JUDGMENT M. N. Roy, J.: This appeal from original order is directed against an order dated 9th July 1982, passed by Order No. 101 dated 9tn July 1982, passed in Title Suit No. 1462 of 1979 by Shri B. G. Chakraborty, learned Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta, was presented on 16th August 1982. 2. On or about 8th August 1979, the plaintiff/respondent am Prakash Jaluka, presented the concerned Title Suit No. 1462 of 1979 before the 12th Bench of the City Civil Court. Calcutta against the defendant/appellant M/s Kakod Sales Agency for declaration that the defendants had no right, title and interest to make any additions and alterations and/or constructions inside their tenancy at premises No. 19. R. N. Mukherjee Road, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the said premises), and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining them, their men and agents from making any alterations and additions and/or making any construction and/or causing any damages within their tenancy at the said premises. Admittedly, the plaintiff was and still is the landlord of a portion of the said premises and it has been alleged that the defendants were inducted as a tenant by him, in respect of one godown on the eastern budding on the ground floor of the said premises find they were holding the concerned tenancy under the plaintiff at a monthly rental of Rs. 1,000/- payable according to English calendar month. 3. It has further been alleged that on the evening of 4th August 1979, the defendant brought men, mistries, masons and cement, bricks, stone-chip and other building materials and started illegal construction within their tenancy and thereby they had caused damages to the load bearing walls and also on the partition walls and have made big holes for the purpose of fixing iron joints, so as to construct a mezzanine floor within their tenancy. Such work has been claimed to have commenced without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. It has further been stated that on detecting the above, the plaintiff's employees rushed to the defendants' godown and asked them to stop such illegal work and construction and on that, their men and darwans threatened those employees of the plaintiff with dire consequences and since there was apprehension of breach of peace, they at that time, took no steps. 4. 4. The plaintiff has further stated that the defendants have no right, title or interest to make any constructions, additions and alterations and/or cause any damages to the tenancy in question. In fact, it has also been alleged that the defendants have already broken a portion of the load bearing wall within their premises as mentioned above and it was also claimed that there was every likelihood that the building may collapse and in that event, there would be imminent danger to human life and property. Such act or actions of the defendants were claimed by the plaintiff to be absolutely illegal. 5. On the next day of the filing of the suit i.e. on 9th August, 1979, the plaintiff had also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the circumstances as indicated hereinbefore and also for the danger as mentioned above, prayed for an order asking the defendants to show cause as to why, they, their men and agents should not be restrained by an order of temporary injunction from making any additions and alterations and/or making any constructions and/or causing any damages to the said tenancy at the said premises, till the disposal of the suit. An ad interim order in terms of the above was also asked for. It would appear that on that date, by Order No. 3, the learned Judge of the Court below, after pursuing the petition, affidavit and other relevant papers directed the issue of a notice upon the defendants to show cause within seven days of service thereto as to why the plaintiff's prayer as mentioned above, for interim injunction, should not be allowed and it has been recorded by the learned Judge that in view of the urgency, the defendants, their men and agents should be restrained by an order of interim injunction from making any additions and alterations and/or causing any damages in the tenancy in question, at the said premises. The learned Judge while making such order directed the filing of the requisites at once and fixed the matter for return and order on 12th September 1979. 6. The learned Judge while making such order directed the filing of the requisites at once and fixed the matter for return and order on 12th September 1979. 6. Thereafter, an affidavit-in-opposition dated 2nd May, 1980, was filed by the defendants, against the above mentioned application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and therein, the defendants have stated that the tenancy was taken by them for the purpose of office-cum-storage of goods and running of workshop for maintenance and repair of their products viz steel furnitures and the allocations in respect of the purported constructions as made in the application were denied. In fact, it was specifically denied that on the evening of 4th August, 1979 or any order time, the defendants brought in their men and materials and started the constructions as alleged. Apart from the above, the other damages as alleged to have been caused to the tenancy at the said premises have also been denied. The defendants have also denied that at any time they started the construction of any mezzanine floor or any latrine inside their godown or that, any men of the plaintiff had any occasion to stop such constructions, which the plaintiff has claimed to be illegal. The threat as was alleged to have given to the plaintiff's men, have also been denied. 7. It has been stated that though the tenancy at the said premises was lot out to the defendants as a godown, it was being used as an office-cum-storage place from before they had entered into the premises and when they took the tenancy, there were already in existence one wooden gallery above the front portion of the room adjoining the entrance door and a bath-room oum privy with a false wooden ceiling. It has further been asserted that there was also an overhead tank for storing water supported by two angles below the ceiling of the bathroom, and the wooden planks constituting the floor of the gallery as well as the false ceiling on the bathroom and the water tank were all worn out and the plaintiff gave the defendant of the affidavit Shri Harshadrai Maganlal Kakkad, a partner of the defendants' firm, permission to replace the wooden planks of the gallery und the bathroom ceiling and to renovate both of them it has been stated that immediately after entering into the tenancy, the defendants replaced the wooden planks of the gallery by new planks and consequently renovated the same, apart from the fact that they took out the worn out tank in the bath-room and properly secured the supporting angles, replaced the broken porcelain tiled floor and walls of the bath room by new ones. It has also been stated that old sanitary fittings were removed and the defendant arranged fur their replacement by new ones. It was also the case of the defendants that as they intended to replace the old false ceiling by a lighter one of masonite and plywood, they started covering up the groves left by the removal of the old planks, but before such work could be completed, the plaintiff stopped the work in question and such work has been left in an unfinished state. It has been alleged that moat of the old wooden planks and the old sanitary fittings, apart from the old wooden ladder, which was used for going up to the gallery, are still lying inside the room in question. 