Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by defendants 1 to 3. The suit was one for injunction to restrain the defendants from trespassing into the suit property and interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the suit property. The plaintiff submitted that he is in possession of the suit property and that he has got the entitlement to obtain a decree for injunction against the defendants since the defendants are attempting to trespass into the suit property. 2. The defendants contended that the plaintiff has no possession over the suit property and that they are in possession of the suit property when the suit was instituted. Plaintiff produced and marked certain documents before the trial court and examined certain witnesses. The trial court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties recorded a finding that the plaintiff has established his possession over the suit property. The trial court also held that the case of the defendants is truthless. Defendants filed an appeal before the appellate court. The appellate court also re-assessed the evidence and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. How the defendants appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding regarding possession is incorrect and opposed to legal norms and principles relating to the proof of possession. He submits that the inferences and conclusions drawn regarding possession from the evidence adduced in the case are wrong and that it is a question of law which this court can consider in second appeal. The counsel also submitted that in the nature of the contentions raised the State is a necessary party to the suit and the question whether the State is a necessary party is definitely a question of law. 4. Admittedly, the suit property is a forest land over which the plaintiff can claim only a right of possession. He cannot have a title, as what we understand, as proprietary title. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving that he has got possession over the suit property even if that possession is the possession of a trespasser, he can successfully defend his possession against any attempt of interference with that possession by any person and in case he is not in a position to prevent the attempted trespass by himself he can seek the judicial remedy of a decree for an injunction. 5. In law possession is a relative matter. 5. In law possession is a relative matter. Generally and usually the court is not concerned with in suits for injunction, the question who has the best right to possess; it is concerned with the question which of the parties before the court has the better right to possess. This principle is illustrated in Salmond on jurisprudence. "If A momentarily hands his wallet to E. from whom it is stolen by C. who then loses it on D's property, where it is then found by E. the question who has the right to possess which is often considered the same as the question who has legal possession will depend on who brings action against whom, Against all subsequent parties E's title would prevail, for finding confers a good title. 6. Plaintiff has produced Exts Al to A4. Ext. Al is a copy of a judgment of this court in OP. No. 5357 of 1974. Exts. A2 and A3 are two receipts issued by the Village Officer. Kodikulam to the first plaintiff and to the second plaintiff respectively. We are concerned only with the possession of the property claimed by the first plaintiff. Ext. A4 is an agreement executed by pw. 4 and others in favour of the first plaintiff. Plaintiff says that the agreement is for cultivating the suit property. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the above documents can be of any use only if the plaintiff proves that these documents relate to the suit property. He submits that the plaintiff should fail on the short ground that the plaintiff was not able to prove the full identity of the property. Only in case the suit property is identifiable, a court can issue an injunction. I think as a proposition, what the learned counsel for the appellants submits, is correct. The court can issue injunction only with respect to a property which is reasonably identifiable. 8. The question that has to be considered on the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is whether the submission of the counsel that the property is not identifiable is correct or not. I think the counsel is not correct in bis submission that the property is not identifiable. There is no case for the defendants that the property is not identifiable. They have not stated so in the written statement. I think the counsel is not correct in bis submission that the property is not identifiable. There is no case for the defendants that the property is not identifiable. They have not stated so in the written statement. In fact, in the written statement they have stated that they have understood the property very well even though it is part of a large extent of forest land. In the written statement, it is very clearly stated thus: Again it is stated: Further the defendants have stated that the statement of the plaintiff that the suit property is cultivated by paddy is correct. This would clearly indicate that the defendants have understood what is the property mentioned in the plaint. This suit property was taken possession of by the receiver appointed by the court and he has gives it for cultivation. In the light of the statement in the written statement, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the property is unidentifiable is not sustainable. 9. Further in the appeal memorandum, in the lower court, no ground was taken on the basis that the identity of the property is vague and ambiguous. 10.The counsel submitted that from the evidence of the plaintiff himself, it can be seen that the plaintiff had no possession since he has admitted that the forest authorities used to destroy the cultivation made by the plaintiff. I think this has not got much bearing. It is true that the plaintiff has stated that on several occasions the forest authorities have destroyed the cultivation made by the plaintiff. It has to be noted that at any rate, the defendants have admitted that there was paddy cultivation in the suit property. To have agricultural operation is an indication of a continuous exercise of an interest in the property, which according to me, will be sufficient for holding that the person who has thus established such a continuous exercise of interest has possession of the suit property. This I say because to understand whether a person is in possession of an item of property, the first parameter which can be used for that purpose is to ascertain whether the person concerned has the necessary animus, an interest to appropriate to himself the exclusive use of the property and whether he is in general control of it. This I say because to understand whether a person is in possession of an item of property, the first parameter which can be used for that purpose is to ascertain whether the person concerned has the necessary animus, an interest to appropriate to himself the exclusive use of the property and whether he is in general control of it. Here also we have to remember that in law we talk rather of possession as something which one person has against another. If this parameter is applied in this case, I have to say that the plaintiff's acts of cultivation though precarious in nature, is sufficient to denote a better possession (though not best) as against the defendants. A defendant who attempts to violate the possession of the plaintiff is not allowed to set up the defence of jus tertii. What is jus tertii the defendant will not be allowed to allege, as against the claim of the plaintiff that neither the plaintiff nor be himself, but a third person is the true owner. "Let every man come and defend his own title". True that the Government may be the true owner, but a wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except the true owner himself. This Court however, has gone much farther than this and has treated possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. S.6 of the Specific Relief Act amply reflects the approach our legal system has adopted in this matter. Even a wrong doer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever simply on the ground of his possession. S.6 of the Specific Relief Act runs thus: "Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.-(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." It provides that even the true owner, who takes his own property, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer and will not be allowed to set up his own superior title to the property. He must surrender up possession and then he should proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing or the property on his right of ownership. The law provides that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law. Really this is a duplication of remedies. It results in providing a provisional protection of possession. If we examine the history of this principle it is not difficult to see its beginning in Roman Law. Canon Law also recognised it. It received considerable extension in Canon Law. What is the reason behind this principle? As I seethe first and foremost reason is that the vice of violent self-help is considered so serious by the law and the society that it must be discouraged by taking away all conveniences and facilities which anyone receives from it. He who helps himself by force even to that which is his own must restore it even to a thief. 11. A second reason for providing possessory remedies is discernible in the admission of the serious imperfections of the early proprietary remedies. It is said "the path of a claimant to establish his proprietary title is strewn with pitfalls and he is lucky if he reaches his destination without disaster". The role of a plaintiff in such an action is one of real disadvantage, as possession being nine points of the law. So no roan should be allowed to secure for himself by violence the superior and advantageous position of defendant and to compel his adversary by such means to assume the dangerous and difficult post of plaintiff. 12. The role of a plaintiff in such an action is one of real disadvantage, as possession being nine points of the law. So no roan should be allowed to secure for himself by violence the superior and advantageous position of defendant and to compel his adversary by such means to assume the dangerous and difficult post of plaintiff. 12. The other reason that can be discerned is from the fact that it is easy to prove that one has been in possession of a thing, but difficult to prove that one is the owner of it. So it is unfair in law that a man should be permitted by violence to shift the heavy burden of proof from his shoulders to those of his opponent. The law insists that every man should endure his own burden. He who acquires a property by violence and force must restore it to him, who has been deprived of it; let him then establish in law, if he can, that he is the owner of it; and the law will then give to him what it will not suffer him to take for himself. 13. In Vasudeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma & Others (1964 KLJ. 634) Raman Nair, J. as he then was, held that a person in possession albeit without title is entitled to remain in possession even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law. He said that the lawful owner is not entitled to take the law into his own hands and throw out the person in possession. Reliance was placed on S.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and S.9 of the Specific Relief Act (old). 14. Holdsworth in History of English Law, Vol. VII puts the same principle under the following propositions. (1) "The person in possession is treated as the owner save as against 'him who can show a better right to possession. As against all the world, except the man with the better right, he has all the powers of an owner." (2) "The owner out of possession has nothing save a right to recover his chattel from the possessor". (3) "The owner put of possession, who seeks to recover his possession must show an absolute right, so that if the defendant in possession can show that some third person has a better right than either, the plaintiff cannot recover" 15. (3) "The owner put of possession, who seeks to recover his possession must show an absolute right, so that if the defendant in possession can show that some third person has a better right than either, the plaintiff cannot recover" 15. I think the contention that the plaintiff had no possession in the eye of law, on account of the fact that the forest authorities were interfering with the cultivation of the plaintiff on several occasions is not sustainable. 16. The only other point that has to be considered is regarding the question whether the State is a necessary party or not. I think there is no merit in this contention. No relief is claimed against the State. The State is not bound by this judgment. Moreover, this point was also not taken in the written statement. The learned counsel for the appellants referred me to the decision reported in AIR. 1954 Madras 479 (Prodathur Municipality v. Gurna Hanumanthu). I think the principle laid down in this decision is not applicable to this case. There the question considered was whether the Government was a necessary party in a suit for injunction filed by a person who claimed that he has got an entitlement for declaration of title in respect of an alleged encroachment of road margin. Under S.2 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, the Government is the owner of all roads and streets and under S.61 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. the Government as the owner of the public streets and appurtenances thereto, can vest them in any Municipality and withdraw any such street etc. from the control of the said municipality. Taking stock of the situation contemplated under S.2 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, the court said that the Government is a necessary party to a suit by a municipal resident against a municipality for declaration of his title in respect of an alleged encroachment on road margin and for an injunction as the grant of such a declaration would materially affect the rights of the Government as real owner. 17. As I said earlier, the only question that has to be considered in a suit for injunction against trespass into the property is the question of possession, and this is a question of fact. 17. As I said earlier, the only question that has to be considered in a suit for injunction against trespass into the property is the question of possession, and this is a question of fact. Now both the courts have found that the plaintiff has established his possession and so he has got the entitlement to obtain a decree for injunction. I see no reason for differing with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The questions of law raised in the appeal memorandum are not questions that really arise for consideration in this appeal in the light of the facts proved in the case. The appeal is only to be dismissed. It is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.