JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the IInd, IIIrd, and IVth year B.E. and M.E. students of Engineering Faculty of the Allahabad University, for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Registrar dated 17-8-1984 (annexure 3 to the writ petition). Asking the Assistant Registrar (Accounts) not to accept fees for revaluation from B.E. and M.E. candidates and to refund the fee, if already deposited for revaluation by the said candidates, as the Executive Council, vide its resolution No. 147 dated July 3, 1984 abolished revaluation. The Allahabad University introduced the revaluation system of scripts in the year 1974 in the Engineering Faculty and that continued until the aforesaid order dated 17-8-1984 was passed by the Registrar. The B.E. and M.E. students, who were not satisfied with the marking done by the examiners, applied for revaluation. Application for revaluation of script was to be made within 30 days of the date of declaration of the results. The examinations relating to the session 1983-84 ended in June 1984 and the results were declared for the Ist, IInd, IIIrd and IVth year on 18th July, 24th July, 25th July and 3rd August, 1984 respectively. Some of the students applied for revaluation and paid the necessary fee. It is at that stage that the petitioners came to know that the revaluation system was abruptly discontinued by the University. The contentions of the petitioners are as follows:- (i) that -abolition of revaluation violated 'Art. 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as, the revaluation system has been continuing in all other Faculties of Allahabad University, (ii) that the abolition of revaluation violated principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioners, (iii) that the abolition is irrational and inexpedient, as the system of revaluation proved to be very useful and efficacious and (iv) that the Executive Council travelled beyond its jurisdiction in having abolished the revaluation system, as the draft proposed by the Academic council, recommending the abolition of revaluation from the examination of 1983, was amended without its approval in violation of sub-s. (4) of S. 52 of the Uttar Pradesh Universities Act, 1973 (for-short the Act 1973). 2. We have heard Sri G. N. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. P. Gupta, for the opposite party No. 1 at length. 2. We have heard Sri G. N. Varma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. P. Gupta, for the opposite party No. 1 at length. We do not agree with Sri Varma that the discontinuation of the revaluation scheme infringed Article 14 of the Constitution of India in any way. The Engineering Faculty like other Faculties of the Allahabad University is a class by itself and the petitioners cannot successfully urge violation of Article 14 on the ground that the system of revaluation was extinguished only in the Engineering Faculty and not in other Faculties. The petitioners could have pleaded violation of Article 14 only when there was discrimination amongst the students of B.E. and M.E. Engineering Faculty inter se. The scheme having been abolished from the Engineering Faculty itself, there is no violation of Article 14. 3. Then the question is whether the impugned order dated 17-8-1984 and the resolution, passed by the Executive council, deleting the Ordinance. providing for revaluation of scripts can be challenged on the ground that before abolishing the revaluation no opportunity was given to the petitioners of being heard and that the system which was very useful and rational was done away with without any rhyme and reason. 4. Sri Gupta submitted that denial of right to ask for revaluation to examinees, who were 'dissatisfied with the results did not visit them with adverse civil consequences and, therefore, there was no violation of principles of natural justice. It was also argued by him that a question whether the provision for revaluation should be retained or discontinued, related to the matter of policy and no right was wested with the students of Engineering Faculty to force the Faculty to retain the provision for revaluation. We agree with the submissions of Sri Gupta. The Executive Council of the University is the Chief Executive cum legislative body. An Ordinance was made by the Executive Council for having introduced revaluation system. The said Ordinance providing for revaluation has been repealed by another Ordinance. There is no duty of the Legislative Body, which the Executive council is, to observe the principles of natural justice. Moreover, it is a matter of policy whether a given system relating to conduct of examinations is to be retained or abolished and the petitioners cannot compel the Executive council to retain the provision for revaluation, howsoever useful, beneficial or efficacious it may be. Moreover, it is a matter of policy whether a given system relating to conduct of examinations is to be retained or abolished and the petitioners cannot compel the Executive council to retain the provision for revaluation, howsoever useful, beneficial or efficacious it may be. We are fortified in taking this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth AIR 1984 SC 1543 . In