8. The defendant of the affidavit has further stated that there was and still is a partition wall between the room, which has been let out to the defendants and the adjoining room which has been let out to another tenant. 8. The defendant of the affidavit has further stated that there was and still is a partition wall between the room, which has been let out to the defendants and the adjoining room which has been let out to another tenant. It was the case of the defendants that when the plaintiff proposed to let out the concerned room to the defendants, the upper part of the said partition wall was made of wire netting and before making over possession to them, the plaintiff at their instance, replaced the said wire net ling by a brick construction, it was also the case of the defendants that there were large cracks in the walls which the plaintiff had verbally agreed to repair, but failed. The defendants have further stated that during the last rains, water percolated through the crack, and damaged a large quantity of their stock in trade and inspite of repeated requests the plaintiff failed to carry out the necessary repairs and as such defendants proposed to carry out such work themselves and that the plaintiff raised no objection. But strangely enough, after the defendants have procured necessary materials and men for the said repairing work, the plaintiff suddenly demanded enhancement of rent to an exorbitant figure, to which they could not agree and thereupon the plaintiff started creating trouble and ultimately succeeded in forestalling further progress of the work. 9. The defendants have denied that they have no right to remove any walls or to make any additions or alterations except works not involving any constructions of a permanent nature and in any event, it has been denied that they have broken any portion of the walls, load bearing or otherwise and have stated that apart from repairs and renovation of the bathroom and the wooden gallery, which included replacement of worn out wooden planks, and remova1 of planks of the false ceiling of the bath room, preparatory to the installation of a new false ceiling, the only work which was done by them was the construction of a chamber with plywood which according to them is of a temporary nature and is not permanently fixed to the floor and walls of the godown in question. In any event, it has been stated that such works were even done by the defendants with the full knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. In any event, it has been stated that such works were even done by the defendants with the full knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. The defendants have further stated that they have not made any additions or alterations or caused any carnage to any part of the tenancy in question and does not intend to do so and that being the position, there was no ground or any question of granting injunction as prayed for. The defendants have really claimed that the allegations as made in the application in question, were false and the same was mala fide, vexatious and an instance of abuse of the process of Court and as such, the application in question according to them should have been rejected. 10. Immediately thereafter and before filing their reply, on 25th June, 1980, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2A which was inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 and is to the following effect :–– 2A. (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and put of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto. 11. 11. In the said application the plaintiff claimed that the order as made by the Court on 9th August, 1979, on his application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was duly served upon the defendants and than, on an application filed by the plaintiff, the Court was pleaded to appoint on Advocate Commissioner who after giving notice to both sides, held inspection on 8th August, 1979 at about 3-30 P.M. and submitted a report about the works already done and which were in the process of being done by the defendants. It has been alleged that the defendants assured the plaintiff that they would restore the premises into the original position and would not proceed with any further construction or additions or alterations. In that application, it has also been stated that on 20th June, 1980, the defendant again brought their men and collected materials and hurriedly constructed the mezzanine floor with wooden beams, planks etc. and also completed the bath room, in violation of the order as issued by the learned Court below, that apart, various allegations with regard to other constructions were made and as such, the plaintiff prayed, that it was necessary that the defendants or their authorities should be sent to civil prison and their properties both movable and immovable, be attached, so as to see that the order as made by the Court is not flouted or the honour of such order was maintained. In such circumstances, necessary prayer was made. 12. The above application, as would appear from the order No. 33 dated 25th June, 1980, was registered as a Misc. case and notices were directed to be issued on the opposite party therein, who were defendants to the suit. 13. Thereafter, on the same day i.e. 25th June, 1980, the plaintiff filed his affidavit in-reply to the defendants' affidavit-in-opposition as indicated hereinbefore and denied the material allegations as contained therein and thereafter, on 22nd August, 1980, filed a supplementary affidavit-in-opposition to his application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Thereafter, on the same day i.e. 25th June, 1980, the plaintiff filed his affidavit in-reply to the defendants' affidavit-in-opposition as indicated hereinbefore and denied the material allegations as contained therein and thereafter, on 22nd August, 1980, filed a supplementary affidavit-in-opposition to his application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this application it was alleged that even in spite of the order of injunction of the Court, the defendants made constructions and were also attempting to make further constructions, in violation of the order as made and on 21st June, 1980, a police officer from the local police station inspected the said premises and found 30 persons including the contractor, Jahir, were working. It has also been stated that Shri H. Kakkad of the defendants, represented to the said officer that he has informed the landlord about the construction and that there was no injunction passed by the City Civil Court. On such, it has been stated that the plaintiff's employees filed an application under S. 144(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Executive Magistrate, Calcutta, who was pleased to pass an order on 27th June, 1980, directing the defendants, their persons, contractor and employees, not to raise any further construction and also directed the police to make enquiry and report on 27th June, 1980. It was also alleged that the defendants wore trying to make further construction in spite of the above order and as such, in the said supplementary application, it was further prayed that necessary orders restraining the defendants be issued, temporarily injuncting them from making any further constructions, additions and alterations and/or damages to the said premises. 