JUDGMENT M. M. Dutt, J.: In these Rules issued on the applications under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have, inter alia, challenged the vires of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. 2. The Corporation of Calcutta made a general valuation under S. 172(2) of the Act and assessed the annual value of the buildings belonging to the petitioners, in these writ petitions. Needless to say, the amount of annual value in each case was enhanced. After the petitioners were served with notice under S. 180 of the Act informing them of the increase in the annual value assessed under S. 172(2) of the Act, they filed their respective objections to the same under S. 181 of the Act. The objections were heard under S. 182 of the Act and the annual value of the buildings belonging to the petitioners were slightly reduced. The petitioners, being aggrieved by the enhancement of the valuation preferred appeals against the orders under S. 182 of the Act on the objections filed by them to the Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta under S. 183 of the Act. It may be stated here that S. 183 of the Act was amended by the Calcutta Municipal (Third Amendment) Act, 1970, by incorporating therein a new sub-s. (3A) which provides al follows : "(3A). No appeal under this section shall be entertained unless a consolidated rate payable up to the date of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined–– (a) by an order under S. 182, in the cost of all appeal to the Court of Small Causes. (b) by the decision of the Court of Small Causes, in the case of appeal to the High Court, has been deposited in the Municipal Office and such consolidated rate is continued to be deposited until the appeal is finally decided." The new sub-s (3A) came into force with effect from June 22, 1976. 3. The petitioners preferred the appeals under S. 183 without, however, depositing the consolidated rates as determined on their objections under S. 182 of the Act and as required to be deposited under sub-s. (3A). 3. The petitioners preferred the appeals under S. 183 without, however, depositing the consolidated rates as determined on their objections under S. 182 of the Act and as required to be deposited under sub-s. (3A). It appears that by an order dated January 29, 1981, it has been directed by the Chief Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta that no municipal appeal will be entertained with effect from January 30, 1981 unless consolidated rate is shown to have been deposited in the municipal office upto this date of presentation of the appeal on the valuation determined by an order under S. 182 of the Act of the Act and such consolidated rate is continued to he deposited until the appeal is finally decided. 4. As the petitioners have preferred the appeals without depositing the consolidated rates in the municipal office, their appeals were not entertained. Accordingly, the petitioners have, in their respective writ petitions, challenged the vires of sub-s. (3A) which have been introduced in S. 183 of the Act by the Calcutta Municipal (Third Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect June 22, 1976. 5. It appears that the question of sub-s. (3A) came up for consideration before Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 11874(W) of 1982 (Chattar Singh Baid & ors. v. The Corporation of Calcutta & ors.). The learned Judge overruled the contention of the petitioners of that case that sub-s. (3A) was ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, and discharged the Rule. An appeal has also been filed against the said judgment of the learned Judge being F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983. As common question of law and fact are involved in the writ petitions as also in the said appeal, and as common arguments have also been made in all these matters, we propose to dispose of the same by this judgment. 6. The principle argument has been by Mr. Dipankar Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, M/s Gillander Arbuthnot & Co. in Matter No. 1312 of 1981. Apart from the question s to the vires of sub-s. (3A), Mr. Ghosh has taken a new point that sub-s (3A) is not applicable to his clients, that is, M/s. Gillander Arbuthnot & Co. Before the point is indicated a few facts may be stated. in Matter No. 1312 of 1981. Apart from the question s to the vires of sub-s. (3A), Mr. Ghosh has taken a new point that sub-s (3A) is not applicable to his clients, that is, M/s. Gillander Arbuthnot & Co. Before the point is indicated a few facts may be stated. In this case, the general valuation made under S. 172(2) of the Act become effective from the commencement of the 4th quarter of 1974-75. The notice under S. 180 of the Act though dated December 13, 1975 was served on the petitioner on December 19, 1977, that is, after sub-s. (3A) was incorporated in S. 183 of the Act and enforced with effect from June 22, 1976. Thereafter, the petitioner filed its objection under S. 181 of the Act on December 9, 1976. The objection was decided on November 21, 1979 and the appeal to the Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta was filed by the petitioner on December 20, 1979. 7. It is submitted by Mr. Ghosh that the appeal of the petitioner filed in the Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta is not governed by the amended S. 183 including sub-s. (3A) thereof, but by the un-amended S. 183 which did not contain sub-s (3A). The reason for this contention is that as soon as the annual valuation was made under S. 172(2) of the Act and a notice under S. 180 of the Act was prepared before the amendment of S. 183, a right of appeal became vested in the petitioner against the enhanced annual valuation to the Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta under the provision of S. 183 of the Act before the same was amended. In other words, sub-s. (3A) is not applicable to the appeal preferred by the petitioner and, accordingly, the petitioner is not required to deposit the consolidated rate of continue to deposit the same pending the disposal of the appeal as required under sub-s. (3A). 