the said case the petitioners challenged cls. (1) and (3) of Regn. 104 of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards Regulations 1977 on the ground that the impugned clauses were violative of the principles of natural justice. Clause (1) of the Regn. 104 entitled a candidate who appeared at the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination, to apply for verification of marks in any particular subject. The clause created a rider that the verification would be restricted to checking whether all the answers have been examined and that there has been no mistake in totalling of marks for each question in the said subject and that no revaluation of answer books or supplements shall be done. Clause (3) dis entitled a candidate from claiming revaluation or disclosure or inspection of the answer books. The High Court rejected the contention of the petitioners that the cls (1) and (3) were invalid on the ground that the principles of natural justice were violated. The Supreme Court approving this view of the High Court said (Para 12) : "In our opinion, the High Court was perfectly right in taking this view and in holding that Process of evaluation of answer papers or of subsequent verification of marks" under cl. (3) of regn. 104 does not attract the principles of natural justice since no decision making process which brings about adverse evil consequences to the examinees is involved. (3) of regn. 104 does not attract the principles of natural justice since no decision making process which brings about adverse evil consequences to the examinees is involved. The principles of natural justice cannot be extended beyond reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried to such absurd lengths as to make it necessary that candidates who have taken a public examination should be allowed to participate in the process of evaluation of their performances or to verify the correctness of the evaluation made by the examiners by themselves conducting an inspection of the answer books and determining whether there has been a proper and fair valuation of the answers by the examiners." Supported by the decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that the validity of deletion of the Ordinance providing for revaluation cannot be attacked on the ground that the principles of natural justice were violated. Whereas the High Court of Bombay held that the clauses (1) and (3) cannot be declared invalid on ground of violation of principles of natural justice, the said High Court observed that the prohibition against the inspection or disclosure of the answer papers and other documents and the declaration made in the impugned clause that they are "treated by the Divisional Board as confidential documents" do not serve any of the purposes of the Act and hence these provisions are ultra vires. Disapproving this view of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed (Para 16) : "In our opinion, the aforesaid approach made by the High Court is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide that policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity." So the legislative powers exercised by the Executive Council can be impugned only on the ground that it travelled beyond the powers so vested in it and not on the ground that abolition of the revaluation scheme was inexpedient or irrational. This being a matter of policy, the petitioner have no right to force the Executive Council to retain the system of revaluation. 5. Then we come to the important legal plea that was raised by Sri Varma. He drew our attention to Sections 25 and 52 of the Act, 1973. Section 25 provides that the Academic council shall be the principle academic body of the University and subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, may advice the Executive Council on all academic matters including matters relating to examinations, conducted by the University. Sub-section (3) of S. 52 of the Act provides that the Executive council may, from time to time, make new additional Ordinance of may amend or repeal the Ordinances referred to in sub-ss. (1) and (2). The proviso to sub-sec. (3) carves out an exception to the legislative powers of the Executive council as conferred by sub-sec. (3). Sub-section (3) of S. 52 of the Act provides that the Executive council may, from time to time, make new additional Ordinance of may amend or repeal the Ordinances referred to in sub-ss. (1) and (2). The proviso to sub-sec. (3) carves out an exception to the legislative powers of the Executive council as conferred by sub-sec. (3). Clause (b) of the proviso is material for our purposes and the proviso and clause (b) read thus : "Provided that no ordinance shall be made effecting the conditions and mode of appointment and duties of examiners and the conduct or standard of examinations or any course of study except in accordance with a proposal of the Faculty or Faculties concerned and unless a draft of such Ordinance has been proposed by the Academic Council." Sub-section (4) of S. 52 prohibits that the Executive council shall not have power to amend any draft proposed by the Academic council under sub-sec. (3) but may reject it or return to the Academic council for