14. On 28th June 1981, written objection to the application under Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Code as mentioned hereinbefore, was filed and thereafter on that date the defendants had filed their written statement also. 15. It should be noted that by order no. 41 dated 11th September 1980, the application for temporary injunction was dismissed on the contest and the interim order of injunction was vacated for the reasons as recorded therein and after the writ fen statement as filed, the Misc. case as was started, was taken up for consideration on 24th April, 1982 and the learned Court below had examined the witnesses as produced. case as was started, was taken up for consideration on 24th April, 1982 and the learned Court below had examined the witnesses as produced. It should also be noted that prior to that, on 28th February 1982 the deposition of Shri Trapada Chakraborty Sub-Inspector of Police was also recorded by the learned Court below. On 12th March, 1982, the learned Advocate Commissioner was also examined and cross-examined and then on 27th March 1982, Shri Becharam Chatterjee an employee of the plaintiff was examined and cross-examined. All these examinations took place in connection with the Misc. proceedings. In the Misc. proceedings further examinations took place of Sarbashree Madan Singh and S. K. Sultania on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner and H. M. Kakkad was examined on behalf of the defendants. Such examinations continued upto 27th April, 1982 and on 9th July, 1982, the order as impeached was passed. By such order, the learned Judge of the Court below has observed that he had no doubt in his mind that the defendants completed the constructions of the mezzanine floor and a bath room in the disputed room, in violation of the order of injunction. Such observations were made by the learned Court below on consideration of the evidence as indicated hereinbefore. It has also been recorded by him that the evidence as tendered through the witnesses also corroborated the reports of the Commissioner. That being the position, the learned Court below has observed that the defendants were thus liable under Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Civil Procedure Code and so he allowed and Misc. case on contest with costs and directed the petitioner before him to supply list of properties which will remain under attachment. Apart from Rule 2A of Order 39 and the relevant provisions of these Rules are quoted hereunder :–– 3. case on contest with costs and directed the petitioner before him to supply list of properties which will remain under attachment. Apart from Rule 2A of Order 39 and the relevant provisions of these Rules are quoted hereunder :–– 3. The Court shall in all cases except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the appellant–– (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with–– (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent. 3A. Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. The proviso to Rule 3 and so also the provisions of Rule 3A were inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976. 16. Mr. The proviso to Rule 3 and so also the provisions of Rule 3A were inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976. 16. Mr. Dutt claimed and contended that under the mandatory provisions of Rule 3 of the Code, mere expression of the words "In view of the urgency as mentioned in Order 3 dated 9th August 1979, whereby the learned Court below had directed the issue of the ad interim order of injunction in this case, and that too without any notice and hearing to the defendant appellants, was improper, unauthorized and without jurisdiction, the more so when, the said Rule required and requires the reasons to be recorded as to what was the urgency or the extenuating circumstances for which, such ex parte ad interim order of injunction was issued. In fact, Mr. Dutt also contended that there was no due and appropriate compliance with the mandatory requirements of the said Rule 3. Mr. Dutt, then pointed out that under or in terms of Rule 3A as quoted above, the learned Court below should have made the case returnable within such time, so that the same could be disposed of within 30 days and the fact that the proceeding was made returnable on 12th September 1979, as would appear from Order No. 3 dated 9th August 1979, would be enough and sufficient to hold that there was non-application of mind and in any event, the proceeding of the ad interim order as issued, became non est after the said period of 30 days. Admittedly the returnable date was fixed after 30 days and that being the position, on the basis of the determinations in the case of M/s Model Press (P) Ltd v. Delhi Municipal Corporation & Anr, AIR 1978 Delhi 44, where it has been observed amongst others that the Civil Procedure Code requires a notice to issue unless there in an immediate threat, Mr. Dutt contended the concerned order to be illegal and a nullity. 17. To establish that the provisions of Rule 3 are mandatory, Mr. Dutt referred to the case of Amiya Prosad v. Bejoy Krishna Chakraborty &. Ors, AIR 1981 Cal. Dutt contended the concerned order to be illegal and a nullity. 17. To establish that the provisions of Rule 3 are mandatory, Mr. Dutt referred to the case of Amiya Prosad v. Bejoy Krishna Chakraborty &. Ors, AIR 1981 Cal. 351 , where the effect of a giant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code, without notice to the opposite party; was considered and it has been indicated that where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving a notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay the learned Judge also observed that the above would be the mandatory requirements under Older 39 Rule 3 of the Code and in that case under consideration, where the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendant from offering the seva puja or doing any duty of the shebaits of Sri Sri Iswar Satbhai Kalimatar Ashram. On the plaintiff's prayer, the learned Munsif passed on interim order for temporary injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 in that respect. It was stated that the matter was urgent and hence interim order was passed. Against that order, by which the prayer for ad interim injunction was allowed, an appeal was preferred. The same was dismissed and hence the revisional application and it has been indicated that such mandatory provision was not complied with, as the learned Munsif gave no reasons to bring the case within the exception provided for in Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, the order as impeached in that case was also held to be improper, as there was no reason recorded that the interim order of injunction was required to be issued as otherwise the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. On the basis of the above decision, Mr. Dutt contended, that because of the proviso to Rule 3, which is mandatory, the interim order of injunction, could not have been passed in the manner in which the same was issued. Under Rule 4 of ardor 39 of the Code, which is to the following effect:–– 4. On the basis of the above decision, Mr. Dutt contended, that because of the proviso to Rule 3, which is mandatory, the interim order of injunction, could not have been passed in the manner in which the same was issued. Under Rule 4 of ardor 39 of the Code, which is to the following effect:–– 4. Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied or set aside by the Court, an application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order: Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interests of justice : Provided further that where an order, for injunction has been passed after giving to a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting aside has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party. 18. An order for injunction may be discharged, varied and set aside and, on the basis of the language of the said Rule and the submissions of Mr. Dutt, a point also arose for consideration viz. whether the said Rule 4 is a remedy in Case of formation of opinion ex parte and what should be the meaning of the terms 'prima facie formation of opinion'. Before dealing with such point, we must also refer to the other case on which Mr. Dutt placed reliance in support of his submissions on the mandatory character of Rule 3 or the proviso thereunder. 19. While on such point, the next case, which in fact was the second one on which Mr. Dutt made a reference, was the Full Bench decision in the case of Akmal & Ors. Dutt placed reliance in support of his submissions on the mandatory character of Rule 3 or the proviso thereunder. 19. While on such point, the next case, which in fact was the second one on which Mr. Dutt made a reference, was the Full Bench decision in the case of Akmal & Ors. v. State of Assam & ors., AIR 1984 Gauhati 86, where the concerned Full Bench was constituted to answer the question "whether an appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, against an ex parte order of ad interim injunction ?, as framed by a learned single Judge of that Court. The said decision has observed amongst others that when the trial court is required by law to sate reasons, but does not furnish them in its order, it violates the provisions of 'the Code'. By its own in action or intentional violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules, a court cannot take away the right of appeal of a person aggrieved by that order. As such, an ex parte order of injunction, whether speaking or non-speaking, is appealable. The reasoning that an ex parte order of ad interim injunction is shortlived so it is not appealable cannot be accepted, apart from holding that an order made under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 3 refusing to grant an ex parte order of ad interim injunction is also appealable because Order 43 Rule 1(r) enables a party to prefer an appeal against "an order", positive or negative, passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A and 4 of Order 39. An order refusing an ad interim injunction is a negative order, but falls within the expression "an order". No appeal lies against the ex parte order or ad interim injunction if it is rendered under any provision of 'the Code', other than under Rules 1, 2, 2A and 4 and 10 of Order 39. In the case of Bipin Chandra & Anr v. M/s Purushottam Bhai Dhoribhai and Co. & ors., AIR 1984 M.P. 110 , to which reference was also made by Mr. In the case of Bipin Chandra & Anr v. M/s Purushottam Bhai Dhoribhai and Co. & ors., AIR 1984 M.P. 110 , to which reference was also made by Mr. Dutt, a suit was filed by some partners for permanent injunction restraining connected with the central and management of the affairs of the firm, on the ground of hostile activities carried on by the defendant partners and there, Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code and the proviso under that Rule, which was added by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act No. 104 of 1976 was considered and it has been observed that while Rule 3 permits the Court to grant an ex parte temporary injunction the proviso enacts a safeguard to the exercise of that jurisdiction. It makes incumbent upon a Court to record its reason for the opinion that withholding of ex parte injunction would defeat the very object of granting injunction. What seems to be intended by adding the proviso is that there should appear to be compelling reasons for the Court to proceed to pass an ex parte temporary injunction without notice to the opposite party and that such reasons must be recorded before the power is exercised. Those reasons must be sufficient to draw an inference that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated if the Court were to await for noticing and hearing the opposite party. The proviso thus is intended to prevent the abuse of the exercise of power granted by Rule 3 to issue ex parte temporary injunction without notice to the opposite party. On the basis of the determinations as above, it was Mr. Dutt's specific and categorical contention that the learned Court below, in making the orders as indicated above complied with the un-amended provisions of Rule 3 of Order 39, but not with the mandatory provisions of the proviso thereunder, which was incorporated by the Amendment Act of 1976, the particulars whereof have been indicated earlier. We shall refer to the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the plaintiff respondent, but before that, we must record that Mr. Chatterjee, on a reference to the cases as cited above stated, that they have really laid down the meaning of the Rule 3 and the proviso thereunder, or just scanning the language as used and have said nothing about the method of compliance. 20. Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the plaintiff respondent, but before that, we must record that Mr. Chatterjee, on a reference to the cases as cited above stated, that they have really laid down the meaning of the Rule 3 and the proviso thereunder, or just scanning the language as used and have said nothing about the method of compliance. 20. Mr. Dutt also contended that the requirements of Rule 3 and the proviso thereunder as added now, would leave no room to doubt that the provisions are mandatory, as non-compliance with such order as made, would involve the offender viz. who fails to comply with the requirements of the same, penal consequences. In fact, he submitted that since such positive character and nature as indicated, was or is involved for non-compliance with the order and more particularly when, such non-compliance would have a punitive character. The case under consideration viz. Suleheslev Pukhaeerson of the king emperor 15 C.W.N. 1001, was under S. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and S. 225B of the Penal Code, 1860 and there it has been observed that the issue of warrant under S. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the arrest of witness in the first instance without previously serving summons upon him for attendance and without recording reasons for the issue of warrant is illegal, apart from indicating that the adoption of stereotyped printed form of the warrant reciting "whereas I have good and sufficient reasons to believe that he (the witness) will not attend as a witness on the hearing of the said complaint unless compelled to do so" is not a sufficient compliance with the imperative direction of law requiring the Court to record the reasons in writing. 21. Mr. Dutt agreed that ex parte temporary injunction could only be granted on perusal and consideration of allegations supported by affidavit, but claimed that even when such injunction is issued, the Court should record reasons in support of such grant. It was his submissions that in the absence of such reasons or any recording of them, the grant of injunction would be invalid. It was his submissions that in the absence of such reasons or any recording of them, the grant of injunction would be invalid. It was further claimed by him that the order issuing such injunction on the face of the same, should disclose due application of mind by the Court, apart from the fact that Rule 3A also requires the recording of reasons for not giving the notice to the person or authority concerned, against whom the concerned order is issued. It was Mr. Dutt's further submissions that for the admitted shortfalls as above, in the procedure relating to the cases and furthermore when, the proceeding was not sought to be disposed of or at least posted for such disposal within 30 days, the concerned order should be quashed. 22. Previous to incorporation of Rule 2A, the proviso to Rule 3 and Rule 3A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, order of injunctions were issued under or in terms of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. By incorporation of the said Rule 2A, the proviso to Rule 3A under Order 39 of the Code, Mr. Dutt pointed out that several checks have inserted and it was his definite submission that such checks were necessary for affording due justice to the party against whom injunction orders are issued and he further claimed that after the amendment as mentioned above, injunction orders are only issued under the added provisions as indicated hereinbefore and not under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, as earlier. Admittedly, in this case interim order was granted under Rule 3 and as such the Proviso thereunder, according to Mr. Dutt should have been adhered to by the learned Court below, apart from following the prescription, in respect of the disposal of the interim order as pointed out in Rule 3A. The interim older as issued previously was admittedly vacated by Order No. 41 dated 11th September, 1980 and such being the position, it was also the specific contention of Mr. Dutt that thereafter or on such vacation of the interim order, Order No. 101 dated 9th July, 1982 as impeached, should not have been issued as after the concerned vacation of the of the interim order on 11th September, 1980, there could not have been any consequence or any disobedience of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code. To establish the above, Mr. To establish the above, Mr. Dutt placed reliance on the case of Sheo Kumar Saxena v. Zila Sahkari Viksh Singh Goonda & Ors., AIR 1983 Allahabad 180, where it has been observed that after vacation of temporary injunction the same cannot be enforced or executed and consequently in such a case, there would be no occasion for any disobedience of Rule 2A of Order 39 of the Code and as such punitive action for the breach of the said Rule cannot also be taken after such vacation or such vacating of the interim order. It was then claimed by Mr. Dutt, that if there was any disobedience of the concerned order after the same was vacated, the same could have given rise to a quasi criminal action or action could have been taken under Contempt of Court Act, but not under Rule 2A of Order 39. 23. The submissions of Mr. Dutt, on the requirements of Rule 3A of Order 39 and more particularly his claim that reasons to be recorded have been indicated hereinbefore and to establish them, he referred to the case of Madhu Limaye v S. D. M. Monghyr, AIR 1971 SC 2486 . The said determination was in fact under S. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and while on the question of the necessity of recording the reasons, it has been observed that the gist of action under the section is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences. As it is possible to act absolutely and even ex parte the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave. It is not an ordinary power flowing from administration but a power used in a judicial manner and which can stand further judicial scrutiny in the need for the exercise of the power and in the extent of its application. There is no general rule that an order under the section cannot be passed without taking evidence. 24. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the plaintiff/respondent and opposing this appeal stated, that the order of injunction under the Code can be issued either under Order 39 or under S. 94 or S. 151, for any breach and for doing substantial justice or for ends of justice. 24. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the plaintiff/respondent and opposing this appeal stated, that the order of injunction under the Code can be issued either under Order 39 or under S. 94 or S. 151, for any breach and for doing substantial justice or for ends of justice. To establish such submissions, be referred to the determinations in the case of Rattu v. Mala & Anr., AIR 1968 Rajasthan 212, which has lain down that disobedience of order of injunction as issued under Order 39 Rules 1, 2, 2(3) and S. 115 of the Code would be punishable under Rule 2(3) even when it was not issued under Rule 2 but issued under Rule 1 or S. 151. It was pointed out by him further, that the injunction in the instant case was not issued under Rule 3 of Order 39, but the same was under Rules 1 and 2 of the said Order and according to him, Rule 3 of the concerned order lays down the procedure which is required to be followed before granting injunction viz. the Court is to direct notice to be issued to the opposite party. It was his further contention that opinion in the instant case, which was required to be formed by the learned Court, was duly formed and in any event, from a reference to Order No. 3 dated 9th August, 1979 which has recorded in view of the urgency ................", there was substantial compliance of such requirement or the necessary formation of the opinion by the Court and it was further contended by Mr. Chatterjee that any non-compliance with Rule 3A will not make the order. Under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39, bad. He, of course, admitted that by making the matter returnable after more then 30 days by order No.3 dated 9th August, 1979, there was some procedural irregularity but, since no steps have been taken to have such order vioatod, set aside or quashed, the defendant/appellant would not now be allowed to contend in the manner as indicated hereinbefore and that too, on account of the shortfalls of the learned Court below as indicated hereinbefore, in making the proceeding returnable after 30 days. On the basis of the determinations in the ease of Shri Subodh Gopal Bose v. Dalmia Join & Co. On the basis of the determinations in the ease of Shri Subodh Gopal Bose v. Dalmia Join & Co. Ltd. & ors, AIR 1951 Patna 206, where it has been observed that the party against whom an order of injunction is made cannot disregard the order on the ground that it was erroneous in any particular right or wrong, the injunction order bound him, and he disregarded at his peril Mr. Chatterjee claimed that even if the learned Court below was wrong or had noted erroneously, in not making the proceeding returnable within 30 days all required under Rule 3A of Order 39 in the Code, the defendant/appellant could not have disregarded the order, without having the same clarified, modified or varied from the learned Court below. That, not having been done. Mr. Chatterjee on the basis of his submission as recorded hereinbefore, also claimed that the defeodunt/appellant should not be allowed to contend the order as impeached or the proceedings as initiated to be null and void for not complying with the said requirements of Rule 3A of Order 9, as indicated hereinbefore. 25. Turning to the two orders dated 11th September 1980 and 9th July, 1982, Mr. Chatterjee stated that in view of the terms of the first order, the learned Court below was right, justified and authorised in restoring the respective possession of the parties and more particularly to their respective positions. It was further claimed by him, that breech of an order under Rule 2A(2) of Order 39 of the Code being a continuing one, the order as impeached, cannot be said to be unjust, irregular, void and inoperative oven in spite of the earlier order dated 11th September, 1980 and that too in view of the underlying principles and purpose as indicated in the said Rule 2A. Mr. Chatterjee, on a further reference to the impugned order dated 9h July, 1982, claimed that, thereby no punishment was inflicted on the defendant/appellant and such order, which was made of necessity to protect the honour of an order duly passed by the learned Court, below and such being the position, there has been no illegality or any irregularity in the instant case, for which, this Court should interfere. 26. Mr. Dutt sought to distinguish the cases as cited by Mr. 26. Mr. Dutt sought to distinguish the cases as cited by Mr. Chatterjee and he specifically claimed that the determinations of the Rajasthan High Court would not apply, as the same was before the amendments of the Code in 1976. He stated that the Allahabad determination as cited, would not also be of any help Mr. Chatterjee in contending or establishing that since the breach in the instant case was continuing or a continuance one, so the order as made, was due, just and proper. It should be noted that Mr. Dutt of course in his usual fairness did not dispute the findings of and the determinations in the Patna case. 27. The principles on which injunctions can be issued are well settled and there can also be no doubt that such power to grant injunction leaves some discretion with the Court, which should be used judicially and if necessary sparingly and more particularly, according to the need or necessity of the facts of each case and while using such discretion the Courts should first see and consider the bona fide contention of the parties and then to consider, in the event of obtaining a successful result of the suit, where will be the balance of inconvenience if the injunction is net issued, bearing in mind, the principle of retaining immovable property in status quo in terms of the determinations in the case of Begg Dunlop & Co v. Satish, 23 CWN 677 and before making any such order indicated above, the Court should firstly be satisfied that the applicant has a prima facie case to go to trial, secondly, protection is necessary from that species and kind of injury known as "irreparable" before his legal right can be established and thirdly, the mischief or inconvenience likely to be caused by refusing injunction will be greater than which is likely to arise from granting the same and it is true that before an injunction is granted the question in dispute need not be examined or the decision anticipated, apart from the fact that the question of irreparable injury and balance of convenience must also be considered. By "irreparable injury" it is not meant that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury and all that is meant is, that the injury would be a material one, and one which could not be adequately compensated by damages. 28. By "irreparable injury" it is not meant that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury and all that is meant is, that the injury would be a material one, and one which could not be adequately compensated by damages. 28. Even prior to the amendments as incorporated now and the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, before granting injunction, notice was required to be given to the opposite party, unless the Court was satisfied that because of such urgency, notice need not be given. Ordinarily, issuing an ex parte ad interim order of injunction and simultaneous notice for the same was forbidden or was not justified and in case of occasion so demanding such an ex parte ad interim order injunction was issued, the opposite party or the party dissatisfied by such order could approach the Court and object. The Court of course had and still has ample power to issue injunction ex debito jusitiae for protection and security of the subject matter of suit or to prevent multiplicity of proceeding. In fact, there being no express prohibition in S. 94 of the Code, it has been observed in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , which has been followed in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1272 , that the Court has inherent power to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances not covered by the provisions of Order 39. 29. 29. Order 39 Rule 1 applies to injunctions in oases as specified in clauses (a) and (b) thereunder and Rule 2 applies to injunction relating to breach of contract or other injury "of any kind" and such terms would mean and include legal injury or wrongful act other than arising from breach of contract Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Order 39 of the Code have been deleted and by the Amendment Act of the 1976, Rule 2A, in the same time and terms as the amendment of Allahabad, have been inserted on the basis of the present Rule 2A, an order of detention in civil prison for breach of an order under Rule 2A, can be passed and it is needless to point out and to record that before passing an order for imprisonment for disobedience, there should be positive proof that the person concerned or who is charged of such disobedience, has deliberately, wilfully and with knowledge, has disobeyed the injunction. Such power in the hands of the Courts, in our view was necessary or has been deliberately given, as otherwise the dignity of their orders, would be difficult to be maintained and preserved. We further feel that if Courts are not clothed with such powers as indicated above, than there would expected to be more breach of the injunction orders as issued than following them duly as the persons or authorities, who are so injuncted, in many cases, would elect or try to violate such orders. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2A of Order 39 with some substitution of penal action in case of disobedience or of breach etc and sub-rule (2) practically corresponds to old sub rule (4) of Rule 2. In fact, the object of the amendment was to provide for the consequences of the breach of an injunction issued under Rule 1 which was not earlier covered and the provisions for breach of injunctions under Rule 2 have been made applicable to the concerned class of cases as well. 30. Rule 2A no doubt leaves some discretion with the Court and before asking for the application of the same legal injury as suffered must be proved. Under or in terms of that Rule, nobody can disregard an order of injunction on the ground that the order as made was erroneous. 30. Rule 2A no doubt leaves some discretion with the Court and before asking for the application of the same legal injury as suffered must be proved. Under or in terms of that Rule, nobody can disregard an order of injunction on the ground that the order as made was erroneous. There is also no doubt that the Court passing an order under Rule 2A would be competent to punish the offender and a ….............. Court will also be empowered to punish disobedience of an order of injunction passed by a predecessor Court and there cannot be any punishment inflicted on mere suspicion. It should of course be remembered that in inflicting punishment, there should be no element of vindictiveness, but actions should be taken or resorted to, to maintain the dignity of the Court. Before passing an order for disobedience, the Court should see, if the offender had direct or constructive knowledge of the order which is said to be violated and also to consider whether such act was done in violation of the concerned order and the Court should not be interested to see or consider, what would be the ultimate decision in the suit. For violation of such an order as made under Rule 2A or for disobedience of the same, there may be punishment by attachment and order for sending the wrong doer to civil prison and such order of sending to civil prison is not dependent on allotment of property. The Court, under Rule 2A has also the power to punish the offender for a continuing wrong, and breach, if any, caused would continue and the commission of such a breach in the past but not on the date of the order or the application for the same, would be no defence. In fact, the dismissal of a suit or appeal would be no bar for taking appropriate action for disobedience. In fact, the dismissal of a suit or appeal would be no bar for taking appropriate action for disobedience. It is true that the issue of injunction may have tremendous adverse effect against the party, who is injuncted and as such as observed in the case of Boddam v. Dhunput, 1 CWN 429, such order of injunction should not ordinarily be issued without strong and due reasons without notice to the party, who would be affected by the same and thus, it has been observed in celebrated decisions that as a rule, notice must be given unless the matter is so urgent that injunction would be defeated or irreparable mischief may be occasioned by delay. The proviso to Rule 3 as added by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 has indicated that the Court may grant injunction even without notice and on recording the reasons that object of granting injunction could be defeated by delay and in amending in the manner as indicated above, the very basis and intention of Rule 3 before amendment has not been really or materially changed and by such amendment, the applicant is required to send a copy of the application of injunction by registered post to the other side, immediately after the grant or obtaining the order with (i) a copy of the affidavit filed along with the injunction proceeding, (ii) a copy of the plaint and (iii) the copy or copies of the documents sought to be relied upon in support of the application and furthermore, to file an affidavit on the day of the grant of injunction or on the next following day, establishing that copies/records have been sent or delivered. 31. By the amendment as indicated hereinbefore, Rule 3A was also inserted in Order 39 of the Code. Since ex parte temporary injunction are one of the causes of delay in disposal of the lis, the said Rule was inserted, prescribing a limit of 30 days from the date of granting such ex parte order within which, ordinarily the application for injunction shall have to be finally disposed of by the Court and to record the reasons, where and when such disposal is not possible and practicable. It is true that when an injunction under Rule 3A is granted ex parte, it should be the endeavour of the Court, to have the same disposed of within 30 days and to record necessary reasons, in case such disposal is not possible. The notice as mentioned above, will not be necessary unless the delay in issue of notice will defeat the object and purpose of injunction or when the party injuncted or his agent is present at the time of such grant. We are not really concerned with the other rules of Order 39 of the Code in view of the lis in this case and the submissions as made. 32. The fact that the proviso as added to Rule 3, in respect of the formation of the opinion and the recording of persons before passing an ex parte order of injunction, is mandatory, cannot be doubted or disputed. It cannot also be disputed that after such ex parte injunction is granted, the Court should ensure other follow up steps to be taken by the applicant. Thus, the question would be what should be the method of such compliance viz. if detailed reasons are to be recorded or whether, the recording of such reasons would be sufficient, if from the same, the intention behind the issue of the ex parte order of injunction or the purpose of the same, would appear. The order No.3 dated 9th August, 1979 in this case would show and establish that the learned Court below, before issuing the ex parte order of injunction considered the records of the case which were placed before him from the learned Registrar's Bench along with the application under Order 39 of the Code, read the said application, the concerned affidavit and other relevant papers and thereafter, issued the ex parte order of injunction "in view of the urgency," The recordings to the above effect, in our view, has established the fact of application of mind, as would be necessary, before issuing an ex parte order of injunction and such expression of the terms "in view of the urgency", in our considered opinion, has also established the fact that the learned Court below felt that because of the urgency of the matter, such