Judgment :- 1. The Second Appeal arises from a suit for perpetual injunction restraining trespass. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the decree was confirmed in appeal. The plaintiff-appellant appears to have filed an application for amendment of the plaint in the appellate court. When the appeal was dismissed for default that application also happened to be dismissed. Subsequently the appeal was restored to file and was disposed of on merits without adverting to the application for amendment The plaintiff-appellant has therefore raised before this court the following questions: 1. Whether the lower appellate court was justified in dismissing the amendment application solely on the ground that the appeal was once dismissed for default? 2. Whether the lower appellate court has acted illegally in not restoring the amendment application after the appeal was restored on file? 2. The learned counsel for the appellant, placing reliance on the decision in Shivaraya v. Sharnappa, AIR 1968 Mysore 283 and Rami Reddi v. Padma Reddy, AIR. 1978 A.P. 30 contended that once the appeal was restored to file the interlocutory application also stood revived and the court below should have considered that application on merits while disposing of the appeal. The Mysore High Court, relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in Saranatha Ayyangar v Muthiah Mooppanar, AIR. 1934 M d. 49 held: "The question whether the restoration of suit revives the ancillary orders passed before the dismissal for default of suit depends upon the terms in which the order of dismissal for default is passed by the trial court and also the terms in which the trial court or the appellate court has restored the suit in question. If the Court passes an order dismissing the suit for default without any reference to the ancillary orders and such a suit is restored by the court which dismissed it for default or by the appellate court, then the ancillary orders passed in the suit get revived after the order of restoration of the suit is passed. If the Court passes an order dismissing the suit for default without any reference to the ancillary orders and such a suit is restored by the court which dismissed it for default or by the appellate court, then the ancillary orders passed in the suit get revived after the order of restoration of the suit is passed. But where the court which dismisses the suit specifically vacates the ancillary orders passed therein and the court restoring such a suit does not advert to ancillary orders so vacated, then the ancillary orders would not get revived even if there is restoration of the suit." In the Madras decision referred to above, the view held was: "The question whether the restoration of a suit does not restore the interlocutory orders or matters as between the parties to the suit, should be decided with reference to the intention of the officer who passed the order restoring the suit As a matter of general rule, the intention would be to restore the suit and all incidental matters. If the is anything expressly appearing against the view that all the interlocutory matters are restored, then one would hold that they are not so restored." The High Court of Andhra Pradesh also considered the effect of restoration of interlocutory orders passed in the suit prior to the dismissal and said: "Once the order of dismissal is set aside the plaintiff must be restored to the position in which he was situated when the court dismissed the suit for default. Therefore, it follows that the interlocutory orders, which had been passed before the order of dismissal, would also be revived along with the suit when the order of dismissal has been set aside and the suit has been restored." 3. Even though the question that arose for consideration in these decisions was the effect of the interlocutory orders passed prior to the dismissal of the suit, the ratio of the decision will apply to a case where the question is whether consequential orders on dismissal of the suit would stand vacated on restoration of the suit. When restoration of the suit or appeal is allowed, the parties are to be restored to the same position in which they were situated when the court dismissed the suit or appeal. When restoration of the suit or appeal is allowed, the parties are to be restored to the same position in which they were situated when the court dismissed the suit or appeal. Then on restoring the appeal dismissed for default, the ancillary matters disposed of in consequence of such dismissal must also get restored and the consequential orders passed on dismissal of the suit or appeal should automatically get vacated. 4. The application for amendment filed by the appellant before the appellate court must therefore be deemed to have been pending when the appeal was finally heard and disposed of after restoration. The lower appellate court was clearly in error in not having considered that application on merits. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is a case in which amendment should have been allowed for a proper and effective adjudication of the dispute between the parties and that in the interests of justice it is necessary that this court allows the same granting leave. The suit related to 14 cents of land over which the plaintiff claimed possession on the basis that the property is included in Ext. Al sale deed dated 19-10-1123. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the owner of the eastern property, was attempting to trespass into the property after interfering with the boundary. The defendant denied the plaintiff's title and possession. The trial court issued a commission for local inspection. The Commissioner filed Ext. Cl report and Ext. C1 (a) sketch. Oral evidence was also recorded. On the issue whether the plaintiff was entitled to the injunction prayed for, the trial court, after discussion of the evidence, concluded that the injunction is not allowable. This finding is on the reasoning that the evidence adduced by both the parties is quite insufficient to hold as to which party is entitled to be in possession of the property on the basis of title and the remedy for the parties is to file a suit for declaration of title in respect of the disputed property and locate the suit property by proper identification with reference to the boundaries and the Survey Number as detailed in Ext. Al, BI and the title deed in respect of the property belonging to the wife of the plaintiff. Al, BI and the title deed in respect of the property belonging to the wife of the plaintiff. The lower appellate court in confirming the decree dismissing the suit has also stated that there is absolutely no believable evidence let in by the plaintiff to come to the conclusion that he was in possession of the plaint schedule property on the date of the suit and there is also lack of evidence to find that the plaint schedule property is included in the assignment deed in favour of the plaintiff. 6. In the nature of the claim put forward by the plaintiff and in the light of what has been found by the courts below, it has become necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of declaration of title. It is for that purpose that leave was sought for by making an application before the lower appellate court. It cannot be said that the application is unduly belated or that any serious prejudice would be caused to the defendant if the amendment is allowed. The learned counsel for the respondent-defendant pointed out that it is open to the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. It is only to avoid multiplicity of suits and for effective adjudication of the controversies between the parties that the courts often exercise power to grant leave for amendment at any stage of the proceedings. 7. On the facts of the present case, I do not think that the application filed by the appellant before the lower appellate court which has not been properly disposed of should be left out of consideration. The leave sought for amendment of the plaint has to be granted compensating the respondent by costs. The interlocutory application will therefore stand allowed on condition of the appellant paying the respondent a sum of Rs. 500/- as costs within one month from this date. In the result, the appeal will stand allowed and the decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit remanded to the trial court for disposal afresh in accordance with law if the above direction is complied with and in default the appeal shall stand dismissed. The parties will bear their costs in the appeal. They are directed to appear before the trial court on 3rd February, 1986. The parties will bear their costs in the appeal. They are directed to appear before the trial court on 3rd February, 1986. I. A. No. 4805 of 1975 filed in A.S.13 of 1978 shall also be forwarded to the trial court. The appellant will get refund of the court fee in case of remand.