reconsideration either in whole or in part together with any amendments which the Executive council may suggest. So the scheme of the Act 1973 is that the Academic council being the principle academic body may advise the Executive council in the matters relating to examinations conducted by the University. The Executive Council is vested with the wide legislative powers by sub-sec. (3) and in exercise of such powers it may make new or additional Ordinances or may amend or repeal the existing Ordinance referred to in sub-ss. (1) and (2). So far as the legislative powers regarding Ordinances affecting the conduct or standard of examinations are concerned they are circumscribed by twin conditions, as laid down in clause (b) of the proviso to sub- sec. (3) and they are, (1) that no Ordinance effecting the conduct or standard of examinations shall be made except in accordance with a proposal of the Faculty or Faculties concerned, and (2) that no such Ordinance shall be made unless a draft of such Ordinance has been passed by the Academic council. The Executive council does not have power to amend any draft proposed by the Academic council under sub-sec. (3) but it has power either to reject draft or return the same for reconsideration to the academic council with its suggestions. The Executive council does not have power to amend any draft proposed by the Academic council under sub-sec. (3) but it has power either to reject draft or return the same for reconsideration to the academic council with its suggestions. The Faculty board of Engineering proposed to the Academic council the abolition of revaluation system. Having accepted the proposal of the Faculty board, the Academic council passed resolution No. 31 date 10th Sept. 1982 as follows : "It was resolved that the recommendation of the faculty board of Engineering be accepted and the revaluation of scripts under the Faculty of Engineering be abolished from the Examinations of 1983" Emphasis supplied). Then the resolution was sent to the Executive council. Instead of accepting the aforesaid resolution as such, the Executive Council resolved as under : "It was resolved that the recommendation of the Academic council be accepted and provision of revaluation of scripts under the Faculty of Engineering, be deleted from the Ordinances for revaluation of scripts which will be effective from 1984 examinations. (Emphasis ours). The argument of Sri Varma is that in view of sub-sec. (4) of S. 52, the Executive Council has no power to amend any draft, proposed by the Academic council under sub-sec. (3). His submission is that the aforementioned resolution is a draft Ordinances within the meaning of cl. (b) of the proviso and that the Executive Council had no power to amend the said draft Ordinance in view of sub-sec. (4) of S. 52. Whereas the Academic council sent a draft Ordinance to the Executive council recommending the abolition of revaluation system from the examinations 1983, the Executive council modified the said draft in that it gave effect to the recommendation of the Academic Council from the examinations of 1984. This is why Sri Varma submitted that the Executive Council amended the draft Ordinance in violation of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 52. So the plea of Sri Varma is that the Ordinance deleting the revaluation system having been passed in violation of the mandate as contained in sub-s. (4) of S. 52, is liable to be struck down. To repel the contention of Sri Varma, Sri Gupta made several submissions. His first submission is that sub-sec. (4) is applicable only to those drafts, as contemplated by cls. (a), (b), and (c) of the proviso to sub- sec. To repel the contention of Sri Varma, Sri Gupta made several submissions. His first submission is that sub-sec. (4) is applicable only to those drafts, as contemplated by cls. (a), (b), and (c) of the proviso to sub- sec. (3) of S. 52 and not to any advice given by the Academic council under cl. (b) of sub- sec. (1) of S. 25. What he says is that the Academic council advised the abolition of the revaluation scheme to the Executive council under cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 25, and, therefore, an interference in the said advice will not amount to amending the draft within the meaning of sub-sec. (4), read with cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of S. 52. Wo do not see any force in this plea of Sri Gupta. The draft Ordinance sent by the Academic council is clearly covered by cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of S. 52 and the change of the year from which the revaluation of scripts was sought to be abolished, is the amendment in the draft within the meaning of sub-s. (4). Sub- section (1) of S. 25 merely enumerates the powers of the Academic council. Section 52 lays down the procedure for making the Ordinances. The Academic council having accepted the proposal of the Faculty Board of Engineering sent the draft Ordinance to the Executive council and hence the same is covered by cl. (b) of the proviso. We find it difficult to agree with Sri Gupta that the draft Ordinance is not covered by cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of S. 52 but by S. 25 