8. In support of the above contention, Mr. Dipankar Ghose has placed much reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs Hosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 221 . In that case, the appellant submitted to the Sales Tax Officer, Aloka, a sales tax return in Form IV for the first quarter. Dipankar Ghose has placed much reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs Hosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 221 . In that case, the appellant submitted to the Sales Tax Officer, Aloka, a sales tax return in Form IV for the first quarter. Notice in Form AI calling upon the assessee to produce evidence in support of the said return having been issued by the Sales Tax Officer, the assessee produced his account books. Not being satisfied by the inspection of the account books as to the correctness of the return and being of opinion that the taxable turnover exceeded rupees two lakhs, the Sales Tax Officer submitted the case to the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Amravati, for assessment. On January 25, 1949, the Assistant Commissioner issued a fresh notice and fixed the case for disposal on February 5, 1949. Eventually, after various further proceedings, the Assistant Commissioner on April 8, 1950 assessed the assessee, to the best of his judgment, for a certain sum of money. Being aggrieved by the order of assessment, the assessee on May 10, 1950 preferred an appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under S. 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The appeal not having being accompanied by the proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred, the authorities declined to admit the appeal. The assessee moved the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, by a revision application against the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner, contending that his appeal was not governed by the proviso to S. 22(1) of the said Act as amended on November 25, 1949 by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1949, but was governed by the proviso to S. 22(1) of the Act as it stood when the assessment proceeding, were started, that is before the said amendment. The Board of Revenue took the view that as the order of assessment was made after the amendment of the section and the aIppea1 was filed thereafter, such appeal must be governed by the provisions of law as it existed at the time the appeal was actually filed, and that the law as if existed before the filing of the appeal could not apply to the case. The assessee moved the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Board of Revenue. The High Court dismissed the application and also the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by Special Leave. 9. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Janardan Reddy v. The State, AIR 1951 SC 124 and in Ganpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 409 that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure, but it is the matter of substantive right. Further, this right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and before the decision is given by, the inferior court. It has also been observed that such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment; an intention to interfere with or to impart or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. Thereafter, it has been observed as follows : "Finally, Shri Ganapathy Aiyar faintly urges that until actual assessment there can be no 'lis' and, therefore, no right of appeal can accrue before that event. There are two answers to this plea. Whenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to that proposition by another a 'lis' arises. It may be conceded, though not deciding it, that when the assessee files his return a 'lis' may not immediately arise, for under S. 11(1) the authority may accept the return as correct and complete. But if the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness of the return and calls for evidence, surely a controversy arises involving a proposition by the assessee and an opposition by the State. The circumstance that the authority who raises the dispute is himself the judge can make no difference, for the authority raises the dispute in the interest of the State and in so acting only represents the State. It will appear from the dates given above that in this case the 'lis' in the sense explained above arose before the date of amendment of the section. It will appear from the dates given above that in this case the 'lis' in the sense explained above arose before the date of amendment of the section. Further, even if the 'lis' is to be taken as arising only on the date of assessment, there was a possibility of such a 'lis' arising as soon as proceedings started with the filing of the return or, at any rate, when the authority called for evidence and started the hearing and the right of appeal must be taken to have been in existence even at those dates. For the purpose of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceeding, and not the decision itself." 10. In Gillander’s case, it has been already stated that the assessment of general valuation under S. 172(2) of the Act was made before the incorporation of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act. The notice under S. 180 of the Act is dated December 30, 1975 which is also before the incorporation of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that as soon as the assessment was made and enhanced with effect from the commencement of 4th quarter of 1974-75 a 'lis' arose and a right of appeal to the Presidency Small Cause Court under the provision of S. 183 of the Act before it was amended became vested in the petitioner. In any event, the 'lis' arose with effect from December 30, 1975 which is the date of notice under S. 180 of the Act after the notice was served. The date of the notice being earlier than the amendment of the section, the right of appeal became vested in the petitioner under the un-amended provision of S. 183. In other words, it is the contention of the petitioner that sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act will have no manner of application to the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had a vested right of appeal under the un-amended provision of S. 183 of the Act. 11. On the other hand, Mr. In other words, it is the contention of the petitioner that sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act will have no manner of application to the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had a vested right of appeal under the un-amended provision of S. 183 of the Act. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Counsel for the Corporation submits that the 'lis' would arise only when an objection is preferred by the assessee pursuant to a notice under S. 180 of the Act is taken to be the starting point of 'lis' or proceedings, the date to be taken into consideration is the date of service of the notice and not the date which appears on the face of the notice, namely, the date on which the notice was prepared. It is submitted that if the municipal authority prepares a notice and keeps it in the file, that notice according to the well-known principles of law of notice is no notice at all. The notice became a notice only when it is served on the party to whom it is addressed. Accordingly, it is contended that the 'lis' arose after the service of the notice under S. 180 of the Act and that having taken place after the amendment of S. 183 of the Act there is no question of the petitioner's vested right of appeal under the un-amended provision of S. 183. 12. The question to be considered is the stage at which the 'lis' arose. As has been observed in the above decision of the Supreme Court whenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to that proposition by another, a 'lis' arises. Before the general valuation, the assessee had been paying municipal taxes at a particular rate. Under the impugned assessment, the annual validation of the building belonging to the petitioner had been enhanced with effect from 4th quarter of 1974-75. The enhancement of the annual valuation, in our opinion, gives rise to a 'lis' between the parties. In other words, the enhancement of the present annual valuation of the building with effect from 1974-75 would constitute the subject matter of dispute between the assessee and the Corporation. The enhancement of the annual valuation, in our opinion, gives rise to a 'lis' between the parties. In other words, the enhancement of the present annual valuation of the building with effect from 1974-75 would constitute the subject matter of dispute between the assessee and the Corporation. It may be that a notice under S. 180 of the Act was served on the assessee, the petitioner herein, on December 7, 1976, that is, after the amendment of S. 183. But, that is, in our opinion, quite irrelevant. The test is when as a matter of fact the dispute started or the 'lis' arose. The service of the notice is merely a ministerial act. The notice is served inasmuch as a dispute had already been raised by the Corporation by enhancing the annual value of the building belonging to the assessee. The notice corroborates that a dispute had already arisen before the issuance of the notice, for the notice refers to the enhancement of the annual value of the building. In the Supreme Court decision of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (supra), the proposition was the return filed by the assessee and the opposition was the act of the authority concerned calling for the evidence, and so a controversy or a 'lis' arose. In the instant case, the proposition was present by the assessee of the rate of tax on the basis of the particular annual valuation of the building in question and, as soon as the valuation of the building of the petitioner. There is, therefore, considerable force in the contention of the petitioner that as soon as the impugned assessment was made enhancing the annual value of the building of the petitioner, a right of appeal to the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta in accordance with the provision of S. 183 of the Act before it was amended became vested in the petitioner. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the Corporation that the 'lis' arose only after the service of the notice under S. 180 of the Act or the starting of the proceeding under S. 182 of the Act. The provision of sub-s. (3A) of S. 182 of the Act will have no application to the case of the petitioner. 13. The provision of sub-s. (3A) of S. 182 of the Act will have no application to the case of the petitioner. 13. In Matter No. 652 of 1982 (Radhakrishen Jhunjhunwala v. The Corporation of Calcutta) and in Matter No. 1103 of 1982 (Turner Morrison Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta), the assessment enhancing the annual value of the building in question having been made prior to the amendment of S. 183 of the Act, for the same reasons as in Gilliander’s case, sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act will not apply to the petitioners in respect of these two matters also. 14. Now we may deal with the said F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983 (Chatter Singh Baid & Others v. The Corporation of Calcutta) and writ petition being Matter No. 1896 of 1981 (Sushila Debi Goenka v. The Corporation of Calcutta). It may be stated here that as both the said F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983 and Matter No. 1896 of 1981 involve common questions of law and fact, the learned Counsel for the parties advanced their contention in the said F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983. 15. It has been already noticed that the learned Judge overruled the contention of the appellants, Chatter Singh Baid and others, that sub-s. (3A) was ultra vires. Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It is submitted by Mr. Dipankar Ghosh, learned Counsel that sub-s. (3A) nullifies or destroys the right of appeal under S. 183 of the Act and, as such, it is an arbitrary and unreasonable piece of legislation. It is contended by him that the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution has been extended by different decisions of the Supreme Court and it is not confined only to the question of equality; it will apply to an arbitrary enactment of the legislature and an arbitrary act of the executive. In support of his contention, Mr. Ghosh has placed reliance upon a few decisions of the Supreme Court which will be started presently. In E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , it has been inter alia, observed by the Supreme Court that Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. Ghosh has placed reliance upon a few decisions of the Supreme Court which will be started presently. In E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , it has been inter alia, observed by the Supreme Court that Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , it has been observed by Bhagabati, J. (as his lordship then was) that the principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipre sense. In a later decision in Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473 , S. 303 of the Penal Code was struck down by the Supreme Court under Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary and oppressive. 