This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 31.10.77 of the accused respondent by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sibsagar, Jorhat. The accused-respondent was charged for the contravention of the provisions of Rule 25(2) (ii), 78 (2) (3) and 79 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 making him liable for prosecu­tion under Sections 23 & 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. 2. The Act, namely, the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, for short, 'the Act' is to regulate the em­ployment of labour and to provide in certain circumstances for the abolition thereof. The system of employment of contract lascar tends itself in various abuses. The Act is an important piece of social legislation. Social justice demands reasonable standards in work and minimum needs of life, which include within itself not only the bare necessities of life but a margin for education of children, a medical aid and a reasonable comfort be made avilable for the personal happiness of each individual. All the forces of Government including the judiciary had tried to curb for long the labour upsurge towards collectivism. The law approximates to justice. The conception of administration of justice is based on the Rule of law in every democratic society which as Conceived by modern justice, is dynamic and includes within its import a social justice. The new idea of welfare State has abo­lished the old idea of “Laissez faire". The concept of social Justice is dynamic. In dispensing special justice, apart from the interest of contesting parties, the general and overall interests of society as a whole have to be taken into consideration so as to prevent exercising influence of one group in society at the cost of the rest. Judges are to do social justice as they have shouldered with the responsibility to do justice. In relation to industrial law, 4hek Lordships of the Supreme Court have expounded the con­ception of social justice and have at many places said what social justice is not. However, it is no more possible to resist the team of the poor sections of the society. In relation to industrial law, 4hek Lordships of the Supreme Court have expounded the con­ception of social justice and have at many places said what social justice is not. However, it is no more possible to resist the team of the poor sections of the society. In matters of claims of labour, the employer and the employees are so principally inter­related and dependant on such other that it is in the interest of each of them the other should survive-and it is in the interest of society that both should be kept functioning in harmony with each other for the greater benefit of the society at large. 3. Here is a case where such a situation arose as alleged by the prosecution that the employer, namely, the accused res­pondent alleged to have violated the aforementioned provisions Of law for which a prosecution had to be launched against the respondent. The facts necessary to be stated for appreciation of the contentions of the learned counsel may be stated herein below : Shri S. K. Mitra, who was then a Labour Enforcement Offi­cer (Central), Chowkidinghee, Dibrugarh lodged a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jorhat against the res­pondent Shri C. L. Garodia of Moran for prosecution under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and the Rules made there under alleging that the accused had contravened the provisions of Rule 25 (2) (ii), 78(2) (a) and 79 of the Central Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 and that he was liable to be punished under the afore­said provisions of law. It was alleged in the said complaint pe­tition that the accused had violated the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971, for short 'the Rules' by committing the following offences : (i) That the contractor had employed 10 (ten) contract labour on 8.9.76 in excess of number of contract labour specified in the licence in contravention of Rule 25(2) (ii) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971. (ii) That the contractor had not maintained Register of overtime at all in contravention of Rule 78(2) (e), of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Roles, 1971, (iii) That the contractor had not displayed an abstract of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 in the form approved by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) New Delhi in English, Hindi and in Assamese in contravention of Rule 79 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971." It was further alleged that the accused Shri C.L. Garodia, a contractor of Oil India Limited who was carrying out con­tract work, namely, the constructions of new power house of Oil India Limited at Moran, Duliajan in the district of Dibrugirh was found engaging more than 25 labourers in the contract work and also failed to maintain register of overtime and did not display the abstract of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abo­lition) Act, 1970 in the form approved by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) New Delhi, as per Rules. The accused-respondent had the licence to employ only 25 contract labour. But as the Inspector on inspection found more labourer engaged by him issued a show cause notice on 31.1.77 alleging the vio­lation of the provisions of the Rules 25 (2) (ii), 78 (2) (e) and 79 of the Rules. Thus the Labour Enforcement Officer sought for prosecution of the accused under Section 23 and 24 of the Act. 4. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sibsagar, Jorhat look cognizance of the offence and directed appearance of the accused in the Court. On his appearance the particulars of the accusation was read over and explained to him. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In course of trial the prosecution examined two witnesses in support of the alle­gations made in the complaint. The defence declined to adduce any oral testimony as the plea advanced by the defence was a plea of denial. The learned trial court considered the evidence on record and concluded that the prosecution completely failed to prove the case against the accused. The defence declined to adduce any oral testimony as the plea advanced by the defence was a plea of denial. The learned trial court considered the evidence on record and concluded that the prosecution completely failed to prove the case against the accused. The learned trial court however further considered about the competency of the com­plaint petition filed by Shri S. K. Mitra, Labour Enforcement Officer, Dibrugarh on the ground that the offence was prior to the appointment of the complainant as Inspector to prose­cute the offender of the provisions of the Act and the Rules under sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act. It was observed by the learned trial court that the complainant was appointed as Inspector to prosecute such offenders under the Act only from 16.2.77 and the offence was alleged to have been committed on 8.9.76 and 31.1.77. The complaint was filed on 13 4.77 after the appointment of the complainant as Inspector. On the above context, the learned trial court also held that the complainant had no authority to file the complaint against the accu­sed for alleged violation of the provisions of the Rules. Conse­quently, the accused was acquitted. Hence this appeal. 5. The learned Central Government Standing Counsel submitted at the outset that the findings of the learned trial court to the effect that the complainant had no authority to file the complaint is erroneous and absolutely untenable in law. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the complaint was lodged on 13.4.77 after obtaining the sanction of the Central Government and on due publication of the notification No. S-16025/8/75-LWI-II dated 16.2.77 by the Ministry of Lobour, Govt. of India appointing the complainant as a prosecuting Inspector to lodge such nature of complaint. Though the offence was committed earlier to the appointment, the complai­nant bad authority to file the complaint as he was duly empo­wered to do so by the aforesaid notification of the Central Government appointing him the Inspector for the purpose of prosecution under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act. The relevant portion of the provisions of sub­section (1) of Section 28 runs as follows : "28. The relevant portion of the provisions of sub­section (1) of Section 28 runs as follows : "28. Inspecting Staff - (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be inspectors for the purposes of this Act, and define local limits within which they shall exercise their powers under this Act.'' This sub-section vests the appropriate Government with the power to appoint Inspectors for the purposes of the Act and to define the local limits of their jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of Section 28 confers powers on the Inspectors for the purpo­ses of the Act as enumerated in (a), (b), (c), (d), & (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Act. Admittedly respondent was a contractor within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act which defines a contractor as under : "(c) 'coatractor', in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor." There is no dispute that the respondent was a contractor within the meaning of this Act as he undertook the contract work for Oil India Limited at Moran, Duliajan. There is nothing in the Act to show that if a complaint is lodged for a prior offence after obtaining due authority under the Act, the complaint is liable to be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and authority to file such complaint. 6. The next important question arises for my consideration is as to whether the complaint petition was barred by the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. The complainant was appointed as Inspector by a notification dated 16.2.77 on or from which date the complainant obtained the authority to lodge a chaplain of any particular violation alleged to have been committed under the Rules/or the Act if it is not hit by Section 27 of the Act. In the present case it is alleged by the prosecution that the respondent had a valid licence for engaging 25 labourers by virtue of which he had to carry on the contract works. In the present case it is alleged by the prosecution that the respondent had a valid licence for engaging 25 labourers by virtue of which he had to carry on the contract works. But on enquiry it was found that on 8.9.76 the respondent engaged 10 extra labourers in excess of the per­sons stipulated in the licence and failed to maintain the regis­ter in proper manner as required under the Rules. During the course of inspection on 28.1.77 it was found that the respondent employed 10 contract labourers on 8.9.76 in excess of the number specified in the licence and thereby he had violated the provisions of Rule 25(2) (ii) of the Rules. It is further alleged by the prosecution that the respondent failed to maintain the register of overtime of such labourers and thereby commit­ted violation of Rule 78(2) (e) of the Rules. It is further alleged that the respondent contravened the provisions of Rule 79 of the Rules. Therefore, it appears that the offence alleged to have been committed was on 8 9.76 and also the contraven­tions alleged by the prosecution was found on inspection on 28.1.77 in respect of which the complaint was lodged on 13.4.77. It would not be necessary to deal with the aforemen­tioned provisions of Rules which according to the prosecution have been violated by the respondent if it is found that the complaint was barred by limitation. Section 27 of the Act puts a limitation for such prosecution which is quoted herein below : "27. Limitation on prosecution. - No court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under this Act unless the complaint thereof is made within three months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an inspector.'' It is apparent that the offence alleged came to the knowledge of the complainant from the inspection held on 28.1.77 and the complaint was filed on 13.4.77 and in that view of the matter, the complaint was filed within the period of 3 months from the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of the inspector on inspection held on 28.1.77. As the complaint was filed on 13. 4.77, it was well within time and that too also filed with authority. Therefore, the question of in competency of the complaint petition for lack of any juris­diction does not arise at all. As the complaint was filed on 13. 4.77, it was well within time and that too also filed with authority. Therefore, the question of in competency of the complaint petition for lack of any juris­diction does not arise at all. On this score Mr. D. N. Barua, the learned counsel for the respondent also could not satisfy me that the complaint was either barred by limitation or the complainant had no authority at that point of time while the complaint was lodged. Therefore, the finding as to the in corapetency of the complaint petition as found by the learned trial court cannot sustain. 7. Now the next question which comes for consideration is as to whether the prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondent. In this context it would be apposite to consider the evidence on record. However, prior to taking up the evide­nce, Jet me consider the relevant provisions of the Rules alleged to have been violated by the respondent. Rule 25 (2) (ii) reads as follows : ''25. Form and terms and conditions of licence - (1) Every licence granted under sub section (1) of Section 12 shall be in Form VI. (2) Every licence granted under sub-rule (1) or renewed un­der Rule 29 shall be subject to the following conditions, namely - (i)..........-...... (ii) the number of workman employed as contract labour in the establishment shall not, on any day, exceed the maximum number specified in the licence;” It, therefore, appears that the contractor that not in any case exceed the maximum number of the contract labour spe­cified in the licence. However, the allegation was that the res­pondent employed 10 contract labourer on 8.9.76 in excess of number specified in the licence. Rule 78 of the Rules prescribes maintenance of Muster Roll, Register of Wages Deduction Register and Overtime Register and those should be maintained in different forms as prescribed un­der the Rules. The allegations levelled against the respondent was that he failed to maintain the overtime register in contra­vention of the provisions of Rule 78(2) (e) of the Rules. Rule 78 of the Rules prescribes maintenance of Muster Roll, Register of Wages Deduction Register and Overtime Register and those should be maintained in different forms as prescribed un­der the Rules. The allegations levelled against the respondent was that he failed to maintain the overtime register in contra­vention of the provisions of Rule 78(2) (e) of the Rules. It is fur­ther alleged that the respondent failed to display an abstract of the Act and the Rules in English and Hindi and in the lan­guage spoken by the majority of workers in such form as may be approved by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) as requi­red under the provisions of Rule 79 of the Rules. 8. To prove the allegation the prosecution examined the complainant himself and one witness who is working as Steno in the Licensing Office. P.W. 2 has deposed only to the effect that the respondent had the authority in the licence to engage 25 contract labourers and also proved the application of the res­pondent praying for licence. He has also proved that the res­pondent obtained the licence on 13.10.76 but the allegation of the prosecution is that on 8.9. 76 the respondent engaged 10 extra labourers in excess of the numbers specified in the lice­nce. It cannot be said that if the licence was obtained on 13.12.76 as deposed by P. W. 2, there cannot be any contravention of that very particular licence alleged to have been committed on 8.9.76. No prior licence was proved to show that the offence was really committed on 8.9.76 during the continuance of the earlier licence prior to 13.12.76. The enquiry was made on 28.1. 77 by P.W. 1 who found the violation of the provisions of the aforementioned Rules. P. W. 1 has stated in his evidence that on 8.9.76 the respondent engaged 10 excess labourers which fact he could ascertain from the register maintained by the respondent but the said register was not produced in Court. A peculiar fact appears from the evidence of this witness that on the day of inspection the respondent was not present. It appears from record that the prosecution failed to produce the material evidence in Court to prove the violation of the provisions of any Rule by the respondent. A peculiar fact appears from the evidence of this witness that on the day of inspection the respondent was not present. It appears from record that the prosecution failed to produce the material evidence in Court to prove the violation of the provisions of any Rule by the respondent. None of the labourers alleged to have been engaged by the respondent in excess of the number specified in his licence was produced by the prosecution at least to show that the respondent engaged more contract labourers on that day. The prosecution has also failed to produce the register seized by P.W. 1 during the course of his inspection to show that those are not properly maintained as required under the Rules. None of the overtime contract labourers could be produced by the pro­secution to prove those allegations. Therefore, in absence of the material evidence on record, the learned trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to prove the offence against the respondent. Upon hearing the learned counsel of the parties and on proper scanning the evidence on record I have no other alter­native than to hold that the learned trial court was absolutely correct in its conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondent. There must be sufficient evidence on record to show that the accused of a particular offence is guilty for commission of such offence and that too also most be concluded beyond all reasonable doubt. If no cogent, relia­ble and material evidence is forthcoming to the Court, it would not be possible for the Court to judge about the guilt of the accused alleged to have committed a particular offence. This case is also one of the examples where there is absolute Sack of evidence to consider about the guilt of the accused. I, therefore, hold that there is nothing to interfere with the impug­ned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned court below. The appeal appears to be absolutely meatless. Hence it is dismissed.