ex parte order of injunction, as issued in this case, was necessary. We are also of the view that the formation of opinion as mentioned above is a mandatory requirement of the proviso to Rule 3, but there is no such mandatory form or any such expression prescribed, by which such mandatory opinion is to be formed and if the order as impeached, can well display from its intrinsic evidence or recordings, as to this case, that such opinion was formed that would be enough. Such being the position, even on the basis of the cases as cited by Mr. Dutt on the proviso to Rule 3, we hold that his submissions were not of much substance in the facts of this case. 33. Admittedly, while issuing the ex parte order of injunction on 9th August, 1979, the learned Court below made the proceedings returnable on 12th September 1979 i.e. after 30 days time limit for disposal of the same, as prescribed by Rule 3A. It was contended by Mr. Dutt that such fact also would establish not only non-application of mind by the learned Court below but for such inaction on the part of the said Court, the order itself became non est. It should be noted that such defects in the order as pointed out Mr. Dutt now and the relevant particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, were not challenged earlier by the defendant appellants although they had ample scope, opportunity and notice of the same and such challenge was not in fact thrown even after the service of the notice of the proceedings. The idea behind the incorporation of the Rule has also been indicated earlier. On the basis of the terms of the Rule, we feel that ordinarily, the Court should make endeavours to complete the proceedings or to dispose of the connected lis within 30 days and if it is not possible to have the lis or the dispute so disposed of, them to record the reasons why the concerned proceeding could not be completed. Here in this case, the learned Court below certainly did a wrong in, making the proceedings returnable even after 30 days, but that would not, as submitted by Mr. Here in this case, the learned Court below certainly did a wrong in, making the proceedings returnable even after 30 days, but that would not, as submitted by Mr. Dutt, made the proceedings non est, the more so when, on the very next date of the order as was made on 9th August 1970, i.e. on 10th August 1979, the plaintiff filed an affidavit under Order 39 Rule 3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that the copy of the injunction petition and that of the plaint have been sent to the defendant appellant under registered post with acknowledgement due and the learned Court below directed those records to be kept with the record and to put up on the date fixed for orders and the proceedings including an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, which was filed on 25th June 1980 and was directed to be registered as a Misc. Case on necessary orders being passed, continued upto 11th September 1980, when by order No. 41, the learned Court below had dismissed the application for temporary injunction or recording the reasons as mentioned in that order and ultimately, the order as impeached was passed in connection with the said Misc. Case on 9th July 1982. In fact, in view of the continuance of the connected proceedings in the manner as indicated herein before and that too when, the same was to continue without any objection from the defendant/appellants, we feel that there was little substance in the submissions of Mr. Dutt on this ground also. We further feel that if we agree with the submissions of Mr. Dutt that if the proceedings is not completed within 30 days as indicated in Rule 3A, the same would become non est, would create or give rise to an impossible situation in many cases or at least in such cases when the proceedings is not completed within the time schedule as prescribed by the code inspite of the endoavours of the Court or in such cases where the Courts cannot complete such proceedings for reasons beyond their control, as in this case, and as in such a case the recipient of the order of injunction cannot be made or asked to suffer. 34. 34. The word "urgency" has its origin from the word "urgent", which according to Oxford Dictionary means, pressing, requiring immediate action or attention "Urgency" in fact relates to a situation demanding prompt action. Thus, the use of the words "In view of the urgency" as in Order No. 3 dated 9th August, 1979, has established or would establish that the learned Court below was satisfied that the issue of the order of injunction in this case, was necessary because of the pressing situation, and as immediate and prompt action was necessary, to protect the interest of the plaintiff/respondent. So, we feel that the learned Court below duly followed the mandatory requirement of law in forming the opinion about the urgency or the necessity of granting an order of ex parte injunction and it cannot also be stated, that in view of the terms of the Order in question, on opinion or reasons were duly recorded, in terms of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. 35. In this case, after filing of the application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 743 of 1980 on 25th June 1980, the application for temporary injunction was dismissed on 11th September 1980, as the defendant/appellants had already made the additions and alterations and completed the constructions and more particularly because by such act or action, the application for prohibitory injunction had become infructuous and since the act, which was sought to be prevented by prohibition, had already been completed. In view of such order of dismissal the subsequent order of allowing the concerned Misc. Case, by Order No. 101 on 9th July 1982 by the learned Court below was claimed by Mr. Dutt to be inappropriate, unauthorised, bid and void. The said Misc. Case under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code was filed, as indicated earlier, on 25th June 1980, for directing appropriate action to be taken against the defendants, for continuing with the construction works, subsequent to the earlier order of injunction and their assurances to restore the said premises to its original position and also that they would not proceed with any further constructions additions and alterations. Since the act or any mischief once committed continue and in fact, they can be claimed to be continuing wrongs and that too in the facts of this case and more particularly when such acts were continued, even after the assurances as given, we feel that the submissions of Mr. Dutt, would also be of no avail or any assistance or help. 36. Thus, the submissions of Mr. Dutt, in our view are not of much substance and as such they fail and so also this appeal and the same is therefore dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs in this appeal. The order of the learned Court below is affirmed. Let the records be sent down at once. We keep it on record that every attempt of the learned Court below, to have the proceedings before him disposed of at an early date, will be highly appreciated. Amarendra Chandra Sengupta, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.