16. It is, however, submitted by Mr. Pradip Ghosh that while an executive action may be interfered with by the Court under Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of arbitrariness, provision of law duly enacted by a competent legislature cannot be struck down under Article 14 on the ground that it is arbitrary. We are unable to accept this proposition of law. The element of equality under Article 14 envisages on arbitrariness laid down by Bhagabati, J. (as his lordship then was) in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra). Arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality under Article 14. It does not stand to reason why, when a piece of legislation suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness, it cannot be struck down. Indeed, in Mithu v. State of Punjab (supra), the Supreme Court, a noticed earlier, has struck down the provision of S. 303 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that such a law must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and oppressive and, as such, ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus not only an executive act, but also a legislative enactment can be set at naught under Article 14 if it is arbitrary and unreasonable. 17. It is the contention of the appellants that the restriction imposed on the right of appeal under sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act is so onerous as to make the right illusory and, accordingly, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. It is the contention of the appellants that the restriction imposed on the right of appeal under sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act is so onerous as to make the right illusory and, accordingly, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, we may first of all deal with the contention of the Corporation that right of appeal being the creature of a statute, if there be no provision for an appeal, the question of such a right will not arise. It is submitted that while the legislature is the authority to confer a right of appeal, it has also the authority to put restriction on the exercise of such right. It is pointed out on behalf of the Corporation that in many cases, the Supreme Court found that the provision of a particular statute providing for a right of appeal is so onerous as to make the right of appeal almost illusory, but in none of such cases, the Supreme Court has declared the provision ultra vires the Constitution. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Himat Lal Hiralal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 403 . In that case, one of the questions was whether the writ petition was barred by the alternative remedy of appeal as provided for in the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court, however, found that the said remedy was of an onerous and burdensome character inasmuch as before the assessee could avail of it, he had to deposit the whole amount of tax. It was held by the Supreme Court that such a provision could hardly be described as an adequate alternative remedy. The question whether the provision for appeal was ultra vires or not was not mooted before the Supreme Court. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme in M. G. Abrol v. Shantilal Chotelal & Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 . It was held that the remedy by way of an appeal against the order of confiscation and imposition of a large penalty under the Sea Customs Act is not an effective remedy, when no appeal can be filed unless the large penalty imposed upon the petitioner has first been deposited. In this case also, the provision for appeal was not challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of Constitution. In this case also, the provision for appeal was not challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of Constitution. These decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be said to be laying down the principle that the vires of a provision imposing restriction on the right of appeal cannot be assailed on the ground that it has made such right onerous and, as such, arbitrary and unreasonable. 18. It is urged by Mr. Pradip Ghosh for the Corporation that a provision for appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial authority is not a sine qua non of reasonableness. In other words, his submission is that even if there be no provision for appeal, statute cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The answer to this question, in our opinion, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that an absence of a provision for appeal will render the statute in question unreasonable or arbitrary. We may refer to the following decisions of the Supreme Court which have been relied upon by the Corporation in support of its contention : Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1803 ; K. L. Gupte v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & ors., AIR 1968 SC 302; Chintalingm v. Government of India, AIR 1973 SC 474, Ram Verma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 1918 ; Ram Bachhan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1404 and Gopal Narayan v. State of U. P., AIR 1968 SC 370. In all these cases, the statutes concerned were challenged as conferring uncontrolled and uncanalised power on the executive without any provision for appeal. The Supreme Court, however, overruled the contention as other remedies were provided for or some guidelines were laid down in the statutes. 19. On the other hand, Mr. Dipankar Ghosh, learned Counsel has placed reliance upon some decisions of the Supreme Court in which it has been laid down that a right of appeal is an important safeguard against any unreasonable act of an authority and is a gesture of statutory fairness in disposal of cases (See Jyoti Parshad v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 1602; Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1832 and Fatehchand v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1825 ). 