JUDGMENT This is a defendant's appeal arising out of the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 516 of 1982 by the learned Additional District Judge, Ninth Court, Alipore, revising those of the learned Munsif, Fifth Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 385 of 1977. 2. The plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises as described in the schedule to the plaint, on the grounds of default, material deterioration to the condition of the suit premises and on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff. 3. By a notice to quit dated April 4, 1977, the plaintiff terminated the defendant's tenancy directing him thereby to suit and vacate the premises on the expiry of the month of May 1977. 4. However, the defendant not having vacated the suit premises in spite of the notice, the plaintiff filed the instant suit for khas possession and mesne profits. 5. The defendant contested by filing a written statement denying inter alia the ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and there was a further denial to the effect that the plaintiff actually required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. 6. On the aforesaid facts the parties having gone into evidence, the learned Munsif held that there could be no eviction on the ground of default in payment of rents as well as for the alleged material deterioration to the condition of the suit premises The learned court, however, held that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises in suit but he was of the view that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and consequently he dismissed the suit. 7. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned lower appellate Court took a different view of the matter. He, however, confirmed the finding of the learned trial court that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises but contrary to the findings recorded by the learned trial court, the learned Judge to the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff had been able to prove by dependable evidence that he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and on the aforesaid findings allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 8. 8. Being aggrieved, the defendant has now come up in appeal before this Court. 9. Appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant, Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate, made two fold contentions His first contention was that the plaintiff not being the owner of the suit premises was not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, in view of the provisions of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Secondly, he contended that in view of the subsequent events, viz., the mother-in-law of the plaintiff having expired and three out of his four daughters having been married, it could not be said that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Bhuniya the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. contended that the plaintiff as a member of a co-operative society having been allotted a plot of land and he having constructed a house on the said plot by taking loan from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, where he was employed and he having since repaid the loan, the plaintiff for all practical purposes is the owner of the suit premises, though the formal deed of transfer is yet to be executed by the co-operative society. 11. Regarding reasonable requirement it was contended by Mr. Bhuniya that in spire of his mother-in-law having died during the pendency of the appeal and three out of his four daughters having been married, the plaintiff still reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. 12. Coming now to the rival contention of the parties, it was submitted by Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant that 'ownership' as contemplated in S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 is absolute ownership and the plaintiff, under no circumstances, could be said to be the absolute owner of the suit premises, when the formal deed of transfer was yet to be executed in his favour. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the Bench decision of this Court in Jogamaya Pakhira v. Santisudha Bose, reported in ILR (1979) 2 Cal. 70. There the question arose whether a permanent lessee could be described as the owner within the meaning of S. 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the Bench decision of this Court in Jogamaya Pakhira v. Santisudha Bose, reported in ILR (1979) 2 Cal. 70. There the question arose whether a permanent lessee could be described as the owner within the meaning of S. 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. While answering the point in the negative the learned Court observed that the term 'owner' as used in the Section should receive its ordinary connotation in the sense of meaning a person who has the full or absolute ownership of the disputed property. However, the point at issue in the said decision was whether a permanent lessee could be said to be an owner within the moaning of S. 13(1)(ff) and the Court's answer was in the negative. 13. The instant case, however, stands on a different footing, the facts being entirely different and it has to be decided whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff could be said to be the owner of the suit premises within the meaning of S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act. 14. According to Mr. Bhuniya appearing on behalf of the respondent 'ownership' as contemplated in S. 13(1)(ff) of the Act does not mean absolute ownership and in support of his contention he referred to two decisions of this Court reported in Jiban Roychowdhury v. Taramoyee Debi, AIR 1979 Cal. 339 and Kartick Chandra Jana v. Rekha Das, 82 CWN 735. 