only, and, therefore, sub-sec. (4) of S. 52 has no application thereto. From the procedure adopted, it follows that the Faculty board of Engineering proposed abolition of the provision of revaluation to the Academic council and the latter having accepted the said proposal sent a draft ordinance within the meaning of cl. (b) of the proviso to sub- sec. (3) of S. 52, to the Executive Council and it is this draft which has been amended by the Executive Council within the meaning of sub sec. (4) in that the Executive council abolished the revaluation system from the examination of 1984 contrary to the recommendation of the Academic Council, which sought abolition of revaluation from the examination of 1983. (3) of S. 52, to the Executive Council and it is this draft which has been amended by the Executive Council within the meaning of sub sec. (4) in that the Executive council abolished the revaluation system from the examination of 1984 contrary to the recommendation of the Academic Council, which sought abolition of revaluation from the examination of 1983. The Executive Council has, in our view travelled beyond its powers and has thereby violated the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 52. So the action of the Executive Council deleting the Ordinance providing for revaluation is vitiated. 6. Second argument of Sri Gupta was that sub-sec. (3) of S. 52 conferred three powers on the Executive Council, namely, (1) to make new or additional Ordinances, (2) to amend or (3) to repeal the existing ordinance, as referred to in sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 52 and that the proviso to sub-s. (3) is germane only to the power of first category above mentioned. In short, the submission was that the proviso has no relevance to the remaining two powers, namely, to amend or to repeal, and therefore, the draft ordinance amending or repealing the existing Ordinance as proposed by the Academic council within the meaning of cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) will not be hit by sub-s. (4) of S. 52. To support this contention, he stressed on the opening sentence of the proviso which reads : Provided that no Ordinance shall be made .............." From the word `made' occurring in the beginning of the proviso, Sri Gupta drew an inference that the proviso referred to only to first category of the legislative powers as contained in sub- s. (3), namely, "make new or additional Ordinance." It was submitted by him that such power can be said to have been exercised only when a new Ordinance comes into force. No new Ordinance having come into force, as a result of amendment, even if assumed to have been made. Sri Gupta contended that proviso to subs. (3) being applicable only to making new Ordinances, has no application to the instant facts and that being so, sub-s. (4) cannot be invoked. We are afraid that the construction sought to be put by Sri Gupta on the proviso cannot be accepted. Sri Gupta contended that proviso to subs. (3) being applicable only to making new Ordinances, has no application to the instant facts and that being so, sub-s. (4) cannot be invoked. We are afraid that the construction sought to be put by Sri Gupta on the proviso cannot be accepted. The word 'made' occurring in the beginning of the proviso, in our opinion, is of wide amplitude and that embraces all the three categories of the legislative powers, as stated in sub-s. (3) of S. 52. If the proviso to subs (3) is interpreted in the way, as suggested by Sri Gupta, then we think it will give rise to anomalous results. The scheme of the provisions of S. 52 and the Act of 1973 as a whole seems to be that in the matters relating to conduct or standard of examinations, the Executive council will be advised by the Academic Council, which is a principal academic body of the University. Under sub-s. (4), the Executive Council is clearly prohibited from amending any draft proposed by the Academic council under sub- s. (3) but power to reject the same has been conferred on the Executive council. Deprived of the power of amendment, the Executive Council has been empowered either to reject the draft or return the same to the Academic Council for its reconsideration, either in whole or in part, together with any amendments which the Executive Council may suggest. So the Executive council cannot make an amendment itself but it may simply suggest amendments to the Academic Council, which may or may not agree with such suggestions of the Executive council. So the draft as proposed by the Academic Council if not accepted as such, can either be rejected or returned to the Academic Council for reconsideration by the Executive Council. So the draft as proposed by the Academic Council either it pertains to making new or additional Ordinances or to amending or repealing the existing Ordinance, has been made sacrosanct in the sense that the Executive Council is debarred from altering it in any way, though it has the power to reject the same. So the draft as proposed by the Academic Council either it pertains to making new or additional Ordinances or to amending or repealing the existing Ordinance, has been made sacrosanct in the sense that the Executive Council is debarred from altering