20. 20. The most important decision with which we are concerned very much are Ananta Mills v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 1234 and Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 2097 . Mr. Dipankar Ghosh has placed much reliance upon these two decisions particularly on the last mentioned one. In paragraph 19 of the judgment in Nand Lal’s case (supra), the Supreme Court observes as follows : "It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reason why the legislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory (vide the last decision in Ananta Mill’s Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 1234 ). Counsel for the appellants, however, urged that the conditions imposed should be regarded as unreasonably onerous especially when no discretion has been left with the appellate or revisional authority to relax or waive the condition or grant exemption in respect thereof in fit and proper cases and therefore, the fetter imposed must be regarded as unconstitutional and struck down. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reason. In the first place, the object of imposing he condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeals and revision that impede the implementation of the ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to sub-ss. (8) and (9) it is clear that the each deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of exaction to in the nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in unlawfu1 possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantees is correlated to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which we are informed, varies in the State of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed are i.e., the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the appellant or petitioner. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed are i.e., the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the appellant or petitioner. Having regard to those aspects, particularly the meager rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. The challenge to S. 18 (7) must, therefore, fail." 21. It is, however, submitted by Mr. Pradip Ghosh for the Corporation that no such principle of law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Anant Mill’s case (supra) as contained in paragraph 19 and, accordingly, the said observation is an obiter dictum. In Anant Mill’s case, it has been held that the requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which seeks to challenge the imposition of the quantum of tax has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially in view of the fact that discretion is vested in the appellate Judge to dispense with the above requirement. Further, it has been observed that the right of appeal being the creature of a statute, the legislature while granting the right of appeal can impose conditions for the exercise of such right so that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against, in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. In Anant Mill’s case the expression "so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right of appeal illusory" is not there or the principle embodied in that expression has not been laid down. But that will not make the observation in Nand Lal’s case (supra) and obiter dictum. In Anant Mill’s case the expression "so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right of appeal illusory" is not there or the principle embodied in that expression has not been laid down. But that will not make the observation in Nand Lal’s case (supra) and obiter dictum. Moreover, when in the view of the Supreme Court in Nand Lal’s case that such a principle of law has been laid down in Anant Mill’s case (supra) that the legislature while granting the right of appeal can impose condition for the exercise of such right so long as the condition is not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restriction rendering that right almost illusory. The legal position that emerges from these two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Anant Mill's case and Nand Lal's case are that the right of appeal being the creature of a statute, the legislature while granting the said right can impose condition for the exercise of such right. The legislature, however, cannot impose condition for the exercise of such right making it so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restriction tendering the right of appeal almost illusory. The object of imposing the said condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeals that impede the implementation of the statute, and that there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. 22. The next question which is important for the purpose of this appeal is whether the conditions imposed under sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act are so onerous, arbitrary and unreasonable as to make the right of appeal illusory. Sub-section (3A) provides for the deposit of the consolidated rate as the condition precedent to the entertainment of the appeal. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the expression "consolidated rate" must necessarily mean both owner's and occupier's shares of the rate. Thus, it is submitted, if a tenant wants to prefer an appeal he has to deposit not only the occupier's share of the consolidated rate, but also the owner's share of such rate. It is contended that this condition is onerous, unreasonable and harsh and has made the right of appeal nugatory. 23. We are, however, unable to accept the above contention. It is contended that this condition is onerous, unreasonable and harsh and has made the right of appeal nugatory. 23. We are, however, unable to accept the above contention. What is to be deposited under sub-s. (3A) is the “consolidated rate payable". In this connection, we may refer to S. 191 of the Act which provides, inter alia, that one-half of the consolidated rate shall be payable by owners of the land and buildings and the other half by the occupiers thereof. It is, therefore, apparent from S. 191 that the owner has to pay the owner's share of the consolidated rate and the occupier of the occupier's share of such rate. The word "payable" in sub-s. (3A) must be understood in the light of the provision of S. 191. In other words, the owner or the occupier preferring an appeal against an order of assessment will have to deposit the owner's share or the occupier's share of the consolidated rate, s the case may be. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that sub-s. (3A) enjoins deposit of both shares of consolidated rate before an appeal preferred by an owner or an occupier is entertained. The learned Judge, in our opinion, has rightly concluded that the expression "consolidated rate payable" in sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act is identical with the amount the appellants would be lawfully liable to pay under the other relevant provisions of the Act. 24. The next contention of the appellants is based on clause (a) of sub-s. (2) of S. 207 of the Act. Section 207(2)(a) provides as follows : "(1) * * * * * * (2) If, when the objection has been finally determined or the valuation has become final under S. 183, the previous valuation is altered, then–– (a) any sum paid or deposited under S. 183 in excess shall be refunded or allowed to be set-off against any present or future demand of the Corporation under this Act." 25. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the provision of S. 207(2)(a) is not arbitrary but also makes the right of the appellants to get back the money practically useless. It is complained that the appellants cannot straightway get the refund of the excess amount, as the Corporation may set it off against its demand. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the provision of S. 207(2)(a) is not arbitrary but also makes the right of the appellants to get back the money practically useless. It is complained that the appellants cannot straightway get the refund of the excess amount, as the Corporation may set it off against its demand. It has been held by the learned Judge that it is the option of the appellants to ask for refund of the excess amount or for adjustment of the same against present or future demand of the Corporation. In our opinion, the language of clause (a) is plain and simple. By the first part, clause (a) enjoins the Corporation to refund the excess sum deposited under S. 183. By the second part, clause (a) has conferred a discretion on the Corporation to set-off the excess amount against the present or future demand of the Corporation on the request of the appellant. The word "allowed" is very significant. It presupposes prior request by the appellant for the setting-off the excess amount towards the present or future demand of the Corporation. The Corporation has been granted the discretion to allow such a request of the appellant. If no such request is made, the Corporation cannot adjust the excess amount as against any of its demands, present or future, but is bound to refund the amount to the appellant. There is, therefore, in our opinion, no substance in the contention of the appellants that the appellants cannot straightway get the refund of the excess amount inasmuch as the Corporation may set off against its demand. The contention is, accordingly, overruled. 26. In support of their contention that sub-s. (3A) suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, it is pointed out on behalf of the appellants that the Act does not contain any provision permitting the appellate Court to relax or dispense with the onerous provision of sub-s. (3A) in a proper case. It is submitted that as a result of the absence of such a provision, the condition imposed under sub-s. (3A) has become arbitrary and unreasonable and has rendered the right of appeal partially illusory and nugatory. It is submitted that as a result of the absence of such a provision, the condition imposed under sub-s. (3A) has become arbitrary and unreasonable and has rendered the right of appeal partially illusory and nugatory. We are afraid, there is no authority for the proposition that whenever any condition is imposed on the exercise of the right of appeal, there must be a provision conferring power on the appellate authority to relax or dispense with such condition. It is difficult to lay down any proposition of law that unless there is a provision empowering the appellate authority to relax or dispense with such a condition, the right of appeal will become illusory or nugatory, as contended on behalf of the appellant. Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellants on the observation of the Supreme Court in Anant Mill's case (supra), already noticed, that the requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which seeks to challenge the imposition or the quantum of tax has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially if view of the fact that discretion is vested in the appellate Judge to dispense with the above requirement. We are unable to read this observation as laying down that the absence of a provision conferring on the appellate authority to relax or dispense with the condition will nullify the right of appeal. It has been categorically stated in the observation that the deposit of the amount as the condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal will not have the effect of nullifying the right of appeal. In making this statement of law, the Supreme Court has also taken into consideration the power of the appellate Judge to dispense with such a condition precedent. But surely the Supreme Court has not meant to lay down that wherever there is a condition imposed on the right of appeal, unless the appellate Judge is empowered to dispense with such a condition, it will have the effect of nullifying the right of appeal. Indeed, in Nand Lal's case (supra), such a contention was made on behalf of the appellant, but that was overruled on the ground that the condition could not be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. Indeed, in Nand Lal's case (supra), such a contention was made on behalf of the appellant, but that was overruled on the ground that the condition could not be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. The proper test, therefore, is whether the condition that has been imposed is so onerous and unreasonable as to make the right of appeal illusory. The appellants have failed to establish that the provision of sub-s. (3A) is onerous, unreasonable and harsh. Therefore, the absence of any provision in relaxation of the condition imposed on the right of appeal is immaterial. 