15. In the decision reported in AIR 1979 Cal. 339 , a life interest holder was found to be the owner within the meaning of S. 13(1)(ff) and in the decision reported in 82 CWN 735, thika tenants were also said to be coming within the definition of owner as contemplated by the said Section. 16. Mr. Bhuniya further contended that in view of the change in the concept of ownership, the word has to be interpreted reasonably and in consonance with justice. It should not be interpreted in such a way as to make the section unworkable. 17. Now, so far the plaintiff is concerned, it is in evidence that the land on which the suit premises stands was allotted to him by a co-operative society, he being a member of the said society. It should not be interpreted in such a way as to make the section unworkable. 17. Now, so far the plaintiff is concerned, it is in evidence that the land on which the suit premises stands was allotted to him by a co-operative society, he being a member of the said society. The plaintiff was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India and by raising loan from the Life Insurance Corporation, he constructed the suit premises and let it out to the defendant. He has since repaid the entire loan and is awaiting executing of the formal deed of transfer. The plaintiff produced letters of allotment issued to him by the co-operative society (vide Exts. 7, 8 and 9) and he also produced municipal tax receipts showing payment of municipal taxes by him in respect of the premises in suit (Exts. 5 series). 18. It also appears that as security for the loan raised by the plaintiff, the land on which the suit premises is situated as well as the premises itself stand mortgaged to the Life Insurance Corporation of India Mr. Bhuniya, in my view, was substantially right in contending that unless the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises, he could not have mortgaged it as security for repayment of the house building loan raised by him. Similarly, without being the owner, the plaintiff also could not let out the suit premises to the defendant and appropriate the rents realised from the defendant for his own purposes. 19. In my judgment, though the formal deed of transfer is yet to be executed in favour of the plaintiff by the co-operative society, the plaintiff has in him all the trappings of ownership in respect of the premises in suit. 20. In this connection, Mr. Bhuniya referred to S. 27(iii) of the Income Tax Act which provides that "a member of a co-operative society to whom a building or part thereof is allotted or leased under a house building scheme of the society shall be deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof". 21. 20. In this connection, Mr. Bhuniya referred to S. 27(iii) of the Income Tax Act which provides that "a member of a co-operative society to whom a building or part thereof is allotted or leased under a house building scheme of the society shall be deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof". 21. Similarly, S. 4(7) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 to which also reference was made by him provides that "where the assessee is a member of an association of persons, being a co-operative housing society, and building or a part thereof is allotted or leased to him under a house building scheme of the society, the assessee shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be the owner of such building or part and the value of such building or part shall be included in computing the net wealth of the assessee; and, in determining the value of such building or part, the value of any outstanding instalments of the amount payable under such scheme by the assessee to the society towards the cost of such building or part and the land appurtenant thereto shall, whether the amount so payable is described as such or in any other manner in such scheme be deducted as a debt owed by him in relation to such building or part". 22. The above provisions in the allied legislations, support Mr. Bhuniya's contention that for all practical purposes the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premise, and as a mailer of fact, he has been exorcising all the rights of ownership in respect thereof. The execution of the deed of transfer by the co-operative society in his favour is now only a formality. 23. Mr. Bhuniya in this connection also referred to a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar v. Sahay Properties and Investments Co. (P) Ltd. reported in 144 ITR 357. In that case the assessee paid the entire consideration and was in actual physical possession of the entire properties. The assessee was also empowered by the vendor to use the properties in whatsoever manner the assessee liked and enjoy the entire usufructs thereof. As in the instant case the assessee there also paid the consideration money in full. In that case the assessee paid the entire consideration and was in actual physical possession of the entire properties. The assessee was also empowered by the vendor to use the properties in whatsoever manner the assessee liked and enjoy the entire usufructs thereof. As in the instant case the assessee there also paid the consideration money in full. Considering the aforesaid circumstances the learned Court held that the assessee was the owner of the property within the meaning of S. 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 24. In my judgment, the nature of right that the plaintiff has so far acquired in the suit premises makes him the owner thereof for all practical purposes, including his right to evict the tenant under S. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act. To interpret otherwise is to ignore certain new concepts of ownership making thereby the provision of S. 13(1)(ff) unworkable even to genuine cases which the legislature never intended. 25. In view of the nature and circumstances of the case, it is immaterial whether the formal deed of transfer has been executed in favour or the plaintiff or not. 26. Coming now to the question of reasonable requirement, the suit premises comprises three rooms. The plaintiff resides in a rented accommodation consisting of two rooms only. 27. The defendant, as it appears, was inducted by the plaintiff into the suit premises in the year 1973 and the plaintiff shifted to the rented house. The plaintiff who has since retired, was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India at that time and the daughters were unmarried. Maybe, for convenience he shifted to the rented house at Baghbazar, though the accommodation there was smaller and the rental high. Maybe, that somehow he squeezed himself there keeping in view the location of the rented house wherefrom he could conveniently attend his office and his daughters, their respective educational institutions. 28. The plaintiff has since retired and three of his daughters have been married. Simply because at some point of time he did not find it convenient to live in his own house, which is distantly situated from the heart of the Calcutta metropolis and squeezed himself with a bigger family. In a much smaller accommodation, it cannot by itself be a ground for refusing his claim to live in his own house. 29. Simply because at some point of time he did not find it convenient to live in his own house, which is distantly situated from the heart of the Calcutta metropolis and squeezed himself with a bigger family. In a much smaller accommodation, it cannot by itself be a ground for refusing his claim to live in his own house. 29. So far the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff of the suit premises is concerned, the referred lower appellate court decided the point in his favour. Before this Court a petition was filed by the defendant-appellant stating that the plaintiff's mother-in-law, who had been living with him, is since dead, a fact not disputed by the plaintiff. 30. At present, the plaintiff's family comprises himself, his wife, a grown up unmarried daughter and a married daughter with a child, who it is alleged has left her matrimonial home under unfortunate circumstances and is now a part of her father's family. 31. Out of the three rooms in the suit premises the plaintiff requires one for himself and his wife, one for the two daughters and the remaining one as drawing room and for other multifarious purposes including accommodation of his married daughters, who occasionally visit his house and stay with him. Besides, being a retired man he is paying a rent of Rs 200/- while receiving Rs. 125/- from the defendant. His tenancy also stands terminated by a suit notice. 32. These are all facts which prima facie support the plaintiff's case of requirement. It can hardly be said to be a case of mere desire. To compel such a person to live life-long in a rented accommodation depriving him thereby all the comforts of living in one's own house which obviously he must have built for a peaceful and comfortable living after his retirement, could never have been the intention of the legislature in incorporating S. 13(1)(ff) in the statute book. 33. The two rooms in the rented home where obviously for compelling reasons he somehow squeezed himself with his family members and where his stay is precarious, as a rented accommodation generally is, can by no standard be said to be a reasonably suitable accommodation and to compel the plaintiff to live there for the rest of his life would be defeating the true intention of the legislature. 34. 34. Incidentally, the learned lower appellate court has found that the ration of the married daughter of the plaintiff who is living with him, is still being drawn by the plaintiff which prima facie shows that she is a part of the plaintiff's family. 35. I am unable to accept Mr. Chatterjee's contention that since there has not been any matrimonial action so far, the story of the girl's living with her father even after marriage due to matrimonial unhappiness, is nothing but a myth I do not think that simply for getting a decree for ejectment, a father would make out falsely a story of his married daughter's matrimonial unhappiness, a situation, which any father worth the name would shudder even to conceive. 36. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances above, I am of the view that even with the existing strength of his family the plaintiff would require at least three rooms for a reasonably comfortable living, which the owner of a house cannot be denied. 37. In the above view of the matter, I am inclined to hold that the learned lower appellate court was quite justified in concluding that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises for all practical purposes and that he also required the suit premises for his own uses and occupation. 38. The appeal, as such, fails and is dismissed on contest. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court are hereby affirmed. 39. However, in modification of the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court, the defendant is allowed time till the expiry of the month of March 1986 to quit and vacate the suit premises provided he goes on depositing amounts equivalent to rent in the learned trial Court. In default of payment of anyone of these instalments, the decree shall become executable at once. 40. The parties arc directed to bear their own costs of this appeal. 41. No further order need be made on the application which shall be deemed to have been disposed of. Let the records along with a copy of this judgment be remitted to the learned trial court as expeditiously as possible. Appeal dismissed.