it in any way, though it has the power to reject the same. Sri Gupta does not appear to be correct in arguing that only those drafts which lead to making new ordinances have been precluded from the amending jurisdiction of the Executive Council and not the other draft leading to amendment or repeal of the existing Ordinance. No such distinction has been made by the proviso to sub-sec (3). The statutory provisions have to be read as a whole and not in piecemeal and when so done, there does not appear to be any justification in the submission of Sri Gupta that the proviso to sub-sec. (3) be read so as to mean that it refers only to those Ordinances which are new or additional. In our view, the proviso equally applies to the legislative powers of second and third categories, namely, to amend or repeal the Ordinances, referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2). 7. Next, it was argued by Sri Gupta that the conduct of examinations is over when the answer books are examined and the results are declared and the event of revaluation which takes place much subsequently, has nothing to do with the conduct of explorations and, therefore, abolition of revaluation is not covered by the expression" Conduct or standard of examinations" occurring in cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3). We are not impressed by this submission. Evaluation of the answer books and revaluation both are the activities which are covered by the ambit of the expression "conduct or standard of examinations "occurring in cl. (b) of the proviso. When evaluation is undisputedly an activity covered by conduct of examinations, we fail to understand why revaluation is not the part of conduct of examinations. Almost similar observation was made in para 15 by the Supreme Court in AIR 1984 SC 1543 (Supra). 8. (b) of the proviso. When evaluation is undisputedly an activity covered by conduct of examinations, we fail to understand why revaluation is not the part of conduct of examinations. Almost similar observation was made in para 15 by the Supreme Court in AIR 1984 SC 1543 (Supra). 8. It is also argued that fixation of the date from which the Ordinance made by the Executive Council shall be given effect to, could be done only by the Executive Council in view of sub-s. (5) of S. 52 and that the Academic Council had no power for fixing the year of abolition of the Ordinance. So the argument of Sri Gupta is that the Executive Council having possessed the power to fix the date from which the Ordinance will come into force, has not at all exceeded its jurisdiction and the plea of the petitioners that the draft Ordinance was amended in violation of sub- s. (4) of S. 52, by substituting the year 1984 for the year 1983, for abolishing the revaluation system is not sustainable. Upon perusal of sub-s. (5) of S. 52, it is manifest that the Executive council may direct a date from which the Ordinance shall have effect. The question for consideration is : whether the year 1983 as disclosed in the draft Ordinance can be said to be a date to be directed by the Executive Council within the meaning of sub- s. (5) when the Ordinance shall have effect. In reply, Sri Varma contended that no date, as envisaged by sub-s. (5) was directed by the Executive council but the Ordinance deleting the Ordinance relating to revaluation came into force in view of S. 5 of U. P. General Clauses Act. From the tenor of resolution as reproduced as Item No. 147 in the Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive council for the year 1984 dated 3rd July 1984 (Annexure C.A. 1), it appears that revaluation system was sought to be abolished from the examinations of 1983 by the Academic Council and neither the year 1983 nor the year 1984 was the date, as can be directed under sub-section (5) for making the Ordinance operative. The year 1983, as mentioned in the resolution passed by the Executive Council at Item No. 147 of the Annexure C.A. 1, in our opinion, was the year from which the revaluation system was sought to be abolished and that the expression "be abolished from the examination 1983" was integral and indivisible part of the draft ordinance, as reproduced hereinbefore. The aforesaid expression cannot be equated with a date which the Executive Council can direct under sub-s. (5) of S. 52 to give effect to an Ordinance. If it were a date to be directed within the meaning of sub-s. (5), then Sri Gupta would have been right in saying that such date was to be fixed only by the Executive Council and not by the Academic Council. 9. Then Sri Gupta urged that the Academic Council sought abolition of revaluation and that was accepted by the Executive Council and that there was substantial compliance on the part of the Executive Council. The resolution No. 31 dated 10th Sept, 1982 passed by the Academic Council having been substantially complied with by the Executive Council Sri Gupta argued that the same could not be said to be invalid. He relied on AIR 1963 All. 596 (Gyanandra Vir Singh v. Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad) in this regard. We do not agree with him. The matter in hand has to be seen entirely from a different angle and not from the one whether there was substantial compliance of the draft ordinance. The question for consideration is whether the Executive Council amended the draft Ordinance in violation of sub-s. (4) of S. 52 and, if so, whether the impugned ordinance and the order dated 17-8-1984 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) will become invalid on that ground. We have already taken the view in the foregoing paragraphs that the executive Council had exceeded its jurisdiction in having amended the draft, covered by sub-s. (3). The Ordinance deleting the Ordinance introducing revaluation system is, therefore, illegal and inoperative and consequently the impugned order passed by the Registrar dated 17-8-1984 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is inoperative, ineffective and illegal. 10. The Ordinance deleting the Ordinance introducing revaluation system is, therefore, illegal and inoperative and consequently the impugned order passed by the Registrar dated 17-8-1984 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is inoperative, ineffective and illegal. 10. Lastly, Sri Gupta vehemently submitted that the Executive Council could have accepted the draft ordinance as proposed by the Academic Council, without adding the words "which will be effective from 1984 examinations" in its resolution, what he wants to say is that the Academic Council was not concerned with the fixation of point of time from which the revaluation was to be abolished. The argument proceeded on the footing that the expression "conduct or standard of examination" occurring in clause (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of S. 52 does not take within its ambit the fixation of the year from which the revaluation as to be abolished. Sri Gupta submitted that the Executive council committed no illegality in substituting the year 1983 by the year 1984, as fixation of the year 1983 for abolishing the revaluation was beyond the powers of the Academic Council being outside the scope of the draft ordinance, as envisaged by cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of S. 52 of the Act, 1973. The gist of the argument is that any alteration by the Executive Council in the portion of the draft proposed by the Academic Council which is not germane to the expression "conduct or standard of examination" occurring in cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of S. 52 of the Act, 1973, will not amount to amendment within the meaning of sub-s. (4) and no illegality can be said to have been committed by such alteration. An illegality can arise, Sri Gupta says, only when a draft strictly covering and referring to the expression, "conduct Sr standard of examination" is changed by the Executive Council without prior approval of the Academic Council. We are unable to accept the submission of Sri Gupta that the suffix of the draft dated 10th Sept 1982 passed by the Academic Council, running as "from the examinations of 1983" is beyond the scope of the expression "conduct or standard of examination" in respect of which the Executive Council is to be advised by the Academic Council. We are unable to accept the submission of Sri Gupta that the suffix of the draft dated 10th Sept 1982 passed by the Academic Council, running as "from the examinations of 1983" is beyond the scope of the expression "conduct or standard of examination" in respect of which the Executive Council is to be advised by the Academic Council. No material has been shown by Sri Gupta justifying his argument that the draft dated 10th Sept 1982 can be dissected into two parts one covered by the advisory jurisdiction of the Academic Council and the other, being surplus or foreign to the advisory jurisdiction. The Academic Council being the principal academic body is competent to advice the Executive council in the matter relating to conduct of examinations. Whether revaluation is to be abolished and when it is to be abolished both these questions relate to the subject, namely, `conduct of examinations' on which the Academic Council has full advisory jurisdiction. Sri Gupta is, therefore, not correct in saying that fixation of the time from which the revaluation was to be abolished was beyond the advisory jurisdiction of the Academic Council. It was also stated by Sri Gupta that the Executive council being a subordinate legislative body is not competent to legislate retrospectively and, therefore, in the year 1984, it could not have made an ordinance abolishing revaluation from the examination 1983, as proposed by the Academic Council. The fact that considerable time has elapsed between the two stages (1) when the draft ordinance was proposed by the Academic Council and (2) when it was accepted by the Executive Council, will not clothe the Executive Council with the jurisdiction to alter the draft of the Academic council. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 17-8-1984 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is quashed. A writ of mandamus will issue that the petitioners who are students of B.D./M.E. courses of IInd. IIIrd and IVth year of 1983-84 session, are entitled to apply for revaluation of scripts. The interim mandamus issued in this regard is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.