26A. Moreover, the object of imposing such condition under sub-s. (3A) is to prevent frivolous appeals and to secure payment of tax by an appellant. Secondly, there is a prior remedy under S. 182 of the Act which provides for hearing of the objections of the assessee. We, therefore, do not think that the condition under sub-s. (3A) is so onerous, unreasonable and harsh as to make the right of appeal illusory or nugatory. 27. It is next contended on behalf of the appellants that the provision of sub-s. (3A) is not workable, for unless the rate bill is presented, the tax is not payable; consideration. In this connection, we may refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Section 191 of the Act to which we have already referred relates to payment of the consolidated rate. Section 191 runs as follows :–– "One-half of the consolidated rate shall be payable by the owners of the lands and buildings and the other half by the occupiers thereof. The payment shall be made in quarterly instalment and the quarters shall be taken to commence on the first day of April, the first day of July, the first day of October and the first day of January. The instalments shall be payable on or before the fifteenth day of May, the fifteenth day of August, the fifteenth day of November and the fifteenth day of February, respectively, for such quarters." 27A. Section 235 of the Act provides for the presentation of bills Sub-section (1) of S. 235 provides that when the consolidated rates or any instalment thereof is due, the Commissioner shall with the least practicable delay, cause to be presented to the person liable a bill for the sum due. Section 236 of the Act relates to the notice of demand. Section 236 of the Act relates to the notice of demand. Sub-section (1) of S. 236 provides that if the amount of the consolidated rates is not paid into the Municipal Office within the time allowed under S. 191, the Commissioner may cause to be served upon the person liable a notice of demand in the form on Schedule VIII or, in a form to the like effect. 28. Thus it appears that the liability to pay the consolidated rate arises under S. 191 of the Act which also fixes the lime within which the consolidated rate for a particular quarter has to be paid. If the amount of the consolidated rate is not paid within the time allowed under S. 191 then, in view of S. 236(1) of the Act, the Corporation will be entitled to demand the consolidated rate and, thereafter, to proceed for the recovery of the same. Section 236(1) does not refer to the provision of S. 235, nor does it require presentation of the bill as the condition precedent to the making of a demand. Thus, the liability to pay the consolidated rate arises under S. 191 of the Act. Section 235 is a step in the procedure for recovery of the consolidated rate as rightly contended by Mr. Pradip Ghosh for the Corporation. It merely informs the person liable of the fact that he is in arrear of the amount of consolidated rate as specified in the bill. The bill is a notice to the person liable reminding him his liability to pay within the time mentioned in S. 191 of the Act. But the liability of the assessee to pay tax arises under S. 191 of the Act. 29. Much reliance has, however, been placed on behalf of the appellants on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta and others, AIR 1973 Cal. 488 , where it has been laid down that though the liability to be taxed arises under the different provisions of the Act, the liability to pay arises only on the bills being presented. In that case, the question was whether the Corporation could recover tax from the petitioner for a certain period after the presentation of unsigned bills. 488 , where it has been laid down that though the liability to be taxed arises under the different provisions of the Act, the liability to pay arises only on the bills being presented. In that case, the question was whether the Corporation could recover tax from the petitioner for a certain period after the presentation of unsigned bills. It was observed by the learned Judge that in view of the procedure and practice followed by the Corporation and, further, in view of the fact that the petitioner had all along been aware of the said practice, and had paid in the past, the Corporation dues on the so-called unsigned bills, it would not be appropriate to allow the petitioner to urge the point. Thereafter, the learned Judge observed that the liability to pay would arise on the bills being presented. This observation, in our opinion, is obiter. In this connection, we may refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Mathura Prosad v. Corporation of Calcutta, 48 CWN 336, which has been relied upon by the Corporation. In the case, it has been held that the liability for the consolidated rates arises under S. 149 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, corresponding to S. 191 of the Act with which we are concerned, and that presentation of a bill to the person liable to pay is not a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against him for the recovery of consolidated rate. The Bench decision supports the view we have taken. But apart from anything else, sub-s (3A) of S. 183 of the Act itself imposes the liability on an appellant to deposit the consolidated rate as the condition precedent to the entertainment of the appeal. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the appellants that the provisions of sub-s. (3A) is not workable unless the bill is presented. The contention is, accordingly, rejected. 