefore, after exclusion of the invalid portion must be made a rule of Court. 12. In the result, therefore, this miscellaneous appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed