Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 404 (MAD)

The Kanyakumari District Co-operative Central Bank Employees Union, rep by its Ganeral Secretary v. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep by Secretary

1985-10-07

RATNAM

body1985
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Kanyakumari District Co-operative Central Bank Employees Union. One Meenakshia Pillai was working as a driver under the second respondent Bank. On 12th August, 1975, while he was driving the vehicle MDK 3838 it was involved in an accident. With reference to this incident the driver was suspended on 30th September, 1975. Four charges were framed against the driver and they were as under:— (i) Wilful damage to the properties of the Bank; (ii) Gross negligence in discharge of duty; (iii) Incurring of an expenditure in a sum of Rs. 1.472.25 in repairing the vehicle MDK 3838 involved in the accident; and (iv) Involvement of the vehicle of the Bank in another accident on 25th April, 1975 and expenditure of a sum of Rs. 1,010.52 in repairing there of. The driver was asked to submit an explanation and he denied the charges. Though some criminal proceedings were taken against the driver in respect of the accident on 12th August, 1975, it appears that subsequently, it ended in his acquittal. Even so, the domestic enquiry against the petitioner was proceeded with on the charges referred to earlier. The concerned officer found that the charges against the driver had been established and pursuant to that the driver was reverted as a peon. Against this order, the driver preferred an appeal, but the appeal was also dismissed. Subsequently, the petitioner wrote to the Labour Officer. Nagercoil, demanding that the reverted driver should be restored to his post as driver. Thereupon, the second respondent was asked to file his counter which was done and further efforts at conciliation having failed, the Labour Officer submitted his report of 23rd August, 1977. By G.O.Ms. No. 1214, Labour and Employment, dated 12th October, 1978 the first respondent considered that there was no case for being referred for further adjudication. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this writ petition. 2. What is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the first respondent had almost, while declining to refer this dispute for adjudication, arrogated to itself the functions of the Labour Court, or other adjudicating authority, in that it had concluded that the charges against the driver had been proved in the domestic enquiry which held that the punishment of reversion was also not excessive. Reliance in this connection was also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the decision in Ram Avtar Sharma and other v. State of Haryana and another 1. However, the learned Additional Government Pleader for the first respondent and the counsel for the second respondent pointed out that unless it is established that the refusal to refer the dispute for adjudication is rested on extraneous or irrelevant grounds, no exception can be taken to the order so declining to make the reference. 3. Under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the appropriate Government should first entertain an opinion that an Industrial Dispute exists or is apprehended. Thereafter, it may, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute for adjudication. Without the formation of an opinion, the Government cannot proceed to deal with the question of either making a reference or decline to make it. Necessarily, therefore, before forming the opinion with a view to exercise the discretion to refer or not to refer, it would be necessary for the Government to examine the materials. It is true that such an examination need not be very elaborate or in great depth and detail. At the same time, the discretion vested in the Government under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be exercised without a reference to any material, for, in such a case it would be extremely doubtful whether any opinion at all would have been entertained by the Government with reference to the issue of reference. Therefore, it is that, while on the one hand the Government should form an opinion and on the basis of such opinion it has to deal with the issue of referring the case for further adjudication, such opinion cannot be a substitute for the eventual conclusion that may be arrived at by the adjudicating authority in the event of a reference being made. Even so, there cannot be a mechanical reference of all disputes by the Government in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no dispute that the power under Sec, 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is one of discretion, which has to be exercised in a proper and reasonable manner after entertaining an opinion on the facts and circumstances of a particular case regarding the manner in which that discretion has to be exercised. There is no dispute that the power under Sec, 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is one of discretion, which has to be exercised in a proper and reasonable manner after entertaining an opinion on the facts and circumstances of a particular case regarding the manner in which that discretion has to be exercised. In this case, it is seen that the driver had involved the vehicle of the Bank in accidents at least on three occasions catalogued in paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit. As a result of that, the Bank had been put to loss of property and also avoidable expenditure directly attributable to the negligence of the driver. It was on this basis that the driver was found guilty of the charges framed against him in the course of the domestic enquiry after affording him a full and fair opportunity. The punishment imposed was not one of dismissal, but reversion to the post of peon. These, in my view, would be relevant matters to be considered in the formation of the opinion by the Government prior to exercising its discretion one way or the other under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act Otherwise, the order declining to refer the dispute would be subject to the criticism that no materials at all were taken into account, and, therefore, the Government had not formed any opinion in regard to the question of referring the dispute for further adjudication or not. So long as the considerations taken into account to form an opinion and to exercise powers of reference one way or the other are not extraneous, irrelevant and not germane, no exception can be taken to the ultimate order passed by the Government in its discretion under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is recognised that the appropriate Government has to prima facie determine whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony and if the grounds on which or the reasons for which the Government declined to make a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, are irrelevant, extraneous or the germane to the determination, then the aggrieved party would be entitled to move by a writ of mandamus. It is also well settled that in cases where the order holding the charges of misconduct proved was unreasonable or perverse or was actuated by mala fides or even if the penalty imposed on the worker was totally disproportionate to the misconduct, then, the exercise of the powers of reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be withheld. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances and also the nature of the punishment imposed on the driver, the first respondent had formed an opinion that this is not a case where the order of reversion passed is an unreasonable one or perverse or actuated by mala fides . Even with reference to the question of punishment, the first respondent was of the opinion that it was adequate and proper. It was in that view that the first respondent declined to make the reference and in doing so, the first respondent cannot be stated to have acted upon the extraneous or irrelevant matters. Under these circumstances, no exception can be taken to the order of the first respondent declining to make a reference. Consequently, the rule nisi is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.