30. We may now consider the next argument of the appellants directed against the validity of sub-s. (3A) which, as noted earlier, has been inserted in S. 183 of the Act by the Calcutta Municipal (Third Amendment) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the 'Amendment Act'. It is urged that the imposition of the new condition of deposit of the consolidated rate has no nexus with the object of the Amendment Act, that is, augmentation of revenue. It is urged that the imposition of the new condition of deposit of the consolidated rate has no nexus with the object of the Amendment Act, that is, augmentation of revenue. In the statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment Act, it has been inter alia, stated as follows : "In view of the financial crisis of the Corporation of Calcutta it was considered necessary to amend certain sections of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 with a view to augmenting the resources of the Corporation of Calcutta and enforcing certain administrative measures." It is the contention of the appellants that the amount that is deposited by all appellant under sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 is either refunded or adjusted as provided in S. 207(2)(a) of the Act and, therefore, there is no question of augmentation of revenue. It is, accordingly, submitted that there is no nexus between the declared object of the Amendment Act, namely, augmentation of revenue and the provision of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act. It is also the contention of that appellants, the sub-s. (3A) provides for 'deposit' and so the deposit cannot be 'revenue'. Thus, it is submitted, there is no question of augmentation of revenue. 31. In our opinion, the above contention is wholly misconceived. In case sub-s. (3A) had not been inserted in S. 183 of the Act, the impugned consolidated rate would not be required to be deposited as a condition precedent to the entertainment of the appeal. The Corporation might not proceed against the appellant for the recovery of the new consolidated rate inasmuch as the finality of the valuation is, as per S. 184 of the Act also subject to the provision of S. 183 of the Act. Thus, the Corporation would be deprived of the immediate realization of the new consolidated rate pending the disposal of the appeal. In view of the amendment of S. 183 and insertion of sub-s. (3A) therein, the appellant has to deposit the new consolidated rate and also to go on depositing the same until the appeal is finally decided. Thus the Corporation has not to wait till the disposal of the appeal and, thereafter, start proceeding for recovery which is also time consuming. In this sense, sub-s. (3A) can be said to have been enacted for the purpose of augmenting revenue. Thus the Corporation has not to wait till the disposal of the appeal and, thereafter, start proceeding for recovery which is also time consuming. In this sense, sub-s. (3A) can be said to have been enacted for the purpose of augmenting revenue. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that as the amount has to be deposited under sub-s. (3A), it is not revenue. It is absurd to think that because the consolidated rate is directed to be deposited it loses the character of revenue. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention, and it is rejected. For the reasons aforesaid, we are also unable to accept the contention of the appellants that the deposit of the consolidated rate is a forced loan and not revenue or that the enactment of sub-s. (3A) is a fraud on the power as it has been done in the guise of augmenting revenue. These contentions are without substance and are overruled. 32. Lastly, it has been finally argued on behalf of the appellants that the impugned sub-s. (3A) imposes an unreasonable fetter on the access to Court which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and, accordingly, it is ultra vires Article 14 and also Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution which was in force at the time sub-s. (3A) was inserted in S. 183 of the Act by the Amendment Act. The contention, in our opinion, is equally untenable. It has been already held by us that the provision of sub-s. (3A) is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. The condition imposed under sub-s. (3A) has nothing to do with the basic structure of the Constitution. It is true that there should be easy access to Court for justice, but that does not mean that if any amount is charged for access to Court, that will be against the basic structure of the Constitution. The position, however, is not so. If that be so, payment of Court fee may be said to strike at the root of the basic structure. The amount that is required to be deposited is not in the nature of Court fee or any imposition for access to court, but is the consolidated rate which an assessee filing an appeal under S. 183 is liable to pay. The amount that is required to be deposited is not in the nature of Court fee or any imposition for access to court, but is the consolidated rate which an assessee filing an appeal under S. 183 is liable to pay. It is only a mode of realization of the consolidated rates and not a fetter on the access to Court. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention and it is rejected. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellants. 33. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Judge is affirmed and the appeal being F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983 is dismissed. For the same reasons, the Rule Nisi being Matter No. 1896 of 1981 is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. The appellants in the said F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983 and the writ petitioners in the said matter No. 1896 of 1981 is granted liberty to comply with the provision of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act within four weeks of the reopening of the Court after long vacation. 34. As regards the Rules Nisi being Matter No. 1312 of 1981, Matter No. 652 of 1982, Matter No. 653 of 1982, Matter No. 654 of 1982, Matter No. 1312 of 1981 and Matter No. 1103 of 1982, in view of our decision that the appeals filed by the petitioners in these Rules are not governed by sub-s. (3A) but by the unnamed provision of S. 183 of the Act, these Rules are made absolute. Let writs in the nature of Mandamus issue commanding the respondents in these Rules to forbear from giving any effect to the provision of sub-s. (3A) of S. 183 of the Act in regard to the respective appeals of the petitioners which shall be entertained under the un-amended provision of S. 182 of the Act and disposed of in accordance with law. There will be no order for costs in the said appeal or in any of the above matters. Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J.: I agree. F.M.A.T. No. 2031 of 1983 dismissed; Rule No. 1896 of 1981 discharged; Rules No. 1312 of 1981, 652 of 1982 653 of 1982, 1103 of 1982, 654 of 1982, 1312 of 1981 made absolute.